# Security K – BEJJ 2022

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### 1NC

#### The Aff’s speech act around the securitization of NATO and the West is empirically used to justify militarization and endless violence—NATO relies on narrative and threat construction to justify its existence.

Benjamin Herborth and Gunther Hellman 17, Professors at the University of Groningen and Goethe-Universitat Frankfurt am Main, 1-2017, "(PDF) Uses of the West: Security and the Politics of Order", ResearchGate, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/314217000\_Uses\_of\_the\_West\_Security\_and\_the\_Politics\_of\_Order //AW

Debates over the future of NATO easily transform into debates about whether ‘Western civilization’ and ‘the West’ as a whole might be in decline or whether they are the winner of the Cold War’s ideological battles (cf. Huntington, 1993; Fukuyama, 1989). Compared to NATO, however, a Western security community seems to be quite prosperous despite continuing conflicts between NATO members (Cox, 2005; Pouliot, 2006). In this chapter I have tried to show that a transatlantic alliance was (re-)constituted via the mobilization and re-articulation of foundational narratives by the allies in order to justify the existence, continuity, and transformation of NATO. Foundational narratives, then, direct our attention exactly to the politics of security and identity where political subjects are formed in the first place and help to understand how security communities are constituted instead of postulating that they are already existing (Adler and Barnett 1998, p. 3; contrary: Deutsch et al., 1969). In conclusion, I want to highlight how NATO’s re-constitution relates to the overall theme of this volume, ‘the West’. It is not surprising that NATO allies often referred to ‘democracy’, ‘individual liberty’, or ‘the rule of law’ in order to justify NATO as a geo-political community of solidarity with defensive and peaceful intentions. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the Soviet Union was repeatedly accused of modernizing its military capacities, harboring expansionist intentions, and being an aggressive opponent in an ideological struggle between ‘freedom’ and ‘communism’. This rather plain self/other construction, however, was quickly modified in the early 1990s by declaring an ‘end of the Cold War’, invoking the CEE as a distinct political subject, and by focusing on new risks and challenges different from the past focus on territorial defense. Moreover, NATO had ‘gone global’ in order to ‘bring stability to other parts of the world’ (Daalder and Goldgeier, 2006, p. 105; Brzezinski, 2009). While this global NATO is depicted as a result of changing security politics, in particular as a consequence of globalized terrorist threat, it is short-sighted to argue that these transformations are merely a reaction to external pressures. Grand narratives about a ‘Cold War’ and a ‘War on Terrorism’ are as much produced by a transatlantic security discourse intended to make sense of the world as they serve to justify political decisions. It is a moot question whether the global projection of power by ‘the West’ caused violent opposition around the globe or whether ‘new wars’ and terror networks caused a transformation of NATO. It is puzzling, though, that NATO has managed to secure its survival and to transform. I have argued that the creation and repetition of foundational narratives – in particular the invention of a geopolitical community of solidarity and a political community according to Article 4 of the Washington Treaty – made sucha two-sided re-constitution of continuity and transformation possible. This also implies that NATO will persist and at once change as long as the allies carry on re-articulating this foundational narrative. Such a foundational narrative serves its integrating function only against the background of ‘the West’ as a shared yet unspecified signifier, which is implicitly represented as a threatened referent object of security. ‘Europe’, the ‘transatlantic area’, respectively ‘the West’ are the endangered subjects of NATO’s strategic discourse justifying a durable and institutionally dense military cooperation of its member states and a nuclearizaiton of its defense strategy. Whenever allies pursued ( national) security policies without consultation, conflicts and crisis within the alliance were foreseeable. It was only through NATO that ‘the West’ could utilize its power position through a specific form of self-authorization. NATO< respectively Western states, presented ‘democracy’, ‘human rights’, the ‘rule of law’, and ‘market economy’ as normatively unquestioned principles they had already realized. Others had only one choice: to comply or to resist. The normative attractiveness of ‘the West’, thus, also implies the temptations of self-authorizing and securitizing practices where a culture of legal formalism is marginalized (Wæver, 1995; Koskenniemi, 2001). Yet ‘Others’ might only be known as defectors to a Western project of modernization and democracy.

#### The alternative is the process of de-securitization.

Wilhelmsen 2017 (Julie Wilhelmsen, Senior fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, “How does war become a legitimate undertaking? Re-engaging the post-structuralist foundation of securitization theory”, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48512937>) //sethlee

Moreover, alternative articulations of the Self/Other boundary which attach a lower level of threat to the Other can emerge and render emergency measures illegitimate. This would be a process of de-securitization. A first step towards such a re-interpretation would be to substitute Austinian speech act with post-structuralist discourse as the core concept in the theory. Discourse, not Austinian speech act: According to Copenhagen School ST, threats and security are determined through the speech act. Understood as a speech act, ‘security’ means that the very identification, the articulation of words that describe something as a security threat, is an act (Wæver, 1995b: 55). The weight given to words in this explication seems to match post-structuralists’ foregrounding of language, but it is still not useful to theorize securitization as a speech act. It is an impossible attempt at reconciling relationalism with actor-centric understandings of social change. The initial focus on actors implicit in Copenhagen School ST is amplified with the adoption of speech act in the Austinian ‘once said, then done’ way. Not only is the securitizing actor projected as the driving force in the process, but also his words are accorded status as final and decisive. Thus, the audience is certainly not significant and the intersubjective process is lost (for a similar critique see Balzacq, 2005: 182–183; Stritzel, 2014: 20–24; Taureck, 2006: 52– 61). By adhering firmly to relationalism and placing agency not in an actor, but in the discursive practices that comprise a securitization, a post-structuralist approach offers a less contradictory theoretical framework and one that gives priority to intersubjectivity. Discourses are seen as structures of signification which construct social realities. The understanding of significative construction which informs most post-structuralist work is taken from the structuralist linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure (1974). He held that language is not determined by the reality to which it refers – it should be understood as a system of signs, with the meaning of each sign determined by its relation to other signs. A sign is thus part of a structure together with other signs that it differs from, and it gains its specific value precisely from being different from other signs. The assumption, prevalent in most post-structuralist international relations (IR) work, that discourses are structured largely in terms of binary oppositions draws on the work of Jacques Derrida. According to Derrida (1981), language is a system of differential signs and meaning is established not by the essence of a thing itself but through a series of juxtapositions, where one element is valued over its opposite. Binary oppositions are not neutral, they establish a relation of power such that one element in the binary is privileged. Discourses are seen as made in a process of social practical interaction and are always textually interconnected; as such, they are a set of collectively articulated codes and are intersubjectively embedded at the outset. Moreover, they are continuously conditioned by intersubjectivity – because, despite being highly structured, they are seen not as stable grids, but as open-ended, changeable and historically contingent (Milliken, 1999: 230). This aspect of discourse implies that there is a play of practice, or struggles over which discourses should prevail. Some fixations of meaning become so conventionalized that we think of them as natural. Other fixations are always possible, but may become temporarily excluded by these hegemonic discourses (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). The first argument for replacing Austinian ‘speech act’ with post-structuralist ‘discourse’ is, therefore, that it enables us to move from a self-contained and definite core concept in the theory to an inherently intersubjective and process-oriented concept. But also, if we consider what a securitization would look like in the empirical world, a more reasonable understanding would be that a ‘securitizing attempt’ consists of a series of utterances. Nothing can be constituted as an existential threat on a political arena through a ‘speech act’ in the ‘once said, then done’ sense. As Butler (1993) points out, the power of speech acts (not to be confused with Austinian illocutionary speech acts) lie in their iterability; that is, they can be cited, recited and changed through such citation. It is only through iterability that utterances have transformative potential.9 This makes it more appropriate to explicate ‘securitizing moves’ as the onset or strengthening of a discourse that constructs something as an existential threat. Finally, as regards the application of securitization to understand how war becomes acceptable, a discursive approach simply seems to have greater explicatory clout. The Second Chechen War and the acceptance of this violent undertaking in the wider Russian public cannot be thought of as a single authoritative act: it is better grasped as an evolving intersubjective process. The purpose of an enquiry informed by post-structuralist ST is to study how this intersubjective process of securitization unfolds.

## 2NC

## Framework

#### Language is its own creator and creation—the absolutization of language creates an ontological negotiation, excluding existence beyond the world language has created

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Since we are investigating the underlying principles that give rise to a specific kind of world, we shall look at language through the lens of what language does, that is, what it produces when it is used. Any time we put forward a linguistic statement, every time we express a linguistic unit, we are suggesting to our interlocutors that a certain figure (an object, property or relation) be admitted as legitimately present in the world. The interlocutors' acceptance of our linguistic utterance as meaningful, grants legitimate presence in the word to the suggested figure- thus making it available to be employed in the larger game of linguistic exchange and recombination. The same happens in a soliloquy or at the level of one's conscious thinking - though the rapidity with which we accept our own linguistic proposal as plausibly present in the world, tends to obfuscate this questioning process. And of course, the same also applies to cases in which the utterer or interlocutor is not a human, but a machine.

In this sense, language's production is fundamentally ontological, consisting in a continuous negotiation on which figures could or should be included in the catalogue of the world. Every linguistic unit thus takes on the form of a candidature and of a proposition. Equally, the world becomes the negotiating table onto which the figures of our daily experience are alternatively granted or denied legitimate ontological status as ‘present’. In this sense, language functions as a way to manage what entities make it onto the catalogue of the communicable and operable layer of reality.

However, when language is taken absolutely, that is when it is unbound (ab-solutus) from any external constraint or from any other principle outside itself, the world that it creates suddenly becomes the only possible ontological field. When language becomes absolute language, its cosmogony ceases to be just one possible way of looking at the world (namely, in terms of which figures have a legitimate presence in it, as communicable and operable items) becoming instead an all-encompassing terrain. Outside of it, nothing is permitted; outside of negotiated linguistic ‘presence’, nothing is allowed, not even existence as it stands ineffably in itself. Existence is substituted by presence, and its stability is taken over by the negotiating process of language. Language creates the world in its own image, and when it becomes absolute, suddenly there is no longer outside the world.

The process of ontological negotiation that normally takes place at the level of language, now becomes fully internal to language itself; it is no longer an extra-linguistic interlocutor that accepts or rejects candidates to presence in the world, but it is the very fabric of language that absorbs or rejects possible figures as they emerge from language itself. In the state in which it becomes absolute, language presents itself as supposedly uttered by no mouth; rather, it is claims to be at once its own creator and creation. *“I suo fattore non disegno di farsi sua fattura.”* Equally absolute language presents itself as unrestrained by any specific extra-linguistic localization; a linguistic figure can take place anywhere within the field of language, and, what is more, can do so simultaneously in multiple instances. Taken in its absolute form, language thus condenses that principle of seriality which we observed in its symptomatic manifestations in the first chapter, during our discussion of measure as the geometric centre of Tehcnic’s historical force.

To better elucidate the quality of language as understood absolutely, let us bring in our first example of an archetypal incarnation of a hypostasis. The archetypal incarnation of the first hypostasis in Tehcnic’s chain of emanations, consists in a suggested equivalence between truth and representation, according to which: *truth is representation and representation is truth.* We can find this equivalence at work in countless aspects of our contemporary experience of the world, in all fields of human activity. Let us unpick it piece by piece, starting with its first element: truth.

For the sake of brevity, and being aware of endorsing one possible definition over others, we can that predicating the truthfulness of something, means claiming that something is ‘the case’. If I say that it is true that a brick’s colour is red, for example. What I mean is that ‘it is the case’ that red is the brick’s colour. If I say that is it true that something happened, I mean that it ‘is the case’ that it happened, and so on. This might appear at first as merely a matter of plain description; yet, if we consider truth as a mechanism within a cosmogonic force, the extent of its influence will soon become apparent. Considered ontologically, truth’s reference to something ‘being the case’, takes the place of something simple ‘being’. By assuming the truth-mechanism as a crucial element in the architecture of a cosmogonic force, we witness a shift from a condition in which ‘existence’ was the most basic attribute for something to be able to enter reality, to a condition in which this attribute becomes its ‘being the case’. In metaphysical terms, we can say that this is a passage from a world of ‘things’, to one made up of ‘states of affairs’. This passage is pregnant with the consequences on several levels. While something can ‘be’ or ‘not be’ just in itself, the fact of its ‘being the case’ or ‘not being the case’ relies entirely on an external sanction. For something to ‘be or not the case’, we require both a context within which their ‘being or not the case’ takes place, and an enunciation of their truthfulness or falsehood as states of affairs. Whatever ‘is or not the case’, relies entirely on the enunciation that sanctions its claim, and on the context within which such claims to truthfulness or falsehood is meaningful. Thus, while ‘things’ can exist fully and autonomously, states of affairs are present only precariously and subordinately. Namely, they are subordinate to the sanction bestowed upon them by the linguistic context within which they are suggested as taking place. This aspect of truth, adopted as an ontological principle, refers to the way in which, within language taken absolutely, things are reduced merely to the ‘being the case’(or, as we called it in Chapter 1, ‘activation’) of a grammatical position. Within absolute language, things are reduced to states of affairs that require the series in which they are inserted, both to acquire signification and to be enunciated. In themselves, before the series ‘speaks’ them and makes them present within itself, they are nothing at all, since they don’t even reach the stage in which they can be discussed in terms of existence and nonexistence. We have seen in the previous chapter how this abstract mechanism translated in the daily functioning of historical series such as those of finance, big data, neuroscience, citizenship and so on.

#### Inertia DA – countering securitizing discourse via debates usurps hegemonic narratives.

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In the present paper elements of institutional theory, policy networks and analytical governance are used to complement discourse theory. This leads us to propose the conceptualisation of discourse inertia. In terms of discourse, inertia is considered to represent the persistent promotion and dominance of a perception of reality. This leads to the continuous reproduction of certain storylines and elements of a discourse. Sanctioned discourses, often ones that are institutionalised, are thought more likely to achieve or display inertia due to the involvement of path dependent tendencies and powerful entrenched interests.

Discourse is considered to be dynamic, even where discourse inertia is present, as discourses must constantly be represented and reinforced. Once an actor's, or a group's, discourse becomes dominant, it is fiercely defended. Subsequently, dominant discourses are constantly reinforced and embedded. This can lead to certain narratives becoming entrenched within both institutions and political and social practices, thus reaching an ideational status. These privileged narratives become taken for granted and self-reinforcing, making them prone to discourse inertia. More shallow narratives can function over privileged narratives to achieve an interest or align with an outside commitment. These narratives are more fluid and flexible and are, therefore, easily manipulated.

The concept of discourse inertia reflects how a discourse may persist and resist pressures for change. It contributes to our understanding discourse dynamics, dissonance and governance. Discourse inertia may aid in understanding the persistence of a certain policy pathway, despite evidence of its ineffectiveness or the presence of more suitable alternative approaches.

Discourse inertia is illustrated by utilising and extending Den Besten et al. (2014) ‘discursive-institutional spiral’ (Fig. 1). The discursive-institutional spiral demonstrates how discourses evolve. A spiral exists between actors, their ideas, subject areas and institutional initiatives. Moments of institutionalisation start each loop of the spiral, which then leads to discussion and debates that draw in new actors. The more actors that become involved, the more likely that new ideas and concepts will be introduced. The expansion of actors and ideas subsequently leads to institutionalisation, which narrows the discourse. Certain ideas are excluded and actors are empowered or disempowered. Institutionalisation then begins the next loop of the spiral as well as the inception of new ideas and rise of critical discourses. Power can be exercised by excluding or including actors or ideas in the discursive-institutional process (Den Besten et al., 2014).

This concept is extended through the proposal of a narrowing discursive-institutional spiral. Here, a process akin to institutional path dependency occurs within the spiral, which restricts the entry of new actors and ideas into the discourse. As a result, the evolution and expansion of the discursive-institutional spiral is limited (Fig. 2 and 3). Certain discursive elements that become institutionalised may be self-reinforcing along subsequent spirals. These elements may consistently exclude other elements and actors. This can further limit the ability of new actors to access the discourse, which reduces the introduction of alternative ideas

#### Communities of Practice DA – uncritical acceptance of discourse embeds problematic practices that disrupt implementation.

Judith Kreuter ’21 [Research associate at the chair for International Relations, PhD thesis, Technische Universität Darmstadt; “Chapter 3: Ideas and Objects, Meaning and Causation—Frame Analysis from a Modernist Social Constructivism Perspective”; 2021; Springer; *Climate Engineering as an Instance of Politicization: Talking Tomorrow’s Technology—Framing Political Choice?*; Accessed 7/14/21]

Discourses play a significant role in this process of construction of meaning: “The world is not objectively accessible, but instead is imparted through language through discursive processes and symbolic interpretations” (Uther 2014: 60).2 This means that much of the meaning-construction of social reality, which the brand of social constructivism espoused here relies upon, is done through what many authors call discourse. The frames that are studied in this analysis are considered as elements in discourse. Discourse, here, is understood, following Maarten Hajer, as “an ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categories through which meaning is given to social and physical phenomena, and which is produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of practices” (Hajer 2006: 67). This captures the simultaneous constructedness and constructiveness of the social meaning of material objects: Through language and practice humans both capture the meaning material objects have, and change or reproduce this meaning. Similarly, Dryzek defines discourse as “a shared way of apprehending the world. Embedded in language, it enables those who subscribe to it to interpret bits of information and put them together into coherent stories or accounts” (Dryzek 2005: 9). This means that meaning is constructed in discourses in “supra-individual and rather unconscious” ways (Methmann et al. 2013a: 6).

At the same time, human actors, in this study, will not be considered as entities subordinate to a super-human structural power of discourse. Actors, according to Uther’s discussion, are both constructed and constructing (see Uther 2014: 55). Following her approach, actors are considered to be the central active agents in any meaning-making situation, and thus not helpless pawns in the flow of discourse: “The actor is not passively subdued to the discourse, as, for example, the subject of Foucault, but it actively participates in shaping the discourse through its own interpretive achievements” (Uther 2014: 66).3 This two-fold characterization of actors as both constructed and constructing is captured by practice theory. The terms ‘practice’ and ‘discourse’ are considered to not be antithetical to each other: Practices are “meaningful patterns of action, which, in being performed more or less competently, simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and around the material world” (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 4). Thus, (non-linguistic) practices are understood to interact with (linguistic) discourses and in this interaction construct or deconstruct meanings. Other authors reconcile linguistic and non-linguistic elements of meaning-construction by subsuming both under the term ‘discourse’(see Anshelm and Hultman 2015: 11; Methmann et al. 2013a: 6) As Dryzek (2006: 3) argues, “discourses are a matter of practice as well as words, for actions in the social realm are always accompanied by language that establishes the meaning of action” (see also Adler 2008: 198). I assume, in line with these authors, that meaningful action—or practice—and meaningful talk—or discourse—construct or deconstruct the ideational meaning of an object. Further, I assume that practice is meaningful action which acts out certain meanings about the world, thus making it causally relevant.

Practice theory provides tools to put actors center stage as practice as meaningful action depends on the existence of an actor. Adler and Pouilot describe practice theory as an “invitation […] to conceive of the social as bundles of ideas and matter that are linguistically, materially, and intersubjectively mediated in the form of practices” (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 14). Practices as “meaningful patterns of action” (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 4) can more specifically be defined as a type of action, which, in turn, is a type of behavior. As Adler and Pouliot (2011: 5) describe: “[A]ction is behavior imbued with meaning. Running in the streets aimlessly is mere behavior, running after a thief is an action endowed with meaning.” For an action to be a practice, it needs to fulfill additional criteria: “Practices[…] are patterned actions that are embedded in particular organized contexts and, as such, are articulated into specific types of action and are socially developed through learning and training” (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 5). Accordingly, a practice is behavior endowed with meaning, “embedded in an organizational context, repeated over time and space, constituted by knowledge […], and articulated as part of a complex set of other social performances […]” (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 6). The knowledge in question is in part tacit, and it not only constitutes practices, but is also bound up in them. Adler and Pouliot call this ‘background knowledge’: “expectations, dispositions, skills, techniques, and rituals that are the basis for the constitution of practices and their boundaries” (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 17). This background knowledge “does not create uniformity of a group of community, but organize[s] their differences around pervasive understandings of reality” (Adler and Bernstein 2005: 296).

Ontologically, practice theory is understood by its proponents to provide a way out of the dichotomy of agency versus structure, or to conceptualize the two-fold characterization of actors as both constructed and constructing (see above). The agency-structure-dichotomy describes an analytical problem similar to the one of hen and egg: Should agents inside of the structure be understood to have final causal power over phenomena in the social world, or is it the structure, which was in turn constructed by agents, that finally influences what happens? For example, should developments in global climate policy be accorded to the UNFCCC (structure) or to efforts of the government of small island states (actor)? According to the structuration theory by Giddens (1984), actors and structures determine and influence each other. Practice theory can give a more detailed insight into the workings of this reciprocal constitution:

[P]ractices are both individual (agential) and structural […]. When ‘disaggregated’, practices are ultimately performed by individual human beings and thus they clearly are what human agency is about. […] Recursively, in and through practice, agents lock in structural meaning in time and space. (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 16)

Adler argues that these agents, these

‘carriers’ of social structures across functional and geographical boundaries are not necessarily states or societal networks, but ‘communities of practice’ […] – like-minded groups of practitioners who are informally as well as contextually bound by a shared interest in learning and applying a common practice. (Adler 2008: 196)

In the analysis of the discursive construction of CE, the tool of the Communities of Practice (CoP) approach is applied. The CoP approach allows for the analysis of actors which transcend national borders, such as transnationally active scholars, researchers and scientists as well as political and economic actors, all of whom can conceivably influence the social construction of CE—both of its ideational meaning and its causal materiality. The focus in this study lies on academic actors as a community of practice. It needs to be kept in mind, however, that communities of practice can be characterized as both actor and structure:

Communities of practice are intersubjective social structures that constitute the normative and epistemic ground for action, but they also are agents, made up of real people, who – working via network channels, across national or organizational lines, and in the halls of government – affect political, economic, and social events. (Adler 2008: 199)

The Epistemic Communities (EC) approach (see Haas 1992; Adler and Haas 1992), an approach “considered to be the most influential” (Beck 2015: 286) in the debate on the role of academic and other experts in global governance, can, according to Adler, be understood as the description of the role of a very specific type of community of practice (Adler 2008: 199). This approach provides the background for the explication of one of the central ontological assumptions of this study, namely that the academic discussion is particularly relevant in the construction and enactment of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of CE as measure to address climate change.

To sum up, the moderately idealist social-constructivist ontology defining the understanding of reality in this study means that specific communities of practice can—in interaction with other factors—constitute the meaning of an object and, by enacting this meaning through practice—again, in interaction with other factors— cause material change in the configuration of objects in the world. For example, a community of practice constituting the “normative and epistemic ground for action” (Adler 2008: 199) on cyber security such as the German Chaos Computer Club regularly constitutes the meanings of objects such as virtual networks or computer viruses by defining, for the former, their vulnerability to attack, and, for the latter, their threat potential. This is done, for example, in interviews or reports. The community also enacts these meanings through practice, e.g. by interacting with federal offices and agencies in order to change the material configurations in our reality according to the meanings applied to objects, e.g., changing the material basis of digital infrastructures in order to make them more resilient.

In this study, the academic community researching CE constitutes the community of practice that is most interesting as it is assumed to play a significant role in the early construction of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of CE as a measure to address climate change.4 This community constitutes the legitimacy or illegitimacy of these approaches through framing them, for example in academic publications, which present a form of practice as these publications carry the framings of CE into the public, thus enacting these framings. However, it is important to note that this framing is, in most publications, not the main intention of the respective authors: Other than epistemic communities in their original conception, the group of academics researching and discussing CE approaches is not united in a common policy endeavor. The main intention of this diverse group of actors is the publication and discussion of research results. I claim, however, that even this disinterested activity can, when it concerns a set of physical objects that remain to be materially developed, influence the legitimacy or illegitimacy of these objects—in this case, CE approaches—even if this was not the intention of the actor.

## Discourse Shapes Reality

### 2NC---General

#### Argumentative discourse determines the value and outcome of policy.

Jessica M. Williams 20, Postdoctoral Research Fellow at The University of Hong Kong, 2020, “Discourse inertia and the governance of transboundary rivers in Asia,” Earth System Governance, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esg.2019.100041> [ML]

Institutional and governance approaches and theories have been widely utilised in the study of governance issues. However, it is argued that such approaches would be strengthened if greater attention is given to the ideational dimension (i.e., the ability to influence the perceptions and beliefs of others regarding specific issues (Mirumachi, 2015)). This is because discursive factors tend to be eclipsed by more formal and prominent governance and institutional perspectives. This is due to the predominance of positivist and neopositivist approaches towards international relations and political studies (Fischer, 1998; Phillips et al., 2004). Therefore, a discourse-centric approach that highlights the role of discourse and allows a focus on the interactive and dynamic processes that are determinative of policy is proposed. Discourse comprises the group of ideas, concepts and categories that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a certain nexus of practices. Social and physical relations are given meaning in this manner. Discourses are context dependent and cannot be separated from the social practices within which they are fashioned (Jӓgerskog, 2002; Mirumachi, 2015). To create material change, social agents first need to work on a discursive level by creating significant and stable meanings to the territory within which they are competing (Rear and Jones, 2013). Discourses can become sanctioned. This essentially means that they become unquestioned and dominant. With resources such as water, issues such as nationalism can become intertwined in the sanctioned discourse. As a result, decision makers may not always implement the most seemingly rational policies (Jӓgerskog, 2002). Assumptions that dominate the sanctioned discourse will act to constrain the options available to policymakers and in doing so signal policy outcomes (Dayton, 2000; Gerlak and Schmeier, 2014). Thus, changes in the sanctioned discourse can indicate changes in policy direction. However, identifying discourse change is difficult. Change can occur slowly, over a long time period, or be sudden and dramatic. What initially appears to be change may just be a continuation of a larger story or the same discourse in an alternative form. Thereby, discourse can appear to change when in reality it has co-opted elements from another discourse. Normative concepts, such as ‘sustainable development’, are particularly susceptible to being co-opted (Christoff, 2013). Exogenous events or crises that confront the sanctioned discourse can effect a change in discourse. Pressure from foreign governments or financial/donor institutions may incentivise a shift in discourse to align with a certain perspective. Actors may also intentionally try and effect change through discursive strategies. Such strategies include constructing narratives and counternarratives, exclusion strategies, as well as employing normative power and delegitimising tactics. The success and extent of change is dependent on the power, position and resources of those seeking to effect the change, and the level of change being sought (Leipold and Winkel, 2013). Discourse can be used to consider how issues reach and stay on the political agenda and become policy. Discourse can show how broader interests underlying policies are shaped into physical consequences, which then indicates policy direction. The way discourse is formulated shapes how the problem or issues around which it is constructed are framed, interpreted, discussed and analysed. Therefore, it implies the favoured solutions, how policies are to be implemented and their potential success (Crow-Miller, 2015). Policy documents also instruct what needs to be done, what stands to reason and what is unquestionable (Apthorpe and Gasper, 2014; Bacchi, 2000). Issues are not seen as political problems unless they are constructed as such by influential actors or society (Hajer, 1995). The framing of policies can immediately close off some responses while making others seem self-evident. It is also rare for a problem to be ‘solved’. Instead it can be removed from the discourse or discussed as if it were a different problem. Policies may be utilised to this effect to constrain the impact of reform initiatives (Bacchi, 2000). The argumentative approach to discourse holds that policymaking reflects competition over meaning. Therefore, policies are the result of competing interests that strategically utilise discourse and is, therefore, a social phenomenon (Taylor, 2004). Policy discourse is thus the group of ideas, concepts, frames and definitions that provide meaning to a real-world phenomenon and structure it as a policy problem (Hajer, 1995, 2006). Policy creation, change and continuation are held as an interactive process of discursive struggle between actors. Policymaking is considered the competition over meaning, with policies being the result of competing interests that employ discourse strategically (Taylor, 2004). Policy creation, change and continuation are interactive processes of discursive struggle between actors. Through argument, actors position themselves or try to impose their views on to others during negotiations (Fischer and Forester, 1993). Institutions can be mobilised and solutions sought once a problem definition is established (Hajer, 1995). Within policymaking, discourses are essential in finding settlements between conflicting interests and this assists in regulating underlying social conflicts (Taylor, 2004; Hajer, 1995). Here, discourse is concerned with redefining a social phenomenon in a manner that allows a solution to be identified (Hajer, 1995). Discourse can move policies up or down the political agenda through depoliticising or securitising moves (Zeitoun et al., 2011). Depoliticising the policy process acts to distance policy makers from the policy's impacts thereby removing responsibility for the policy's outcome. Foucault (2009) utilises the concept of ‘political technology’ to illustrate how issues that are essentially political are removed from policy discourse and reframed in neutral scientific language. The role of expert knowledge in designing institutional procedures is essential to this process (Shore and Wright, 1997). When policies become highly politicised, they become securitised and are regarded as high priority issues that constitute an issue of national interest and essential to state sovereignty. As a result, exceptional measures are, or may be, legitimised (Buzan et al., 1998; Allan and Mirumachi, 2010). The securitising actor's ability to convince the audience and elicit a certain action/reaction is decisive to the securitisation process (Mirumachi, 2015). Once a common understanding of a threat is formed between the securitising actor and the audience, securitisation is held as successful (Trombetta, 2011). The main objective of a securitising discourse is to allow potential violations of rules that would not otherwise be accepted. Threats do not have to be real or in existence for a securitising act to occur (Stritzel, 2007; Mirumachi, 2015).

#### Social reality is preceded by practice and linguistics. The performance of the 1AC is directly involved in the construction of it.

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Discourses play a significant role in this process of construction of meaning: “The world is not objectively accessible, but instead is imparted through language through discursive processes and symbolic interpretations” (Uther 2014: 60).2 This means that much of the meaning-construction of social reality, which the brand of social constructivism espoused here relies upon, is done through what many authors call discourse. The frames that are studied in this analysis are considered as elements in discourse. Discourse, here, is understood, following Maarten Hajer, as “an ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categories through which meaning is given to social and physical phenomena, and which is produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of practices” (Hajer 2006: 67). This captures the simultaneous constructedness and constructiveness of the social meaning of material objects: Through language and practice humans both capture the meaning material objects have, and change or reproduce this meaning. Similarly, Dryzek defines discourse as “a shared way of apprehending the world. Embedded in language, it enables those who subscribe to it to interpret bits of information and put them together into coherent stories or accounts” (Dryzek 2005: 9). This means that meaning is constructed in discourses in “supra-individual and rather unconscious” ways (Methmann et al. 2013a: 6). At the same time, human actors, in this study, will not be considered as entities subordinate to a super-human structural power of discourse. Actors, according to Uther’s discussion, are both constructed and constructing (see Uther 2014: 55). Following her approach, actors are considered to be the central active agents in any meaning-making situation, and thus not helpless pawns in the flow of discourse: “The actor is not passively subdued to the discourse, as, for example, the subject of Foucault, but it actively participates in shaping the discourse through its own interpretive achievements” (Uther 2014: 66).3 This two-fold characterization of actors as both constructed and constructing is captured by practice theory. The terms ‘practice’ and ‘discourse’ are considered to not be antithetical to each other: Practices are “meaningful patterns of action, which, in being performed more or less competently, simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and around the material world” (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 4). Thus, (non-linguistic) practices are understood to interact with (linguistic) discourses and in this interaction construct or deconstruct meanings. Other authors reconcile linguistic and non-linguistic elements of meaning-construction by subsuming both under the term ‘discourse’(see Anshelm and Hultman 2015: 11; Methmann et al. 2013a: 6) As Dryzek (2006: 3) argues, “discourses are a matter of practice as well as words, for actions in the social realm are always accompanied by language that establishes the meaning of action” (see also Adler 2008: 198). I assume, in line with these authors, that meaningful action—or practice—and meaningful talk—or discourse—construct or deconstruct the ideational meaning of an object. Further, I assume that practice is meaningful action which acts out certain meanings about the world, thus making it causally relevant.

#### Discourse and discursive acts shape reality.

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For a more radical version of the claim that reality itself is socially constructed, yet one that sometimes (but not always) seems consistent with an ontological framework of common sense realism, we can turn to the work of a number of social psychologists, notably the group known as discursive psychologists. 3 Within the discipline of psychology, this approach is marked by turning its attention away from the cognitive study of individual minds, which it sees as inaccessible, towards the study of our interactions with each other. As Jonathan Potter and Margaret Wetherell put it, “for research purposes we are inevitably faced with discourse … Given the essentially performative and indexical nature of language use how can researchers construe it as a neutral record of secondary phenomena, in this case cognitive or mental states?” (1987: 145). This is a kind of sceptical empiricism that takes talk as empirically accessible but radically questions claims that talk tells us anything about what lies behind it: not only whether it tells us anything about the individual or the mind that is taken by other psychologists to have produced it, but also whether it tells us anything about what it purports to be about. From this perspective, our sense of what is real is a product of discourse or of rhetoric. According to Potter, for example, “Reality enters into human practices by way of the categories and descriptions that are part of those practices. The world is not ready categorized by God or nature in ways that we are all forced to accept. It is constituted in one way or another as people talk it, write it and argue it” (1996: 98). From a critical realist perspective, it is surprising to find these statements juxtaposed in this way. As Chapter 7 argued, for example, it seems overwhelmingly likely that there are natural kinds in the world, but this is a separate question from the question of how we categorize the things of the world; the relation between natural kinds and linguistic categories is an open one and a fallible one. Potter’s last sentence, therefore, would be entirely acceptable to realists if it said that the world was categorized as people talk it, write it, and argue it. But for a critical realist there is a logical gap between his second sentence and the argument that the world is constituted in this way. The world is already constituted, and in the case of ordinary material objects (disregarding any physical part that humans may have had in their shaping) this is independent of our talking, writing, and arguing. But from the kind of perspective adopted by writers like Potter, it seems that there is nothing we can say about how the world is, independently of our talking, writing, and arguing, so in discussing how it is constituted we can only be discussing how our accounts of it are constituted. Nevertheless, there is still a sense in here of a basic realism, a sense that although the world is not ready categorized, it is nevertheless somehow there before we constitute our accounts of it. Potter explicitly distances himself from the view that our descriptions lead to the material world “literally springing in to existence as it is talked or written about” (1996: 98) in some kind of “mystical process” (Potter 1996: 177). As Laclau and Mouffe have put it, “What is denied is not that such objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive conditions of emergence” (1985: 108). Burr suggests that Foucault thinks in similar terms: He does not deny the materiality of events, but says that our only way of apprehending reality is through discourse, which determines our perceptions of reality. In a sense, Foucault brackets off the question of reality. Since we can never have direct access to a reality beyond discourse we cannot concern ourselves with its nature. (2003: 90) This kind of thinking has been counterposed to realism most provocatively in Edwards, Ashmore, and Potter’s well-known paper ‘Death and Furniture’, which seeks to undermine classic realist responses to radical social constructionism by analysing the rhetoric that is used in them (1995).4 The paradigm case they examine is that of the realist seeking to demonstrate the existence of material reality by thumping on a table. But such thumping, they argue, is in itself a discursive act: The very act of producing a non-represented, unconstructed external world is inevitably representational, threatening, as soon as it is produced, to turn around upon and counter the very position it is meant to demonstrate. Furniture ‘arguments’ perform categorization and relevance via semiosis. (Edwards et al. 1995: 27) Realist arguments, they are suggesting, fail to prove that there is a world beyond discourse because they are themselves discursive acts, even in the case of thumping on a table.

### 2NC---Discourse Shapes (Cyber)

#### The language that we use in cybersecurity threat discourse matters---it shapes our response---that turns case and generates a self-fulfilling prophecy

Sean Lawson & Michael K. Middleton 19, Sean is an associate professor in Communication at the University of Utah, Michael is an associate professor in Communication at the University of Utah, “Cyber Pearl Harbor: Analogy, fear, and the framing of cyber security threats in the United States, 1991-2016,” First Manday, Volume 24, Number 3 – 4, March 2019, https://journals.uic.edu/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/9623 \\pairie

Cyber Pearl Harbor in the news

The analysis above provides an account of the emergence and evolution of cyber Pearl Harbor among elite actors like government officials and industry experts. But, as James Wirtz notes, the notion of a cyber Pearl Harbor “is reinforced by recurring media reports” [22]. To map how those recurring reports foster the public imagination about what cyber Pearl Harbor entails and the seriousness with which it is invoked, we performed a content analysis of a sample of 203 articles from U.S. newspapers spanning the period from 1991 to early 2016.

First, cyber Pearl Harbor’s 25-year presence in news media reporting has been marked by certain moments of intense interest that correspond with the emergence of other prominent national security concerns (see Figure 1). Concern with cyber Pearl Harbor spiked after 1995, declined around 2003 and spiked again in 2011 and 2012. The first uptick in interest corresponds with U.S. officials’ growing concern with the possibility of mass casualty, new technology-enabled, “new terrorism.” Reasons for such concerns could be found in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway system, and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. The possibility for cyber terrorism piggy-backed off of concerns about other, similar kinds of terrorism, e.g., bioterrorism, agricultural terrorism, etc. (Carter, et al., 1998; Hoffman, 1998; Laqueur, 1999; Lifton, 1999). Similarly, Secretary Panetta’s public statements drove much of the coverage of cyber Pearl Harbor in 2011 and 2012. These statements were provoked by a series of retaliatory cyber attacks on the United States and its Persian Gulf allies by Iran in response to the U.S.-Israeli Stuxnet attack on Iranian nuclear facilities. In both cases, increased concern with cyber Pearl Harbor in the news corresponds with other, pressing (but not necessarily cyber-related) national security concerns of the day.

Mentions of cyber Pearl Harbor in major U.S. newspapers

Figure 1: Mentions of cyber Pearl Harbor in major U.S. newspapers.

Content analysis also reinforces the importance of our close analysis of cyber Pearl Harbor’s origins because government officials remain primarily responsible for spreading concern about the possibility of a cyber Pearl Harbor. An overwhelming 60 percent of cases where cyber Pearl Harbor received news attention as a realistic threat, government officials were promoting the idea. Interestingly, in 65 percent of cases where cyber Pearl Harbor was portrayed as unlikely or unrealistic, news reports cited private actors such as industry experts, academics, or journalists (see Figures 2 and 3).

Positive Pearl Harbor sentiment by actor

Negative Pearl Harbor sentiment by actor

Figures 2 and 3: Positive and negative Pearl Harbor sentiments by actor.

Officials promoting a cyber Pearl Harbor doomsday find willing allies in the news media. The vast majority of news stories (77 percent) presented only the perspective of those promoting the idea of possible cyber Pearl Harbor. On only a few occasions did news articles provide a balanced view, including perspectives skeptical of cyber Pearl Harbor alongside those promoting the idea (three percent), or providing a purely negative assessment of cyber Pearl Harbor (18 percent; see Figure 4). Interestingly, there has been less skepticism and more positive reporting about the potential for cyber Pearl Harbor over time (see Figure 5).

Cyber Pearl Harbor sentiment in major U.S. newspapers

Figure 4: Cyber Pearl Harbor sentiment in major U.S. newspapers.

Cyber Pearl Harbor sentiment over time

Figure 5: Cyber Pearl Harbor sentiment over time.

As we might expect based on the analysis of key texts above, news coverage of cyber Pearl Harbor is largely unclear about just who might carry out such an attack (see Figure 6). In a 38 percent plurality of articles, the potential perpetrator (threat subject) is illusive and unspecified. Next is a laundry list combination of perpetrators at 27 percent, meaning that in over half the mentions of a cyber Pearl Harbor no one is quite sure who is actually planning to implement such a tactic. Only at the most abstract levels can patterns suggest that an evolution in thinking about cyber Pearl Harbor has occurred. Generally, more concern is expressed over non-state actors; however, over time news articles demonstrate an increasing concern with states (see Figure 7).

Cyber Pearl Harbor threat subjects

Figure 6: Cyber Pearl Harbor threat subjects.

Cyber Pearl Harbor threat subjects (State vs. non-state), 1991-2016

Figure 7: Cyber Pearl Harbor threat subjects (State vs. non-state), 1991–2016.

In media reports that sustain the concern over cyber Pearl Harbor, like the key texts that promoted it, civilian infrastructure experiences the greatest likelihood of being a target of such an attack with 55 percent of mentions. However, there are also a significant number of articles that do not specify a target for such an attack or merely provide a laundry list of potential targets (35 percent), which has the effect of leaving the question of referent object, or who and what is at risk, largely unanswered (see Figure 8).

Cyber Pearl Harbor: Referent objects

Figure 8: Cyber Pearl Harbor: Referent objects.

The last notable similarity between key texts and news articles is promoting the seriousness of the cyber Pearl Harbor threat by pointing to prior cyber incidents or vulnerabilities (41 percent). Fictional scenarios (15 percent) and reference to non-cyber events (nine percent) are also deployed as reason for concern about cyber Pearl Harbor. Most problematic, however, is that many news articles (24 percent) provide no clear reason or evidence at all in support of the idea that cyber Pearl Harbor is realistic or likely (see Figure 9).

Cyber Pearl Harbor: Focusing event/sensitizing condition

Figure 9: Cyber Pearl Harbor: Focusing event/sensitizing condition.

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Analogy, framing, and fear

Mapping the use of cyber Pearl Harbor in both elite stakeholder discourse and broader media coverage in our analysis highlights the ubiquity of its use and the preferred meanings that have attached to the analogy over time. The enduring nature of these meanings and uses has consequences for the cyber security terrain that they shape. Various observers, including promoters of the idea of a cyber Pearl Harbor, like John Hamre, have worried, rightly we will argue, that the metaphor’s use might have negative implications for our ability to understand and respond appropriately to contemporary cyber threats. This is a risk made more prescient by the 2016 interference by Russia in U.S. election systems and its campaign of information warfare carried out by social media manipulation and other cyber tactics.

Decades of research in a number of disciplines, from cognitive science to communication studies and more, argue that language and rhetoric has an important structuring effect on how we see and respond to the world around us; that “language, perception, and knowledge are inextricably intertwined” [23]. Far from being “a matter of ... mere words,” leading researchers Lakoff and Johnson argue that, “human thought processes are largely metaphorical ... the human conceptual system is metaphorically structured and defined” [24]. But, this is not just an individual affair; our use of language helps “to structure collective, human knowledge” and to “bridge the gap between individual human cognition and collective understanding and action” (Lawson, 2012). What’s more, like potato chips, with metaphors it is hard to have just one. This is because individual metaphors often come with “entailments” that necessarily implicate other, related metaphors [25]. Even more important is that because metaphors can also operate as normative “structuring devices” [26], they can entail, “often covertly and insidiously, natural ‘solutions’” [27]. The language we use, our metaphors and analogies, can enable or constrain our perceptions and understanding of the world around us, as well as our avenues of possible action in response [28].

Military and national security professionals have increasingly recognized the importance of language, including metaphor and analogy, for correctly framing and responding to national security threats. Top leaders in these services have promoted this idea and, in the case of the Army, have incorporated it into official doctrine and officer education (Mattis, 2008; U.S. Department of the Army, 2015; School of Advanced Military Studies, n.d.). As a consequence, the cyber security debate has not been immune to this rhetorical turn in national security discourse. As early as 1997, Martin Libicki worried about the use of facile metaphors in the information warfare debates of the day. He warned, “To use metaphor in place of analysis verges on intellectual abuse. It invites the unquestioning extension of a logic that works across the looking glass but lacks explanatory power in the real world. Those who forget this are apt to try to make their metaphors do their thinking for them” [29].

More recently, U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) and its former parent organization, U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), officially recognized the critical importance of language and analogy for understanding cyber threats and then developing and carrying out a cyber strategy. In 2009, USSTRATCOM released The Cyber Warfare Lexicon. The document began with a series of epigraphs. The first, from Dee Hock, read, “Language is only secondarily the means by which we communicate, it is primarily the means by which we think.” The second informed readers, “You can’t talk about a subject if you don’t have the words. And, some psychologists would argue, you can’t even think about it. At least not very productively.” And finally, the document quoted Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper (USMC, Ret.) as saying, “The seeming inability to express ideas clearly, loose use of words, and ill-considered invention of other terms have damaged the military lexicon to the point that it interferes with effective professional military discourse.” [30]

In the world of cyber warfare, appropriate conceptual tools and metaphors for navigating emergent threats comes with the highest stakes:

“Without a shared understanding of the accurate meanings of a significant number of frequently used terms, it will be difficult to make progress on the more complex and unresolved technical and operational issues for non-traditional weapons: actionable requirements, technical and operational assurance, effective mission planning techniques, and meaningful measures of effectiveness.” [31]

Recognizing the gravity of this concern USCYBERCOM launched the Cyber Analogies Project at the Naval Postgraduate School in 2012 with the mission “to assist U.S. Cyber Command in identifying and developing relevant historical, economic, and other useful metaphors that could be used to enrich the discourse about cyber strategy, doctrine, and policy” [32]. Ultimately, the report argues that appropriate “analogies, metaphors, and parables” are necessary to facilitate learning, communicating, and “winning H.G. Well’s ‘race between education and catastrophe’” [33].

Second, we also know that news media not only plays an important role in promoting policy-makers’ preferred agendas and problem frames for a wider public, but also in shaping policy-makers’ understanding of the world. In this literature, “frames” are “schemata of interpretation” for individuals and groups to “locate, perceive, identify, and label” occurrences and events [34]. These “interpretive frameworks embedded in media messages” aid individuals and groups in “forming political attitudes and value judgments” by “evok[ing] as well as constrain[ing] the interpretative activities of audiences” [35]. Policy-makers are not immune from such effects; “In some such cases the media can participate in a positive feedback loop, which drives upward policymaking attention and outcomes very rapidly” (Wolfe, et al., 2013). This feedback loop is at work in the case of cyber Pearl Harbor too. Peter Singer of Brookings has been extremely critical of this situation, saying,

“[T]here is the histrionic — the “get scared” — category [of cyber security writing], then repeated back in the wider media, such as through the half-million references to “cyber 9/11.” Journalists need to be more discerning consumers when they hear that kind of thing. There is a joke in our field that there should be a drinking game based on any time someone references a “cyber Pearl Harbor.” More seriously, when someone says that, journalists should be prepared to follow up. Those phrases are the bumper stickers, not the end of the statement or argument. Yet they are used in business pitches, governmental speeches and Congressional hearings in that way. We’ve been caught between this state of ignorance and this fear factor. That’s not a good place for anybody, either in the public space or on the journalistic side.” (Singer and Wihbey, 2014)

There is reason to believe that reliance on cyber Pearl Harbor to frame our thinking and responses has had real, negative impacts. General Alexander’s internal 2012 memo about preventing a cyber Pearl Harbor indicates that this analogy and metaphor is not merely used by officials in public speeches, which is then picked up and repeated uncritically in news media, but that it also feeds back into the system of internal cyber security discourse and strategizing as a device that structures official thinking and planning behind the scenes (Alexander, 2012). We got a preview of those in 1996 in Sen. Nunn’s questioning of DCI Deutch, whose understanding of cyber threats had been shaped by the vision of cyber Pearl Harbor and whose “natural” solutions entailed militarization, deterrence, and even offense.

But there is reason to be concerned that these public appeals to fear of catastrophic cyber Pearl Harbor may also have negative impacts on discourse and decision-making more broadly. The continuing use of cyber Pearl Harbor, despite recognition of its failures, is exemplary of the fact that policy-makers and news media often rely on appeals to fear in their efforts to promote a policy agenda and frame issues for the public and themselves (Altheide, 2006, 2002; Glassner, 1999). However, a growing body of research in communication studies (Peters, et al., 2013; Pfau, 2007; Walton, 2000; Witte, 1996; Witte and Allen, 2000), psychology [36], and even information security (Lee, et al., 2006; Herath and Rao, 2009; Pfleeger and Caputo, 2012; Siponen, et al., 2014; Boss, et al., 2015), demonstrates that such rhetoric can have a negative impact. One recent study suggests that depictions of cyber doom scenarios in popular media “can lead to a sense of fatalism and demotivation to act” and “could impair efforts to motivate appropriate policy responses to genuine cyber security threats” [37].

Similarly, there is evidence to support Healey’s concern that constant worry about cyber Pearl Harbor has distracted us from the real threats we face, both cyber and non-cyber. In the cyber realm, Peter Singer writes, “Indeed, while the focus of US debate is more frequently on fears of a so-called ‘digital Pearl Harbor’, the more serious problem may actually be a long-term economic ‘death by a thousand cuts’.” [38]. Likewise, we can see repeated examples over the years of officials and experts warning of imminent cyber doom, or even ranking cyber threats higher than threats of terrorism or weapons of mass destruction, all while the real world continues to defy their predictions (Lawson, 2016). While officials and experts worried about cyber terror attacks against the World Trade Center, al-Qa’ida plotted to bring down the Twin Towers with box cutters and airplanes. Nonetheless, we worried that “the next attack” would certainly be a cyber attack. But still terrorists attacked using cars, bombs, guns, and their very bodies. In more recent times, we have been warned that state adversaries would soon carry out a cyber Pearl Harbor, or perhaps that they already have, as when Director of NSA called the North Korea hack of Sony a cyber Pearl Harbor. Meanwhile, in reality, the North Koreans have stunned the world with their brazen tests of missiles and nuclear weapons. For their part, in cyberspace, the Russians have not carried out catastrophic cyber attacks on the U.S. power grid, but have instead attempted to manipulate the U.S. presidential election in a manner to which Washington seems unprepared to respond.

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Conclusion

For 25 years, cyber Pearl Harbor has remained a go-to analogy and metaphor for officials and others looking to raise awareness of, and motivate a response to, perceived cyber threats. Because of this effective service life, Cyber Pearl Harbor is not going away any time soon, no matter how inaccurate it is as a descriptive device. This is because its rhetorical force and appeal are not a product of its ability to accurately describe, but rather, of its users’ belief, rightly or wrongly, that the fear it evokes in listeners can call attention to and motivate a response to cyber threats, whatever their true nature may be. On the other hand, our ongoing, incorrect use of this analogy may have set in motion a self-fulfilling prophecy of militarization, including development and use of offensive cyber capabilities, which may have actually made the kinds of scenarios envisioned in cyber Pearl Harbor rhetoric more, rather than less, likely. More research is needed, however, that traces the ongoing use of the cyber Pearl Harbor analogy since 2016, as well as its resonance with public audiences.

In the face of increasing criticism combined with an ongoing penchant for appealing to fear, one option for the future of cyber Pearl Harbor is rehabilitation through redefinition. This involves redefining cyber Pearl Harbor as many small attacks, or even large attacks, that occur but somehow go unnoticed. In short, it involves exaggerating the impacts of actual events, as when the NSA Director called the hack of Sony a cyber Pearl Harbor in February 2015 (Lyngaas, 2015). Examples of this rhetorical move have been ubiquitous over the years (Deutch, 1996; Blitstein, 2007; Singel, 2009; Censer, 2012; Whitlock, 2014; Geraghty, 2015; Weisman, 2015; Robb, 2015; Carman, 2015). But, as Tim Stevens notes, these kinds of redefinitions of cyber Pearl Harbor serve to “pluralize[] the previously singular ‘event’ and locat[e] them across multiple sectors ... The integrity of the historical event is subverted still further by reference to the possibility of multiple ‘small-scale’ digital Pearl Harbors.” In particular, he calls Clarke’s assertion of daily digital Pearl Harbors “an idiosyncratic leap of logic too far, which all but destroyed any sensible use of the metaphor” [39]. It is hard to see, therefore, how redefining and “pluralizing” cyber Pearl Harbor will clarify our understanding of the real threats we face.

In the end, we would prefer to see the analogy abandoned altogether. What’s more, there is no shortage of other, potentially more appropriate and useful analogies and metaphors that may be enlisted to help us think about cyber security challenges. These can include other forms of conflict or weapons systems like piracy, counterinsurgency, political warfare, biological weapons, or even non-war analogies and metaphors such as the immune systems, public health, ecosystems, or complex adaptive systems. A number of scholars, technologists, and policy-makers have begun to think along these lines, offering many possibilities for moving away from the stale, inaccurate, and potentially detrimental threat of a cyber Pearl Harbor (Charney, 2011; McMorrow, 2010; Liles, 2010; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011; Lapointe, 2011; Lawson, 2012; Axelrod, 2014; Jensen, et al., 2019).

The importance of language and rhetoric for appropriately framing and responding to problems is abundantly clear. Increasingly, military and national security professionals are coming to this understanding as well. This includes those who are wrestling with complex problems like threats to cyber security, where there is increasing recognition that hyperbolic analogies and metaphors like cyber Pearl Harbor are not only inadequate, but may actually be harmful to our ability to understand and respond to the cyber threats we face today. It is our hope that the research presented here can aid scholars and policy makers in understanding the emergence, evolution, and persistence of the cyber Pearl Harbor analogy as a first step towards developing more appropriate and productive frames for navigating cyber security threats.

### 2NC---AT: Security Doesn’t Shape Reality

#### Specifically, securitization shapes reality.

Giovanni Ercolani 11, Ph.D., member of the “Centre for Energy and Environment Security” (Nottingham Trent University, UK), Thesis Adviser at the “Peace Operations Training Institute” (USA), 2011, “Keeping Security and Peace: Behind the Strategicalization of NATO's Critical Security Discourse,” Security Strategies Year: 7 Issue: 14 [ML]

I have based my methodological approach on the assumption that “’Security’ is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frame the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization. In theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from non-politicized (meaning the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision) through politicized (meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely, some other form of communal governance) to securitized (meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying action outside the normal bounds of political procedure)” (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998, p.23-24). Then it is extremely clear how the process of securitization becomes a political process in which the narrative has its primary importance. “The process of securitization is what in language theory is called a speech act. It is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real; it is the utterance itself that is the act. By saying the words, something is done (like betting, giving a promise, naming a ship)” (Buzan, Weaver, de Wilde, 1998, p. 26). But whereas “by saying the words, something is done”, in this specific case of “securitization”, when we use the very word “security”, something more is done: an emotional element has been added to the narrative. Here I will use a discourse analysis lens because discourse analysis represents a general term for a number of approaches to analysing written, spoken, signed language use or any significant semiotic event. Indeed, I could say that like Don Quixote and Sancho Panza (the two fictional figures of the famous book of Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra) our condition is to be completely surrounded and immersed into stories. Stories which are told to us through the use of a language, images, media, etc... However, the story can be a language because “language itself conditions, limits, and predetermines what we see. Thus, all reality is constructed through language, so that nothing is simply ‘there’ in an unproblematic way – everything is a linguistic/textual construct. Language does not record reality; it shapes and creates it, so that the whole of our universe is textual” (Barry, 2002). Moreover, when we look at our capacity to memorize, neuroscience has proved that “the brain has two memory systems, one for ordinary facts and one for emotionally charged ones” (Goleman, 1996), and indeed our brain is formed by two opposite hemispheres, the right and the left one.

#### Security rhetoric shapes reality and legitimize policy actions that construct imagined threats

Wilhelmsen 2017 (Julie Wilhelmsen, Senior fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, “How does war become a legitimate undertaking? Re-engaging the post-structuralist foundation of securitization theory”, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48512937>) //sethlee

The core insight of Copenhagen School ST is that issues can become ‘securitized’ when ‘securitizing actors’, by means of rhetorical strategies, elevate them to the status of an existential threat to a referent object and when a significant audience accepts this representation of the issue (Buzan, 1997: 5–28). This process generates endorsement for emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind (Wæver, 1995a). The general thrust of the argument underlying this description of the securitization process is in many respects in line with post-structuralist ideas of how policies are coconstituted by identities and rely on accounts that make sense of them and legitimize them as they are launched (Campbell, 1992; Hansen, 2006). The post-structuralist stance is that policies are not a given response to an external reality to which the state (or other social actors) relates objectively, but are co-constituted by ideas or identities. References to identities are necessary to represent and legitimize policies, but at the same time these identities are constituted and reproduced through the formulation of policies. This is why the term ‘co-constituted’ is used. When the production of politics is understood in this way the task for the analyst is to ‘embrace a logic of interpretation that acknowledges the improbability of cataloguing, calculating and specifying “real causes” and concerns itself with considering the manifest political consequences of adopting one mode of representation over another’ (Campbell, 1992: 4). Studying politics then involves studying how some representations of reality become dominant discourses, and how problems, subjects and objects are constituted in these discourses that simultaneously indicate relevant policies to pursue. The claim is not that such dominant representations cause certain policies or actions, but that they both open up and constrain the range of policies and actions that seem possible and legitimate to undertake (Hansen, 2006). This link between identity and policies can be conceptualized more explicitly as one of legitimation. Jackson (2006: 16) sees legitimation as: the process of drawing and (re)establishing boundaries, ruling some courses of action acceptable and others unacceptable. Out of the general morass of public political debate, legitimation contingently stabilizes the boundaries of acceptable action, making it possible for certain policies to be enacted. ‘The process of drawing and (re)establishing boundaries’ is here taken to be the continuous references to Self and Other that policy formulation implies and which, in turn, legitimates policy implementation. Based on this understanding of how policies are produced and legitimized, a poststructuralist approach would imply treating securitization as a process through which a representation of something as an existential threat becomes dominant at the expense of other representations and uncovering, in the course of research, the changing boundary between this identity and that given to the ‘referent object’. These changing representations would not determine emergency action, but would condition the range of emergency measures political actors could undertake legitimately. In turn, the undertaking of such emergency measures against the something that is said to be threatening and in defence of the referent object would confirm and reinforce the new identity boundaries that were drawn up and legitimize the undertaking of emergency measures. From a poststructuralist perspective the process of securitization is a fundamentally co-constitutive process and one that implies legitimizing concrete material security practices (see below). This reading suggests that securitization cannot be treated as a sequential, linear process from securitizing actor through audience acceptance and to emergency measures. Rather, it is a much more dynamic development; securitizing actors, referent object, threat objects as well as exceptional measures are co-constituted within the securitizing process.4

### 2NC---AT: Reality

#### Reality constructs itself through linguistic practices, especially in foreign policy.

Erik Ringmar, 14, a professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at İbn Haldun Üniversitesi, Istanbul, Turkey, 2014, “Performance, Not Performativity: An Embodied Critique of Post-Structural IR Theory,” Lund University, <https://lucris.lub.lu.se/ws/files/6266345/7512005.pdf> [ML]

This is what Jacques Derrida discussed as “deconstruction” ― the reversal of established hierarchies, the introduction of new oppositions, the attempt to expose repressed terms and to challenge the natural and inevitable status of seemingly dichotomous pairs.5 Applying the deconstructivist tools to the notion of the self we realize that there is no one there. Deconstruction reveals “the metaphysics of presence” ― the illusion that we are present to ourselves, as though, beneath all the empirical jetsam and emotional flotsam, there really were a person, ready and complete.6 There can be no “freedom” and no “authenticity,” as Judith Butler explains, since “the ascription of interiority is itself a publicly regulated and sanctioned form of essence fabrication.“7 The notion of the ever-present subject is one of the foundational myth of modern society ― as propounded by René Descartes, Immanuel Kant, and others ― and it is the metaphysical basis on which modern individuals make their often preposterous claims to power, rights and attention.8 When applied to the study of international politics, this position turns into a critique of the state, or rather, a critique of sovereignty. There is no state, say post-structural international relations scholars such as Cynthia Weber and David Campbell, at least if we take the state to constitute a pre-existing subject to which sovereignty can be attached as an attribute.9 Focusing on “institutions,“ the “people,“ or perhaps on the state as a transcendental idea, mainstream accounts always presuppose that which they intend to prove. Instead sovereignty must be understood as the process through which political subjects come to constitute themselves as such. “I suggest,“ says Weber, “that sovereign nation-states are not pre-given subjects but in process and that all subjects in process (be they individual or collective) are the ontological effects of practices which are performatively enacted.”10 Weber's idea of “performatively enacted practices” needs further elucidation.1 Even if we reject the idea of a pre-given self, there is certainly the illusion of such a being, and the question thus becomes how that illusion arose. According to poststructural theory, the self is created through reiterative linguistic practices. Language precedes the human subject, they explain; we are born into language, and language is best understood as a semiotic structure where the meaning of each word is constituted by its difference from other words. It is, as Ferdinand Saussure once argued, the structure as a whole that ultimately determines what things mean. According to performativity theorists, in other words, structure is to practice as langue is to parole; as the abstract rules that make possible the production of grammatical sentences, that is, are to the production of an actual sentence.12 A structure, like langue, is a complex of rules with a virtual existence whereas practice, like speech, is an enactment of these rules in space and time. But a semiotic structure is not yet a sovereign self. We move closer to the subject once we realize that words do not only mean things but also do things in the world. Words have what John Austin's in How to Do Things with Words, 1962, called a “perlocutionary force.”13 The proverbial example is the “I do” of the wedding ceremony. By speaking the words, you are not merely conveying meaning, you are also doing something, you are constituting a marriage. The words are performed and thereby enacted.14 Adding to Austin's conclusions, Derrida emphasizes what he calls the “citational” quality of even the most pragmatic forms of language use. That is, the texts we invoke always cite seemingly absent contexts from which they ultimately derive their meaning. “Could a performative utterance succeed,” Derrida asks, if its formulation did not repeat a “coded” or iterable utterance, or in other words, if the formula I pronounce in order to open a meeting, launch a ship or a marriage were not identifiable as conforming with an iterable model, if it were not then identifiable in some way as a “citation”?15 This is how the subject comes to constitute itself. “The subject is inscribed in language, is a 'function' of language, becomes a speaking subject only by making its speech conform … to the system of the rules of language as a system of differences.”16 The human subject is “a being devoid of Being until it is organized by a system of codes.”17 This is an argument further developed by Judith Butler.18 Our identities take shape, she says, through the perlocutionary force of the discourse we apply to ourselves. Talking about the being that we take our selves to be, we quote statements that connote normalcy and imply acceptance much as a lawyer might cite supporting precedents in a court of law. By making performative statements, and applying them to ourselves, a certain person comes into being; performativity is “a compulsory reiteration of those norms through which a subject is constituted”; “subjectivity is performatively constituted by the ritualized production or codified social behavior.”19 These statements, says Butler, are not only repetitive and ritualistic but also socially determined. If we misquote the established discourse and fail to construct an appropriate self for ourselves, we are punished through various, often surprisingly severe, social sanctions.20

#### The 1AC is a theatrical performance of international relations that discursively brings the state into existence.

Erik Ringmar, 14, a professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at İbn Haldun Üniversitesi, Istanbul, Turkey, 2014, “Performance, Not Performativity: An Embodied Critique of Post-Structural IR Theory,” Lund University, <https://lucris.lub.lu.se/ws/files/6266345/7512005.pdf> [ML]

Yet performances do not only take place in theaters, but also in society at large. Social interaction is to a considerable extent a matter of presenting oneself before others on any of the many small stages constituted by daily interpersonal interaction.96 Here too we project an imaginary self, a person we would like to be, and we ask the people observing us to recognize us under this description. In the process we build sociality and inauthenticity into our being. It is easy to be disgusted with this spectacle, especially of course if the performance goes badly and we fail to receive the kind of recognition we feel we deserve. For this reason the playacting self, its antics and its fate, have often been a source of mournful laments. “Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player,” as Shakespeare's Macbeth put it, “That struts and frets his hour upon the stage.”97 And Jean-Jacques Rousseau, scathing in his criticism of the superficiality and decadence of Parisian high-society, was equally scathing of the theater which he saw as a threat to a more natural, more rural and thereby more authentic, way of life.98 Yet what Rousseau wished for is not available. Away from the many small stages of everyday life, the self, as we know it, does not exist. But performances are presented also on a larger stage as social and political events are made to happen, and to appear, in a certain manner.99 We can talk of “public performances” as staged events through which imaginary blends of social facts and visions are presented to vast audiences, perhaps to entire societies, at the same time. Through the public performance the world is cast in a certain form and held up for our contemplation; something is discovered, something is remembered or exposed.100 Examples include a terrorist attack on a building in a major city; an attempt to “shock and awe” a civilian population; the signing of a peace treaty by two former enemies; the funeral of a world leader; the diplomatic rituals shared by members of the same international system.101 But make no mistake, these are not the performative reiterations of discursive practices. Public performances are originals, not citations; they involve all the senses and engage all neurological systems, not just the literal-minded mind. The way we, as members of the audience, react to these public performances may often surprise us. We scream at a rock concert; we raise our fists at a political rally, or we speak in tongues at a religious convocation. These are physical reactions, performed by us to be sure, yet they are in a sense not ours. They may be referred to as cases of “mass hysteria,” or as examples of “conversion syndrome,” but we could also say that they are the reactions of a shared, a public, body.102 It is in this public performance and in this public body that we come across ourselves as a society. It is also here that we find the state. The state ― pace Weber, Campbell, Derrida and Butler ― is not declared into existence through the iteration of texts, but neither is it abolished through military interventions. Instead, in next to all cases, before independence could be declared it had to be fought for. People had to present themselves to themselves and to others as willing to risk their lives for the right to self-determination.103 Such struggles constitute clashes of real interests, and often of real weapons, but they are also performances in a fully theatrical sense ― involving aspirational plots, fluttering flags, arousing music, self-sacrifice, betrayal, and heroism. It was by watching these performances, and by getting involved with them themselves, that “the people” and “the state” came to be constituted as subjects of international politics.

### 2NC---Reps First

#### Rhetorical framing is the key factor in solving debates on public policy

Brian Head, 2022, Fellow of Academy of the Social Sciences, PhD Politics, University of London, Master of Arts (Politics), Monash University, professor of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Queensland in Australia, *“Wicked Problems in Public Policy”* Chapter 1: Debates in Public Policy—Problem Framing, Knowledge, and Interests, doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-94580-0//ekc

Introduction to Problem Framing

This chapter provides a brief background about public policy in democratic political systems, and especially the central importance of how policy problems are ‘framed’ by various actors in policy debates. This background sets the scene for the main discussion (in Chapter 2) of the ‘wicked problems’ framework. It also provides a foundation for later analysis (in Chapter 3) of policy instruments for achieving policy goals and the institutional capacities required for successfully tackling complex problems.

Disagreements arise among stakeholders about the nature of policy problems and how to address them. These divergent viewpoints are shaped by different assumptions, values, and interests. These differences of perspective have major impacts on policy decision-making and implementation, because the way a problem is defined or interpreted tends to correlate with particular remedial actions to address the identified problem.

The fundamental proposition in this chapter is that divergent ‘framing’ of policy problems generates conflict about the nature of these problems and about how to address them. Competing policy perspectives and viewpoints are inevitable. These differences are often entrenched or resistant to change, owing to their complex anchoring in values, interests, emotions and ideological assumptions. Such perspectives about the nature of the issue, and about actions to be taken, are not derived from the ‘agreed facts’ about an issue – they are more likely to be influenced by a combination of ideological orientations, economic interests, political identities, professional or managerial assumptions, and past institutional legacies (Edelman, 1988; Majone, 1989; Head, 2010a; Cairney, 2016). The role of ‘evidence-informed’ analysis and expertise can be important, but is only part of the policy process (Head, 2016).

In democratic systems, public policy debates are focused on the ‘problems’ that stakeholders claim require greater public attention. Deborah Stone argues that an issue only becomes a public policy ‘problem’ when groups demand that action be taken; and when plausible stories are advanced concerning the causes and remedies for the problem (Stone, 1989, p. 299). The agenda-setting aspects of public policy debates are essentially arguments about the nature and urgency of policy problems and how to address them. Scoping the problems, proposing feasible solutions, and mobilising support for priority actions, are three important and closely related dimensions of the policy development process (Crowley et al., 2020; Kingdon, 1995; Majone, 1989). In every jurisdiction, diverse political actors, stakeholders and advocates are continually striving to place their key issues on the policy agenda for further debate and thus the consideration of decision-makers. The types of problems that attract public attention shift over time, depending on changes in leadership, changes in socio-economic conditions, changes in communication technologies, and changes in the design of policy programs and service systems.

The modern policy analysis literature—whether in health, education, criminology or environment—emphasises the importance of problem definitions or perceptions in influencing how policy debates unfold. ‘Framing’ here refers to how an issue or problem is defined and presented to wider audiences, as part of the process of setting policy agendas and priorities. Problem framing is about how actors attempt to persuade other citizens and decision-makers about the nature and significance of issues under discussion (van Hulst & Yanow, 2016). It is clear that very different stories tend to emerge about the causes and severity of the problems (and therefore the preferred actions to tackle the problems). ‘Framing’ is about how actors’ understandings of problems, contexts and responses are articulated, represented through narratives, and further shaped through interaction (Fischer, 2003, p. 144). Schön and Rein consider framing ‘a way of selecting, organising, interpreting and making sense of a complex reality to provide guideposts for knowing, analysing, persuading and acting’ (Schön & Rein, 1994, p. 146). Framing is also central for articulating the core values and identities that underlie social movements seeking policy change—for example, those advocating for substantive civil rights and non-discrimination on the basis of gender, religion or ethnicity (Benford & Snow, 2000). Under modern conditions in a democratic society with diverse media channels and technologies available to citizens, the fragmentation of media framings may generate ‘preference-based reinforcement’ (or group-think) among each of these media audiences (Cacciatore et al., 2016) rather than generalised impacts across the mass population.

Rittel and Webber argued that problem framing had become more difficult under modern conditions of social pluralism and political communication. By now we are all beginning to realize that one of the most intractable problems is that of defining problems (of knowing what distinguishes an observed condition from a desired condition) and of locating problems (finding where in the complex causal networks the trouble really lies). In turn, and equally intractable, is the problem of identifying the actions that might effectively narrow the gap between what-is and what-ought-to-be. (Rittel & Webber 1973, p. 159)

The dynamics of problem framing are important for many reasons, including the close connection generally found between how a problem is defined (or ‘structured’) by stakeholders and the preferred solutions they propose (Dery, 1984; Gusfield, 1989). Peters demonstrates that specific policy ‘problems’ (such as environmental pollution) emerge under specific political conditions and institutional contexts (Peters, 2005). He shows how the problems are interpreted by various actors in the light of issue histories, the balance of key participants, and their dominant ideologies and interests. The way a problem is framed by stakeholders and decisionmakers is strongly correlated with their preferences for specific policy tools (e.g. market-based instruments vs state regulation).

Thus, the way problems are interpreted is closely tied to proposed solutions recommended by various government agencies, business groups and community stakeholders. To take an everyday example, poverty and economic inequality are widely seen as conditions of life in most countries. However, despite apparent agreement that poverty is a ‘real’ and ongoing problem, there are very different underlying narratives about the causes of poverty, the degree of urgency, and the proposed solutions. If poverty is seen as an individual-centred problem (generated by deficits in personal skills and motivation), the proposed solutions will be oriented towards encouraging individuals to take more responsibility for their unfortunate situation and challenging them to develop their work skills and their ‘achievement orientation’. However, if poverty is seen as an enduring structural feature of society (generated by impersonal market forces which primarily benefit wealthy elites), the solutions proposed might be oriented towards political action to improve employment security and the public funding of social services. In the same way, people enmeshed in long-term unemployment can be seen either as unwilling to grasp opportunities to develop new skills, or alternatively can be seen as the unfortunate victims of structural and technological change.

Debates about the nature and causes of problems provide the foundations for considering policy solutions and governance arrangements. Bacchi argues that the assumptions underlying policy arguments need to be carefully scrutinised. Policy dynamics can best be understood by ‘problematising’ the assumptions, interests and values underlying each viewpoint, and by identifying the likely impacts of adopting one position rather than another (Bacchi, 2009). Her critical analysis of social policy fields reveals some of the hidden interests and value assumptions embedded in mainstream social policy programs, including youth welfare, drugs policy, immigration, education and equal opportunity.

According to the policy analysis literature, policy debates always include key moments when the nature and scope of problems are intensely disputed and redefined (Dery, 1984). The contest over problem definitions and priorities evolves over time, constituting the contemporary public policy agenda. This agenda-setting process is crucial, because it shapes the selection of issues deemed worthy of attention, the manner in which they are considered, the nature of solutions regarded as feasible and supportable, and ultimately the pattern of winners and losers in various policy fields (Kingdon, 1995; Stone, 2012). Agenda-setting involves the exercise of power and influence, conducted through a contest of ideas and interests. For example, in responding to crises and emergencies, political leaders seek to influence how the media portray the nature of the challenges and how the proposed solutions are publicly defined, in order to avoid blame and to mobilise coalitions of support for particular policy outcomes (Boin et al., 2009).

In filtering out some proposed courses of action and favouring others, framing contests have real impacts on the policy process. A classic example of why problem-framing matters is to consider how the phrase ‘sustainable development’—originally a policy framework critical of the status quo—became a mainstream goal endorsed across a wide spectrum. Nevertheless, goals and methods of ‘sustainable development’ have become interpreted in radically different ways by corporate interests (who promote business profitability and continuous economic growth) and by ecological activists (who regard protection of natural assets as paramount). Thus the policy debate over how to interpret ‘sustainable development’ has been bitterly polarised between pro-growth advocates and those seeking to protect environmental values (Dovers & Hussey, 2013; Schandl & Walker, 2017).

Framing of policy problems and solutions occurs in specific contexts, necessarily linked to policy histories and the local array of political and economic stakeholders. For example, the problem of ‘gun violence’ has been handled in very different ways internationally. Policy diversity regarding gun control has been evident, even within the OECD group of liberal democracies. In a study of three federal countries—the USA, Canada and Australia—Newman and Head (2017b) showed how political and ideological factors led to very different outcomes. In the USA, a coalition of economic and political stakeholders have entrenched a permissive ‘gun culture’ that allows widespread civil access to weapons. This permissive outcome has been facilitated by an expansive reading of the Second Amendment of the US Constitution, and buttressed through intensive political lobbying by the financially powerful firearms industry. Canada and Australia have been different, despite having had strong rural lobbies advocating for the rights of hunters and sporting shooters. Regulatory controls have been more acceptable in those two countries, and in the case of Australia those controls were significantly tightened through a concerted political and legislative response to mass shootings in 1998. The Australian regulatory approach was recently influential in New Zealand, which suffered a mass shooting in a mosque in 2019 (EveryPalmer et al., 2020). Response to a tragedy can generate diverse policy pathways, dependent on the interplay between actors in various political and institutional contexts and their contest of ideas (Béland & Cox, 2011).

#### Discourse analysis is a prerequisite to understand the potential effectiveness of policy

Kate Anderson and Jessica Holloway, 18, PhD and Associate Professor at Arizona State University; Senior research fellow at Australian Catholic University, “Discourse analysis as a theory, method, and epistemology in studies of education policy” https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329912399\_Discourse\_analysis\_as\_theory\_method\_and\_epistemology\_in\_studies\_of\_education\_policy/ekc

Discourse analysis as a theory, method, and tool has illuminated ways that education policy is messy and dynamic. Evaluative approaches to policy analysis might be appealing to policymakers and other government officials due to their supposed promise of efficiency and accuracy. However, discourse analytic approaches offer analytic and practical complementarity via their demonstration of the complexities of policy development and the context-dependence of policy effects. As such, discourse analysis offers invaluable tools for understanding the ‘how’ and the ‘why’ of education policy (rather than just the ‘what’ or ‘whether’), especially as policy landscapes and networks are shifting to more global terrains and relationalities (Ball 2012; Rizvi and Lingard 2009).

In this article, we have argued that acknowledgement of conceptual definitions and theoretical and epistemological stances are paramount toward establishing methodological coherence that allows for the continued creative and productive uses of discourse analysis to push the field forward. Our argument follows Rabinow and Rose’s (2003) call to treat ‘indeterminacies, contingencies and difference as assets rather than as disconfirming evidence that feeds into already established logics of “science” and established logics of “justice”’ (13, as cited in Webb and Gulson 2015, 46). Therefore, our effort is not to ‘tame the wild profusion of existing things’ (Foucault 1970, xv, cited in Lather 2006, 36), but rather to illustrate the complexity of the various ways discourse analysts structure and execute their projects in order to study educational policy. It would seem that there are as many ways of doing this as there are people who do it, which is itself not problematic. However, our conclusions from the analysis of these 37 articles is that complications in terms of theoretical and analytical coherence might prevent the promise we expect from our collective and individual work. The analysis of literature presented here took years to complete and only brings us through articles published in 2014. With the proliferation of discourse analytic studies focusing on education policy in the ensuing years increasing exponentially, the field is rife for further analysis of this dynamic and evolving sub-field from 2015 onward. We hope that this initial consideration can help identify the conceptual boundaries between operationalizations of discourse and policy, epistemological assumptions informing methods and findings, and ontological stances on the purpose and promise of research. Yet, we remind readers that these categories are never fixed, and that cracks and fissures within and between them always provide potential ‘site[s] of being and becoming’ (Lather 2006, 52) to emerge.

#### Language is its own creator and creation—the absolutization of language creates an ontological negotiation, excluding existence beyond the world language has created

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Since we are investigating the underlying principles that give rise to a specific kind of world, we shall look at language through the lens of what language does, that is, what it produces when it is used. Any time we put forward a linguistic statement, every time we express a linguistic unit, we are suggesting to our interlocutors that a certain figure (an object, property or relation) be admitted as legitimately present in the world. The interlocutors' acceptance of our linguistic utterance as meaningful, grants legitimate presence in the word to the suggested figure- thus making it available to be employed in the larger game of linguistic exchange and recombination. The same happens in a soliloquy or at the level of one's conscious thinking - though the rapidity with which we accept our own linguistic proposal as plausibly present in the world, tends to obfuscate this questioning process. And of course, the same also applies to cases in which the utterer or interlocutor is not a human, but a machine.

In this sense, language's production is fundamentally ontological, consisting in a continuous negotiation on which figures could or should be included in the catalogue of the world. Every linguistic unit thus takes on the form of a candidature and of a proposition. Equally, the world becomes the negotiating table onto which the figures of our daily experience are alternatively granted or denied legitimate ontological status as ‘present’. In this sense, language functions as a way to manage what entities make it onto the catalogue of the communicable and operable layer of reality.

However, when language is taken absolutely, that is when it is unbound (ab-solutus) from any external constraint or from any other principle outside itself, the world that it creates suddenly becomes the only possible ontological field. When language becomes absolute language, its cosmogony ceases to be just one possible way of looking at the world (namely, in terms of which figures have a legitimate presence in it, as communicable and operable items) becoming instead an all-encompassing terrain. Outside of it, nothing is permitted; outside of negotiated linguistic ‘presence’, nothing is allowed, not even existence as it stands ineffably in itself. Existence is substituted by presence, and its stability is taken over by the negotiating process of language. Language creates the world in its own image, and when it becomes absolute, suddenly there is no longer outside the world.

The process of ontological negotiation that normally takes place at the level of language, now becomes fully internal to language itself; it is no longer an extra-linguistic interlocutor that accepts or rejects candidates to presence in the world, but it is the very fabric of language that absorbs or rejects possible figures as they emerge from language itself. In the state in which it becomes absolute, language presents itself as supposedly uttered by no mouth; rather, it is claims to be at once its own creator and creation. *“I suo fattore non disegno di farsi sua fattura.”* Equally absolute language presents itself as unrestrained by any specific extra-linguistic localization; a linguistic figure can take place anywhere within the field of language, and, what is more, can do so simultaneously in multiple instances. Taken in its absolute form, language thus condenses that principle of seriality which we observed in its symptomatic manifestations in the first chapter, during our discussion of measure as the geometric centre of Tehcnic’s historical force.

To better elucidate the quality of language as understood absolutely, let us bring in our first example of an archetypal incarnation of a hypostasis. The archetypal incarnation of the first hypostasis in Tehcnic’s chain of emanations, consists in a suggested equivalence between truth and representation, according to which: *truth is representation and representation is truth.* We can find this equivalence at work in countless aspects of our contemporary experience of the world, in all fields of human activity. Let us unpick it piece by piece, starting with its first element: truth.

For the sake of brevity, and being aware of endorsing one possible definition over others, we can that predicating the truthfulness of something, means claiming that something is ‘the case’. If I say that it is true that a brick’s colour is red, for example. What I mean is that ‘it is the case’ that red is the brick’s colour. If I say that is it true that something happened, I mean that it ‘is the case’ that it happened, and so on. This might appear at first as merely a matter of plain description; yet, if we consider truth as a mechanism within a cosmogonic force, the extent of its influence will soon become apparent. Considered ontologically, truth’s reference to something ‘being the case’, takes the place of something simple ‘being’. By assuming the truth-mechanism as a crucial element in the architecture of a cosmogonic force, we witness a shift from a condition in which ‘existence’ was the most basic attribute for something to be able to enter reality, to a condition in which this attribute becomes its ‘being the case’. In metaphysical terms, we can say that this is a passage from a world of ‘things’, to one made up of ‘states of affairs’. This passage is pregnant with the consequences on several levels. While something can ‘be’ or ‘not be’ just in itself, the fact of its ‘being the case’ or ‘not being the case’ relies entirely on an external sanction. For something to ‘be or not the case’, we require both a context within which their ‘being or not the case’ takes place, and an enunciation of their truthfulness or falsehood as states of affairs. Whatever ‘is or not the case’, relies entirely on the enunciation that sanctions its claim, and on the context within which such claims to truthfulness or falsehood is meaningful. Thus, while ‘things’ can exist fully and autonomously, states of affairs are present only precariously and subordinately. Namely, they are subordinate to the sanction bestowed upon them by the linguistic context within which they are suggested as taking place. This aspect of truth, adopted as an ontological principle, refers to the way in which, within language taken absolutely, things are reduced merely to the ‘being the case’(or, as we called it in Chapter 1, ‘activation’) of a grammatical position. Within absolute language, things are reduced to states of affairs that require the series in which they are inserted, both to acquire signification and to be enunciated. In themselves, before the series ‘speaks’ them and makes them present within itself, they are nothing at all, since they don’t even reach the stage in which they can be discussed in terms of existence and nonexistence. We have seen in the previous chapter how this abstract mechanism translated in the daily functioning of historical series such as those of finance, big data, neuroscience, citizenship and so on.

### 2NC---AT: Threats Real

#### National security threats suggested by the state are amplified and presented as facts by the media --- Iraq war proves that the media fails to check the government or present anti-war viewpoints because of their desire for profit

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From the media entity decision equation, U(v) = X (r, + nal) - [(1 - (c + f,)], ri is a composite for viewer emotion and is comprised of patriotism, security threat perceptions, and humanitarian justice; nal is perceived utility in attacking a security threat first; c, is the media's perceived current period loss for inaccurate reporting or for not providing diversity; f, is the possible future loss for biased and inaccurate reporting; and X is the likelihood that the Executive's security threat advocacy is real.365 The equation probes potential discord between constitutional aspirations for the news media as a purveyor of political discourse and corporate media profitability obligations to shareholders and suggests that a media entity could view departing from the industry status quo and investigating and challenging the government's security threat allegations as a move that risks losing viewership-which it must avoid at all costs.3 66

Prior to the 2003 Iraq War, top Bush Administration officials proffered hundreds of unequivocal threat claims in the media, and the media broadcasted allegations as fact while ignoring antiwar positions and dissent.3 67 Media positions of advocacy and repetition of official and quasiofficial sources' arguments converged and drowned out alternative views to generate an extremely pervasive prowar bias in the news media.368 Rhetoric and polls intimated that nal and ri were positively related and high and that the perceived cl was low due to median viewer perceptions. 369 Media entities may have individually assumed that they would earn a higher utility payoff by declining to challenge threat allegations or provide more diverse viewpoints.

After the invasion of Iraq, it became clear that there were no chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and no connections between al-Qaeda and Hussein's regime-and that the Bush Administration's intelligence estimates about Iraq were thoroughly wrong, unreasonably relied upon, and based on details and sources hidden by White House classification prerogatives. 37° Many news entities and journalists acknowledged the American media's poor performance, particularly for uncritically accepting the Executive's security threat proclamations and the unverified accounts of Iraqi defectors.3 71 The nearly diurnal government message was unequivocal and false (X was 0). If the news media had been held accountable, the cost side of the equation, [(1 - X)(cl + fn)], could have imposed enormous consequences for conforming to the Bush Administration's expectations and uncritically reporting on its unsubstantiated security threat allegations-but that was not the case.

The news media refused to impose any reverberating cost on the Bush Administration and largely accepted the shift from justifying the invasion of Iraq on the basis of security threats to Americans (Hl) to justifications based on liberating Iraqis (u) and blind patriotism (a). 372 Further, the news media was complicit in generating ambiguities through participation in the embedded reporter program, where reporters endeavored to be the first to announce that prohibited weapons had been discovered but rarely followed up to dispel false positives 373 and through reliance on military analysts kept on a short leash by the Bush Administration, who provided patriotic, prowar commentary disguised as impartial sourcing.374 After the invasion, the effect on the composite emotion variable (ri) was that 11 dropped because there was no verified security threat, while patriotism (a) and humanitarian justice (u) were elevated with the ex post facto liberation rationale.

Perhaps confirming the logic behind the model interaction, the American media coalesced again at uncritical reporting during the invasion and occupation;375 for this, the future cost (fn)-after the security threat perception (X) was finally disproved-was citizens' profound irritation aimed at the entire news media industry. Media entities experienced the repercussion of a share in a temporary loss of trust in the entire industry. 376 Consider this: a poll conducted during the post-Watergate 1970s-a time of near-peak cynicism-indicated that about 25 percent of the American public trusted the media.377 In 2005, after the media's failure to investigate and defuse the Bush Administration's false security threat allegations, only 12 percent of Americans had confidence in their news media.378

Citizens would assuredly not favor false information saturation over truthful and trustworthy information,3 79 but given the possibility that news media entities' reporting could span a spectrum that included the extremes of being lapdogs for the Executive or watchdogs as the Framers intended,3 0 could President Bush have been able to anticipate the news media's obeisant performance when choosing to initiate an agenda-setting blitz in September 2002, or even prior to his State of the Union Address in January 2002?81 This analysis suggests it is highly probable. A media system with dominant corporate conglomerates that amplify the same general "facts" in a comparable manner across national, regional, and local media sources is apt to beget uniformity in perspective and may utterly fail to check the government. Profitability interests may accordingly restrict dissent and curtail, chill, or silence speech that should be promoted in the public interest. This failure may be even more likely in a national security threat scenario due to concerns about appearing sufficiently patriotic and informational asymmetries that result when the evidentiary bases of security threat allegations are classified. It is not clear that there are currently any viable catalysts that would goad the media to perform differently in a security threat scenario; if, in a similar situation in the future, a scofflaw regime without firm factual justifications to substantiate its policy agenda chooses overly aggressive security threat agenda setting, the outcome-American use of military force in costly, debilitating, and illegal ways-might be predictable or even inevitable.

## Links

### 2NC---AI

#### The framing of an AI arms race is dangerous---turns the case--it creates a self-fulfilling prophecy and wrecks any safety precautions

Stephen Cave 18, Stephen holds a PhD in philosophy from Cambridge University, “An AI Race for Strategic Advantage: Rhetoric and Risks,” January 2018, AI Ethics and Society 2018, Volume 1 [\\pairie](file:///\\pairie)

The Dangers of an AI Race for Technological Advantage: In Rhetoric and in Reality What is so bad about framing the development of AI in terms of a race for technological advantage? After all, it is widely agreed that AI brings enormous potential benefits across many sectors. One recent report estimated that it could add £232 billion by 2030 to the UK economy alone, with healthcare one of the sectors most enhanced, potentially bringing faster, better service to consumers (PwC 2017). There is a widespread belief that competition and other market forces are central to such innovation. So in as much as a race to develop AI technology means these kinds of benefit come sooner, we have reason to view it positively.

But at the same time, the development of such a potentially powerful new technology will need to be steered if it is to be as beneficial as possible while minimising the risks it might pose (Crawford and Calo 2016). In the words of the Future of Life Institute’s open letter on ‘Research Priorities for Robust and Beneficial Artificial Intelligence’, signed by over 8,000 people including many leading figures in AI, work should focus “not only on making AI more capable, but also on maximizing the societal benefit of AI.” (Future of Life Institute, 2017a). The danger of an AI race is that it makes exactly this thoughtful steering towards broadly beneficial outcomes more difficult.

Three Sets of Risks

We want to distinguish between three sets of risks:

i) The dangers of an AI ‘race for technological advantage’ framing, regardless of whether the race is seriously pursued;

ii) The dangers of an AI ‘race for technological advantage’ framing and an actual AI race for technological advantage, regardless of whether the race is won;

iii) The dangers of an AI race for technological advantage being won.

(i) Risks Posed by a Race Rhetoric Alone It is possible that the trend towards ‘race for technological advantage’ terminology in AI, including suggestions such as Vladimir Putin’s that the winner of such a race “will become the ruler of the world,” could pose risks even if the race is not pursued in earnest, let alone won. We perceive two main risks here:

(i.a) The kind of thoughtful consideration of how to achieve broadly beneficial AI, as mentioned above, will require subtle, inclusive, multi-stakeholder deliberation over a prolonged period. The rhetoric of the race for technological advantage, with its implicit or explicit threat that dire consequences will follow if some other group wins that race, is not likely to be conducive to such deliberation. Indeed, rhetoric around technological superiority (such as the ‘arms race’ rhetoric used in the Cold War in the US), played into what has been called a politics of fear, or a politics of insecurity -- that is, a political climate that discourages debate in favour of unquestioning support for a prescribed agenda (Griffith 1987). In The Politics of Insecurity, Jef Huysmans argues that use of the language of security (by which he means militarised language, which would include ‘arms race’ and related rhetoric) “is a particular technique of framing policy questions in logics of survival with a capacity to mobilize politics of fear in which social relations are structured on the basis of distrust” (Huysmans 2006).

(i.b) Second, if the rhetoric of a competitive, ‘winner takes all’ AI race is used in the absence of an actual race, it could contribute to sparking such a race.

(ii) Risks Posed by a Race Emerging

If the rhetoric of a race for technological advantage became an actual race to develop sophisticated AI, the risks increase further:

(ii.a) First, there is the risk that racing to achieve powerful AI would not be conducive to taking the proper safety precautions that such technology will require (Armstrong, Bostrom, and Shulman 2016). We mentioned above the need for broad consultation about the role AI should play in the life of a community. This might help address important considerations such as avoiding biased systems, or maximising fairness. But in addition to these goals, serious attention must also be given to ensuring humans do not lose control of systems. Such considerations become particularly important if AI approaches general intelligence or superintelligence (Bostrom 2014), but also long before, particularly when AI systems are performing critical functions. The risk is that as the perceived benefit to winning the race increases, so correspondingly does the incentive to cut corners on these safety considerations.

(ii.b) Second, a ‘race for technological advantage’ could increase the risk of competition in AI causing real conflict (overt or covert). Huysmans argues that militarised language such as this has “a specific capacity for fabricating and sustaining antagonistic relations between groups. In the case of the race for technological advantage, it encourages us to see competitors as threats or even enemies. The belief that a country intends in earnest to win an AI race, and that this would result in technological dominance, could, for example, prompt other countries to use aggression to prevent this (akin to the cyberattacks made against Iranian nuclear facilities attributed to the US and Israel) (Nakashima 2012), or motivate the targeting of key personnel (precedents -- though specific to their historical context -- might include Operation Paperclip, during which over 1,600 German scientists and engineers who had worked on military technology were taken to the US (Jacobsen 2014), or the apparently ongoing operations to encourage the defection of nuclear scientists between nations) (Golden 2017). Such scenarios would also increase the risk that a general race for technological superiority became increasingly a military AI arms race.

(iii) Risks Posed by Race Victory

The third category of risks of an AI race for technological superiority are those that would arise if a race were won. We will not explore these in detail here -- and the forms they take will anyway depend on the precise nature of the technology in question. But as an example, these risks include the concentration of power in the hands of whatever group possesses this transformative technology. If we survey the current international landscape, and consider the number of countries demonstrably willing to use force against others, as well as the speed with which political direction within a country can change, and the persistence of non-state actors such as terrorist groups, we might conclude that the number of groups we would not trust to responsibly manage an overwhelming technological advantage

#### The alternative solves the AFF---we can develop AI minus their framing of it as an arms race

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Alternatives to a Race Approach

If we are not to pursue (and talk about pursuing) AI development as a race, then how should we pursue (and talk about pursuing) such development? This is too big a topic to consider thoroughly here. But we note these promising directions for alternative narratives around progress in, and benefits of, AI:

AI Development as a Shared Priority for Global Good

As advances in AI find application to an ever-wider range of scientific and societal challenges, there is a burgeoning discussion around harnessing the benefits of AI for global benefit. This reflects a widespread view among AI scientists and a growing number of policymakers that AI presents tremendous opportunities for making progress on global societal ills, and aiding in tackling some of the biggest challenges we face in the coming century -- among them climate change and clean energy production, biodiversity loss, healthcare, global poverty and education. Emphasising these benefits could counteract a race approach in a number of ways: First, if there is global scientific consensus that some of the key aims of AI should be to benefit humanity in these ways, then it becomes less important in which companies or countries key breakthroughs occur. Second, it makes clear that cooperation on the development of AI stands to result in faster progress on these pressing challenges. Lastly, if the aims of the field are to benefit humanity worldwide, then the global community represent stakeholders in the process of AI development; this narrative therefore promotes inclusive and collaborative development and deployment of AI.

Cooperation on AI as it is Applied to Increasingly Safety-Critical Settings Globally

The next decade will see AI applied in an increasingly integral way to safety-critical systems; healthcare, transport, infrastructure to name a few. In order to realise these benefits as quickly and safely as possible, sharing of research, datasets, and best practices will be critical. For example, to ensure the safety of autonomous cars, pooling expertise and datasets on vehicle performances across as wide as possible a range of environments and conditions (including accidents and near-accidents) would provide substantial benefits for all involved. This is particularly so given that the research, data, and testing needed to refine and ensure the safety of such systems before deployment may be considerably more costly and time-consuming than the research needed to develop the initial technological capability.

Promoting recognition that deep cooperation of this nature is needed to deliver the benefits of AI robustly may be a powerful tool in dispelling a ‘technological race’ narrative; and a ‘cooperation for safe AI’ framing is likely to become increasingly important as more powerful and broadly capable AI systems are developed and deployed.

#### Turns case---the rhetoric of the AI arms race causes the development of unsafe AI---we become more accepting of risks and accelerates to hyperwar

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AI Competition and the Security Dilemma

Even if military AI spending does not rise to the level of an “arms race,” many nations are nevertheless engaged in a security competition in the adoption of military AI, a competition that does pose risks. The situation that states find themselves in with regard to AI competition is much more accurately described as a security dilemma,16 a more generalized competitive dynamic between states than the more narrowly defined “arms race.” In his 1978 article, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” Robert Jervis defined the security dilemma as follows: “[M]any of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others.”17 As Charles Glaser has pointed out, it is not obvious from this definition why it would be intrinsically bad for an increase in one state’s security to come at the expense of another’s security.18 In fact, decreasing the security of other states could have beneficial effects in enhancing deterrence and reducing the risks of aggression or achieving a favorable balance of power in a region, which could lead to greater political influence. The problem comes in the second- and third-order effects that could develop when another state reacts to having its security reduced. Responses could include counterbalancing with a net effect of no change in security (or worsening security). Glaser argues that there are some situations in which security competition is a rational strategy for a state to pursue even if competitors will arm in response. In other situations, arming may be a suboptimal strategy for a state, which would be better served by restraint or pursuing arms control.19

Security competition could even leave both states worse off than before. This can occur during a traditional arms race if nations expend vast sums of money in an unsuccessful attempt to gain an advantage over one another, with the result that both nations divert funds from non-defense expenditures. If the outcome of a security competition is the same relative military balance as before, the balance of power may not have meaningfully changed, but both nations could face diminished economic and social well-being at home relative to if they had avoided a security competition. Even absent this “guns vs. butter” tradeoff, however, there are other ways in which security competition can lead to a net negative outcome for both states.

One way this could occur is if military innovation and the development of new capabilities alter the character of warfare in a manner that is more harmful, more destructive, less stable, or otherwise less desirable than before. In his 1997 article, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” Glaser gave the example of military capabilities that shifted warfare to a more offense-dominant regime.20 There are other ways in which warfare could evolve in a net negative direction as well. For example, in World War I, Germany’s interest in developing and deploying chemical weapons was spurred in part due to fears about France’s developments in poison gas.21 The result was the introduction of a weapon that increased combatant suffering on both sides, without delivering a significant military advantage to either. The same could occur with AI: It could alter the character of warfare in a way that would be a net negative for all participants.

An Accelerating Tempo of Warfare

One possibility for how AI could alter warfare in a manner that would leave all states worse off would be if it accelerated the tempo of war past the point of human control, making warfare faster, more violent, and less controllable. There are advantages to adding intelligence into machines, but given the limitations of AI systems today, the optimal model for achieving the highest quality decision-making would be a joint human-machine architecture that combines human and machine decision-making. One way in which machines outperform humans, however, is in speed. It is possible to envision a competitive dynamic in which countries feel compelled to automate increasing amounts of their military operations in order to keep pace with adversaries. Then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert O. Work summed up the dilemma when he asked, “If our competitors go to Terminators and we are still operating where the machines are helping the humans and it turns out the Terminators are able to make decisions faster, even if they’re bad, how would we respond?”22 This is a classic security dilemma. One state’s pursuit of greater automation and faster reaction times undermines other states’ security and leads them to similarly pursue more automation just to keep up.

If states fall victim to this trap, it could lead to all states being less secure, since the pursuit of greater automation would not merely be an evolution in weapons and countermeasures that simply leads to the creation of new weapons in the future. At some point, warfare could shift to a qualitatively different regime in which humans have less control over lethal force as decisions become more automated and the accelerating tempo of operations pushes humans “out of the loop” of decision-making. Some Chinese scholars have hypothesized about a battlefield “singularity,” in which the pace of combat eclipses human decision-making.23 U.S. scholars have used the term “hyperwar” to refer to a similar scenario.24 While the speed of engagement necessitates automation in some limited areas today, such as immediate localized defense of ships, bases, and vehicles from rocket and missile attack, expanding this zone of machine control into broader areas of war would be a significant development. Less human control over warfare could lead to wars that are less controllable and that escalate more quickly or more widely than humans intend. Similarly, limiting escalation or terminating conflicts could be more challenging if the pace of operations on the battlefield exceeds human decision-making. Political leaders would have a command-and-control problem in which their military forces are operating “inside” (i.e., faster than) their own decision cycle. The net effect of the quite rational desire for nations to gain an edge in speed could lead to an outcome that is worse for all. Yet, competitive dynamics could nevertheless drive such a result.

One state’s pursuit of greater automation and faster reaction times undermines other states’ security and leads them to similarly pursue more automation just to keep up.

Financial markets provide an example of this dynamic in a non-military competitive environment. Automation introduced into financial markets, especially high-frequency trading in which trades are executed at super-human speeds in milliseconds, has contributed to unstable market conditions that can lead to “flash crashes,” in which prices rapidly and dramatically shift.25 Financial regulators have responded by employing “circuit breakers” that automatically halt trading for a pre-determined period of time if the price moves too quickly.26 Financial markets have the benefit of a regulator who can force cooperative measures on competitors to address suboptimal outcomes. Under conditions of anarchy in the international security environment, any such cooperation would have to come from states themselves.

The dynamic of a competition in speed is like an arms race, if we expand the definition of an arms race to be more in line with biological examples of competitive co-evolution. Biologists often use the metaphor of an arms race to explain “an unstable runaway escalation” of adaptation and counter-adaption that can occur in animals.27 This can occur between species, such as predator and prey, or within species, such as males evolving in competition for females. Biological arms races can manifest in a variety of ways, such as competitions between predator and prey with regard to camouflage vs. detection and armor vs. claws, as well as speed, cognitive abilities, poison, deception, or other attributes that might increase chances of survival.28 This broader biological definition of an arms race is more in line with the potential for an escalating “arms race in speed” among nations that leads to greater automation in warfare. While this concept does not meet the traditional definition of an arms race in the security studies literature, it is nevertheless a useful concept to describe the potential for a co-evolution in speed that leads to no net relative advantage and in fact may leave both sides worse off.

Race to the Bottom on Safety

A related risk of a “racing” dynamic among competitors could come from an acceleration, not of the pace of operations on the battlefield, but of the process of fielding new AI systems. AI systems today have a host of safety and security problems that can make them brittle, unreliable, and insecure.29 Because machine learning in particular can create new ways in which systems can fail, militaries face novel challenges in adopting AI systems.30 Militaries will have to adopt new methods to test, evaluate, verify, and validate AI systems (also known as TEVV).31 Such concerns related to autonomy are well known in the U.S. defense community,32 although at present they have not been solved to a satisfactory degree. Machine learning introduces additional challenges with regard to testing, evaluation, verification, and validation. A rush to field AI systems before they are fully tested could result in a “race to the bottom” on safety, with militaries fielding accident-prone AI systems.

There are strong bureaucratic and institutional imperatives for militaries to field systems that are robust and secure. Indeed, designing systems to military specification standards often means making them more robust for a wider range of environmental conditions and shocks than comparable commercial systems, even at the expense of other aspects of performance, such as size, weight, or usability. AI presents novel challenges, however, in achieving the robustness needed for operating in the complex, hazardous, and adversarial environments that often characterize military operations.

Certain AI methods today, such as deep learning, remain relatively immature with significant reliability challenges. A 2017 Department of Defense report by the JASON scientific advisory group explained that deep neural networks

are immature as regards the “illities”, including reliability, maintainability, accountability, validation and verification, debug-ability, evolvability, fragility, attackability, and so forth. … Further, it is not clear that the existing AI paradigm is immediately amenable to any sort of software engineering validation and verification. This is a serious issue, and is a potential roadblock to DoD’s [Department of Defense’s] use of these modern AI systems, especially when considering the liability and accountability of using AI in lethal systems.33

The Defense Department’s 2018 AI strategy calls for building AI systems that are “resilient, robust, reliable, and secure.”34 Yet, the current state of technology makes achieving this goal particularly difficult for AI systems that incorporate deep learning, a subfield of AI that has seen significant growth and attention in recent years. While there is active research underway to improve AI safety and security, militaries will have to adapt to the technology as it currently is, at least for the time being. An ideal process would be for militaries to engage in experimentation, prototyping, and concept development, but also to subject AI systems to rigorous TEVV under realistic operational conditions before deployment. Taking shortcuts on testing and evaluation and fielding a system before it is fully tested could lead to accidents, which, in some settings, could undermine international stability.

In evaluating new technologies, militaries may be relatively accepting of the risk of accidents, which may lead them to tolerate the deployment of systems that have reliability concerns. In building and fielding new capabilities, militaries have to weigh the possibility of an accident occurring against other concerns, such as forgoing valuable military capabilities. The military operational environment is fraught with risk, in both training and real-world operations. Military institutions balance managing this risk with other factors, such as the need for training, developing new capabilities, or accomplishing the mission. Military institutions view casualties from training accidents or testing new capabilities as a tragic but unavoidable part of the business of preparing for war. Militaries expect high performance from their forces, often while they are performing dangerous tasks, but militaries neither demand nor expect accident-free operations in most settings.35 From 2006 to 2020, over 5,000 U.S. servicemembers were killed in non-war related accidents, the majority of which occurred within the United States. Accidents overall accounted for nearly 32 percent of U.S. servicemember deaths during this period, and even accounted for a significant portion of servicemember deaths in Iraq (19 percent) and Afghanistan (16 percent).36 These accident rates are not unusual for the U.S. armed forces. This is business as usual. Accidents draw the attention of senior military and civilian officials when a spate of accidents occur in a short amount of time — such as a series of aircraft crashes,37 ship collisions,38 or training accidents.39 Yet, as one report on naval accidents from 1945 to 1988 notes, “peacetime naval accidents are a fact of life.”40 The same is true of military air and ground operations. Other nations’ militaries may do an even poorer job of managing risk when it comes to accidents than the U.S. military. For example, the Soviet/Russian submarine community has a much higher accident rate than the U.S. submarine community.41

#### Their threats are definitely misrepresented---there is no AI arms race to be won---the scale of spending is not enough to constitute an arms race

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Current Military AI Competition Is Not an “Arms Race”

As Heather Roff has written, the arms race framing “misrepresents the competition going on among countries.”5 To begin with, AI is not a weapon. AI is a general-purpose enabling technology with myriad applications. It is not like a missile or a tank. It is more like electricity, the internal combustion engine, or computer networks.6 General-purpose technologies like AI have applications across a range of industries. Wired magazine co-founder Kevin Kelly has argued that it “will enliven inert objects, much as electricity did more than a century ago. Everything that we formerly electrified we will now cognitize.”7

Nations may very well be in a technology race to adopt AI across a range of industries. AI will help to improve economic productivity and, by extension, economic and military power. During the industrial revolution, early adopters of industrial technology significantly increased their national power. From 1830 to 1890, Britain and Germany, which were both early industrializers, more than doubled their per capita gross national product while Russia, which lagged in industrialization, increased its per capita gross national product by a mere 7 percent over that 60-year period.8 These technological advantages led to increased economic and military power, most notably for Europe relative to the rest of the world. In 1790, Europe (collectively), China, and India (including what is now Pakistan and Bangladesh) held roughly the same shares of global manufacturing output, with Europe and India each holding about one-quarter of global manufacturing output and China holding roughly one-third. They all had approximately equivalent levels of per capita industrialization at that time. But the industrial revolution skyrocketed European economic productivity. By 1900, Europe collectively controlled 62 percent of global manufacturing output, while China held only six percent and India less than two percent. These economic advantages translated into military power. By 1914, Europeans occupied or controlled over 80 percent of the world’s land surface.9

Being ahead of the curve in adopting AI is likely to lead to significant national advantages. Although AI can increase military capabilities, the more consequential advantages over the long term may come from non-military AI applications across society. Long-term benefits from AI could include increased productivity, improved healthcare outcomes, economic growth, and other indicators of national well-being. Increasing productivity is especially significant because it has a compounding effect on economic growth. Over the long term, technological progress is the main driver of economic growth.10

The scale of military AI spending, at least at present, is nowhere near large enough to warrant the title of “arms race.”

Of course, AI can also be used for weapons. Militaries around the world are actively working to adopt AI to improve their military capabilities. Yet the militarization of AI does not, at present, meet the traditional definition of an arms race, despite the rhetorical urgency of many national leaders. Michael D. Wallace, in his 1979 article “Arms Races and Escalation,” defined an arms race as “involving simultaneous abnormal rates of growth in the military outlays of two or more nations” resulting from “the competitive pressure of the military itself, and not from domestic forces exogenous to this rivalry.” Wallace further stated that the concept of an arms race only applied “between nations whose foreign and defense policies are heavily interdependent” and who have “roughly comparable” capabilities.11 AI is being adopted by many countries around the globe.12 Arguably at least some of the dyads, such as the United States and China, meet Wallace’s definition in terms of being nations with “roughly comparable” capabilities, locked in competition, “whose foreign and defense policies are heavily interdependent.” However, AI fails the arms race test in the critical area of spending.

Wallace distinguished arms races from the normal behavior of states to improve their military forces. A state that adopts a new technology and modernizes its military forces is not automatically in an arms race, under Wallace’s definition, even if the modernization is aimed at competition with another country. The decisive factor in qualifying as an arms race, according to Wallace, is the rate of growth in defense spending. Wallace characterized arms races as resulting in abnormally large growth rates in defense spending, beyond the historical average of 4 to 5 percent annual growth (in real dollars). In an arms race, annual growth rates are above 10 percent or even as high as 20 to 25 percent.13 Other scholars define arms races using different quantitative thresholds — and some definitions lack clear quantitative thresholds at all — but the existence of rapid increases in defense spending or military forces above normal levels is a common criterion in the scholarly literature on arms races.14

Arms races result in situations in which two or more countries are locked in spiraling defense spending, grabbing ever-greater shares of national treasure often with little to no net gain in relative advantage over the other. Classic historical examples include the Anglo-German naval arms race prior to World War I and the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race during the Cold War. Military AI spending today clearly does not meet these criteria of abnormally large growth rates in defense spending. AI defense spending is difficult to calculate due to the general-purpose nature of AI technology. Unlike ships or ballistic missiles, AI systems cannot be easily counted. Nevertheless, even crude estimates of defense spending show that military AI investments are nowhere near large enough to constitute an arms race. An independent estimate by Bloomberg Government of U.S. defense spending on AI identified $5 billion in AI-related research and development in fiscal year 2020, or roughly 0.7 percent of the Department of Defense’s over $700 billion budget.15 The scale of military AI spending, at least at present, is nowhere near large enough to warrant the title of “arms race.” (Adding in private sector spending, which constitutes the bulk of AI investment, would lead to larger figures but would further belie the claim of an “arms” race since most private sector AI investment is not in weapons.)

#### The K turns the Aff – alarmist narratives in the 1ac is the CAUSE of the US-China confrontation – by securitizing AI, the Aff produces the real threat.

Jinghan Zeng, 8-1-2021, "Securitization of Artificial Intelligence in China," OUP Academic, https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article/14/3/417/6352222#303568932//jc

First, a highly securitized AI sector will affect the flow of foreign AI labor and capital to China’s AI industry. To make it attractive to global talent and capital, a booming AI industry requires an outward-looking, open-minded, and international socio-politico-economic environment. However, the securitization trend is pushing in the opposite direction by producing a rising nationalistic, inward-looking, security AI discourse. This is counterproductive to China’s AI ambitions, because it puts China at a disadvantage in the global market. More specifically, there is a global shortage of AI talent and, as previously mentioned, China is short of 5 million or more qualified AI industry workers. This has led to fierce global competition in the AI industry for qualified workers, to the extent where Chinese tech companies offer extremely—or unreasonably—high salaries.126 Such financial attraction, however, could be offset by an unfavorably nationalistic domestic environment. Second, the securitization trend could hinder economic efficiency. As previously discussed, it contributes to the rise of a self-reliance discourse on technology whose creation is often at the cost of economic efficiency. Precisely because China is lagging behind in AI development, it needs to make use of the global AI supply chain to catch up. However, the self-reliance discourse considers the risk of relying on foreign technology too high, and thus focuses on “Made in China.” Such self-reliance is difficult (if not impossible) to realize in the short run, and hinders China’s ability to benefit from the global AI market and thus maximize industrial efficiency. Similarly, the securitization of AI in the United States also undermines the appeal that America holds for Chinese national AI talent, capital, and technology. Growing tension between China and the United States has, moreover, undermined Chinese companies’ willingness to invest in the United States. In the long run, therefore, securitization is detrimental to the competitiveness of the American AI industry. Third, in connection with the above paragraph, the domestic inward-looking nationalistic trend that securitization has created hinders China’s realization of global leadership. To lead AI in the global arena, China must provide public goods and win support from others through successful partnerships. It must play a key role in promoting global governance and, as a global leader, act according to common interests rather than solely national interests. However, a security-focused, inward-looking, nationalistic AI discourse is helpful to neither global governance nor common interests. For example, it can foster the rise of inward-looking national AI policies that prioritize national interests over those of the globalized world. This is in direct contrast to global governance goals, i.e., to build a shared future through global solidarity. Indeed, many of the problems that AI has created, such as those relating to ethics, represent collective challenges to humankind that require a globally concerted response. Inward-looking national AI policies may contribute to a fragmented global governance structure, and thus obstruct concerted global actions to address AI problems. Fourth, the securitization trend has reinforced technological rivalry at the expense of the potential for global AI cooperation, and will likely exacerbate the United States–China confrontation. This is not to deny the existence of United States–China cooperation in the field of AI. However, by speaking of AI in the language of security and a global race, the relevant security AI discourse emphasizes competition over cooperation and destruction over creation. This may produce a real security threat, and perhaps an actual global AI race, thus undermining the space for cooperation from which both the United States and China can benefit. In other words, the rivalry discourse adopts a zero-sum geopolitical angle for understanding AI innovation that is inevitably to the latter’s detriment in both countries.127 More importantly, securitization may push AI further into the hard security area by virtue of its military applications. The securitizing actor tends to exaggerate the security threat to achieve a successful securitization, so enhancing the strategic risks of AI military practices and increasing the likelihood of war, and of escalating ongoing conflicts. In this regard, a highly securitized AI politics may set China and the United States on a dangerous path towards a catastrophic confrontation that imperils everyone’s interests and security. In the worst case scenario, as in all arms races, blithe assertions about the inevitability of AI-enabled war are a self-fulfilling and self-defeating prophecy. In this regard, the aforementioned Fu Ying’s call to regulate AI’s military application merits more attention. Lastly, by strengthening state involvement in China’s AI industry, securitization may undermine the interests of Chinese AI companies. The boundary between the state and the market is always far less defined in China than in other countries, due to China’s political environment. Making AI a national security matter justifies the necessity for heavier state involvement, if not control. Although a blessing in the Chinese domestic market, close ties with the state are a burden on the global stage. Take the aforementioned civil-military integration as an example. Although helpful in gaining China’s AI companies and research institutes more state funding, it undermines their global access. Close relations with the Chinese government have caused certain Chinese AI companies, including members of the “national AI team of China,” to be subjected to punishment, in the form of the aforementioned American sanctions. In this regard, securitization could hinder the access of China’s AI companies to the global market, and hence their future development. It also remains to be seen whether heavier state involvement in the AI industry hinders market efficiency.

### 2NC---Biotech

#### Biotechnology is an ethnicization of security--shapes the production of knowledge and truth

**Rychnovská, 16** --- (Dagmar Rychnovská- Charles University In Prague and Metropolitan University Prague, Czech Republiccorresponding Author, "Governing dual-use knowledge: From the politics of responsible science to the ethicalization of security", 8-5-2016, SAGE Journals, https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010616658848)//mishelle

Managing the risks of techno-scientific progress is unique neither to life sciences nor to contemporary politics. However, existing concerns over a potential misuse of scientific research were given a new meaning and salience in the post-9/11 environment with the rising fears of hostile non-state actors. In comparison with that of the Cold War era, though, the current focus is less on nuclear physics or technologies related to conventional weapons and more on emerging technologies that are more accessible and thus more attractive for potential terrorists. This article has pointed out that, as part of this development, more and more attention is given to the regulation of knowledge, and it has explored how knowledge politics plays out in life sciences, where these concerns have gained great prominence. It has found that the attempts to secure potentially dangerous research and innovation are based on redefining the principles and practices of scientific responsibility and transforming an **ethics-based system of governance into a technology of security, and has suggested understanding this phenomenon as an ethicalization of securit**y. However, building a ‘culture of responsibility’ as a technology of security may raise tensions both within the scientific field and between scientists and society and breed a ‘culture of insecurity’. The prevailing all-embracing approach to the security governance of science does not help in this regard either. Instead of providing better understanding of the ‘threatening’ issues at stake, along with their contextualization and prioritization, it shifts the attention to action – that is, how to effectively ‘secure’ science. This further reinforces the role of apparently apolitical expert decisionmaking processes and downplays debates on how relevant these issues are, who shall decide on them, on behalf of whom, and how. Especially in undemocratic settings, the introduction of similarly motivated policies may be prone to the misuse of power in academia and have unforeseen consequences (see Schiermeier, 2015). The implications of ethicalization for the ontology of science will be explored in further research. For science as a cognitive domain, ethicalization may lead to changing the criteria for the validity of knowledge – that is, the norms and practices defining how scientists observe the world, produce truth claims about its functioning and reflect on the process of knowledge production. By shaping the meaning of scientific progress and tying it more closely to the neoliberal risk–benefit framework, ethicalization is also related to shifting the attention to ‘desired’ objects and methods of research while downplaying others. As such, it may contribute to constructing new scientific taboos narrowly defined by material rather than social factors. However, the question is not only how ethicalization shapes the ‘production of knowledge and truth’ in science, but also what status this knowledge is to have under the new social contract for science. This raises further questions: How does the turn to state-imposed self-regulatory modes of governance affect the role of science in society as well as the functioning of the academic field? How does it affect the practices of security expertise and the prospects of politicizing and potentially resisting security? And how does the dynamic of ethicalization vary across different disciplinary fields and (political) contexts? To move beyond the simplistic understanding of scientific knowledge as a double-edged sword, it is important not only to better understand the functioning of science, but also to reflect on the interplay among science, politics and security in which the current concerns over dual-use research are situated. More critical engagement with this topic can not only move the debate on dual-use research, but also provide new inspiration for the social scientific research on security.

#### US securitization of terror causes state follow-on AND excessive use of violence – Bush administration proves

Ellen Edman 19, Evaluator in civil preparedness at MSB (Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency), B.S. at Lund University, 2019, “Can securitization be just? A case study of the U.S securitization of bioterrorism post 9/11”, Lund University, <https://www.lunduniversity.lu.se/lup/publication/8977756>\\iris

Critique has been directed towards the U.S after the consequences of the global War on Terror have been unveiled. The security policy of the Bush administration has been described as a deeply illiberal means, for achieving liberal ends (Singh, 2014: 117). The security measures described in the previous section will be discussed with regards to how harmful they were to the referent object, bystanders and the aggressor.

The consequences of the securitization will be compared to the imminent risk of a bioterrorist attack. As mentioned before, 50 kg of anthrax could kill 250.000 people in an urban city. Human extinction is not very likely as a consequence of bioterrorism, especially not with anthrax since it is not contagious. However, it has been estimated that it would not be difficult to smuggle five bags of anthrax, containing 50 kg each, into the U.S. If five bags were to be efficiently dispersed in five major cities, the casualties could amount to over a million. Such a coordinated attack would completely overwhelm the U.S medical system. This is the threat the U.S was dealing with and acted to prevent (Millett & Snyder-Beattie, 2017: 380, Davis, 2004: 303).

The War on Terror that took place primarily in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan entailed large numbers of casualties. The wars fought by the U.S and its allies, have caused somewhere between an estimated 480.000 and 507.000 casualties. This number includes the deaths of not only civilians, but every death related to the violence of the War on Terror in 2001-2018. Of course, other estimates have been made of a lesser death toll, but the human suffering and the political destabilization of the region has been extensive (Crawford, 2018: 1-6).

Another impact of the War on Terror is the extended function of U.S intelligence and defense agencies. Interrogation techniques of suspected terrorists escalated in Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib during the War on Terror. These methods do not comply with human rights or international humanitarian law, and the U.S has received critique for it. The PATRIOT Act gave intelligence services more extensive possibilities of monitoring terrorists, which also infringed on the integrity of ordinary citizens in the U.S (NE2, HRW 2004).

A third consequence is the security paradox of the U.S biodefense program. Government spending has increased enormously, by some estimates to 41 billion USD. Most efforts made by the new biodefense program has been benign and reduced the risk of a catastrophe if a bioterrorist attack would occur. If other states saw the U.S activity as a breach of the BWC, the biodefense industry could escalate in other parts of the world. This could cause a security paradox and make the U.S countermeasures counterproductive (Leitenberg et al., 2004: 3, Enemark, 2006: 40).

The U.S biodefense program has not only affected other states and their perception of the U.S. As explained in the introduction, the biodefense program has been expanded to a 30-fold increase of personnel and institutions. Most importantly, 15.000 people had access to BW in 2007, compared to about 100 people at the time of the amerithrax attack. This surely heightens the risk of bioterrorism with agents obtained from U.S biolaboratories (Dudley Miller, 2008: 20).

The evidence presented in this section suggests that the U.S securitization of bioterrorism was very harmful. It has entailed great risks for the U.S population, it has affected innocent bystanders at the sites of the War on Terror, and al-Qaeda terrorists have been inhumanely treated at Guantánamo Bay and Abu Ghraib. Human suffering, infringed integrity and the breach of human rights are consequences caused by the U.S securitization.

#### The discourse of ‘food insecurity’ is one that allows for liberal humanitarian interventions – that alienates the global south as a place to expand the neoliberal system

Melanie Sommerville et al 14, Professor in the Department of Geography, University of British Columbia, Jamey Essex, Professor in the Department of Political Science, University of Windsor, & Philippe Le Billon, Professor in the Department of Geography, University of British Columbia, June 20th 2014, “The ‘Global Food Crisis’ and the Geopolitics of Food Security”, Geopolitics, 19,

The emergence of food security as a pressing geopolitical concern is clearly demonstrated in the popular press, which has carried a steady flow of stories about poor harvests, food shortages, famine, and rising food prices over the last six years. More in-depth studies asking “Could Food Shortages Bring Down Civilization?” and explaining “How Hunger Could Topple Regimes” have appeared in Scientific American and Time, respectively.3 A June 2009 story in National Geographic asserted that the crisis represents a Malthusian moment in humankind’s struggle to feed an ever-growing population, while former head of the US Agency for International Development Andrew Natsios warned of “The Coming Food Coups” in The Washington Quarterly. 4 More recently, prominent environmental commentator and Melanie Sommerville et al. activist Lester Brown identified a “new geopolitics of food,” arguing that the failure to resolve the underlying causes of the 2007–2008 food price increases and volatility meant that “the food crisis of 2011 is for real.” He warns that “farmers and foreign ministers alike” should get ready “for a new era in which world food scarcity increasingly shapes global politics.” This new era of food-insecure geopolitics is driven by familiar ills (for example, “population growth and climate change”) coupled with deepening global inequalities and an international system unable or unwilling to coordinate across the range of policy fronts required to resolve the underlying roots of crisis.5

Yet it is not just the media that is heralding a new era of food-insecure geopolitics, but also mainstream policy narratives. A report to the World Food Program suggested that “food insecurity – especially when caused by a rise in food prices – is a threat and impact multiplier for violent conflict”, though noting it is rarely the direct (and singular) cause of conflict.6 Participants to an FAO Forum on Addressing Food Insecurity in Protracted Crises “emphasized the circular link between food insecurity and conflict”.7 The UN High Level Task Force on Global Food Security, the philanthropocapitalist Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), and many other development, aid, and philanthropic organisations have suggested that there is an urgent geopolitical need for rapidly increased food production through a so-called “new” or “second Green Revolution”, with massive new investments targeted for agricultural production and research in the developing world.8 At a 2012 symposium in Washington on global food security, US President Barack Obama stated that the danger of food riots and price volatility producing global geopolitical instability “will only grow if a surging global population isn’t matched by surging food production.” Investment in agricultural productivity that reduces the incidence of hunger and vulnerability, argued Obama, “advances international peace and security – and that includes the national security of the United States.”9

Although it is unsurprising that concerns about overpopulation, dwindling resources, (under)productivity, and political turmoil are being aired amid the lingering impacts of food price shifts, we assert that such concerns must be critically interrogated. Grounded in neo-Malthusian discourses of eco-catastrophe and the return of environmental determinism (or, as Robert Kaplan put it, the ‘revenge of geography’), such narratives overlook the central role of politics in organising abundance and scarcity.10 They offer a securitised framing of food insecurity, where hunger is seen not only as a politically revolutionary force but also as a fount of secondary problems such as disease, terrorism, illicit drugs and refugees. In such framings, the dangers posed by hunger threaten to reach far beyond the low-income populations and countries in which hunger resides. In doing so, they open the way for liberal humanitarian responses rooted in the nexus of security and development, and which rely on ‘tecFhnologies of betterment’ to resolve the threats posed by hunger and thereby prevent their circulation.11 These efforts Downloaded by [The University of British Columbia] at 09:38 13 January 2016 The ‘Global Food Crisis’ and Food Security 243 and discourses privilege technological solutions to complex conditions of food insecurity, and hinge on the expansion and intensification of liberalised market relations and North-to-South technology transfers, doing little to challenge existing inequalities or limit exposure to economic shocks that threaten livelihoods and contribute to vulnerability, poverty, and hunger. As such they reflect not only the ‘rendering technical’ and ‘anti-politics’ aspects of aid projects, but also more broadly the ‘post-political’ character of ‘common sense’ neoliberal policy debates.12

In this sense, a critical political geography approach towards food crisis narratives can not only help reveal the assumptions and perspectives that frame them, but also how this framing contributes to the reproduction of a conventional agro-food political paradigm. This paradigm is predicated on assumptions drawn from two main realms. On the one hand, it employs the tropes of political realism to construct a world in which combative nationstates are competing in a zero-sum contest for global influence and power, with food security envisioned and strategised as an element of geopolitical risk and calculation. On the other, it re-substantiates the battered but still dominant economic assumptions and practices of global neoliberalism, in which market openness and economic interdependence and connectivity are enthusiastically embraced as policy platforms for advancing food security. Both visions of world geopolitical space envision geographic relationships between people and places in which food insecurity and resultant sociopolitical unrest threaten, respectively, geospatial order and the security of the state and the unimpeded flow of investment and trade upon which capitalist globalisation depends. The resulting ‘neoliberal geopolitics’ frame those people and places that are disconnected from or that lie outside of such flows and systems of accumulation and calculation as gaps, risks, and threats. Security oriented responses reliant on traditional institutions of state power and geopolitical control uneasily intertwine with coercive and unequal forms of neoliberalised economic connection, extending and reproducing the power of dominant institutions and conventional paradigms while excluding other policy approaches and discourses as unfeasible, too expensive, too radical, or simply illegitimate.13

Predictions of rapidly unfolding chaos sparked by unequal access to uncertain food supplies advance a powerful geopolitical view of a world struggling with scarcity, as opposed to inequality and domination, and on the brink of conflict, disaster, and generalised turmoil. Such chaos threatens the vision of ever-increasing stability and growth that has guided the governance of food and agriculture since the end of World War II, a vision of continued improvements in food security premised on the sustained expansion of food supplies through Green Revolution technologies and methods designed to intensify and industrialise agricultural production. The structural adjustment programmes that began in the 1980s and the liberalisation of agricultural trade at the World Trade Organization after 1995 was supposed to stretch the benefits of this system even further through a new supra-national governance and regulatory structure that would bring the benefits of liberalised market dynamics to poor farmers and consumers around the world. In the promised and hoped-for success of these initiatives, food security had little geopolitical relevance. While significant food insecurity continued to exist, especially in many parts of the Global South, this was seen primarily as an economic rather than a geopolitical issue, to be addressed through injections of commodities, technology, capital, or expertise.14 In short, the increasingly hegemonic geopolitical practices of a globalising agro-industrial model were rendered largely invisible by universalising discourses of neoliberal development that depoliticised the model’s social and environmental consequences.

Popular framings of and responses to the current ‘global food crisis’ could challenge these developmentalist discourses by postulating a future marked not by steady progression toward improved food security, cohesive economic integration and international peace, but by deteriorating food security, economic unravelling and political upheaval in the Global South and, potentially, the North as well. The food crisis thus represents a disruption to the existing geopolitical order of global agro-food systems, calling into question established food production and consumption practices and neoliberal framings of food security. At the same time, however, it serves as an opportunity to re-establish some dimensions of neoliberal hegemony, by directing new funding and investment streams into the agro-industrial model, thereby reproducing and expanding the dominant geopolitical order to incorporate new spaces, populations, and agro-food systems (especially but not uniquely in the Global South), in effect turning ‘zones of chaos’ into ‘zones of potential growth’. What the food crisis reveals is the degree to which shifting geopolitical discourses and interventions into global agro-food systems are not just intimately interlinked with the political economy of agricultural production and food consumption, but rather integrally constitutive of this political economy (and vice versa).15

In this context, conceptualising recent shifts in food security as a temporally discrete and global ‘crisis’ is not a neutral framing, but one that risks neglecting longer term and structural drivers of food insecurity, lending legitimacy to securitised forms of intervention and creating new opportunities for capitalist accumulation in the global agro-food system. This speaks to the need to bring a critical eye to shifts in governance resulting from the food crisis, and to situate these amid longer term trajectories of both agrarian change and geopolitical projects and discursive formations. Within this, it is also imperative to examine the opportunities opened by gaps, silences, and failures in the prevailing geopolitical order and to engage critical and radical voices that emphasise alternative geopolitical arrangements, including governance from below and forms of de-globalisation, localisation, and translocal networking based on peasant and consumer power.16

#### Biological weapons framed as a security issue- countries produce biological weapons to inherently protect themselves

**Saunders-Hastings, 14** --- (Patrick Saunders-Hastings- s an epidemiologist risk scientist working with Accenture. With expertise in pandemic preparedness and response, " Securitization Theory and Biological Weapons", Jan 8 2014, E-International Relations, <https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/45317)//mishelle>

Securitization theory is a constructivist approach informing how certain issues become framed through a security lens6 . It offers a useful analytical framework for understanding how, why, and what issues come to be viewed as security threats. Securitization is an active process wherein a securitizing actor, in this case the American government, presents and addresses an issue as an existential threat to a particular group, or referent object7 . In these situations, emergency response measures and extensive resource commitments are considered justified7 . Securitization theory generally promotes desecuritization as preferable because it avoids the negative consequences of securitization, including a heavy-handed state response, reduced democratic accountability, and the narrowing of public choice8 . However, it also recognizes that securitization is sometimes appropriate. Recent considerations of securitization theory identify three criteria that, if fulfilled, justify securitization: an objective, existential threat, a referent object whose protection promotes human well-being, and a response appropriately measured to the particular threat6 . In the case of bioweapons securitization, the second criterion is less controversial, given that the referent object is human population; thus, any harm to the referent object would directly reduce a human well-being. However, the question of whether securitization of biological weapons meets the other two criteria is more contentious. Skeptics may point to Colin Powell’s 2003 address to the United Nations as a case where the biological weapons security threat may have been exaggerated and securitization was promoted for political ends, thereby calling into question the legitimacy of the securitizing actor, the U.S. government. In his speech, Powell made the case for an invasion of Iraq by claiming Iraq had capabilities to produce biological weapons of mass destruction, including mobile bioweapons labs, a claim that later turned out to be false9. Critics also target the policies resulting from securitization, arguing that the capacity of aggressors to carry out large scale attacks causing mortality has been overestimated, calling into question whether an existential threat truly exists and whether the response has been appropriately measured10. Government funding may be seen as unjustifiably skewed in favour of biodefense, defined as the capacity to respond to a biological weapons attack, to the neglect of other key areas, such as endemic and pandemic diseases. For instance, Klotz calculated what is referred as the “likelihood-adjusted mortality” for biological weapons, pandemic diseases, and endemic diseases by multiplying the probability of occurrence by an estimate of mortality were an event to occur11. By comparing these values with government funding allocated to each category, he demonstrated that biodefense receives more funding than its likelihood-adjusted mortality estimate would suggest is warranted11 . However, objections have been raised to this argument. Supporters of biodefense prioritization point to the fact that focusing solely on potential fatalities ignores other issues, such as the negative social and economic fallout from an attack12. Additionally, they point to the possibility that it is more expensive to combat intentional threats, where there will be an explicit effort to circumvent current practices by exploiting weaknesses12. It should also be considered that the probability of one attack is not independent from another, and that an increasing probability of success may elicit more attempts12. To follow will be an examination of whether government spending and policies constitute a justified response to the threat of biological weapons. Securitization is relevant in that it was a way for decision-makers to implement the policies they want and is justifiable to the extent that the programs themselves are necessary and appropriate. Despite other consequences of securitization, such as public fear, political manipulation, and a heavyhanded response, which may give the impression of an overreaction, the reality is that securitization was a means of enabling the implementation of certain policies and programs necessary to respond to the threat of biological weapons.

### 2NC---China Rise [Rogelja]

#### Rhetoric of Chinese as subversive authoritarians locks in violent policymaking and Sinophobia—security concerns conflate business motives with existential threats.

Igor Rogelja ‘20, Max Weber Fellow at the European University Institute and a Teaching Fellow at the Lau China Institute, King’s College Londo, 2-17-2020, "Narrating the China Threat: Securitising Chinese Economic Presence in Europe", OUP Academic, Vol 13, Issue 1, https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article/13/1/103/5739302?login=true //AW

The third discursive pillar in the construction of Chinese FDI as a threat concentrates on the authoritarian polity of the PRC. Of course, the CCP’s authoritarian rule, its poor human rights and civil liberties record, and the subordination of the judiciary and legislative branches to the executive are the defining characteristics of the PRC’s political system that render it the precise opposite of ‘Europeanness’. At the international level, as Holslag has eloquently described, the EU’s liberal agenda and China’s state-centred foreign policy-making have led to a ‘normative incongruence’ between China and Europe which has affected their strategic cooperation.83 The ‘authoritarian other’ logic, however, assumes that China’s behaviour on the international scene could never be compatible with the interests of liberal, democratic European states, or the EU as a whole. We need to point out that the GPPi–MERICS report is the most explicit effort so far to use identity as a basis for threat construction, and serves as the main point of reference in this section. This report stands out as an illustrative example of the erroneous assumptions and potentially harmful implications that ‘othering’ can have in the context of understanding Chinese investment in Europe. We concentrate on this case because we would like to record the transition from a fact-based approach to a discourse of securitising everything—and everyone—Chinese. The most basic function of ‘othering’ in the GPPi–MERICS report is to establish China as a threat not because of what it does but for what it is. This crucial element of the securitising discourse deflects attention from an evidence-based discussion towards a vague interpretation of ‘motives’ based on the CCP’s essential characteristics as an authoritarian entity. In turn, this interpretation provides the prism whereby various incidents can be reconstructed as a threat. It is a tactful logic, which gives an aura of credibility to an essentially non-falsifiable argument that can be summarised as follows: China is an authoritarian state, so whatever it does is potentially harmful. Let’s consider the following passage: … from the perspective of liberal democracies, all areas of interaction with China are potentially problematic and deserve scrutiny. After all, China’s political model is based on an authoritarian regime intent on strengthening a deeply illiberal surveillance state at home while also exporting—or at least trying to popularise—its political and economic development model abroad.84 Ergo, all areas of Europe’s interaction with China have strong political undertones. This ‘othering’ is distinct from recognising what has been described as ‘pluralisation and diversification of the global ideoscape’85—China’s normative impact at a global level. For the authors of this report, China is a threat because of its domestic politics, which the CCP is allegedly exporting. Being deprived of agency, according to the first discursive pillar, and with their economic activities presented as a threat to EU unity, according to the second, Chinese actors are now villainised as possible tentacles of authoritarianism. This is a key step in the process of reframing Chinese investment as an existential issue which requires extraordinary action. But assigning ulterior, dark motives to Chinese actors on the basis of the PRC’s authoritarian system of government is not confined to SOEs, as the report unfolds a logic of limitless securitisation. Indeed, in their effort to substantiate ‘authoritarian advance’, GPPi–MERICS target not just the activities of Chinese intelligence services or companies, but also that of Chinese think tanks, scholars, students, and associations, all of whom are treated as ‘influencing’ tools.86 In doing so, the report makes the dubious leap of assuming perfect success rates for any of the Chinese government’s campaigns aimed at its citizens abroad. Although the report warns in its introduction against ‘a campaign targeting Chinese citizens’, its framing of the problem and suggested policy solutions achieve exactly that: the creation of an environment of suspicion that can legitimise future extraordinary action against individuals. Constructing Chinese activities as a threat is pursued through the instrumentalisation of institutional initiatives and individuals. The activities of Chinese think tanks are discussed under the label ‘Tool 1: China sets up research exchange mechanisms and think tanks in Central and Eastern Europe to influence perceptions and agendas’.87 The first example is the creation of SiLKS (Silk Road Think Tank Network) by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, a network engaging European think tanks that includes, among others, Chatham House, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), the France China Committee, the Fundación Alternativas, the Institute of Development Studies, and the Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The report does not explain how the creation of a loose network will influence the research impartiality and integrity of these reputable institutions, nor why engagement of this type is a source of concern. After all, interactions between think tanks from democratic and authoritarian states are neither new nor a China-specific phenomenon. What is more, the institutional affiliations of Chinese think tanks are well-known and taken into consideration by European counterparts when developing joint projects. The example of SiLKS is followed by a consideration of the China–Central and Eastern European (China–CEE) Institute, a think tank known for openly promoting China’s BRI in the 17 + 1 framework. The authors of the GPPi–MERICS report claim that the China–CEE pursues ‘track 1.5 exercises’, involving ‘exchanges tak[ing] place behind closed doors’. The lack of evidence to substantiate the effectiveness of these activities and the presentation of routine public diplomacy as harmful to EU interests demonstrate that these reports offer a discourse for policy consumption, rather than fact-based analysis. Similarly, the section on knowledge production and lobbying (‘Tool 2’) uses random examples that fail to amount to more than a set of standard practices, such as employing lobbyists and local ‘experts’ to promote Chinese interests in the EU’s multifarious policy-making process. In an effort to provide some evidence to support their discourse, the authors refer to events organised by the Chinese Mission to the EU, the annual Europe–China forum, and the involvement of China Daily in broadcasting them.88 However, once again the reader needs to try hard to discern how these activities, involving official actors openly affiliated to the Chinese government, constitute anything more than standard public diplomacy efforts similar to those undertaken by many third countries within the EU. The third institutional tool, titled ‘China shapes academic programs’, discusses the CCP’s alleged determination to ‘control how China is taught and studied in Western academic institutions. The authors refer to controversies surrounding Confucius Institutes (CIs hereafter) in the US and Europe, particularly their clumsy censorship attempts. The problematic nature of the CIs is a well-discussed topic that has indeed drawn considerable criticism. Many studies have shown significant variances of experience as regards the operation of CIs, and that attempts to use them as anything other than their stated role have met with recipient universities’ determination to protect academic freedom,89 particularly when CIs have been egregiously ham-fisted, as was the case at the European Association for Chinese Studies (EACS) conference in Portugal in 2014.90 As Hartig91 has argued in his examination of CIs in Europe, Oceania, and Africa, by attempting to project a state-sponsored image of China, CIs are compromising their effectiveness in increasing China’s soft power. Hubbert,92 in an ethnographic study of CIs as soft power tools, reaches the same conclusion; when teachers side-lined official teaching guidelines and material, putting aside propaganda content, they were more effective in communicating an appealing image of China. Put differently, the more political CIs are, the less effectively they operate as soft power mechanisms. Yet, the GPPi–MERICS report makes no mention of these important findings in relation to CIs, as this would weaken the sense of urgency it aims to create. ‘Othering’ is ultimately extended to Chinese nationals (the fourth ‘tool’), particularly university students, who are identified as potential agents of the CCP. The report concentrates on the activities of the Chinese Students and Scholars Associations (CSSAs), a network developed under the auspices of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office that has gained visibility in the US and Australia with high-profile (counter-) protests during visits of the Dalai Lama, the 2008 Olympic torch relay, and demonstrations by dissidents on minority rights.93 The authors employ the same tactic of lumping together non-EU related examples with certain minor incidents within EU member states to create an exaggerated sense of imminent threat. Characteristically, they confound probability with intent: While there have not been as many cases of CSS-related retaliation in Europe as in the US, it is possible that this trend might feature more prominently at European institutions in the future. These incidents represent an escalation of Chinese government tactics … 94 These descriptions are accompanied by a map titled ‘The CCP Could Mobilise a Critical Mass of Europe-Based Nationals Organised in Chinese Students and Scholars Associations’ that shows the number of CSSAs in European countries, essentially instrumentalising members of these associations as CCP tools. We are not oblivious to the fact that the CSSA has been involved in controversial activities. However, such examples are scarce (very few have taken place within the EU95) and cannot justify the exaggerated threat perception advocated by the authors of this report. What is more, research on the role of Chinese students’ associations as ‘soft power’ mechanisms96 demonstrates that they face significant limitations, similar to those of CIs. However, GPPi–MERICS operates under the assumption that Chinese nationals have a significantly enhanced potential for political action compared to others. This is evident in the polemic language used, with references to China’s assumed ‘retaliation’ and ‘escalation’, especially since 2012. The authors do not take into consideration that many student societies are formed on the basis of nationality, and engage in political activities on European campuses, even in coordination with their respective embassies. GPPi–MERICS imposes the authoritarian other lens that renders even inconsequential acts—for instance, Chinese students formally complaining about an invitation to a Falun Gong practitioner and Human rights activist to give a talk at Durham97—as evidence of China’s authoritarian advance. Under such an interpretative context, providing evidence of the actual influence and effectiveness of these ‘tools’ becomes unimportant. Lastly, ‘othering’ is also applied in relation to European actors: governments, businesses, news agencies, academic and research institutions, and individuals. As early as 2009, the first version of the ‘China Audit’ ECFR reports categorised EU governments according to their China-policy preferences,98 while the recent GPPi–MERICS study identified ‘willing enablers’ within European elites and opinion setters.99 These references include justified criticism against populist politicians who use China to legitimise their illiberal views, but they also target European newspapers and agencies as vehicles of Chinese propaganda, accusing them of carrying content that is ‘prepared and controlled by China’s party-state media’, thus ‘spread[ing] China’s concept of journalism’.100 The evidence provided is, once again, incoherent, including lists of European media carrying the supplement ChinaWatch, and various media forums organised on a national basis. The authors represent every instance of engagement as evidence of China’s instrumentalisation of European media, disregarding their critical reporting on China’s domestic affairs. Going a step further, the Association for International Affairs (AMO) study, funded by the National Endowment for Democracy, presents a ranking of domestic ‘opinion setters’ in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary, including journalists, political scientists, economists, businessmen, business analysts, artists, publicists, translators, and sinologists, according to their positive or negative attitudes towards China.101 But whereas elected politicians and businessmen need to be scrutinised, the targeting of non-political and non-business actors as pro-China opinion setters raises concerns about the perceptions created, including potential damage to one’s professional reputation. This labelling, the ultimate practice of ‘othering’ is a worrying development that we expect to see in a more intensified form as Chinese FDI in Europe is increasingly discussed in security terms. Lastly, the GPPi–MERICS’s continuous distinction between ‘independent’ and ‘dependent’ China expertise in Europe creates the impression that sectors of the academic and research community on the continent perform propaganda functions.102 Having neglected to provide any further justification for this claim this repeated statement casts an unacceptable shadow of suspicion over the entire scholarly community of Chinese Studies in Europe. Taken as a whole, the othering discourse on China’s institutional initiatives glues together incidents of limited importance, disregarding both their actual (in)effectiveness and the resilience of European democracy. Ultimately, there is no justification for such an alarmist tone. On the contrary, we are concerned that if othering practices are adopted widely, they may fuel Sinophobic policies and social attitudes that will challenge the already repeatedly questioned liberal foundations of the EU and limit the debate on EU–China relations to a speculation regarding the motives of the involved parts. For the time being, the vast majority of think tanks examined are careful in this regard. However, the GPPi–MERICS and AMO cases demonstrate that the transition from fact to extreme discourse-based policy discussion is simple once the securitising prisms are applied. Indeed, considering the hardening political discourse of (mainly north-) European leaders in the past few years, it is not difficult to imagine that ‘othering’ will be used more extensively in efforts to securitise Chinese investment.

#### Securitizing Chinese economic dominance dooms policymakers to failure and displaces a focus on legitimate risks—single minded focus and discursive feedback loops locks in false threats.

Igor Rogelja ‘20, Max Weber Fellow at the European University Institute and a Teaching Fellow at the Lau China Institute, King’s College Londo, 2-17-2020, "Narrating the China Threat: Securitising Chinese Economic Presence in Europe", OUP Academic, Vol 13, Issue 1, https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article/13/1/103/5739302?login=true //AW \*ableist language omitted

The first step is to identify the role and space of think tanks in a securitisation move. In this regard, Sjöstedt11 proposes an empirically observable conceptualisation of the securitising move as ‘the public framing of an issue as a national threat, accompanied by a strategy for action’. She further draws our attention to the initial stages of this framing process12—what Kingdon calls the elusive ‘pre-decision processes’ that led to policy-makers’ adoption of proposals.13 Sjöstedt and Kingdon thus offer a more nuanced view of the securitisation process which permits us to pin down the think tanks' role and importance. Think tanks are not decision makers, yet participate as securitising actors in the process of idea formation and bidding, ultimately helping to articulate a securitising frame of reference that resonates with decision makers. In our case, think tanks operate as securitising actors to an audience of EU and national-level decision-makers, whose involvement is necessary for the securitising move to be carried forward. The success or failure of such a securitising move depends, according to Sjöstedt, on decision makers ‘internalising’ idea-frames that constitute something as a threat.14 Here, she gainfully redeploys the concept of ‘idea entrepreneurs’ who use their authority to give credence to the idea frame and insert it in the discursive space around an issue initiating the internalisation process by decision makers.15 Sjöstedt’s understanding of the securitisation move, however, is somewhat linear and can, therefore, miss the complexity of agency involved. In Balzacq’s analysis, the success of securitisation depends on the audience’s predisposition to a securitising narrative on one hand, and the securitising actors’ competency on the other.16 For both these processes to work, therefore, the ‘idea entrepreneurs’ must not just ‘say’ security, but also possess a recognised level of expertise and have access to an audience that is positively predisposed to their message—in our case the institutional cachet accorded to top think tanks and their inclusion in internal briefing papers for MEPs. What is more, the ‘idea entrepreneurs’ of the ‘China threat’ argument do not operate in a vacuum, nor are their audiences passive recipients of their message. Instead, we identify a process of securitisation that is bidirectional and discursive, involving agency by both decision makers and securitising actors. This allows us to conceptualise the securitisation move not only as a final outcome of a linear process, but as a dialectical construction of a common frame of reference. In this frame, policy entrepreneurs and decision makers sharing a certain predisposition to an issue start to discuss it in the same language, what Balzacq conceptualises as ‘congruence’.17 Essentially, think tanks offer specialist narratives that enable decision makers to crystallise their policy preferences, so explaining the credence given to the European ‘China Threat’ variant. That several European leaders, including Angela Merkel, Emmanuel Macron, Sigmar Gabriel, and Jean-Claude Juncker, have made pronouncements congruent to the output of the think tanks does not mean they were ‘convinced’ by a unidirectional process, but that a common interpretive platform is emerging that understands Chinese economic presence as a threat requiring extraordinary responses. As a result of this congruence, the European ‘China threat’ discourse is already legitimising policy initiatives targeted against China. It also continues to fuel policy debates in Brussels and other European capitals that call for further action, in the form of economic protectionism, or more direct interventions by security apparatuses to Chinese companies, in effect producing what Hanneman and Huotari call ‘downward convergence’18 with China. But the most disquieting element in this discursive congruence is that it is becoming increasingly axiomatic, and thus ‘[deprives]’ the parties involved to alternative explanations that empirical evidence may suggest. The screening mechanism’s single-minded focus on security and public order19 also ignores legitimate areasof concern such as environmental protection and sustainability. We believe that the emergence of such a unidimensional discursive space around Chinese investment is ultimately harmful to the EU’s ability to respond to the challenges arising from China’s expanding economic presence, and may have negative implications for its traumatised cohesion.

#### Conflating the rationality of Chinese economic actors with the CCP’s political aims lead to serial policy failure—obfuscates the real motives that drive effective policymaking.

Igor Rogelja ‘20, Max Weber Fellow at the European University Institute and a Teaching Fellow at the Lau China Institute, King’s College Londo, 2-17-2020, "Narrating the China Threat: Securitising Chinese Economic Presence in Europe", OUP Academic, Vol 13, Issue 1, https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article/13/1/103/5739302?login=true //AW \*ableist language replaced in brackets

Pillar 1: Centralising Agency The rapid rise in Chinese outward FDI into Europe has reached a historic point and surpassed the reverse annual flows of capital since 2010, yet in cumulative terms, EU-held investments in China exceed those of Chinese entities by a factor of 2.6, while US-held FDI stock in the EU dwarfs China’s by a ratio of 35:1.30 Rather than size, what the ‘China threat’ discourse problematises is the nature of Chinese investment, which is said to be centrally controlled and subject to the Chinese state’s geostrategic considerations.31 Moreover, as Tingley et al., have shown, opposition to incoming Chinese FDI on grounds of national security is often a vehicle for other grievances,32 while Nyman explains that the securitisation of US energy policy relies on similar, simplistic accounts of strategic competition.33 In this manner, Chinese investment as a whole is transformed into a security threat even when the evidence to support security concerns in individual cases is scant. Establishing privatisations and foreign acquisitions as a threat to economic security in a liberal economic context that promotes the role of businesses vis-à-vis the state in economic activity can be ‘intellectually incoherent’, as BWW note.34 Therefore, securitisation depends on identifying or constructing spill-over effects on politics, military security, society, and environment by ascribing the agency of various actors involved in these deals up the command chain to Beijing. This is not to say China, especially under Xi Jinping, has not promoted narratives of Chinese exceptionalism and reassertion of the party’s control, but such propaganda should not be taken at face value, as it obscures the complex decision-making processes in China proper. ‘Centralising agency’ involves two discursive tactics: (i) subsuming all commercial rationality of Chinese firms into a political frame, and (ii) negating informed rationality on part of the host states or host business partners. In the first instance, centralising agency allows securitising actors to attribute all Chinese economic activity to the machinations of the CCP, so obviating the need to establish factually such a link on a case-by-case basis, and without considering the full set of relevant contingencies, interests, and dynamics. Chinese firms, regardless of ownership status, are cast as agents of the Chinese state, unable to make their own financial decisions and beholden to their political masters in Zhongnanhai. This view of China as a singular entity does not take into account a growing body of literature that understands the Belt and Road Initiative as an inherently decentralised endeavour wherein state-owned enterprises (SOEs), local governments, different bureaucracies, and private companies pursue their own interests, often competing with each other for the centre’s attention.35 The assumption that initiatives such as the Belt and Road constitute a centrally executed conspiracy has a major impact on the way we analyse Chinese economic presence abroad. Because the securitisation of investment relies on establishing ‘spill-overs’, so-called critical infrastructure is especially prone to such a biased interpretation. Thus, in the field of maritime logistics, companies like COSCO are presented as CCP agents taking over Europe’s port infrastructure,36 while emphatically ignoring alternative business explanations. The focus on security achieved through centralising agency, no matter how tenuous, differentiates Chinese from other (state-led) port investment companies, such as Dubai’s DP World, without proposing comparative insights between the effect of investment from different authoritarian states such as the United Arab Emirates or Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, one should consider that during a time of falling profits for shipping operators, port operations remain a highly profitable aspect of the logistics business. In addition, significant overcapacity is predicted for terminal operations globally in the coming years,37 signifying fierce competition among European ports for market shares. Therefore, as the top eight big carrier groups largely determine global cargo flows, a tie-in with a large carrier/port operator like COSCO, particularly for less established ports, presents a viable strategy. Italy’s IAI (Istituto Affari Internazionali) accurately notes that Piraeus’s takeover will increase competition for ports in ‘Northern range’ countries such as Belgium and the Netherlands, but nevertheless frames it as a ‘political and commercial threat’.38 Seen from Piraeus, however, both the 2008 (concession of container Piers II&III) and 2016 (Piraeus Port Authority privatisation) deals had a clear commercial logic.39 COSCO got involved in Piraeus because it was looking for a faster transportation channel for Chinese products, and gradually solidified its commitment to the Greek port, especially since its investment in Naples became unsustainable. An even stronger attempt at securitisation is seen in comparisons of Piraeus to Chinese-run ports outside Europe where the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has occasionally been granted access—with the host country’s permission.40 Absolutely no indications that Piraeus will become a ‘double use’ port hosting the PLAN exist, but framing a Chinese takeover of a port authority as an existential threat to Europeanness is less plausible without linking it to a military (‘a base for Chinese warships’) or political (‘control over host government’) issue. What these reports disregard is that Piraeus often hosts foreign navies, both from NATO and third countries, including Russia, and that the latter have no access to facilities or services that could sustain military action of any kind. The PLAN visits in Piraeus have taken place either under the UN anti-piracy mandate or as part of the evacuation of Chinese civilians from Libya. In addition, the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)’s 2017 report41 makes the unsubstantiated claim that Japanese ships have experienced difficulties when docking in Piraeus, arguing that there is no clear distinction between taking over the management of the Port and sovereign control over it.42 The logic of centralising agency paints any Chinese investment at worst as a security risk and at best as a political one. The creation of such intersubjective meanings in the representation of Chinese companies as agents of a malevolent state blurs the boundaries between ‘technical’, ‘economic’, ‘environmental’, and ‘political’ matters, as well as between sectors and regions, in effect politicising any and all incoming investment. This is especially important when there are clear and valid concerns about the entry of Chinese investors who might fail to comply with EU laws on competition, labour standards, or environmental protection, for example. Yet the securitising logic which lumps disparate Chinese investments and projects together obfuscates rather than illuminates their contingent and complex nature. For example, when Croatia awarded the €270 m Pelješac Bridge contract to China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) in early 2018, it did so not due to direct political pressure or by circumventing public tender rules. Quite the reverse, this moment marked the first successful bid by a Chinese company for an EU-funded project and the culmination of the CRBC’s decade-long effort to progress to public bids in developed countries. The Croatian authorities rejected the losing parties’ allegations of price dumping because even the Chinese offer was significantly higher than the expected tender value set by the Croatian road authority.43 More than the issue of price dumping—a longstanding concern of European industry—what is curious about the case is that the Austrian complainant specifically cited as a key argument in its complaint the interest of the Chinese state in entering the EU market. Accordingly, the bridge regularly features in articles discussing China’s attempts to ‘divide’ the EU44 or spread its influence to Western Balkan states.45 CRBC’s choices, however, seem consistent with the literature on Chinese outgoing investment, which emphasises the efforts of companies to leverage their firm-specific assets to gain market share in advanced economies46—a relatively typical pattern of behaviour with few discernible security aspects. Similarly, COSCO obtained gradual control of Piraeus following two international tenders (in 2008 and 2016), both scrutinised by EU institutions. In fact, COSCO was the sole contender for the 2016 privatisation of the Piraeus Port Authority, one of Greece’s commitments under its 2015 bailout agreement with the EU. China’s construction and infrastructure acquisition spree in SE Europe was thus more about Chinese actors pursuing their business interests within the legal framework of the EU than changing the rules of the game. This is not to say that the entanglement of politics and economics in China is irrelevant, yet denying Chinese firms’ economic rationale provides a singular account of what is a complex form of decision-making. The second thread of centralising agency concerns the role of European states, companies or other actors and treating them as naïve or selfish, dismissing their rational calculations as insufficiently considering China’s ‘true’ intentions. In this vein, the 2016 acquisition of German robotics firm Kuka by the Chinese Midea caused a stir in the German political class, and is heavily used in think tank narratives as an example of technology-stripping by Chinese actors, with the ECFR report even calling it a ‘raid’.47 However, Midea and Kuka executives emphasised the business rationale for the deal giving Kuka access to a huge market ripe for automation in manufacturing.48 Still, in a meeting with German industrialists, Chancellor Merkel reportedly told them that they were ‘naïve’ about Chinese intentions.49 Essentially, by negating the business rationale of the deal the German state politicised competition. In the race towards ‘Industrie 4.0’, both corporate and state actors pursue strategies to ensure their continued competitiveness; these strategies may come into conflict but they are decided by autonomous and rational European actors. The Belgrade–Budapest ‘high-speed’ railway is another case of allegedly naïve governments being ‘duped’ into paying for China’s grand schemes. In this narrative, the railway, built using preferential loans from Chinese banks to Serbia, serves the purpose of creating a logistical corridor from Piraeus to the markets of central Europe at Serbian and Hungarian taxpayers’ expense.50 However, Serbian authorities had scheduled an upgrading of the rail line in question before the idea of a Chinese corridor from Piraeus even existed.51 The importance of the line to Serbia is traceable to decisions made not in Beijing but in Brussels. The TEN-T corridor from Athens to Hamburg bypassed the direct route via Serbia and Macedonia to favour member states Bulgaria and Romania. Imminent isolation from EU-funded infrastructural connectivities explains why Belgrade had been advocating a rail upgrading since the mid-2000s. China wasn’t even the preferred lender, given that plans originally envisaged World Bank participation, while the current upgrading is partly financed by a Russian loan. Rather than being naïve, Balkan countries are using what leverage they can muster in suboptimal surroundings, namely, the flexibility to accommodate bilateral deals by balancing Western and other funders. Unable to rely on EU support, Serbia is a prime case since it should be particularly susceptible to Chinese pressure and could so become a ‘Trojan Horse’ in Europe.52 Yet Chinese influence has so far resulted in just one symbolic gesture53 which illustrates the limitations of Chinese ‘sharp power’54 rather than its reach. Elsewhere, the ‘selfishness’ of European entities is emphasised, as with Italy’s premier shipbuilder Fincantieri. Using suggestive language, a report by the ECFR attempts to construct a conspiratorial web out of Fincantieri’s takeover of French shipyard STX, its joint venture in Shanghai, and a Chinese SOE’s acquisition of a minor Italian yacht maker (Ferretti) without putting forward a shred of evidence. It correctly points out that Fincantieri agreed to share cruise ship production technology, but does not make clear why the business decisions of one Italian firm should subsequently be linked to the takeover of another (Fincantieri was not a shareholder in Ferretti), nor why Fincantieri’s takeover of a French shipyard should be considered a ‘still apparently unrelated development’55 rather than a genuinely unrelated one. The report then goes as far as to characterise Fincantieri’s takeover bid for STX as being done ‘… in a very Chinese way’.56 While we deal with the rhetorical tool of ‘othering’ in a subsequent section, the ECFR report questions the economic rationality of this major (and, incidentally, state-owned) Italian shipbuilder by suggesting that it is selling out cruise ship technology in pursuit of corporate profits. But as this charge is not sufficiently alarmist, the issue of Ferretti’s military speedboat arm is loosely associated with Fincantieri, and the securitising loop is thus complete: European corporate profit-seeking leads to the leaking of military technology to China. Kuka, Serbia, and Fincantieri were following their own agenda—as were the Greek ship-owning elite and the Greek government. Greek ship-owners promoted the idea of COSCO’s presence in Piraeus to both sides, lobbying the Greek government in favour of the 2008 Concession, and playing a crucial role in its successful conclusion.57 The appeal of Piraeus for COSCO increased due to the active support of this key constituency, who were clients of Chinese shipyards and banks,58 and trusted providers of services for COSCO and other Chinese companies.59 The financial benefits for Greek ship-owners, the Piraeus Port Authority, and the Greek economy have since been considerable.60 Similarly, for all Greek governments since 2008, companies like COSCO constitute an important source of investment, especially at a time of financial crisis when privatisation tenders run the risk of low offers. A Chinese company’s bid in such international tenders creates additional competition, which raises the value of the deal for the Greek state. What is more, COSCO’s diversion of container traffic from other European ports to Piraeus could lead to technological upgrading of the Port’s facilities, job growth, and spill-over effects in other economic sectors.61 Issues of reciprocal market access are a longstanding and valid concern of European businesses operating in China. Indeed, the future of EU–China relations will be largely defined by the ability of the two sides to resolve these issues, either through bilateral negotiations or dispute resolution instruments. Yet the discourse presented in the analysed reports does not stop there, rather advocating the upgrading of such concerns to full-blown panic about Europe’s strategic industries and assets being bought, stolen, or neutralised by actors associated with the Chinese Communist Party. This level of analysis conveniently ignores the agency of firms, interest groups, and host states by instead concentrating agency in the hands of the Chinese state. Yet Chinese companies have adapted to dealing with the many practices, voices, legal and business environments, and individual agents across Europe. In a similar vein, European states, companies, and elites have shown a remarkable propensity to think about their own bottom line or national interest. Paradoxically, the centralising agency narrative portrays Chinese actors as subsuming their economic rationality to the state’s political concerns, while European actors are faulted for following particularistic economic concerns instead of collective political interests. As the next section will clarify, the identification of ‘collective’ interests vis-à-vis China is a contested field, and we [cannot afford] to assign the spectres haunting the politics and economy of Europe to Chinese agency or present them as a threat to European security through a one-size-fits-all contextualisation of Chinese investment.

### 2NC---China Threat

#### China threat construction is a self-fulfilling prophecy—Cold War Rhetoric shapes government policy toward China.

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American hawks, especially those of the ‘deep state’ intelligence and defence community, advocate a new Cold War script where China constitutes a progressively serious political threat. This rhetoric has been on the rise over the last couple of years. In the first place, an existential threat is the ideologically and politically antithetical Other. To American hawks, China is an authoritarian regime under Communist one-party rule, which in itself constitutes an existential threat to the free democracy of the United States. For example, the 2017 US National Security Strategy states that China ‘spreads features of its authoritarian system’.115 This mindset is even more apparent in an open letter from former military officials, scholars, and other conservative China watchers to President Trump in 2019, in which they emphasise that China and its Communist party are an existential threat to US values and the US-led world order.116 Meanwhile, it should be noted that although there is a rising rhetoric on ideological differences, it is more about China’s political system itself than the expansive nature of communism so often promoted in the Soviet threat story. In the second place, there is the China Model. In this frame, China represents an authoritarian capitalism, and its great economic success offers other countries an alternative model. This constitutes a challenge to the United States’ free democratic market economy model in the global order. The Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community released by the Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats in 2019 bluntly points out that China will more actively ‘seek to assert China’s model of authoritarian capitalism as an alternative’ for other countries to the Washington Consensus, which may ‘threaten international support for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law’; also that China’s Belt and Road Initiative is a platform to expand China’s ‘global economic, political, and military reach’ and ‘diminish US influence’.117 In the third place is the whole-of-society threat. In this hawkish portrayal, China is taking advantage of the United States’ open environment and political loopholes to gain economic, political, and military benefits, thus threatening US security from the inside. Although this mode of thought has long existed in the China threat discourse, the ‘whole-of-society threat’ concept was coined by FBI Director Christopher Wray during a Senate hearing in February 2018. He said that, in order to replace the United States’ global leadership, China employs not only state institutions but also non-traditional collectors like students and professors to amass intelligence and steal intellectual property rights, so this is ‘not just a whole-of-government threat, but a whole-of-society threat’.118 This narrative template was reinforced in Vice President Pence’s China policy speech in October 2018, in which he said China was attempting to ‘shift American public opinion and public policy’, influence US elections, and fragment domestic interest groups by ‘rewarding or coercing’ agents of influence, such as students, scholars, journalists, and think tanks in the United States.119 One month after the Pence speech, a report from the Hoover Institution echoed this frame by detailing how China has employed agents of influence to influence American domestic politics and policies towards China.120 This narrative was rapidly transposed into government policy. Over the last two years, the visas of certain Chinese scholars have been withdrawn, a number of Chinese Confucius Institutes closed, and the enrolment of Chinese students in certain key areas has also clearly been affected. Military Threat While both China and the Soviet Union are narrated as a military threat, China is largely framed as a regional one rather than a global one. Admiral Philip. S. Davidson, the Commander of US Indo-Pacific Command said in his statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee on US Command Posture on 12 February, 2019: ‘The PLA is the principal threat to US interests, US citizens, and our allies inside the First Island Chain’.121 It should be noted that China’s so-called military threat does not signify that China’s forces have surpassed or actively challenged US military power but rather that China’s military threat arises as long as China can potentially pose a challenge to US military predominance. In this narrative logic, China’s increased military spending, upgrading and expanding of weapons systems and technologies, and overseas deployments to protect its commercial interests, or even the limited access to information on China’s military planning are taken as evidence of China’s rising military threat. This kind of hawkish rhetoric is widespread in annual Department of Defense reports to Congress on China’s military power and in US Defense Intelligence Agency reports on China’s Military Power. One notable feature of the evolving discourse is the growing attention the United States is paying to the PLA’s cyber and nuclear warfare capabilities. Conclusion Rather than the rationalist approach to national security, we adopt a narrative approach to unravelling the narrative process whereby national threats are constructed. Having encountered three successive national rivals since WWII, the United States has constructed three distinctive threat stories to safeguard its hegemonic identity. The Soviet threat consists in the story of two ideologically opposed rivals competing for world domination; the Japan-bashing narrative tells a victimhood story stemming from Japan’s unfair competition. China threat stories, however, are now more complex,conflating a story of US victimhood at the hands of China’s unfair competition, advocated by President Trump,with a widely embedded but malleable epic tale of power competition between a rising power and the ruling power, and a new, ‘deep state’ defence community-propagated Cold War script. All these threat stories have framed what is perceived and what should be done, but they are merely those from among other alternative narratives that eventually gained a dominant position at critical junctures. These socalled national threats are hence no more than narrative constructs in a self-other manner of articulation rather than one of objective existence. Upon examining the narrative templates of US threat stories, we find striking differences among them. The Soviet threat spectrum ranges from the ideological to the political and military domains, and economic challenge is the focus of the Japan threat. But China represents the full spectrum of threats that previously featured in both the Soviet threat story and the Japan-bashing narrative. Upon zooming in, we further find that an ideological conflict constitutes the main thread of the Soviet threat storyline, but that the economic challenge of the China threat outweighs the ideological and political ones. On the political front, the Soviet Union’s totalitarian dictatorship is the polar opposite of liberal democracy, while China is often styled as an authoritarian state—a far less antagonistic wording. As to military threats, the Soviet threat is urgent and global, but the China threat is only a rising and regional one. To counter the economic challenge emanating first from Japan and then from China, the United States adopted different strategies to construct its victimhood story, namely, coining new concepts for Japan, and cashing in on stereotypes for China. In spite of the above-marked differences, however, we can also clearly discern continuity in the United States’ national threat stories. This is reflected not only in the United States’ consistently resorting to the victimhood narrative to counter economic challenges from both Japan and China, and unremittingly cashing in on its widely-shared mythologies and images regarding the Self and Others to achieve resonance, but also, more revealingly, in the underlying logic of US national threat-making. The United States will invariably adopt a zero-sum mindset in making a diametrical self-other story for any country—be it a formidable power with an antagonistic ideology like the Soviet Union, an ally like Japan, or a rising peer competitor like China—that might threaten its hegemonic identity. According to this logic, the American Self is always superior to Others, and articulating the threat confirms its superiority. Not surprisingly, when Others, like Japan or China, challenge its economic primacy, the United States, rather than examining its own problems, will always blame such others for playing an ‘unfair game’. This paper also provides us with a vantage point to appreciate the current debate on Sino–US relations. Clearly, we are in the second half of the critical juncture wherein the question is not whether the United States and China will compete with each other but in which way the competition will unfold, for the bankruptcy of the liberal international order discourse makes it unlikely to revert to yesteryear’s policy of engagement. As the three narrative threads of the China threat stories all point to competition and conflict, and can be self-fulfilling, we may witness increasing tensions between them. Specifically, the Japan-bashing victimhood story can shed considerable light on our understanding of Trump’s China policy. We find that the story President Trump advocates to a large extent matches the victimhood story that the revisionists concocted to deal with Japan in the 1980s. Trump’s rhetoric regarding unfair trade and industry targeting, slapping of trade tariffs amounting to blackmail on both China and US allies, resultsoriented approach to trade negotiation, and the US high-tech stranglehold that curbs or bars investment in the industry by US competitors can all be found in the Japan threat story toolbox. Having pivoted China policy towards conflict, however, there are few indications that Trump wants to act out a Cold War script. In accordance with the storytelling logic, should Trump retain his presidency in the coming election, the trade war will probably not end in a ‘fair’ trade agreement until such time as the US economy far outperforms China’s, because US superiority entails outperformance, failing which the blame must go on unfair play. That is what happened to Japan, that is to say, successive rounds of sanctions and negotiations until Japan drifted into the Lost Decade. China may, moreover, face even greater US hostility to its high-tech industry and investment, as happened in 1980s. These are issues that China’s political nature and growing military may further complicate. But it should be noted that China is not Japan and will neither give in easily as Japan did nor pose a solely economic challenge to the United States. The Soviet threat story also offers insight. Indeed, a new Cold War rhetoric is rising in Sino–US relations narratives in the United States. Hawks in the US defence community, among them congressman like Senators Rick Scott and Marco Rubio, former officials like John Bolton, and to some extent even Vice President Mike Pence and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, have all contributed to the rise of a Cold War mentality. The effect of this Cold War rhetoric is apparent in government policy, such as the barring of visits from certain Chinese scholars and treating Chinese news media as ‘foreign missions’. Although this new Cold War script may sensationalise and aggravate the already deteriorated Sino–US relations, unless major events or crises occur, it seems unlikely to become a grand dominant narrative in the near future. This is partly due to the fact that China, unlike the Soviet Union, does not export Communism, so what Americans are agonising most about now is China’s catching up and the United States’ relatively underperforming economy. Moreover, quite apart from China’s refusal to accept and act on such a script, China has become deeply embedded in the world economy, and its trading partners have little incentive to contain China. The future dominant threat story is hence likely to be a hybrid one that allows cooperation while being open to confrontation.

#### Securitizing against the China threat is reductive and self-defeating—‘China threat’ paradigm risks overreaction.

Abdur Shah 21, Professor at Department of International Relations (IR), National University of Modern Languages, Islamabad, Pakistan, 4-8-2021, "Revisiting China Threat: The US’ Securitization of the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’", Chinese Political Science Review , https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41111-021-00179-0 //AW

The National Defence Strategy (2018, p. 2) cautioned that China (along with Russia) is “now undermining the international order from within the system by exploiting its benefits while simultaneously undercutting its principles and “rules of the road””. According to this line of argument, Beijing’s policies—including its Belt and Road project—are antithetical and harmful to American vision, values and interests at global level (White House 2019; US Department of State 2019b). Simultaneously, the Trump administration insisted that China seeks global predominance by displacing the US as a sole super power (National Defence Strategy of the US 2018; Lynch 2019). Beijing does so by promoting its “repressive vision of world order” (White House 2017, p. 45) and model of “authoritarian capitalism” (Director of National Intelligence 2019, p. 25) as “a “new type” of global governance” even if “the existing system has served the world—China included—very well in the seven decades since World War II” (US Embassy & Consulate in South Korea 2019). In retrospective sense, the US’ portrayal of China’s ambitions under the Trump administration is a revisit to decades-old ‘China threat’ paradigm thriving in the US from time to time. An analysis of the narratives of Trump administration vis-a-vis BRI reveals that the US’ approach actually reflected the ‘China threat’ mindset (Interviews with diplomats from Central Asia and South Asia, June–July 2019, researchers working for Pakistan government, July–December 2019, Douglas Paal, July 2019, Eyck Freymann, August 2019, Li Xing, August 2019, Yiwei Wang, November 2019). Chengxin Pan (2012, p. 23) aptly explains the paradigm. The ‘China threat’ is a fundamental image that casts China’s rise and its international implications primarily in a negative, alarming, and threatening light. It is more than a particular argument, or a singular ‘China threat theory’, as many of its Chinese critics often call it. Rather, it represents a paradigm that, as a lasting normative concern and cognitive habit, both informs and lends coherence to otherwise divergent ways of looking at China in scholarly analysis, government documents, popular culture and mass media. Eminent analysts, researchers, and academics (i.e. Kishore Mahbubani, Fareed Zakaria, Suzan L. Shirk, Danial Drezner, Taylor Fravel et. al., Stapleton Roy, Michael D. Swaine, Susan A. Thornton and Ezra Vogel etc.) believed that under Donald Trump administration, American perceptions of and actions towards the challenge posed by China were increasingly guided by the ‘China threat’ or ‘China scare’ or ‘Red scare’ thinking (Economist 2020; Swanson 2019; Fravel et al. 2019; Waldman 2019; Wong 2019a; Zakaria 2020). There was a palpable understanding running across both the parties (Republicans and Democrats) in Congress and all the departments of government (the State Department, Department of Defence, Department of Justice, Pentagon, FBI and other spy agencies etc.) in Washington concurring that China poses a threat to US on multiple fronts (Reuters 2019b; Economist 2019a, b, c). The Trump administration was at the forefront of stimulating and building on this thinking both at discursive and policy levels. The threat personification at this level was rather sweeping and oscillating and any pattern of China’s foreign policy behaviour could be interpreted as an ultimate threat. Accordingly, a diverse range of China’s policies and initiatives were identified as part of the broader China problem: unfair trade practices; subsidising Chinese businesses and state owned enterprises; 5G technology and risk of espionage; theft of intellectual property and trade and corporate secrets; ‘Made in China 2025’; and off course the BRI reify the threat posed by China to US’ interests. Policy Responses to Counter the Threat BRI The discourse of BRI securitisation was complemented by a set of policy actions adopted by the US government aimed clearly at the containment of expanding Chinese footprints and influence. First, the Trump administration employed the policy of diplomatic and rhetorical dissuasion to cajole and pressurise other countries not to join the BRI (Wong 2019b). Washington’s warnings against the negative consequences of BRI’s infrastructure-based investments aimed to deter the states like Ukraine, Italy, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Kazakhstan from opting for Chinese money. Besides this direct pressure, discursive characterisation of the project itself has profound repercussions on the potential appeal of BRI investments to other countries. As a consequence, China’s soft power image, which is an important component of BRI (Li 2019, p. 42), is time and again put to the test to convince international community that Beijing does not harbour any malign designs with regard to BRI. At second level, the US tried to tackle this challenge through acts of institutional balancing. Washington came up with its own aid programs to outcompete the reach of BRI. In 2018, the US government increased the portfolio of its development finance institution Overseas Private Investment Corporation from $30 billion to $60 billion and passed the Better Utilisation of Investments Leading to Development (BUILD) Act as counter response to China’s Belt and Road project. A new US aid agency International Development Finance Corporation with $60 billion funding was launched to counter BRI in Asia (Lo 2020). Similarly, the US reached out to like-minded countries in the Asia–Pacific to balance China’s increasing influence across the region. Hence, US, India, Australia and Japan revived the “Quad” with this particular policy objective. Finally, Trump officials incessantly tried to undermine China’s BRI diplomacy at the international fora such as the United Nations (Lynch 2019), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (Guardian 2018) and as recently as Munich Security Conference in February 2020. How Far is the Securitisation of BRI Warranted? During the last six years of its implementation, BRI has exhibited ample reasons to question different aspects of this initiative and its methods of functioning. From ballooning debts to unviable projects etc., a familiar pattern of undesirable outcomes has trailed the BRI projects across many of the countries. The US’ viewpoint does identify these issues with BRI rightly but only partially. A critical cross-examination of securitisation approach towards the BRI and ultimately China’s international role as adopted stridently by the Trump administration shows that American approach is far-fetched on many counts across conceptual, empirical and policy spectrums. In addition to general observations, discussions and communications with diplomats, academics, researchers and analysts from a range of countries with links to Belt and Road project help develop the following critique of the US’ approach. Unlike the American Perspective of Zero-Sum Game, BRI is Generally Viewed as an Opportunity by Many, Though Not Without Concerns for Some Strategic, Political and Economic Implications Most of the countries view BRI investments as opportunity to develop critical infrastructure so direly needed across the Asian countries (Interviews with diplomats from Central Asia and South Asia, June–July 2019, researchers working for Pakistan government, July–December 2019, Ngeow Chow Bing, August 2019, Harris Zainul December 2019). In response to American assertions that BRI holds grave risks to the sovereign integrity and economic development of recipient countries and should therefore be shunned, a Central Asian diplomat (2019) observed. Geography is an unalterable force for states. We cannot change our neighbours and the geopolitics of surrounding states even if the US wants us to do so. So we have to work with this OBOR model…The potential significance of OBOR for regions like Central Asia and South Asia is undeniable for us. This thinking stands diametrically opposite to American narratives proclaiming the BRI as ‘predatory economics’ and ‘debt-trap’ diplomacy. There is a genuine reason for that: Most of the BRI members suffer from acute deficit of development infrastructure. According to a much-cited report by the Asian Development Bank (2017), Asia needs whopping annual $1.7 trillion investments in infrastructure through 2030 or $26 trillion from 2016 to 2030 in order to maintain its growth momentum, tackle poverty and respond to climate change. American observers also agree that BRI investments have the potential to bring ‘win–win’ outcomes for both the parties (Interviews with Douglas Paal, July 2019, Joshua Kurlantzick, July 2019, Eyck Freymann, August 2019, James Schwemlein, September, 2019). However, there is an understanding that BRI with all its promising prospects might also hold some economic and strategic implications. Member countries are conscious of the fact that China has likely pinned strategic interests and goals with certain BRI investments in South Asia (Interviews with South Asian diplomat, August 2019, researcher working for Pakistan government, August 2019) or the BRI might further tip the trade balance in favour of China (Interviews with a Central Asian diplomat, June 2019). Still these countries perceive the project primarily as an economic opportunity. The ‘agency’ of Member Countries and Their Domestic Politics has Played Key Role in Evolution and Dynamics of the BRI. The US’ Perspective Ignores that The US’ perspective stands on the assumption that China holds predominant position of “dictating” (Hindustan Times 2017) and “leveraging” (US Senate 2019) its model “in a more muscular manner, demanding other nations become tribute states kowtowing to Beijing” (U.S. Department of Defense 2018b). This notion is flawed both on conceptual and empirical bases. First, the argument that China unilaterally dictates the BRI reduces the ‘agency’ of member countries and their domestic politics to that of a ‘black box’ playing to the sweet wills of Beijing. The argument therefore is reductive at best. In fact, in many cases the incumbent governments of the member countries approach China for investments and assistance. The cases of Pakistan’ Gwadar port and Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port are notable in this respect. In addition, these governments are quite egoistic in assessing the costs and benefits of Chinese money though their interests are more likely parochial in the sense they prioritise their own political capital or survival (Interviews with Eyck Freymann, August 2019, researchers working for Pakistan government, July–December 2019 and Harris Zainul, December 2019; Brautigam 2019). Therefore, it also depends a lot more on the ruling government’s priorities while discussing the terms and conditions of BRI projects with Chinese. (Interviews with a Central Asian diplomat, June 2019, Hong Zhang, December 2019). In similar vein, these countries have adroitly manoeuvred relations with both China and its rival powers, seeking to get aid form both groups while they compete against each other (Markey 2020). Sri Lanka opened its arms to Indian and Japanese offers in the aftermath of Hambantota port deal. Similarly, Pakistan has been warming lately to US and even reportedly tried to assure the latter that Islamabad attaches great significance to ties with Washington and will not allow Beijing to use Gwadar port for strategic purposes (Siddiqa 2019a, b). On the empirical side, BRI does not function as a linear model steered or imposed all the way from Beijing. Member countries enjoy great deal of leeway in implementing, delaying and even leveraging the Belt and Road projects. Domestic politics are a complex of changing regimes, different interest and pressure groups vying for their respective political agendas and interests. The evidence shows that BRI is not immune to vagaries of domestic politics. One of the top officials of China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) confided that after daily Dawn divulged the details of CPEC ‘master plan’ (Husain 2017), the erstwhile government had to downsize considerably parts of the actual plan due to harsh outcry from media and the public (Interview, December 2019). Changes of governments after elections in Malaysia, Pakistan and Maldives had a great deal of impact on the implementation of BRI projects across these countries. Malaysia even halted the BRI projects and then renegotiated the deals with China. In Pakistan, the government of Pakistan Tehreek e Insaf (PTI) explicitly questioned the terms of CPEC deals signed by the previous government of Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (Anderlini 2018). The Chinese side developed many apprehensions and grievances with regard to PTI’s approach towards the CPEC (Interviews with researchers working for Pakistan government, July–December 2019). Unlike the American assertion that China beguiles other countries into trap, member countries are mindful of ceding too much control to China as a result of BRI projects. For example, Pakistan’s invitation to Saudi Arabia to become the third partner in the CPEC (that some thought was done without taking China into confidence) and its withdrawal of Diamer-Bhasha dam from CPEC in November 2017 were motivated by strategic considerations (Interview with a government researcher).Footnote2 Similarly, the newly elected President of Sri Lanka Gotabaya Rajapaksa said (Xinhua 2019) that his government is “not worried about the commercial aspect” of the Hambantota port deal but is “concerned about the security aspect as to whether there are any security lapses. That is what I am discussing with China.” Many of the intricate details of the Belt and Road falls beyond the tight control of China even if the latter would desire to be on the top of everything. In this way the progression and ultimate success of BRI hinges in many ways on the agency of member countries and their domestic politics. Securitising BRI Outrightly is Erroneous and Self-Contradictory for Many Reasons China’s BRI approach has many limitations but the way Trump administration securitised the subject is questionable for some reasons. To begin with, the US hyped and overstated the challenge of BRI and China’s role (Interviews with a South Asian diplomat, August 2019 and researchers and government officials of Pakistan, July–December 2019). The argument that BRI is “predatory” or “debt trap” is not persuasive as it draws its reasoning from a singular case of Hambantota port deal which is more of an exception than a pattern (Interviews with Douglas Paul, July 2019, Eyck Freymann, August 2019, Ngeow Chow Bing, August 2019 and Harris Zainul, December 2019; Freeman Jr. 2019; Swaine 2019). The facts related to that debt-to-equity swap deal are far more complex than the US or other conventional sources have asserted so far (Moramudali 2020). According to Yiwei Wang (Interview, November 2019), “it is a problem but this is the case of a debt not necessarily a trap.” For others, rather than being a debt-trap diplomacy, BRI is “just globalisation with Chinese characteristics” (Brautigam 2019). The notion that China gains influence over other countries by miring them in massive debts stands on self-contradictory footing. Each failing project brings China profound economic and diplomatic liabilities. After all the China’s BRI mantra is based on ‘win–win’ narratives. Hence, this kind of approach would be self-defeating and unsustainable in the long run. The fallouts of Hambantota port deal—in the form of international backlash—for China’s soft image are too enormous to be ignored. As massive debts and unsustainable projects can make China “a victim of its own lending practice and hubris”, the reasoning of the ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ would be a “misreading” of a complex phenomenon (Ferchen 2018). Patronising behaviour of the US’ approach is another issue. The Trump administration presented countries with a binary proposition that China is an imminent threat and the US is the saviour hence they should forsake China for the US. Even though many of the countries have resisted and countered American assertion with argument that BRI is not a debt trap, the US insists otherwise. For instance, Pakistan and Sri LankaFootnote3 have repeatedly tried to dispel the notion that BRI investments are a trap yet the US is parroting the same line with a missionary zeal. Instead of successfully convincing others to eschew the BRI or Chinese assistance, the US risks overreacting to the issue at hand. Finally, the Trump administration’s policy to identify and counter China threat is regressive and counter-productive. The US approach, according to Chas Freeman Jr. (2019), seems to be influenced by Cold War thinking wherein two superpowers could force other countries to take side with either the US or its rival. A broad range of prominent scholars, analysts, and experts agree that the approach to characterise China as an outright threat and consequently counter it is far-fetched and based on overreaction to the so-called threat of China (Beckley 2019; Feigenbaum 2018; Johnston 2019; Joshua 2019; Swaine 2019; Swanson 2019; Fravel et al. 2019; Zakaria 2020; Interviews with Douglas Paul, July 2019, Eyck Freymann, August 2019 and James Schwemlein, September, 2019).

#### Threat constructions of China that rely on totalizing theories of IR are detached from epistemological or ontological foundations—scientific theories crowd out alternative perspectives.

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Securitizing the China Threat as Scientific Theory Within the China threat genre there is a broader range of discursive examples following the scientific mode of securitization. These are mostly scholarly works enacted by academics. Here is a classic “theory as practice” text: Can China rise peacefully? My answer is no. If China continues its impressive economic growth over the next few decades, the United States and China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war. Most of China’s neighbours—including India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Russia and Vietnam—will join with the United States to contain China’s power.40 At the very beginning of this essay, boldly titled “China’s Unpeaceful Rise,” John Mearsheimer, a world-renowned IR scholar, pessimistically predicts the consequences of China’s rise. Mearsheimer’s claim that China’s rise will be “unpeaceful” is clearly in antithesis to the Chinese government’s promise of a “peaceful rise.” In a typical example of the latter, Zheng, a former Chinese official and policy advisor, assures the outside world that “China does not seek hegemony or predominance in world affairs,” and that “China’s development depends on world peace— a peace that its development will in turn reinforce.” 41 People are thus faced with two opposing scenarios for IR in East Asia. Which should one believe? A poststructuralist reading of the above extract suggests that Mearsheimer articulates the China threat theory through the scientific mode of representation. First, there is a process of structural incorporation, whereby the subject of China serves the broader interests of academic enquiry. In short, although this is a serious issue of “hard” security, it is presented as a research topic. The author does not mention the China threat directly in the essay, and his argument develops in a fairly objective tone. Indeed, Mearsheimer emphasizes at the outset the need for a “theory of international politics” that explains the behavior of rising great powers when one tries to “predict” the future of world politics.42 Therefore, the issue of China’s rise and its consequences is fashioned as an academic subject rather than an internationally current topic of passionate debate. In the scientific mode, the China threat is securitized via “scientific” reasoning. In this regard, the referent object is the national security of the United States, the world’s single remaining superpower and its allies. The subject or audience comprises the intellectual elites and, more important, policy makers of the United States and its allies. The securitizers are IR academics and policy analysts, represented in the above extract by Mearsheimer. From the poststructuralist perspective, these agents perform securitization acts by formulating theories, predicting inevitable outcomes, and advocating policy options. As a result, the distinction between theory and practice disappears at this point. To ensure that the issue of the China threat is situated in the relevant epistemic terrain, the proper language must be adopted for academic debate on the existence and nature of the threat posed by China. Mearsheimer thus claims that his argument is based on a “theory” of rising great powers and the effects of their rise on international politics. As students of international politics will immediately recognize, this “theory” is the “offensive” variant of the realist IR tradition, well documented in Mearsheimer’s 2001 book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.43 In this influential study, Mearsheimer presents his argument on the China threat issue with consummate professionalism. He first enumerates the five “bedrock” assumptions of offensive realism: an anarchic international system; the inherently offensive military capabilities of great powers; uncertainty about other states’ intentions; survival as the primary goal; and the rationality of state actors. The combined effects of these assumptions are that great powers tend to be fearful of each other, to rely upon themselves for their survival, and to try by any means to maximize their own power.44 Mearsheimer concludes that this “scientific” logic is generally applicable as an explanation of the behavior of great powers that “seek to gain as much power as possible over their rivals.” 45 The issues of power and knowledge are crucial to the scientific mode. Only certain individuals can lay claim to the “knowledge” that is widely accepted as legitimate. The dominant “knowledge” of global affairs is both “arbitrary” (in the sense that it is only one of many interpretations) and “non-arbitrary” (in the sense that certain interpretative practices predominate worldwide).46 For an interpretation of global affairs to become dominant, it requires power and authority in its field. The epistemological and ontological foundations of interpretations of IR thus matter less than their authority. Due to his well-established reputation worldwide as a scholar of IR, Mearsheimer’s acts of securitization have considerable power and authority. One survey ranks him among the scholars with the greatest influence and most interesting output in the field over the past few decades.47 According to Google Scholar, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics has been cited as many as 3,371 times (as of April 2014). With regard to substantial modality, the main social spheres addressed by the scientific mode of securitization are military and strategic. Unlike China, which defends itself against China threat allegations primarily with reassurances of goodwill, a securitizer, like Mearsheimer, seeks to argue from a “scientific” basis. He reasons that “to predict the future in Asia, one needs a theory of international politics” that is “logically sound.”48 Mearsheimer builds a specific communicative “sign system” in the use of scientific language to make claims to knowledge.49 He speaks from the perspective of a scientifically trained expert in world politics, thus privileging technical language over everyday language. The threat posed by a rising China to international security is reasoned “scientifically” to be inevitable. This raises the question of what practice or activity this use of language is designed to elicit. By persuading readers of the inevitability of a Chinese threat, for example, Mearsheimer may aim to prompt the action perceived as necessary to prevent this threat. According to a survey titled “The Ivory Tower,” published in Foreign Policy, the majority of both academics and practitioners in the United States consider China’s rise to be the most important U.S. foreign-policy challenge.50 Similarly, both IR scholars and practitioners regularly pinpoint East Asia as the region of greatest strategic importance to the United States today and over the next 20 years. Although most IR scholars agree that China’s political influence has not yet exceeded that of the United States, they predict that the chance of war between the two countries will increase from 13 percent in the next 10 years to 23 percent in the next 30 years.51 In the scientific mode, securitizers reason deductively from scientific theory to the existence of a “China threat.” This deductive process entails many instances of “intertextuality,”52 moments at which one spoken or written text alludes to, quotes, or otherwise relates to another. Discussion of the China threat is no longer limited to the world of academia; for instance, the issue has been widely referenced and examined by U.S. journalists in books that have subsequently become bestsellers.53 It is difficult to trace the ways in which academics and policy makers influence each other. However, it is clear that renowned IR scholars like Mearsheimer are influential not only in their own fields but far beyond. Here, knowledge and power mutually reinforce each other. With the increasing popularity of offensive realism and powertransition theory, people in many different professions are alluding to or talking at length about the so-called China threat. In scholarly discussion, policy analysis, and strategic planning, the issue is often taken as a given.

#### The Aff’s framing of “China threat” is part of a broader violent attempt to protect the “American identity”

Qiana Gilkey, xx-xx-2022, "How do speech acts contribute to the securitization of China?," Malmo University, <https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1667683/FULLTEXT01.pdf> //jc

The framing of the ‘China threat’ draws attention to securitization theory as this construction is a distinctive example of securitization. Many are divided on if China actually poses an existential threat. Amongst scholars, the threat China poses is overinflated, while US elites frame China as a genuine threat that should be taken seriously and policies should reflect it. The US-Sino tensions are based in relevance to competition regarding hegemonic status based on the perceived ‘China threat’ from the US. This power shift of China as a rising power can lead to the US and China falling to the Thucydides Trap (Lee, 2019; Mastro, 2018), and there will be a major war during the shift of power. This concept is closely related to the power transition theory which can be operationalized to predict the probability of a war between the two states. While power transition theory is important in understanding the potential for conflict, it does not illustrate why and how tensions arose, much less the effect securitization had on the tensions. It can also lead to a security dilemma in which the US perceives the modernization of China’s military as a threat and challenging its regional hegemonic status (Ambrosio et al, 2020; Jie, 2020). The modernization and advances in military capabilities are not the only way in which the US perceives China as a threat. The ‘China threat’ has been used by the US to protect its interests in national security, the international economic sector, and energy security (Campion, 2020; Nyman, 2014). Campion (2020) and Nyman (2014) use a critical discourse analysis of the energy and cybersecurity sectors to see how they have become intertwined in the construction of China as a threat. Since perceptions of security and insecurity are discursive constructions, it is useful to use speech-acts to uncover how the issues are advanced from everyday politics to high politics (Buzan and Wæver, 2009) and how it constitutes an existential threat. Despite both countries being economically intertwined and cooperative through international organizations and bilateral agreements, China perceives the US as untrustworthy and imposing, while the US views China as a threat in many sectors and a potential challenger to its position as a unipole and regional hegemon. (Nyman, 2014). China is perceived as a threat to the status quo, therefore it poses a threat to the American identity. Chengqiu’s (2020) article does not analyze the US-Sino rivalry in relevance to securitization, but ideational differences and perceptions have been factors that affect the relationship between the two countries. The theoretical framework used is a combination of the cognitive psychology of perceptions and misperceptions by Jervis and social constructivism by Wendt. The data of the American strategy toward China was surmised on four aspects, 7 integrating China into the Western-dominated international economic system, transforming China into a liberal democracy, engaging with China to solve regional and international issues, and preventing China from challenging American hegemony (Chengqiu, 2020: 35). By analyzing the policies towards China from the 1990s to 2020 the results showed how much of a threat China was constructed to be according to each president and if they were competitive or collaborative. The results showed the policies towards China varied according to the perceptions of each president but have progressively become more combative while China’s policies towards the US have been relatively stable. Contrastingly, Almén et al (2021) specifically analyze the perceptional differences between the US and China in three sectors: political, economic, and security. Diverging from Chengqiu, their findings show that the US perceives China as trying to spread authoritarian and communist ideologies and overturn the international order, which China perceives the US as an ‘increasingly antagonistic hegemon that strives for regime change in China’ (Almén et al, 2021: 79). Their position and findings are better suited to this thesis, as the assumption is the US perceiving China as an existential threat that needs immediate attention.

#### The language that we use matters---it contributes to the way we construct the Chinese threat

Qiana Gilkey, xx-xx-2022, "How do speech acts contribute to the securitization of China?," Malmo University, <https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1667683/FULLTEXT01.pdf> //jc

[analysis of Dr. Stephen Roach, a senior fellow at the Jackson Institute of Global Affairs and senior lecturer at Yale University]

In Roach’s quote, the language used is quite interesting. It is not brazen to say Roach is being rather presumptuous by speaking on behalf of ‘the world’ and the perspectives it has on China. The international system and particularly the economic system is dominated by American and Western norms, so while this statement may be true for states in the Global North, the same cannot be assumed of states in the Global South. Therefore, by assuming and stating that ‘the world’ is in an uncomfortable position with China’s growing presence, Roach constitutes a securitizing actor and is attempting to securitize China by framing its rise as leaving the world in an uncomfortable place that may further devolve in the future. This relates to the aspects of American strategy by Chengqiu (2020) by preventing China from challenging its hegemony.

5.1.2 Discursive Practice and Substantial Modality In terms of substantial modality, the threat of the BRI and China is largely concerned with the political and societal sectors. These sectors define existential threats as sovereignty, ideology, and large-scale collective identities (Buzan et al, 1998: 22). Melton speculates that if China assists in the economic development of 68 countries it will lead to stability and positive feelings. This can change the collective identity of a state as the political ideology will be influenced by China’s presence. Buzan et al (1998) note that identities will react and change in response to internal and external developments, therefore the BRI and the presence of China in developing countries in Latin America and Africa might shift the political ideology and identity to reflect more authoritarian and communist ideals. These countries may also become allies with China, thus reducing the amount of global influence the US holds. This can present the opportunity for China to challenge American hegemony not only in Asia but now in Africa and Latin America as well. The potential change in identity and ideology may not be amicable and free of discord; Almén et al (2021) hold that China desired a tributary system and may be using the BRI to produce an ulterior debt-trap policy. Relating back to the epistemic terrain and Roach’s speaking on behalf of ‘the world’ concerning the identity of the international system, post-WWII and Cold War the US was in the position to reshape the international system to represent its needs and strategic interests. China’s BRI is perceived to be a threat to the international identity it had shaped and enjoyed 22 for decades. One of Chengqiu’s (2020) aspects include ‘integrating China into a Western dominated international economic system’ so as not to disrupt the current system. It is perceived that if China reshapes the identity of the system, it will perhaps sway norms that are not conforming to US interests. This does not only concern the restructuring of the economic system, but also is expanded to include the political identity of states in which the BRI operates. The US perceives China as an authoritarian and Communist state having expansionist motives concerning the spread of ideology and ideals, which also concurs with Melton’s statement of states developing positive feelings toward China and their domestic ideologies being influenced by authoritarian principles.

#### ‘China threat’ scholarship creates a self-fulfilling prophecy and enables violence against the Chinese other.

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The concept of the “China threat” is not new; its history in the West is more than a century long. Initially, the implications of the term China threat were primarily cultural and social: the Chinese people and their traditions were portrayed by popular Western writers as malevolent, alien, and threatening to Western culture.1 This depiction remained in the Western imagination and later expanded to include the political realm, in which China was represented as brutal and belligerent, especially during the heyday of McCarthyism or the “Second Red Scare” following China’s regime change in 1949.2 In recent decades, and particularly since the end of the Cold War, the so-called China threat has become a topical issue within contemporary international relations (IR).3 The concept has taken on a more prominent role in Western political discourse—especially, but not exclusively, in the United States—over the past two decades. It not only has been introduced into the public sphere by journalists and other opinion leaders, but has entered the domain of policy through the work of policy analysts and politicians.4 Those concerned by the China threat argue in essence that a rising China poses an increasing, imminent, and real threat both to its neighbors and to far-distant countries. Moreover, this threat is perceived to be comprehensive, with security-related, military, economic, and environmental implications. Naturally, this hotly debated topic has also received scholarly attention. Most researchers have taken either a positivist or a normative approach to the issue of the “China threat.” Positivist studies emphasize causal factors, whereas the aim of normative research is to refute or support a given thesis from a historical and ideological perspective. Both positivist and normative researchers provide theoretical and practical insights into the study of the alleged “China threat,” together with recommendations for dealing with it. Roy, one of the first scholars to address the issue of the China threat from an IR perspective,5 provides a survey of the major arguments on both sides of the debate, including a literature review of neorealist and neoclassical–realist theories of the threat posed by China and policy recommendations for Western governments. Notable original research on the China threat topic has continued to emerge over the years. Taking a more liberal approach, Li argues that the challenge posed by a fastgrowing China to stability in and beyond the Asia-Pacific region depends on the expectations of Chinese policy makers, who operate in a highly economically interdependent environment.6 They are more likely to use peaceful means to settle disputes with neighbors and others if they perceive economic benefits to arise from such a strategy. Other scholars use realist-IR theory (particularly power-transition theory) to contend that the so-called China threat has emerged in the political discourse of the United States and other Western countries in response to the rise of China.7 In another review article, Jeffery argues thought-provokingly for the danger of creating a real China threat through “historical analogies” with previous challenger states.8 For instance, power-transition theorists in the realist-IR school compare China’s threat with that of 19th-century Germany, and adherents of the successor state image theory draw analogies with the Soviet Union. Most of the Chinese scholars involved in this debate take a normative approach to the issue. They focus on two major questions: why the issue of the China threat exists and how to cope with it. Chen argues that from a legal and historical perspective, the China threat allegations made by U.S. politicians, defense officials, and academics are nothing but a reincarnation of the “yellow peril” conspiracy theory promulgated by Tsarist Russia and Wilhelmine Germany in the late 19th century.9 This view is echoed by Shi, who takes a postcolonial approach to interpreting the position of the China threat within Western discourse.10 More directly, Luo challenges the China threat thesis on the grounds that the nature of the international threat posed by China depends on its foreignpolicy strategy rather than on its growing power; as Chinese policy makers have exhibited little inclination to challenge international peace and stability, the China threat argument is unfounded.11 In terms of policy recommendations, Chinese scholars such as Chen, Feng, and Jiang suggest that the Chinese government should win trust from other states by making its peace-loving foreign strategy clear and participating more actively in the international community.12 A few researchers diverge from the mainstream response to this issue. Oliver Turner, for example, highlights the ideational rather than material factors in the processes of representing the China threat complicit in the U.S.–China policy.13 He argues that the main purpose of these processes is to create a threatening Chinese identity, foreign to that of the United States, to trigger actions that reinforce the binary opposition between the two countries. Before Turner and in the same vein, Pan takes a poststructuralist discursive approach to interpreting the role of the China threat within the U.S. political discourse. He focuses on the “discursive construction of otherness” by which China is fashioned as a “threatening, absolute other” to the “US-led evolutionary scheme.”14 Much of Pan’s discussion of this issue is devoted to real policy implications, namely the risk that considering “theory as practice” in U.S. policy will give rise to a real “China threat.”15 He further expands his scope of enquiry by deconstructing the Western representation of China’s rise. To him, dominant Western perceptions of China’s rise tell us less about China and more about Western self-imagination and its desire for certainty.

### 2NC---Climate

#### The alarmist climate security narrative presented of the 1ac generates massive skepticism – causes emerging countries to reject the plan which crushes solvency

Jeroen Warner, Ingrid Boaswageningen University, Netherlandscorresponding Author, 3-13-2019, "Securitization of climate change: How invoking global dangers for instrumental ends can backfire," SAGE Journals, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2399654419834018//jc>

By strengthening the climate security coalition, more pressure was put on those states still needing to make ambitious mitigation commitments during the UNFCCC negotiations on the post-Kyoto Framework. The primary countries the FCO targeted at that time were the US and the emerging developing countries (FCO, 2007: 71). But these emerging countries were precisely those overtly rejecting the security narrative on climate change, criticizing the move to discuss climate change in the Security Council during the UN Security Council debates on climate change in 2007 and 2011, and expressing great scepticism regarding alarmist security framings on climate change. To counter the security discourse on climate change, the Brazilian delegation for instance argued: ‘…utmost caution must be exercised in establishing links between conflict and the utilization of natural resources or the evolution of climate on our planet’ (UNSC, 2007: 20). Similar comments were made by other emerging countries, such as China and India, and received support from other developing countries who see climate change as a matter of sustainable development (Boas, 2015; Sindico, 2007). In particular, emerging giants with no special voting powers in the UN Security Council, such as India and Brazil, have been highly sceptical of these moves and preferred climate change to be discussed in fora where they do have decision-making power. In the 2011 debate, Brazil, Russia, India and China, generally expressing scepticism with respect to a security framing of climate change, showed consideration with the precarious situation of developing small island states (SIDS). The four BRICS countries however accused the West of intending to change the terms of the debate by lifting climate change to the level of the UN Security Council (Boas, 2015) – a clear case of ‘venue shopping’ (Pralle, 2009). In India, for instance, it triggered distrust and a defensive position towards the UK’s intentions, adding to a tense negotiation climate. In the words of the former Indian Prime Minister’s Special Envoy on Climate Change, ‘the security argument put forward by the West is an attempt to deflect attention away from what they need to do themselves’.10 In 2013, the UK together with Pakistan tried to convene another formal UN Security Council debate on the subject, which was however blocked by Russia and China (King, 2013). The debate still happened but in an informal setting under the so-called ‘Arriaformula’. In 2015, another ‘Arriaformula’ debate was held, then initiated by Spain and Malaysia (Werrell and Femia, 2015). Thus while some emerging developing countries continue to oppose the idea, others, such as Malaysia and Pakistan, shifted to the side of the securitizers, suggesting an increasing disagreement on the subject amongst the leading countries of the G-77 group. Whilst the Small Island States actively raise the security argument in the UN Security Council, there is dissent at home as to whether this is the appropriate frame. For instance, small-island state populations resist the associated helpless image of drowning islands producing so-called ‘climate refugees’ (Farbotko and Lazrus, 2012). In addition, the alarmist climate security narrative was also unable to maintain a support base within the UK itself in recent years. The tide turned when the Conservatives came to power in 2010 and gave the promotion of climate action in the UNFCCC a lower level of priority. The focus turned more to other crises, which were experienced more directly at home, such as the economic crisis and Brexit. In the 2010 National Security Strategy and the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review, the striving for a multilateral deal on climate change mitigation was only mentioned once (Cabinet Office, 2010: 18), without employing a security narrative to promote efforts towards such action. The policy constituency within the UK had eroded, making space for alternative and related framings (see Boas and Rothe, 2016, for details).

#### 1ac security rhetoric creates a bunker mentality in which people feel too helpless to create change – fundamentally ignores the crisis depicted by the Aff and crushes solvency

Jeroen Warner, Ingrid Boaswageningen University, Netherlandscorresponding Author, 3-13-2019, "Securitization of climate change: How invoking global dangers for instrumental ends can backfire," SAGE Journals, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2399654419834018//jc>

Davoudi (2014) shows how the social understanding of nature moved from nature-as-clockwork (Enlightenment) through nature-as-finite (Club of Rome, 1970s), through nature as risk (1990s) to discourses of global danger and insecurity caused by nature. The author traces the rise of ‘climate securitization’ back to a conference, ‘The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security’ in Toronto in 1988, which portrayed the consequences of climate change as only second to nuclear war. Since the 1990s climate change has often been presented as a global crisis, an existential threat to human civilization, a planetary catastrophe (Paglia, 2018). Yet, unlike an aggressive force out to conquer foreign territory, climate change is a special domain of emergency, that of ‘threats without enemies’ (Prins, 1993). As argued by Methmann and Rothe (2012: 328), climate is depicted as an external threat, with impacts coming suddenly, ‘from the outside’. Issues of risk and security ‘can provoke strong emotions, legitimise extraordinary practices, and lead to practices that are otherwise indefensible’ (Davoudi, 2014: 371–372). Environmental securitization however is an uncertain domain for securitization (Buzan et al., 1998; Trombetta, 2008). In climate change, the burden of proof to legitimize securitization is especially tricky. While a clear majority of the academic community considers anthropogenic climate change sufficiently proven, its invisibility as a source of anticipated catastrophes that have yet to happen, cannot easily compete with visible weather events in the ‘attention economy' (Hamblyn, 2009). Other publics, then, are not convinced, as has become clear for instance under the Trump administration. Moreover, there is no ready consensus within the academic community on a clear and present nexus between climate change, violent conflict and/or migration (Adams et al., 2018), and if there is, that it can be successfully averted through a particular course of action. The lack of ‘full closure' has not stopped some from trying to securitise climate change. But overstressing the security dimension risks reducing democratic accountability (Coaffee et al., 2008). Some scholars have indeed warned for a security discourse to induce aversive policies, such as a larger role for the military to cope with feared effects of global warming like climate migration (Hartmann, 2010). Indeed, issues that can harm military capability, are more likely to become securitized than those that cannot (Fidler, 2007). Not only is climate a ‘threat without an enemy’ (Prins, 1993) but also lacks a ‘hero’ to save the day. Armed forces can defeat an invading enemy, a SWAT team can neutralise a terrorist, ICT experts can intercept a hacker, civil engineers and water managers can stop the flood, but no single actor can stop climate change. A pitfall of climate securitization therefore is that of instilling a sense of ontological insecurity in the intended audience rather than rallying support. Presenting an apocalyptic picture without a ‘way out’ upsets people’s basic sense of security and trust in the world around them. ‘Insecuritizing’ them (Bigo, 2002) instils a feeling of helplessness in the recipients of the message, a perceived lack of agency, leading people to ignore the issue and hide behind a false sense of security in their home and community (Harries, 2008). The way out becomes the domain of more mundane technocratic practices. ‘[A]pocalyptic climate change is articulated as overstraining the capacity of political actors, and thus as ruling out exceptional measures and passing responsibility to the “political machine” (…)’ (Methmann and Rothe, 2012: 324). The security discourse on climate change has not resulted in successful securitization in the sense of having led to exceptional measures being accepted and implemented (Corry, 2012; Methmann and Rothe, 2012; Oels, 2012). Instead, it ‘is so exaggerated that it prompts the opposite: routine and micro-practices of risk management: mitigation as precautionary risk management, adaptation as investing in preparedness, and security not as pre-empting but as a combination of the former two’ (Methman and Rothe, 2012: 337). In adding to these scholarly analyses, our study interrogates the question of failed climate securitization through an in-depth empirical account. It hereby further contextualizes and situates arguments provided by others, such as Methmann and Rothe (2012), and points to further explanatory factors that thus far have received less attention. Indeed, both cases point to the rather instrumental character of the securitizing moves by political actors to ‘sell' climate policy and explain why this has not benefited their success amongst the core target audiences. The next section will examine such discursive strategies on climate change and security through the case of the UK’s climate diplomacy in the international policy arena in the late 2000s. Thereafter, our second case traces the genesis, ‘marketing' and resonance of a national plan to make the Dutch delta climate-proof. A comparison between the two (see Table 1) looks at the key elements of securitization – an existential threat and the ‘only way out’, the degree to which this resonated and was responded to by key audiences.

### 2NC---Cyber

#### Hybrid warfare/misinformation discourses are empty signifiers and is just the Western means to delegitimizeopposition and shift attention away from failing institutions

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Since then, strategic communicative actions that are intended to influence, mislead and confuse foreign populations have assumed a central position in global debates about politics and foreign policy. Given the impact of such actions on elections, polarization and crisis management, it was natural for the rhetoric about these actions to assume such a central position(Bradshaw, Howard, 2018). However, over time, popular buzzwords like ‘disinformation/misinformation’, ‘fake news’, and ‘information operations’ have proliferated in global political mainstream discourse and assumed an accusatory nature worldwide as more leaders, diplomats, and politicians have begun using them to discredit and delegitimize their political opponents. This dynamic was later conceptualized as ‘discursive deflection’ (Ross, Rivers, 2018; Smith, 2019) and became acutely visible in the foreign policy domain, as more countries have begun securitizing the concepts ‘fake news’, ‘disinformation’, and ‘information warfare’ to similarly discredit, and delegitimize rival countries(Baum, Potter, 2019). Broadly speaking, ‘discursive-deflection’ is the strategy of discrediting competitors and rivals by portraying oneself as the sole source of truth. While the domestic political use of these terms is well-studied, we are still somewhat in the dark with regard to why countries choose to securitize these terms and what happens in their interactions with other countries when they do so.

The foreign policy use of such terms predates the 2016 US elections and proliferated after the Russian military involvement in Crimea and Donbas (Khaldarova, Pantti, 2016). The primary reason for this contextual proliferation was the Russian decision to deny the initial stages of its involvement in Ukraine and its broader strategy of distracting and dividing Western attention over Russian military operations (Mejias, Vokuev, 2017). There is still a debate over whether it was really Russian information operations that had derailed NATO response in Ukraine, or if disinformation discourses are employed in order to shift the blame over to Russia at a time when NATO was already divided over its commitment to Ukraine (Lysenko, Brooks, 2018). While there is robust evidence of Russian information operations in Ukraine and its role in spreading disinformation in NATO countries, sustained NATO apathy towards rising Russian military influence in the Black Sea after 2014 and Syria after 2015 support the latter claim.

Critics of Western disinformation discourses for example, argue that such discourses have turned into ‘floating (or empty) signifiers’, that have no specific or agreed-upon meaning (Farkas, Schou, 2018). In that vein, blaming others for engaging in disinformation often distracts attention away from a mistake or failed policy enacted by the blamer (Monsees, 2020). In this case, critics argue that Western discourses on disinformation are intended to distract attention away from NATO or EU divisions, or more domesticlevel polarization dynamics, by creating a unique empty signifier (disinformation) that is employed as a rallying rhetoric that bolsters the significance of external threats (Mas-Manchón et al., 2021). This way, disinformation and its associated terms like misinformation, fake news and information war get securitized, receiving disproportionate levels of attention in the policy domain. In this context, disinformation and its associated terms are used to exaggerate an existing threat and create a rallying discourse that would channel the attention of the divided Western nations away from their internal disagreements, and towards an inflated external threat. Some scholars go even further, arguing that disinformation is being securitized in the West (especially in NATO) to the extent the ‘war on terror’ was securitized through the 2000s (Lanoszka, 2019). In this line, disinformation is alleged to have become a new strategic glue that would help Western nations pool in their increasingly diverging interests and resources into a common cause (Baumann, 2020).

Securitization of disinformation in domestic politics is relatively well-studied (Freelon, Wells, 2020; Neo, 2021). Although these terms have entered into mainstream debate after the 2016 US elections, former President Donald Trump too, had securitized fake news to delegitimize his opponents by constructing rival disinformation as a national security problem, indirectly attributable to China (Polletta, Callahan, 2019). Following the tornado of accusations in the US, political actors in Britain, France, Italy, South Africa, Kenya and others have begun blaming each other for engaging in organized disinformation (Maweu, 2019; Saurwein, Spencer-Smith, 2020). Even in Sweden, there is empirical evidence that suggests accusing journalists of spreading fake news results in self-censorship of such outlets (Bennett, Livingston, 2018). There are further cases of evidence supporting the claim that elite-level discourses on disinformation have a direct effect on how the wider society perceives information and facts in general, creating a measurable effect on public trust towards such facts and information (Van Duyn, Collier, 2019). In Singapore for example, delegitimizing rival parties and news outlets through disinformation discourse is considered ‘acceptable’, as part of the state’s duty to discipline the opposition and its political actors (Tan, 2020). Similar trends emerging in democracies and authoritarian countries alike, such as in Austria, Australia, Poland, Russia, and South Africa, demonstrate the universality of instrumentalizing disinformation discourse as a political delegitimization tactic (Kurowska, Reshetnikov, 2018; Tandoc et al., 2018).

While a robust scholarship is emerging on the domestic political uses of disinformation discourse, there has so far been no longitudinal, large-N study that explored how such constructions emerge in international politics. Furthermore, there has so far been no exploration of how such discourses evolve over time and under what contexts in foreign affairs. We know that disinformation and fake news are important issues in world politics and that they are frequently used to bring an issue to public attention, but we are more in the dark over the contextual and temporal nuances that drive how these concepts are discursively constructed in foreign policy discourse.

This study aims to provide an early addition to the emerging literature on foreign policy uses of disinformation discourses by focusing on how the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has used them in its documents and social media posts. It does so by studying 238,452 tweets from official NATO and affiliated accounts, and more than 2,000 NATO texts, news, statements, and publications using computational methods since January 2014 and presents an unsupervised structural topic model (stm) analysis to explore the main thematic and discursive contexts of these texts. Ultimately, we hope to trigger a wider debate on the securitization of disinformation and fake news in foreign policy, and the greater explanatory value of computational methods in studying large-N text data in studying such securitization strategies.

2 Securitizing Disinformation

Over the last few years, defining what misleading content is and how to measure the legitimacy of its dissemination has been at the forefront of journalistic, political and scientific debate (Tandoc et al., 2018). Even before its proliferation in 2016, disinformation was a widely-used term in the mainstream discourse, co-existing with other terms such as infoglut, or information overload (Andrejevic, 2013). Although at first disinformation and misinformation were terms used interchangeably, today, disinformation refers to the deliberate dissemination of false information with the intention to mislead and confuse its audiences. Misinformation, on the other hand, strictly defines unintended diffusion of false information by mistake, without malintent. There are also bridge terms such as ‘malinformation’ that is factually accurate but is deployed to harm and damage an individual or an entity, or the concept of ‘problematic information’ as defined by Caroline Jack (Jack, 2017; Morgan, 2018). Although it is not directly mentioned, all of these concepts refer to the digital space, where information manipulation is disseminated faster and wider on social media and digital communication technologies compared to more media forms of media.

As terms ‘disinformation/misinformation’, ‘fake news’, ‘information operation’, and ‘hybrid war’ are often used interchangeably in political discourse, there are no clear-cut differences in the strategic topic of each word choice (Guess, Lyons, 2020). Politicians and leaders can often use these terms as a bag of buzzwords, without a clear operational definition of what each of them precisely means. Each of these buzzwords generate roughly the same effect on the consumers of such messages, which is the delegitimization of their target (Tucker et al., 2018). Especially problematic is the fact that once the discourse on disinformation is weaponized to delegitimize rivals, there is very little such rivals can do to defend themselves. Given the significant political charge of these terms, individuals or institutions that are alleged to be engaging in disinformation-related activities often have to enter into a fruitless spar of words to challenge such allegations, which usually leads to further controversy. This renders the accuser - or the side that securitizes disinformation - more advantageous compared to the accused, generating a dynamic similar to the ‘attacker’s advantage’ in cyber security where the defender is continuously blindsided (Tong et al., 2020).

#### Cybersecurity as a threat referent is not an apolitical or objective descriptor---it is used as a means to legitimize overly militarized responses

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However cyber warfare is defined—and, just as with the term ‘terrorism’, there is unlikely to be a uniform definition or understanding accepted across all polities—explanations for its emergence as an empirical phenomenon are fairly limited. At the systemic level on which structural realist accounts of international relations tend to focus, cyber capabilities emerge to fulfil political needs within an anarchic system (and a global network of computers), which is ungoverned and ungovernable by nation-states. In this sense, cyberwar capabilities are developed as a natural extension of (and new medium for) existing geopolitical tensions and disputes. The development and use of cyber warfare capabilities by one power drives fear and uncertainty in other states, which invest in similar capabilities themselves. According to this logic, cyber warfare is a strategic chain reaction caused by security dilemmas. That these systemic dynamics are only now receiving sustained and rigorous academic attention,11 and that the second-order effects of cyber deployment (such as arms races) are only beginning to be fully recognized,12 is surprising and disconcerting. A further explanation relates to the nature of the domain of cyberspace itself. Because cyber capabilities can be used covertly, and cyber attacks are difficult to attribute (at least legally and politically, if not technically), they are attractive to revisionist actors, who use them as part of hybrid operations (in combination with special forces operations, disinformation and propaganda, and economic or political coercion) to advance their interests.13

Most of these structural and systemic explanations of the emergence of cyber warfare fail to appreciate the historical, cultural and ideational drivers of cyber conflict, and indeed the cultural, historical and political contexts in which cyberwar capabilities have emerged. Cyber warfare entered the popular imagination during a period of immense historical change and uncertainty. In the 1990s, the fear of hackers, often depicted as cloaked and masked figures, began to displace the fear of the ‘communist under the bed’.14 The instability caused by the disintegration of states in the post-Cold War era and the emergence of complex identity-based conflict was also influential. In Kosovo in 1999, networks of Serbian and Chinese hackers retaliated through cyberspace for the bombing of, respectively, Serbian forces and the Chinese Embassy. This fed into concerns within national security establishments that the modern battlefield was no longer a place in which nations had a monopoly on the use of force, and that a form of warfare was emerging unlike what soldiers had faced before.15 These dynamics were compounded by anticipation of the Millennium (Y2K) Bug, an event which many feared would lead to a global internet meltdown, and which set a precedent for military involvement in cyber-security affairs.16 The ‘war on terror’ perhaps did more than anything to heighten fears around the internet, with fears about cyberterrorism and ‘cyber doom scenarios’ (digital 9/11s) emerging out of acts of real violence by jihadists.17 This period of fear and uncertainty corresponded with an exponential growth in internet users, the formation of social networks, and the use of securitizing discourse to present the internet as something that needed to be managed, controlled and fought over. As Richard Ashley has argued, the conditions of the post-Cold War era—particularly the uncertainty that was inherent in both policymaking and academic communities during this period—created the conditions (a vacuum) for new security narratives (cyberwar in this case) to emerge.18 The cyberwar narrative thus gave meaning and order to a seemingly anarchic international environment. Cyberwar was not, of course, the only narrative that arose to fill the gap created by the demise of the Soviet Union. Fears over environmental and social disintegration, and the threats of civilizational conflict and jihadism, were also prominent; and the destabilizing impact of technology on national and global security became a dominant discourse that was often integrated with other security concerns—the overwrought fear of cyberterrorism, for example.

Importantly, the emergence of cyber warfare has come to constitute an overarching narrative which has been disseminated by and proved beneficial to a variety of actors. In this sense, cyberwar was not just an apolitical tool driven by uncertainty in the security environment, but a concept deliberately constructed and connected to discourses, ideas and behaviours that have permeated, and served the interests of, a host of different security communities. These include the popular and social media, where cyberwar is often depicted in apocalyptic terms—often for commercial reasons (click bait, as it is euphemistically known)— and in military establishments, which have tended to lean on conventional military strategic thought in their attempts to grasp the implications of new technologies. As Alves has argued, the use of ‘battlefield’ analogies to frame cyberspace has contributed to the securitization and militarization of the internet, and helped to dismiss the negative impacts of increasing state control and surveillance, while at the same time eroding trust, freedom and creativity.19 Lawson takes a similar view, arguing that the cyberwar discourse is indicative of ‘an ongoing crisis of effectively identifying and understanding what is old and new, the same and different about cyber conflict’.20 These cultural and discourse-based interpretations of cyberwar exist not solely owing to intellectual lag (the time it takes to rethink strategy when confronted by new security challenges), but because of deliberately constructed narratives about the nature of cyber conflict across a variety of communities that are interested in (and have interests in) cyber security being framed in this way. Cyberwar narratives are thus strategic narratives—rhetorical devices used to package and frame a security issue for strategic benefit. International Relations scholars have also benefited from these framings: creating fear can be used to justify the need for funded research on cyber security, and cyber hyperbole seeks out and draws attention to analyses in popular media and other outlets.

The harms and shortcomings of the cyberwar narrative have crystallized during the last decade. At the geopolitical level, the adoption, development and diffusion of cyber-warfare capabilities, and the diffusion of certain ideas about and characterizations of cyberwar that justify their development and use, have led to destabilizing practices among many of the world’s leading cyber powers. The widespread global damage caused by the WannaCry virus, the continued reverse engineering and widespread diffusion of the Stuxnet malware, the use of cyber attacks to destabilize political systems (as in the case of the 2016 US election) and large-scale cyber espionage on the part of some states all serve as examples. The emergence of ‘cyberwar’ has heightened tensions between world powers, and contributed to the ongoing erosion of the rules-based international order. The latest offensive doctrines of the world’s Great Powers, for example, suggest that it is acceptable to ‘defend forward’ in cyberspace, and continually and persistently to engage your adversaries, regardless of conceptions of sovereignty.21 Russia and China have used cyber attacks against power and energy grids, nuclear infrastructure and other civilian infrastructure.22 Some cyber operations have been responded to with military force, as in the Israeli air strike against a Hamas hacker facility, and the cyber doctrine of many of the world’s leading powers is based on keeping force on the table as an option to respond to network-based attacks. While deterrence and restraint may be important factors in preventing the most damaging forms of attacks,23 significant evidence has emerged that the world’s leading powers are seeking to pre-emptively install malware into foreign critical infrastructure in the expectation of future conflicts.24 Few scholars would argue that the current state of cyber security is anything but risky, dangerous, and harmful to international peace and stability, and increasing attention is being given to the range of other harms caused by offensive cyber operations, including psychological, social/societal, economic, physical and digital damage.25 The recent increase in attacks on health infrastructure and the exploitation of the COVID-19 crisis by hackers to commit cybercrime is illustrative of the connections between wider social instability and cyber operations, and of the need for remedies that don’t exacerbate the problems.

The shortcomings of cyberwar narrative and practice are evident in other areas of policy and intellectual debate too. Cyber warfare is often used to justify protecting the nation-state, even when the protection of people or groups, including vulnerable communities, within the state is not fully considered. Cyber warfare has led to overly militarized approaches to cyber security and the involvement of the military (and intelligence agencies) in traditionally civilian areas of society, even when police, justice or crime-based approaches may be more suitable to countering cyber threats (in the same way that the ‘war on terror’ was an overly militarized approach to a transnational security threat). Often, military involvement is justified by reference to the notions of the permanency and constancy of cyberwar; as the British Chief of the Defence Staff General Sir Nick Carter described it, we are ‘at war every day’.26 And yet, cyberspace is not a controllable or conquerable territory, and is fundamentally ill-suited to the logic of national, defendable boundaries.27 As Lawson argues, the proliferation of these types of narratives leads to ‘the adoption of counterproductive, even dangerous policies’.28

#### It’s not just a single instance---their securitization of Chinese 5G or Huawei or cybersecurity is part of a bigger violent attempt at macrosecuritizing China

AT: No Link---AFF will say something like our specific instance in securitization---this card is just like it’s part of broader violent framing

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This changed dramatically as Western states begun preparing for the fifth generation (5G) networks. The United States embarked upon a global campaign to prevent Chinese suppliers — and in particular the company Huawei — from delivering 5G infrastructure. The American claim was that Chinese equipment would represent a national security hazard for those depending upon it — not because of its technical functionality and stability, but because it allegedly could be a gateway for Chinese espionage and sabotage of Western critical infrastructure. In other words, 5G and Chinese suppliers were securitized. The topic was elevated from the realm of ordinary politics and treated as an emergency, thus legitimizing extraordinary countermeasures (Buzan et al., 1998).

How did this happen? In this article we will explore this question and ask if the securitization of Chinese 5G suppliers was simply a subset of the US's broader securitization of China, or if there was something particular about 5G that distinguished it from previous generations of cellular networks. Further, we will ask if the ban on Chinese companies such as Huawei was an appropriate remedy. Could the securitization of 5G have been isolated from the broader securitization of China and Chinese suppliers? Finally, we will ask how the US's European allies and partners responded to this securitizing move. Did European states follow the American approach, and if not, how did they differ?

The article is an interdisciplinary attempt to address both political and technical aspects of the securitization of 5G. We use securitization theory to help frame the empirical analysis, but also engage with the interplay between the material and social dimensions in securitization theory. We argue that the material nature of 5G technology made securitization more likely, but we also demonstrate that Europe, to a large extent, chose a somewhat different approach to the US. By limiting securitization to the 5G technology (‘niche securitization’), rather than applying it to China as a whole (‘macrosecuritization’), European states achieved enhanced 5G security without confronting China more broadly.

SECURITIZATION

Securitization theory is about the social construction of a threat and the response to it. The theory emerged in the 1990s as a reaction to and rejection of rationalist notions in the then dominant theories in International Relations of dangers and risks as objective givens (Buzan et al., 1998). Instead, securitization theory emphasizes the political processes that make something a security issue. The theory has since evolved in many directions, but the key idea is that ‘an issue is given sufficient saliency to win the assent of the audience, which enables those who are authorized to handle the issue to use whatever means they deem most appropriate. In other words, securitization combines the politics of threat design with that of threat management’ (Balzacq et al., 2016: 495).

The theory comprises a securitizing actor (e.g. an individual or a state), securitizing moves (e.g. speeches and practices), an audience (e.g. a society or a parliament), and a referent object (that which is being securitized, e.g. terrorism or migration). In this article, we use a simple model to enhance an empirical study of the row over 5G in the West. We define the United States as the securitizing actor that securitized 5G through speeches and diplomatic practices in an attempt to convince Europe (the audience) to follow suit.

Applying the theory to processes taking place between states rather than inside them has been labelled macrosecuritization by Buzan and Wæver (2009). This aspect of securitization theory has not been explored as broadly as many other facets of the theory. Buzan and Wæver's model is complex and multidimensional, including level of analysis (local to global), degree of comprehensiveness (from niche to inclusive), and degree of success in convincing the audience. Macrosecuritizations, they write, ‘are necessarily launched as candidates for top-rank threats’, such as ‘geo-economics, terrorism, [and] nuclear proliferation’ (ibid.: 258–59). Niche securitizations, on the other hand, ‘get onto the agenda as accepted threats, but do not rise to top priority’; examples include ‘environmental threats, epidemic diseases, organised crime, [and] drugs’ (ibid.). Buzan and Wæver also point out that macrosecuritizations are more vulnerable to breakdown than mid- or micro-level securitizations, as the mid-level units (states) may pull out or reject the securitizing move. A reason for this could be that there are usually weaker relations between the securitizing actor and the audience on the macro/global level than in mid- or micro-level cases.

Inspired by Buzan and Wæver's model, we borrow some of its concepts for our empirical study, but do not apply it in its full complexity. In our case, the US government was not dependent upon European consent to implement restrictions on Chinese 5G suppliers on American soil. This was a domestic securitization process. The securitizing move we study, however, happened after the initial US securitization and was about convincing other states to undertake their own national securitizations of the 5G rollout. This was an American attempt at comprehensive macrosecuritization of China, with a niche securitization of 5G.

Another dimension of the theory that we engage with here is the material or technological dimension. As Buzan and Wæver (2009: 255) point out: ‘In principle, securitizing actors can attempt to construct anything as a referent object. In practice, however, the constraints of facilitating conditions mean that they are much more likely to be successful with some types of referent object than with others’. In our case we argue that the features of 5G technology — its weaknesses and vulnerabilities as well as its expected role as a critical infrastructure in our societies — are important to understanding securitization processes. In other words, these processes were constrained and impacted by the material ‘realities’ of 5G technology. Understanding, for instance, if the dangers pointed to by the securitizing actor (such as espionage) can be addressed or resolved through technological solutions, is crucial. Such understanding can help us navigate the political terrain and enhance our understanding of securitization processes. This does not mean that the technological specificities of 5G telecoms in any way determine political outcomes — but they do affect them. In short, if a simple technical solution could mitigate all the concerns raised by the securitizing actor, securitization would fail.

AMERICAN SECURITIZATION OF CHINESE TELECOMS

Voices calling for the securitization of Chinese telecommunications companies in the US can be traced back to at least 2010. At that time, the FBI, politicians and US experts repeatedly pointed out that Chinese companies could pose a security threat to the United States (Barboza, 2010). In 2012 Congress warned that the ‘United States should view with suspicion the continued penetration of the US telecommunications market by Chinese telecommunications companies’ (US House of Representatives, 2012: vi).

At the time, these warnings did not gain too much traction. The overall political mood when it came to Chine was one of inclusion. Since the 1990s, the US and the West had had a clear strategy to bring China (and others, such as Russia) into the existing world order. In practice, this meant that they were invited into existing regimes, such as the World Trade Organization, and that trade and dialogue were promoted with the hope that authoritarian regimes would open up and gradually democratize. This policy had been questioned and criticized for a while, but as the Trump administration took office in 2016, a distinct shift in both rhetoric and practices could be noted. Trump embarked upon a confrontational approach towards China in many areas, not least in trade, tariffs and industrial production, but also in security. The argument was that the strategy of inclusion and change had failed, and that China had abused American openness to subsidize its industry, manipulate currency, steal technology and position itself in global markets. Increasingly authoritarian political developments in China and growing pressure on neighbouring countries were also referred to by US government officials. The securitization of Chinese 5G must therefore be seen in this broader context of American securitization of China in general.

It was the Chinese telecoms company Huawei that became a particular target (referent object) of securitization in the US. As a world leader in 5G technology, and a provider of the 4G networks in many Western countries, Huawei was a strong candidate to secure many 5G contracts. However, the Trump administration took a robust stance against the company, citing the risks of espionage from China. They claimed that Huawei and other Chinese technology companies represented a serious threat to national security, as their 5G systems could be misused for the purpose of espionage or even sabotage by China (Cartwright, 2020).

Questions were asked about its ownership structure and the influence the Chinese Communist Party had over Huawei (Hawes and Li, 2017; Rühlig, 2020). In particular, critics of Huawei referred to the 2017 Chinese Intelligence Law, which requires Chinese companies to turn over information to, and comply with, China's intelligence and security services (Rühlig and Björk, 2020: 9). As a result, in 2018 the US decided to ban the use of Huawei and ZTE, another Chinese telecommunications company, in the Armed Forces (US Congress, 2018). Furthermore, in May 2019 the US put Huawei on its ‘Entities List’, a list of companies not allowed to buy American products (Federal Register, 2019). This meant that Huawei could no longer use US-made chips and other components in its products.

In April 2020, the then Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, announced that the United States would introduce a ‘5G Clean Path’ system that would ensure that no correspondence from US embassies would go through Chinese networks or systems. This was later extended to the ‘Clean Network’, whose purpose was to ‘secure national resources, including citizens’ computer security and the company's most sensitive information from aggressive intrusions by malicious actors, such as the Chinese Communist Party’ (US Department of State, 2020a). The Clean Network included ‘Clean Apps’, ‘Clean Carrier’, ‘Clean Store’, ‘Clean Cable’, ‘Clean Cloud’ and ‘Clean Path’. The purpose was to exclude Chinese companies from app stores, remove American apps from Chinese app stores, and refrain from using Chinese networks, cloud services and cables.

At the same time that Huawei was securitized domestically, the Trump administration embarked upon a global campaign to make other countries follow suit. The language used by US officials was forthright, with no diplomatic filters. For instance, in 2020 the then Secretary of Defense, Mark Esper, stated that: ‘If countries choose to go the Huawei route, it could well jeopardize all the information sharing and intelligence sharing we have been talking about, and that could undermine the alliance, or at least our relationship with that country’ (quoted in Sanger and McCabe, 2020). In short, the securitization of Huawei consisted of rhetoric focused on risks and dangers, restrictive legislation and a global campaign, which we will return to below.

However, the campaign against Huawei was not restricted to telecoms security. The company was accused by US authorities of racketeering and theft of trade secrets. The conflict peaked in 2019 when Huawei and its chief financial officer, Meng Wanzhou, were indicted for fraud and sanctions evasion. The arrest of Meng Wanzhou in Canada and subsequent — seemingly retaliatory — arrests of Canadian citizens in China contributed to a strained political climate between China, the US and Canada (Blanchfield, 2020). However, none of this had anything to do with 5G security. According to Sanger and McCabe (2020), ‘The Huawei fight is just one part of a bigger US–China battle, as Washington tries to contain Beijing's influence and power and ensure that the world's second-largest economy does not come to dominate advanced industries that could give it an economic and military edge’. Furthermore, they hold, ‘The United States is also trying to limit China's access to American technology more broadly and is considering restricting sales of microchips, artificial intelligence, robotics and some types of advanced software, along with preventing tech companies from teaming up — or even sharing research — with Chinese firms’ (ibid.). Hence, the securitization of Huawei was about more than just 5G security; geopolitics and economic rivalry were also important factors (Inkster, 2019; Mascitelli and Chung, 2019). The securitization of 5G and Huawei was therefore part of a broader US policy of confronting and securitizing China across a spectrum of issues. It was part of a comprehensive and global macrosecuritization of China.

#### Cyberthreats are intentionally vague and ambiguous as per 1AC “” as a means of increasing false paranoia---turns solvency--it creates fear-induced complacency

---ask them in CX who attacks? How do they attack? The internal link chain for cyberattacks escalating to nuclear war is intentionally made as vague as possible

Sean Lawson & Michael K. Middleton 19, Sean is an associate professor in Communication at the University of Utah, Michael is an associate professor in Communication at the University of Utah, “Cyber Pearl Harbor: Analogy, fear, and the framing of cyber security threats in the United States, 1991-2016,” First Manday, Volume 24, Number 3 – 4, March 2019, https://journals.uic.edu/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/9623 \\pairie

Cyber Pearl Harbor in the securitization of cyberspace

Scholars working within the critical constructivist tradition of security studies have explored the role of language and rhetoric in U.S. cyber security discourse (Bendrath, 2003, 2001; Bendrath, et al., 2007; Betz and Stevens, 2013; Dunn Cavelty, 2007; Eriksson, 2002; Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009; Lawson, 2012). Much of this work has been informed by securitization theory, which posits that it is not predetermined which security threats will make it onto the political agenda. Instead, security threats are “constructed” because the process of identifying, understanding, and responding to them is the result of political discourse. That process involves a “securitizing actor” (usually a political leader or decision-maker) identifying “threat subjects” (the source of the threat), “referent objects” (that which is threatened), and the prospective impacts of a threat (Buzan, et al., 1998; Campbell, 1998). Additionally, Dunn Cavelty (2007) notes that in the case of cyber securitization, specific and sometimes dramatic events or conditions that she calls “focusing events” can serve to focus attention on cyber security threats.

Critical security scholars have been particularly interested in the construction of cyber threats because they exemplify the emergence of various “new threats” in the post-Cold War period [1]. These have included a host of seemingly ambiguous, uncertain, but dangerous threats related to environmental degradation, poverty, health, immigration, and technology [2]. Cyber threat perceptions have mirrored the ambiguity and uncertainty found in perceptions of other “new threats,” making it difficult to identify and then communicate clearly and precisely what it is that is threatened, by whom, and with what potential impacts, in and through cyberspace. As threat perceptions have shifted, so have claims about the primary subjects (e.g., foreign spies, criminals, terrorists, insiders), objects (e.g., corporate data, state secrets, critical infrastructure), and impacts (e.g., monetary loss, diminished economic competitiveness, physical disruption or destruction) of those threats (Dunn Cavelty, 2007; Bendrath, 2003, 2001; Bendrath, et al., 2007).

From the “wild west” to “space,” metaphors and analogies have been central to attempts to understand the Internet and its meaning for society and culture broadly (Johnston, 2009). It is unsurprising, therefore, that the framing of cyber threats in public policy discourse has also relied (perhaps overly so) on metaphors and analogies of various kinds, including to war, military, weapons, and natural disaster (Betz and Stevens, 2013; Lawson, 2012; Lapointe, 2011; Dunn Cavelty, 2013; Libicki, 1997). Among these, “cyber Pearl Harbor” is one of the most prominent in the U.S. cybersecurity debate [3] and is exemplary of the widespread use of “cyber-doom,” “shut down the power grid,” and “worst-case” scenarios by the full range of participants in these debates [4]. In particular, “cyber Pearl Harbor” is exemplary of the tendency to deploy hypothetical scenarios, but also to appropriate the fear and anxiety elicited by non-cyber events such as natural disasters, conventional military attacks, or terrorist attacks to promote fear of cyber-doom [5].

Existing research has yielded a number of important insights and raised a number of serious concerns about the U.S. cybersecurity debate. Scholars have noted that the ambiguity and uncertainty surrounding subjects, objects, means, and impacts of new threats like those to/through cyberspace can lead to a tendency toward possibilistic thinking and a logic of preventative or precautionary action (Füredi, 2009; Sunstein, 2002). In turn, these characteristics have resulted in increased concern over the possibility of “threat inflation,” defined as “the attempt by elites to create concern for a threat that goes beyond the scope and urgency that a disinterested analysis would justify” [6]. Having been identified as “emblematic of new threats,” [7] a number of scholars, journalists, and even some security professionals have argued that U.S. public policy discourse about cybersecurity has been particularly prone to threat inflation (Brito and Watkins, 2011; Blunden, 2015; Blunden and Cheung, 2014; Dunn Cavelty and Van Der Vlugt, 2015; Gartzke, 2013; Schneier, 2010). Still others have raised the concern that use of cyber-doom rhetoric in this debate may backfire, leading to fear-induced complacency instead of the motivation to act that users of such rhetoric presumably wish to elicit from audiences (Lawson, et al., 2016; Hamre, 2015).

To date, whether cyber terror, crime, or warfare, we have not seen any cyber attack approximate the level of destruction contemplated in cyber Pearl Harbor-like scenarios. For well over a decade, scholars have called attention to the inflated fears of cyber terror (Debrix, 2001; Weimann, 2008, 2005; Stohl, 2006; Conway, 2008). Other studies have pointed to inflated estimates of the impacts of cyber crime (Wall, 2008; Jardine, 2017, 2015; Anderson, et al., 2013; Florêncio and Herley, 2013; Romanosky, 2016; Jardine, 2018). Finally, even though the recent conflict in Ukraine has included the first documented cases of cyber attacks used to take down electrical grids, the immediate effects of these attacks were limited, as have been the effects of cyber attacks on the shape of the military conflict more generally (Kostyuk and Zhukov, 2019; Jensen, et al., 2019).

It is perhaps unsurprising; therefore, that such scenarios have come under increased scrutiny over the last several years. Even before the Russian cyber-interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, some current and former intelligence officials had rejected the use of “cyber Armageddon” or “cyber Pearl Harbor” descriptions of cyber threats facing the United States (Bussey, 2016; Clapper, 2015; Hamre, 2015). After the election, many more have argued that Russian cyber-interference shows that the U.S. had been looking in the wrong direction with respect to cyber attacks (Lewis, 2018, 2017; Lipton, et al., 2016; Nye, 2016; Orcutt, 2017; Pollard and Devost, 2016; Pollard, et al., 2018; Pollock, 2017; Von Drehle, 2017; Rid and Buchanan, 2018; Weinstein, 2018; Wolff, 2018). Nonetheless, some have called Russian election hacking the fulfillment of decades of cyber Pearl Harbor predictions (Carr, 2017; Chang and Osborne, 2017; Graham, 2017; Spring, 2017). In these cases, emphasis is placed on the element of surprise in the 2016 Russian cyber operations, not necessarily the physical destruction, of which there was none.

Existing scholarship, recent developments, and the debate that they have sparked, raise a number of important questions. Where does the “cyber Pearl Harbor” analogy come from? What is such a scenario supposed to entail? How has the analogy evolved during its 25 years of use by cyber security stakeholders? And, is it possible that use of this analogy can have negative implications for cyber security policy-making? In the next section, we detail the sources and methods that we have used to help answer these questions.

The discursive construction of cyber Pearl Harbor: Sources and methods

For over 25 years, Americans have been warned that the United States faces an imminent cyber Pearl Harbor, involving cyber attacks against critical infrastructure leading to mass destruction and disruption, followed by social and economic chaos. In a 1999 article, New York Times reporter John Markoff provided perhaps the most concise definition, noting that the “specter of simultaneous computer network attacks against banking, transportation, commerce and utility targets — as well as against the military — conjures up the fear of an electronic Pearl Harbor in which the nation is paralyzed without a single bullet ever being fired” (Markoff, 1999). Markoff’s definition echoed the doomsday scenario envisioned by computer security entrepreneur Winn Schwartau who, in a 1991 op-ed for Computerworld, first used the analogy (which was repeated in his testimony before the U.S. Congress that same year). Schwartau described the impacts of such an event as “truly crippling,” “devastating,” and “inflicting massive damage” on a scale that would undermine “the continuation of well-ordered society ... [to] function as we know it” (Schwartau, 1991).

Twenty years later, the metaphor was still strongly in circulation when former U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta warned Congress, “I’ve often said that there’s a strong likelihood that the next Pearl Harbor that we confront could ... be a cyber attack that cripples our power systems, our grid, our security systems, our financial systems, our governmental systems. This is a real possibility” (U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, 2011). The following year, Panetta doubled down, declaring that a cyber Pearl Harbor “could be as destructive as the terrorist attack of 9/11,” “cause panic, destruction, and even the loss of life,” “paralyze and shock the nation, and create a profound new sense of vulnerability” (Panetta, 2012).

To unpack both the staying power and implications of the cyber Pearl Harbor analogy over 25 years of cybersecurity discourse, this study combines a rhetorical analysis of key texts that utilize the cyber Pearl Harbor metaphor with a quantitative content analysis of U.S. newspaper articles from 1991 (when the concept first emerged) until 2016 (when Russian election tampering refocused national attention on cybersecurity). Both forms of analysis rely on theoretical insights from the critical constructivist tradition of scholarship in security studies (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010; see also Bendrath, 2003, 2001; Bendrath, et al., 2007; Dunn Cavelty, 2007; Eriksson, 2002; Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009; Lawson, 2012; Betz and Stevens, 2013).

First, we identified ten key texts that we examined through close reading and rhetorical analysis (see Appendix C). These texts were chosen because they were exemplary of the use of the cyber Pearl Harbor analogy by critical stakeholders, including industry experts, government officials, large media outlets, or others with the ability to shape and influence U.S. cyber security discourse. The kinds of texts chosen included op-eds, Congressional testimony, speeches, a documentary film, and a declassified government document. Rhetorical analysis provides a tool for explaining “the relationship of persons and ideas within a situation” [8]. To arrive at these explanations, rhetoricians cast their net broadly, asking how “written as well as spoken discourse, nonverbal [e.g., images] as well as verbal symbols, movements as well as individual events, and functions other than those implied by a narrow conception of persuasion” and overtly persuasive texts provide a lens through which to understand how ideas and their relationship to both their producers and audiences are shaped and defined (Brockriede, 1974). Rhetorical analysis’ focus on textual features (metaphor, analogy, etc.) and argumentative strategies provides a means to deconstruct these texts, identifying how cyber Pearl Harbor comes to be defined and operationalized in political debates over its importance. In this regard, rhetorical analysis provides a technique for identifying an “unfolding sequence of arguments, ideas, and figures which interact through the text and gradually build a structure of meaning” [9]. For example, rhetorical analysis helps identify how threat subjects, referent objects, and focusing events that constitute cyber Pearl Harbor are discursively constructed through these key texts. However, beyond helping illuminate how these texts function to define cyber Pearl Harbor as a real and viable threat, a rhetorically-driven close reading also helps inform our analysis of 25 years of media discourse about cyber Pearl Harbor because “the close reading of specific texts often provides both data and methods for comprehending larger discursive formations” [10].

Second, for our quantitative content analysis, we collected examples of the cyber Pearl Harbor analogy in U.S. news media by searching the “U.S. Newspapers” category in LexisNexis Academic Universe using the search string “electronic pearl harbor” OR “digital pearl harbor” OR “cyber pearl harbor.” [11] This produced 214 results. After removal of duplicates and irrelevant results (e.g., letters to the editor), the final coded set included 203 articles. Content analysis complements a rhetorical analysis focused on key texts that participated in and constructed the cyber Pearl Harbor analogy in two ways. First, whereas rhetorical analysis focuses on a small number of key texts to identify the specific rhetorical strategies, content analysis provides a means to identify and draw inferences about how those texts circulate in media discourse and to broader audiences. Second, content analysis complements the interpretive and qualitative conclusions of rhetorical analysis with systematic and more objective accounts of how the cyber Pearl Harbor analogy has evolved. While content analysis operates as a method across a variety of disciplines and includes many variations, its essential characteristic is that it offers a methodology for “a summarizing, quantitative analysis of messages that relies on the scientific method, including attention to objectivity, a priori design, reliability, validity, generalizability, and replicability” [12].

When practicing content analysis, the dimensions of texts that are quantified can be identified and defined inductively or deductively [13]. In the case of the former, researchers derive variables to be quantified by developing familiarity with a body of texts to the extent that a set of exhaustive, mutually exclusive categories emerge. Deductive variables, on the other hand, are derived from a theoretical framework that informs the content analysis and which are relevant to the texts under examination based on related scholarship [14]. For example, in the present study, coding categories were informed by the main concepts of securitization theory, including securitizing actor and referent object, as well as the sentiment of the article and the focusing events or conditions identified as reason for taking such a threat seriously (see Appendix A). For each category, we collaboratively coded random samples from our overall pool of articles until intercoder reliability was established (see Appendix B). Once we achieved an acceptable level of reliability, we divided and independently coded the remainder of the articles. While this practice of quantification of the content of texts can offer a variety of measurement possibilities, most content analysis, like the present study, relies on frequency data to support its inferences about texts, the circumstances of their emergence, and the contexts and consequence of their circulation [15].

By combining these two methodological approaches, we are able to make complementary claims about the development of the cyber Pearl Harbor analogy within cyber security discourses. On the one hand, rhetorical analysis offers a “close-up” view of specific exemplars, or key texts, crafted by primary stakeholders in the evolution of cyber security policy and political discourse. On the other hand, the “satellite view” offered by content analysis of a broad swath of texts across a period of time enables us to identify variations in the intensity of discussion of cyber security via the cyber Pearl Harbor analogy, as well as who is participating in that discourse, based on what concerns, and with what aims (Hart, 1990; Hoffman and Waisanen, 2015). By working between these two levels of abstraction and critical insight, our approach to the use of the cyber Pearl Harbor analogy allows us to make inferences about how these two sources of discourse on the subject influence one another, how they are impacted by contextual factors, e.g., terror attacks, cyber security breaches, etc., and how certain dimensions of the cyber Pearl Harbor analogy are strategically given greater presence (or marginalized) to shape cybersecurity outcomes.

The emergence and evolution of cyber Pearl Harbor

There has been confusion over the origins of the Pearl Harbor analogy in U.S. cyber security discourse. In December 2015, former defense official, John Hamre, claimed to have been the first person to use the term publicly in his November 1997 testimony before the U.S. Congress. He further claimed that General Tom Marsh had been “the author of that phrase” as a result of having led the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, the final report from which was published in 1997 (Hamre, 2015). Others have claimed that president of the RSA computer security company, D. James Bidzos, was the first to use the term in 1991. However, as Tim Stevens notes, the weight of the available evidence supports the contention that it was the computer security entrepreneur, and novelist, Winn Schwartau, who first used the term “electronic Pearl Harbor” in 1991 in an op-ed, Congressional testimony, and a self-published novel [16].

Regardless of its likely emergence in the early 1990s from computer security industry experts, the Pearl Harbor analogy did not become widespread until the mid to late 1990s when it was mentioned in a string of Congressional testimonies by government officials, most notably Director of the C.I.A. John Deutch in 1996 and Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre in 1997 and 1998. A close reading of these early sources of cyber Pearl Harbor from the 1990s demonstrates that the seeds of the currently dominant use of that analogy and related themes emerged very early in the discourse. However, it also reveals the existence of subtle differences in early meanings of cyber Pearl Harbor, which were in turn associated in some cases with differing views of how one should respond to such a threat.

In June 1996, Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) opened a hearing of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on cyber threats by informing listeners and participants that the proceeding would

“focus on the possibility that cyber-attacks on our national infrastructure could be used as a part of a coordinated strategic attack on the United States. How likely is such a scenario? Who has the capacity to launch such an attack? How do we defend against such an attack? Perhaps most important, would we even recognize the fact that such an attack was being carried and be able to determine who was behind the attack in a very timely manner?” (Deutch, 1996)

That is, the hearing would focus on the primary issues of concern for the construction of any threat narrative, including the identification of potential threat subjects and referent objects: Who might attack? What might they target? The answer to the referent object question was already assumed: “national infrastructure.” But, just which infrastructure would be targeted was less certain. What is more, Sen. Nunn raised questions related to evidence and uncertainty, as well as possible responses. How do we know, in the realm of cyber threats, where the real concerns exist and, in the end, what do we do? Beyond the hearing that day, all of the key texts that address the possibility of cyber Pearl Harbor provide answers to most of these questions.

Where threat subjects are concerned, the key texts that we analyzed from the 1990s and early 2000s were focused almost exclusively on non-state actors. Of course, Schwartau’s piece was titled “Fighting terminal terrorism” and contemplated that ”a motivated individual or organization” could carry out “an electronic Pearl Harbor” (Schwartau, 1991). In his 1996 testimony, DCI Deutch and his questioner, Sen. Sam Nunn, both worried about the possibility that not just states, but also “sub-national groups” and “terrorist groups” could obtain the capability to carry out cyber attacks against the United States’ vulnerable networks. DCI Deutch also mentioned the potential, but uncertain threat from “individual criminal elements or individual hacker activities” (Deutch, 1996). Finally, the 2003 PBS Frontline documentary, Cyber War!, which included interviews with prominent cyber security experts, focused entirely on non-state cyber threats, particularly the threat of from terrorists (Kirk, 2003).

Though they continue to mention possible non-state attackers, we see an increased concern with state actors over time in the later texts that we analyzed. Gen. Alexander’s 2012 memo about preventing a cyber Pearl Harbor mentions non-state actors, but is primarily focused on “nation states” (Alexander, 2012). Similarly, Secretary Panetta’s 2012 speech noted the threats from cyber criminals, but said “the even greater danger facing us in cyberspace goes beyond crime and harassment. A cyber attack perpetrated by nation states or violent extremist groups could be as destructive as the terrorist attack of 9/11” (Panetta, 2012). Finally, Hamre’s December 2015 op-ed warned, “Hostile intelligence and military establishments are prepared to wage war now, using cyber tools” (Hamre, 2015).

In both cases, however, specific actors are rarely mentioned, with a few exceptions. In the non-state category, al-Qa’ida is sometimes identified as a potential attacker in the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks (Kirk, 2003). Later, when officials like Secretary Panetta begin to focus more on the threat from state actors, we see occasional mentions of China, Russia, and Iran as potential perpetrators of a cyber Pearl Harbor attack (Alexander, 2012; Panetta, 2012). However, the texts we analyzed far more often identified generic, unspecified state or non-state actors (or both) as the would-be authors of a cyber Pearl Harbor (Schwartau, 1991; Deutch, 1996; Hamre, 1998, 1997; Panetta, 2011). In short, those officials and experts raising the alarm about the threat of a cyber Pearl Harbor were often unclear about exactly who might carry out such an attack.

Far from being a rhetorical weakness, this inability or unwillingness to identify specific threat subjects may serve to heighten fear of a possible cyber Pearl Harbor. One might expect that inability or unwillingness to specify who is willing and able to carry out such an attack would weaken the case that such a threat is indeed real. Instead, the so-called “attribution problem” (Lindsay, 2015; Rid and Buchanan, 2014; Schulzke, 2018) — the idea that one could be cyber attacked without knowing who had carried out the attack — emerged as a consistent theme in the cyber Pearl Harbor discourse that only seemed to heighten the fear. This possibility was first raised by Schwartau, who cautioned that “such an attack can also be launched ... with little or no ability to identify ... the perpetrators” and that “the source of the attack is completely disguised” (Schwartau, 1991). In 1996, the difficulty in determining the source of cyber attack was a concern raised multiple times in Sen. Nunn’s questioning of DCI Deutch (Deutch, 1996). In his 1997 testimony, John Hamre noted, “Our knowledge of the origin of such attacks, and their sponsorship, is likely to be imprecise” (Hamre, 1997). The 2003 PBS documentary used the examples of the Slammer, Code Red, and Nimda malware attacks as evidence of the danger of the attribution problem (Kirk, 2003). By 2012, however, Secretary Panetta was warning would-be cyber attackers that the U.S. had “made significant investments in forensics to address this problem of attribution, and we are seeing returns on those investments” (Panetta, 2012).

#### Securitization of the Chinese cybersecurity threat creates China as a dangerous “other” that we can only combat by increase orientalist violence

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China as thief: cyber battles

The construction of China as potential enemy Other takes on an additional hue when we look at the depictions of China’s cyber activities—China moves from cheat to a more malicious cousin, the thief. The United States first focused on issues of “cyber warfare” in the mid-2000s to late 2000s, but at the time, the trope associated with China was not necessarily that of thief. In the mass news media, a militaristic lens framed much of the discussion, depicting China as a rule breaker flouting international norms and thus posing a security threat. For example, a Los Angeles Times article highlighted that “China in the last year has developed ways to infiltrate and manipulate computer networks around the world in what U.S. defense officials conclude is a new and potentially dangerous military capability, according to a Pentagon report” (Barnes, 2008). China is even placed in relation to al-Qaeda: “Cyber-attacks and cyber-espionage pose a greater potential danger to U.S. national security than Al Qaeda and other militants that have dominated America’s global focus since Sept. 11, 2001, the nation’s top intelligence officials said Tuesday” (Dilanian, 2013). This juxtaposition with al-Qaeda only served to heighten the military valence of China’s cyber activities, and a push to prepare for such a threat. Indeed, in the words of Senator Bill Nelson (D-FL): “The threat, to be sure, is real—and, we cannot allow ourselves to grow complacent …” (Nelson 2008).

Snowden’s revelations of US spying on China in June of 2013 drastically changed the shape of the discussion however. Snowden demonstrated that the NSA (1) had two data centers in China from which it had been inserting spy software into vulnerable computers; (2) targeted the Chinese University of Hong Kong, public officials, businesses, and students; (3) hacked mobile phones; and (4) in 2009, hacked the Pacnet headquarters in Hong Kong, which runs one of the biggest regional fibre-optic networks. In response to Snowden’s revelations, a spate of articles compared the United States’ and China’s hacking, displaying a range of attitudes from journalists—some espoused that both countries demonstrate equivalent transgressive behavior, while others argued that China has crossed the line into more aggressive hacking that goes beyond the United States’ more benign “preemptive” hacking.

The latter attitude indicates the resilience of tropes of the Yellow and Red Perils, a China whose inherent ideological and cultural differences with the West makes it a threat. The different lenses through which journalists and pundits viewed China’s spying in comparison with that of the United States further invoke this Orientalist demarcation. An article in The Washington Post thus contrasts China’s behavior against that of the United States, which merely seeks “to examine huge amounts of communication metadata around the world to look for trends” and “to preempt some threat against the U.S.” China’s spying is described, however, as “infiltrating almost every powerful institution in Washington, D.C.,” “breaking into major news organizations,” “stealing sensitive military technology,” and “stealing so much intellectual property that China’s hacking has been called the ‘greatest transfer of wealth in history’” (Fisher, 2013). Drawing in particular on incendiary words like “stealing” and “infiltrating,” this article distinguishes China as a sneaky thief.

US journalists and pundits, in charging China with stealing economic resources, have further solidified the demarcation of China as an inferior and dangerous Other. A well-circulated quote by national security pundit Adam Segal stated, “The problem is we’re not talking about the same things … We’re trying to make a distinction between cyber economic espionage and normal political-military espionage. The Chinese don’t make that same distinction” (Bengali & Dilanian, 2015). By portraying China as unable to grasp the fundamental distinction between economics and national security, Segal suggests China’s thievery is connected to a more fundamental character flaw—China is unable to grasp proper civilized norms. Similarly, US official response has been that China’s view of data collection as a sovereign right has rendered them essentially different from the United States and by implication, the civilized world. That Chinese governmental espionage involves the collection of economic intelligence that is shared with Chinese companies further departs from civilized norms. Michael Rogers, Director of the National Security Agency thus explained that “they clearly don’t have the same lines in the sand, if you will, with that regard” (Bennett, 2015).

Historically, US depictions of China as uncivilized have occurred whenever China has gained power or threatened US interests. The narrative of China as a sort of child following in the United States’ footsteps on the path to modernity has proven exceedingly popular since World War II and frames the US approach to China as a potential ally and resource who at the same time may never be civilizable (Kim, 2010; Vukovich, 2012). In this Orientalist narrative, China’s journey to modernity is always understood as precarious and, moreover, subject to US vigilance as to whether it meets the appropriate benchmarks. The title of an editorial in The Washington Post epitomizes current iterations of this sentiment and the ease with which Orientalist imagery can be invoked to portray China’s path to modernity as needing US guidance when China falls out of line: “The US Needs to Tame the Cyber-Dragon: Stronger Measures are Need[ed] to Block China’s Economic Espionage [emphasis mine]” (“The U.S. Needs to Tame,” 2013). In reality, US vigilance can be attributed to the concern since the end of the Cold War, that a “sleeping giant” able to challenge US global hegemony is awakening (Kim, 2010).

Thus, the cultural work done by portrayals of China as unable to adhere to civilized norms serve to bolster the image of China as perpetually unprepared to be a responsible member of the international community. In fact, this narrative of China’s thievery serves to persuade the American public that China is a threat to the international community. One Wall Street Journal journalist perfectly echoes this sentiment:

#### “Cybersecurity” is impossible to achieve---market capitalist logic relentlessly infiltrates problem solving to justify continuous biased, Westernized policies

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Cybersecurity the way we like to think of it is actually impossible to achieve. That’s not to say we shouldn’t try hard to achieve it. Nor is it the same thing as saying that our costly efforts to date have been wasted. Instead, if our aim is to make our interactions in cyberspace more secure, we need to recognize two things.

First, part of our troubles has to do with a culture that defines things like success, victory, and security as dichotomous rather than continuous variables. Think of a switch that’s either on or off. Second, speed is hurting us, and calls to replace humans with much faster and “objective” machines will continue to gain momentum, putting us at extreme risk without increasing either our security or prosperity. Let me explain.

[Cyber]security is Not a Switch

In my time in Norway a few years ago, I had the great fortune to be hosted by the Norwegian Institute for Defense. As I toiled to recover the history of Norway’s experience under occupation by the Third Reich, I was able most days to join my Norwegian colleagues for a communal lunch. My colleagues did me the great courtesy of carrying on most conversations in flawless English. As an American academic accustomed to research abroad, I anticipated that sooner or later I’d encounter a classic opening sentence of the form, “You know, the trouble with you Americans is…” And after a month or so my unfailingly polite and generous colleagues obliged. But what ended that sentence has stuck with me since then; and underlines a core value of study abroad at the same time: “You know, the trouble with you Americans is, you think every policy problem has a solution; whereas we Europeans understand that some problems you just have to learn to live with.”

The idea that part of our mission was research intended to support policies that solved problems was never something I’d thought of as varying by culture. But as I reflected more and more on the idea, I realized that insecurity—and by extension cyber-insecurity—would be something we Americans would have to learn to live with.

This “switch” problem is mainly due to the relentless infiltration of market capitalist logic into problem framing and solving. For example, corporations hire cybersecurity consultants to ensure that corporate profit-making operations are secure from hacking, theft, disruption, and so on. When corporations pay money to someone to solve a problem, they expect a “deliverable”: some empirical evidence that corporate operations are now “secure.” It should go without saying that this same corporate logic infiltration—the largely North American idea that governance would be more “effective” if run via corporate profit-making logic—has seriously degraded effective governance as well.

Cybersecurity is not a switch. It isn’t something that’s either “on” or “off,” but something that we can approach if we have a sound strategy. And progress toward our shared ideal itself is what we should be counting as success.

Even if we could agree to moderate our cultural insistence on measuring success or failure in terms of decisively “solving” policy problems, we’d be left with another set of problems caused mainly by the assertion that humans are too slow and emotional as compared to computers, which are imagined as fast (absolutely) and objective (absolutely not). We need to challenge these ideas, because together they make up a kind of binary weapon which leads us into very dangerous territory while at the same time doing little to advance us toward our ideal of “cybersecurity in our time.”

So, a first critical question is, under what conditions is speed a necessary advantage? That’s where computers come in. Few Americans will be aware, for example, that the first-ever presidential directive on cybersecurity—NSDD-145 (1984)—was issued by President Ronald Reagan in reaction to his viewing of John Badham’s WarGames (1983). After viewing the film, which imagines a nascent artificial intelligence called the WOPR hijacking U.S. nuclear missile defense and threatening to start a global thermonuclear war, Reagan asked his national security team whether the events in the film could happen in real life. When his question was later answered in the affirmative, the Reagan administration issued the NSDD. Here’s a key bit of dialogue from Badham’s film, which starts after a simulated nuclear attack resulted in 22 percent of Air Force officers refusing to launch their missiles when commanded to do so:

Mr. McKittrick: I think we ought to take the men out of the loop.

GEN Berringer: Mr. McKittrick, you’re out of line sir!

McKittrick: Why am I out of line?

Cabot: Wait. Excuse me. What are you talking about? I'm sorry. What do you mean, take them ‘out of the loop’?

GEN Berringer: Gentlemen, we've had men in these silos since before any of you were watching Howdy Doody. For myself, I sleep pretty well at night knowing those boys are down there.

McKittrick: General, we all know they're fine men. But in a nuclear war, we can't afford to have our missiles lying dormant in those silos because those men refuse to turn the keys when the computers tell ‘em to!

Watson: You mean, when the president orders them to.

McKittrick: The president will probably follow the computer war plan. Now that’s a fact!

Watson: Well, I imagine the joint chiefs will have some input?

GEN Berringer: You’re damned tootin’!

Cabot: Well hell, if the Soviets launch a surprise attack there's no time…

Healy: Twenty-three minutes from warning to impact. Six minutes, if it’s sub-launched.

McKittrick: Six minutes! Six minutes. That's barely enough time for the president to make a decision. Now once he makes that decision, the computers should take over.

This discussion brackets two critical components of any discussion of contemporary cybersecurity. The first is the “humans are too slow” theme, and by slow, we mean slow as compared to computers. Second, humans have consciousness and morals and computers don’t. Computers have some version of whatever their programmers give them. Recent advances in deep learning and artificial neural networks—in particular foundation models—have created the impression that machine consciousness and independent creativity are here or very near, but they are not; and moreover—and this is key—whatever these machines come up with will always be tethered to their programmers which, to be blunt, remain mostly young, upper-middle-class males from the northern hemisphere.

This impossibility of algorithmic objectivity is the second half of the “binary weapon” I referenced earlier: along with speed, algorithms, code, and the like promise to be objective—but they cannot be. So as mathematician Cathy McNeill or computer scientist (and activist) Joy Buolamwini remind us, when you get turned down for a loan or a job and an algorithm is involved, it remains almost certain that far from being “objective” in the sense we usually mean, some unintended but profitable bias has very likely been introduced. Ask an AI to show you a photo of an “attractive person,” for example, and what the “objective” algorithm is likely to supply is the image of a thin blond woman with large breasts. Imagine deploying biased algorithms in military or cybersecurity applications, but then also imagine that your reservations about bias cause you to hesitate. You’d be terrified that an economic or security rival less principled or cautious than you would deploy and gain a terminal advantage over you. It’s straight out of philosopher Carl von Clausewitz’s discussion of the limitations of restraint in war:

As the use of physical power to the utmost extent by no means excludes the cooperation of the intelligence, it follows that he who uses force unsparingly, without reference to the bloodshed involved, must obtain a superiority if his adversary uses less vigor in its application. The former then dictates the law to the latter, and both proceed to extremities to which the only limitations are those imposed by the amount of counteracting force on each side.

Having weaponized cyberspace, and corporate strategy having appropriated military metaphors, the message is clear: restraint makes you a sucker. In terms of policy, this leaves us with a classic dilemma: we get gored either way. If we don’t deploy AI and our competitors do, we may lose everything. But if we do deploy AI, not fully understanding how it arrives at its conclusions but having unreasonable faith that “it must be right, because it’s math; it’s objective,” we may lose everything as well.

So, the WarGames scene should also remind us that the particular domain in which speed is being claimed as a necessary virtue is armed conflict. Note that Watson’s objection to the idea that “computers are in charge” implies there should be checks and balances between decision and action; an anagram of democracy itself, with its emphasis on deliberation and consensus. But Cabot counters by asserting, reasonably, that in war, checks and balances are a liability: “there’s no time” (contemporary hypersonic missile technology compresses time still further).

In the United States, the idea that we’re always at war—and its destructive impact on democracy worldwide—emerged from the impact of a shattering moment in U.S. history: 9/11. Since then, we’ve never had the feeling we can “go back” to making washing machines and babies as we did after World War II. We are permanently mobilized, always on alert, always at war. And in war, speed above all else seems to make sense (think Blitzkrieg). Being “always at war” also biases politics in favor of the world’s political Right, with its claim that checks and balances, deliberation, and popular sovereignty put citizens of democracies at too much risk. What’s needed, then, is an unfettered executive who can act fast.

Of course, we are not at war and, as a result, speed at any cost is just as likely to lead to disaster as it did in the summer of 1914, when all the major combatants believed whoever struck first was assured of victory, while waiting to be attacked made you a sucker.

Cybersecurity suffers from all the same associations. Once we insist that cyberspace is an arena of conflict, speed at any cost seems a necessity. Automating computer network defense is no longer thought of as a policy choice but is reduced to a question of how and when. I should add that if computer network defense can be automated, so can computer network offense, including espionage, crime, and systems compromise.

In sum, the cybersecurity we aspire to is impossible. Cybersecurity is not a switch, and automating our defenses—computer network defense, national defense—is as likely to destroy us as save us. We live in a world now, by choice, in which “sticks and stones can break our bones, but words can also hurt us.” As the mass shooting at Uvalde Texas and so many others have highlighted, in this new world there is no armor, no fortress walls, no police or army that can protect us. Along with increasingly extreme weather events, we will have to learn to live with cyber intrusions ranging from election interference, disinformation, cybercrime, and threats to our critical infrastructure. We will have to learn to be more self-sufficient and resilient.

#### Cybersecurity or cyberterrorism are the latest manifestations of over-militarized responses to constructed threat---it feeds into collective paranoia and encourages violent policies

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Reinterpreting cyberconflict – path dependency, securitisation and the national cybersecurity state

If the societal security approach is an effective theoretical tool to understand recent cyber events, and a potentially more salient policy framework, then how is it that national and military security-based approaches to cybersecurity have become so dominant in the previous two decades? In answering that question, this section analyses several events that led to the emergence and subsequent consolidation of national cybersecurity states and undermined the emergence of a more decentralised, societal approach based on identity conflicts and socio-psychological factors. This is not an extensive history of post-Cold War cyberconflict. Nevertheless, these cases provide snapshots of the process by which cybersecurity was ‘securitised’ by many governments in the West and national security agencies obtained considerable power in this emergent domain. Cyberattacks were framed in the discourse of political leaders during this period as an existential threat to nations that would cause major disruptions to national economies and be catalysts for conflict between the great powers. Growing concerns over internet failure and instability and attacks against critical infrastructure were instrumental in creating fear and paranoia, but also served the political and commercial purposes of securitising actors and hindered the emergence of societal approaches. Later in the period, owing partly to the growing influence of social media platforms, the societal effects of disinformation were layered into anxiety-saturated cyber policy. Importantly, these cases also created path-dependencies in which the relationship between government and the societal sector worsened and through which military agencies and structures have taken actions that have intensified societal and cybersecurity dilemmas.

‘Millennium madness’ – Kosovo and the Y2K bug

The conflict in Kosovo in 1999 was one of the first major conflicts in which cyberattacks were used by warring parties for strategic advantage. In March that year, NATO, while conducting strategic air strikes on the forces of Milosevic, sustained cyberattacks from Serbian hackers targeted at its headquarters and digital infrastructure. In response to the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Chinese hackers also conducted cyberattacks against the White House website, the US departments of energy and the interior and the national parks service, including replacing website content with images and text expressing fury over the bombing. The US military’s response exhibited elements of restraint, but Pentagon commanders considered a variety of electronic measures to respond to Serbian hackers and enhance their own operational and political effectiveness through electronic means. This included hacking into Serbian banks to cause economic problems for the regime, trying to isolate Slobodan Milosevic electronically to harm the continuity and centrality of command, and targeting his own personal wealth to bring him to the negotiating table (Borger 1999). The Pentagon’s restraint at this time was largely due to legal concerns over whether the use of cyberweapons would constitute war crimes, whether they would be strategically successful, whether they would accelerate the development of offensive cyber tools by foreign power (the security dilemma), and whether the tools used could be reverse engineered or at least reveal US military cyber capabilities and methods (Borger 1999).

The hacks created strong incentives to nationalise and militarise cybersecurity and demonstrated to the US and NATO militaries the seriousness of the cyberthreat they faced. However, the social and psychological elements of the conflict are underappreciated. Kosovo was a typical identity-based conflict, where warring parties were from ethnically aligned, culturally adversarial societal groups. The activities were conducted by non-state hackers, including Serbian and Chinese nationalists, and targeted not only military organisations but the societal sector (parks and energy, for example), illustrating the need for (and lack of) attention to societal cyber vulnerabilities, the spillover effects of military conflicts into the societal sector, and the inability of the US military to respond to hacks and provide assistance to organisations that became entangled in the conflict’s electronic dynamics. The hackers involved in hacktivism during the conflict, moreover, were part of global social networks that included traditional anti-war sentiment and groups. It is illustrative of our argument that when NATO intervened in Libya in 2011, 12 years after the war in Kosovo, Serbian hackers conducted similar anti-NATO hacks. In this case, online communities opposed to and influenced by NATO interventions transcended spatial and temporal boundaries. This was not, however, a lesson prominent in those derived from this and subsequent conflicts. The Kosovo cyberattacks also demonstrated the importance of the informational elements of contemporary conflict and the war of narratives that influences public opinion during conflict situations. The aim of the hackers and the effect of the hacks were to deny and prevent the NATO public affairs website from communicating its narrative around the conflict (the public affairs website was inoperable for several days). In this respect, the tactical and operation effects of the hacking operation, including increasing NATO manpower requirements, slowing operating tempo and enlarging the potential for human error in the air strike operations (Department of Defense 2000) were combined with social and psychological effects targeting perceptions of the conflict among identity groups. Ultimately, none of them caused major damage to the alliance or the US and the impact of these hacks should not be overestimated. In this respect, the acceleration of military capabilities and doctrine that occurred after and because of the conflict may have been disproportionate to the actual threat, which is a common feature of the process of securitisation.

Similar societal and psychosocial dynamics were in evidence as the global community, and particularly the financial sector, faced the prospect of an ‘electronic meltdown’ caused by the Millennium (Y2K) Bug at the turn of the century. The bug caused widespread fear about the integrity of the global internet and hundreds of billions of dollars were spent by governments around the world to prepare for, and mitigate, potential effects (Jowitt 2017). The bug was a relatively simple glitch in electronic systems caused by the transition from the four-digit date 1999–2000, but nevertheless, caused widespread alarm. In October 1998, President Bill Clinton signed the Year 2000 Information and Readiness Disclosure Act, which was an attempt to encourage private sector (and societal sector) actors to share information about Y2K-related vulnerabilities by offering them limited indemnity against losses or lawsuits resulting from the potential disruption. These attempts to involve the societal sector were not helped, however, by a wider context of securitisation. An issue of Time Magazine was indicative of both the global hysteria and the securitising discourse, raising the prospect of Y2K causing ‘The end of the world!?!’, citing ‘Y2K insanity!’, ‘Apocalypse Now!’, asking ‘Will computers melt down? Will society?’, providing what it called ‘A Guide to Millennium Madness’ and citing fears of airlines and banking systems going haywire (Ghishal 2017).

These concerns spilled over into the defence sector, with John Hamre, the US Deputy Secretary of Defense from 1997 to March 2000, contributing to the securitising discourse by arguing that ‘the Y2K problem is the electronic equivalent of the El Niño and there will be nasty surprises around the globe’ (Jowitt 2017). References by cyber policymakers to extreme weather events, Armageddon, apocalypse, natural disasters, pandemics, biological agents and previous wartime scenarios were commonplace in the early 2000s and such analogies served to structure thinking and as rhetorical tools to add urgency to the securitising process (Betz and Stevens 2013). This rhetoric was accompanied by several more practical measures which set a precedent for military responses to cyber-related incidents. In the UK, for example, armed forces were put on standby to assist in maintaining vital public services in the event of an internet meltdown, including providing disaster relief in the event of hospitals, water supplies and roads and traffic systems being affected (Waugh 1998). In the US, officials noted the possibility of military responses to Y2 K problems and addressed concerns about effects of the bug on nuclear missile operations (Gershwin 1999). This contributed to a broader process where militaries were searching for new roles in the absence of the Soviet threat and were increasingly planning for involvement in civil crises and emergencies across security sectors. In this way, trends in cybersecurity advanced in parallel with broader securitisation patterns, including in areas such as pandemic response, terrorism and migration.

While the Y2K bug eventually turned out to be a ‘damp squib’, the fear and uncertainty it generated fed into a new era of collective paranoia which further accelerated the securitisation of the internet and its functions. This included the construction of a perception that the internet lacked resilience and underpinned society in a way that was inherently vulnerable and prone to disintegration (Best 2003). This ran counter to the idea of the internet as a democratising technology, facilitating harmonious relations and technological and societal progress, and exposed ‘the fundamental unknowability both of computer technology and of the ultimate value of that technology, its networking capacity, and its generation of information’ (Best 2003). As Kasvio (2000) argues, ‘Even if the transition to the new Millennium did not cause any major collapses of the existing computer systems, the whole process of preparatory measures showed clearly how strongly the vital functions of modern societies depend on the orderly functioning of extremely complicated systems which nobody fully understands’. The Y2K problem also demonstrated a tendency, which was to become a central feature of cybersecurity debates in the 2000s, to overestimate the risks posed by new technologies, and create disproportionate, centralised and bureaucratic responses. In the words of Quiggin (2005), the Y2K bug created a moral panic in which there was a ‘systematic tendency, arising from the nature of the mass media and political processes, to overstate some kinds of threats, particularly those involving new and unfamiliar dangers.’ This was compounded by a media that tended to exaggerate the risk, sensationalise stories and not cover government efforts to mitigate risks involved, burdensome as those efforts were (Quigley 2004, 823).

In line with the argument in this article, the Y2K bug also had broader socio-psychological effects and demonstrated the need for governments to manage these (although little was done in the aftermath of any of these events to reconcile these dynamics). These effects are addressed by Kevin Quigley (2004, 825), who argues:

IT ranks high in the ‘dread factor’ in psychometric terms; it has the power to unleash considerable anxiety. The more government depends on IT to deliver its service, the more vulnerable it is to a public that oscillates from hyper-reaction to hyper-reaction. Indeed, while IT commentators, both professional and amateur, offer IT as the universal solution to social and organizational problems, Y2 K demonstrates that the ‘panacea’ can quickly deteriorate to a paradoxical ‘organized pandemonium’, as in the case of Y2 K. Hence, the government must be sensitive to this potential and must adopt effective communications with key partners, be they suppliers, private industry, the media or civil society at large, to reassure these partners that they are managing IT effectively.

The effectiveness of communication between the government and private sector was not helped during this period by governments’ own securitisation of the incident.

9/11 And weapons of mass disruption

The fears generated by the Y2K problem did not subside after the millennium passed but were compounded and intensified in processes that resulted from the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC. The attacks presented a seminal moment in the development of fears around cyberterrorism, especially as enhanced border and aviation security created incentives for non-state actors to try to strike the US remotely through digital networks and digital infrastructure. In the aftermath of the attacks, various measures were taken by the US government to protect the US ‘homeland’, and these extended into cyberspace. Concrete examples of enhanced digital security measures included the Patriot Act, which allowed the US government unprecedented powers to access electronic communications, and the now widely-covered activities of the US National Security Agency, including the Prism programme, which enabled the agency to identify and target illegal and extremist activity online through ‘mass surveillance’. The war on terror served to further nationalise security in the US, created powerful new bureaucracies, including the Department for Homeland Security, which was given strong statutory authority to respond to cyberthreats. The empowerment of the intelligence community was also a feature of the post 9/11 environment and a variety of agencies took on a role in online operations against terrorists and rogue states. This powerful national cybersecurity state was not best aligned to match the challenge of globally connected systems of computers and the debates that emerged within the national security community over deterrence and pre-emption returned to Cold War concepts. There was a tendency, for example, to equate weapons of mass disruption (cyberweapons) with weapons of mass destruction and a close association emerged between digital threats and physical – and even nuclear – threats to American and its allies in the aftermath of 9/11. Former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta’s warning of a ‘cyber pearl harbour’ (Bumiller and Shanker 2012) is perhaps the most famous and widely cited example, but there were many others. These warnings appear to have been unrealistic and fears around terrorism and the capability of non-state actors to mount large scale and sophisticated cyberattacks have largely proved unfounded.

The most fundamental problem here was a failure to identify that ‘cyberterrorism’ – cyberattacks causing equivalent effects to conventional terrorist attacks – was not such a serious threat as feared and constructed by national security agencies. In this sense, cyberterrorism was based on fears that were not accurately assessed and which fuelled securitisation processes. A secondary problem was the widespread conflation between cyberterrorism (a very limited problem by any measure) and terrorist use of the internet (a more serious and pervasive issue). The ‘cyber 9/11’ scenario failed to materialise for various reasons, including the fact that cyberattacks do not create the powerful visual effects that more conventional acts of terrorism do; that the difficulty of attributing cyberattacks does not allow terrorist groups to derive the propaganda benefit of being held clearly responsible for such attacks; and the lack of scientific and technical expertise to pull off more than just nuisance type acts of cybervandalism. Despite these now seemingly obvious dynamics, the term cyberterrorism entered the national security discourse and often went unchallenged. As Sean Lawson (2013, 86) has argued, ‘cyber-doom scenarios are the latest manifestation of fears about ‘technology-out-of-control’ in Western societies,’ and are ‘unrealistic’ and ‘encourage the adoption of counterproductive, even dangerous policies.’ In this context it is worth noting that, in some cases, states have taken military actions against hackers associated with terrorist groups, including the targeted killing by US forces of an ISIS hacker in 2016 and the more recent Israeli military attack against a Hamas cyber facility. These kinetic responses do not appear to have been based on the likelihood of physical damage being caused by cyber operations, but in response to hack and leak operations in the US case (the ISIS hacker has released hacked details of US military personnel), and a Hamas cyber operation which had already been fended off by Israeli cyber defences (Newman 2019). In this respect, and in line with the arguments of this article, terrorism presents an arguably greater societal threat than it does to the military, stems from identity divides that terrorist groups prey on and exploit and has led to over-militarised responses which have fed existing identity-based conflicts.

#### **The premise of “increased cybersecurity” remains an alarmist, baseless justification for the expansion of the imperialist state and its control over its population.**

Glenn Edward Greenwald 13, an American journalist, author and lawyer. In 2014, he cofounded The Intercept, January 28th, 2013, “Pentagon's new massive expansion of 'cyber-security' unit is about everything except defense, The Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jan/28/pentagon-cyber-security-expansion-stuxnet> [ML]

As the US government depicts the Defense Department as shrinking due to budgetary constraints, the Washington Post this morning announces "a major expansion of [the Pentagon's] cybersecurity force over the next several years, increasing its size more than fivefold." Specifically, says the New York Times this morning, "the expansion would increase the Defense Department's Cyber Command by more than 4,000 people, up from the current 900." The Post describes this expansion as "part of an effort to turn an organization that has focused largely on defensive measures into the equivalent of an Internet-era fighting force." This Cyber Command Unit operates under the command of Gen. Keith Alexander, who also happens to be the head of the National Security Agency, the highly secretive government network that spies on the communications of foreign nationals - and American citizens.

The Pentagon's rhetorical justification for this expansion is deeply misleading. Beyond that, these activities pose a wide array of serious threats to internet freedom, privacy, and international law that, as usual, will be conducted with full-scale secrecy and with little to no oversight and accountability. And, as always, there is a small army of private-sector corporations who will benefit most from this expansion.

Disguising aggression as "defense"

Let's begin with the way this so-called "cyber-security" expansion has been marketed. It is part of a sustained campaign which, quite typically, relies on blatant fear-mongering.

In March, 2010, the Washington Post published an amazing Op-Ed by Adm. Michael McConnell, Bush's former Director of National Intelligence and a past and current executive with Booz Allen, a firm representing numerous corporate contractors which profit enormously each time the government expands its "cyber-security" activities. McConnell's career over the last two decades - both at Booz, Allen and inside the government - has been devoted to accelerating the merger between the government and private sector in all intelligence, surveillance and national security matters (it was he who led the successful campaign to retroactively immunize the telecom giants for their participation in the illegal NSA domestic spying program). Privatizing government cyber-spying and cyber-warfare is his primary focus now.

McConnell's Op-Ed was as alarmist and hysterical as possible. Claiming that "the United States is fighting a cyber-war today, and we are losing", it warned that "chaos would result" from an enemy cyber-attack on US financial systems and that "our power grids, air and ground transportation, telecommunications, and water-filtration systems are in jeopardy as well." Based on these threats, McConnell advocated that "we" - meaning "the government and the private sector" - "need to develop an early-warning system to monitor cyberspace" and that "we need to reengineer the Internet to make attribution, geolocation, intelligence analysis and impact assessment - who did it, from where, why and what was the result - more manageable." As Wired's Ryan Singel wrote: "He's talking about changing the internet to make everything anyone does on the net traceable and geo-located so the National Security Agency can pinpoint users and their computers for retaliation."

The same week the Post published McConnell's extraordinary Op-Ed, the Obama White House issued its own fear-mongering decree on cyber-threats, depicting the US as a vulnerable victim to cyber-aggression. It began with this sentence: "President Obama has identified cybersecurity as one of the most serious economic and national security challenges we face as a nation, but one that we as a government or as a country are not adequately prepared to counter." It announced that "the Executive Branch was directed to work closely with all key players in US cybersecurity, including state and local governments and the private sector" and to "strengthen public/private partnerships", and specifically announced Obama's intent to "to implement the recommendations of the Cyberspace Policy Review built on the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) launched by President George W. Bush."

Since then, the fear-mongering rhetoric from government officials has relentlessly intensified, all devoted to scaring citizens into believing that the US is at serious risk of cataclysmic cyber-attacks from "aggressors". This all culminated when Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, last October, warned of what he called a "cyber-Pearl Harbor". This "would cause physical destruction and the loss of life, an attack that would paralyze and shock the nation and create a profound new sense of vulnerability." Identifying China, Iran, and terrorist groups, he outlined a parade of horribles scarier than anything since Condoleezza Rice's 2002 Iraqi "mushroom cloud":

"An aggressor nation or extremist group could use these kinds of cyber tools to gain control of critical switches. They could derail passenger trains, or even more dangerous, derail passenger trains loaded with lethal chemicals. They could contaminate the water supply in major cities, or shut down the power grid across large parts of the country."

As usual, though, reality is exactly the opposite. This massive new expenditure of money is not primarily devoted to defending against cyber-aggressors. The US itself is the world's leading cyber-aggressor. A major purpose of this expansion is to strengthen the US's ability to destroy other nations with cyber-attacks. Indeed, even the Post report notes that a major component of this new expansion is to "conduct offensive computer operations against foreign adversaries".

It is the US - not Iran, Russia or "terror" groups - which already is the first nation (in partnership with Israel) to aggressively deploy a highly sophisticated and extremely dangerous cyber-attack. Last June, the New York Times' David Sanger reported what most of the world had already suspected: "From his first months in office, President Obama secretly ordered increasingly sophisticated attacks on the computer systems that run Iran's main nuclear enrichment facilities, significantly expanding America's first sustained use of cyberweapons." In fact, Obama "decided to accelerate the attacks . . . even after an element of the program accidentally became public in the summer of 2010 because of a programming error that allowed it to escape Iran's Natanz plant and sent it around the world on the Internet." According to the Sanger's report, Obama himself understood the significance of the US decision to be the first to use serious and aggressive cyber-warfare:

"Mr. Obama, according to participants in the many Situation Room meetings on Olympic Games, was acutely aware that with every attack he was pushing the United States into new territory, much as his predecessors had with the first use of atomic weapons in the 1940s, of intercontinental missiles in the 1950s and of drones in the past decade. He repeatedly expressed concerns that any American acknowledgment that it was using cyberweapons - even under the most careful and limited circumstances - could enable other countries, terrorists or hackers to justify their own attacks."

The US isn't the vulnerable victim of cyber-attacks. It's the leading perpetrator of those attacks. As Columbia Professor and cyber expert Misha Glenny wrote in the NYT last June: Obama's cyber-attack on Iran "marked a significant and dangerous turning point in the gradual militarization of the Internet."

Indeed, exactly as Obama knew would happen, revelations that it was the US which became the first country to use cyber-warfare against a sovereign country - just as it was the first to use the atomic bomb and then drones - would make it impossible for it to claim with any credibility (except among its own media and foreign policy community) that it was in a defensive posture when it came to cyber-warfare. As Professor Glenny wrote: "by introducing such pernicious viruses as Stuxnet and Flame, America has severely undermined its moral and political credibility." That's why, as the Post reported yesterday, the DOJ is engaged in such a frantic and invasive effort to root out Sanger's source: because it reveals the obvious truth that the US is the leading aggressor in the world when it comes to cyber-weapons.

This significant expansion under the Orwellian rubric of "cyber-security" is thus a perfect microcosm of US military spending generally. It's all justified under by the claim that the US must defend itself from threats from Bad, Aggressive Actors, when the reality is the exact opposite: the new program is devoted to ensuring that the US remains the primary offensive threat to the rest of the world. It's the same way the US develops offensive biological weapons under the guise of developing defenses against such weapons (such as the 2001 anthrax that the US government itself says came from a US Army lab). It's how the US government generally convinces its citizens that it is a peaceful victim of aggression by others when the reality is that the US builds more weapons, sells more arms and bombs more countries than virtually the rest of the world combined.

Threats to privacy and internet freedom

Beyond the aggressive threat to other nations posed by the Pentagon's "cyber-security" programs, there is the profound threat to privacy, internet freedom, and the ability to communicate freely for US citizens and foreign nationals alike. The US government has long viewed these "cyber-security" programs as a means of monitoring and controlling the internet and disseminating propaganda. The fact that this is all being done under the auspices of the NSA and the Pentagon means, by definition, that there will be no transparency and no meaningful oversight.

Back in 2003, the Rumsfeld Pentagon prepared a secret report entitled "Information Operations (IO) Roadmap", which laid the foundation for this new cyber-warfare expansion. The Pentagon's self-described objective was "transforming IO into a core military competency on par with air, ground, maritime and special operations". In other words, its key objective was to ensure military control over internet-based communications:

#### The affirmative relies on fear-mongering tactics — competition is distinct from acts of force.

Dr. Donald Stoker 20, Professor of Strategy and Policy for the U.S. Naval War College program at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. Dr. Craig Whiteside is an associate professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College as part of the resident program, Winter 2020, “Blurred Lines: Gr ed Lines: Gray-Zone Conflict and Hybrid W one Conflict and Hybrid War—Two Failures of American Strategic Thinking,” Naval War College Review, V. 73 No. 1 Article 4 [ML]

Tactics, or the tactical realm, deal with how military forces directly fight the enemy. Weapons technologies and methods for using them drive tactics more than any other factor, and the constant roiling of technology means tactics never stand still. Also relevant to this discussion is the so-called spectrum of conflict. This is a commonly used term that seeks to classify the interaction among nations (at war or not), often (but not always) by the scale and type of means being used. 11 Soldier-scholar Harry Summers pointed out that this notion entered the U.S. military lexicon as the “spectrum of war” via the U.S. Army’s 1962 Field Service Regulations. Then the spectrum stretched from cold war to limited war. Summers correctly identified a “serious flaw”: the spectrum fails to delineate between war and peace. 12 This type of defective thinking continues to feed current American misconceptions as we continue to confuse war and peace, something manifest in the discussions of hybrid war, gray-zone war, and so-called cyber war. In a 2016 article, Lieutenant General James Dubik, USA (Ret.), made an argument similar to that of Summers, observing that U.S. leaders are fuzzy about just what war is, a problem fed by the 1994 adoption (really, readoption) of a spectrum-of-conflict approach to strategic analysis. 13 Objecting to using this inaccurate analytical tool does not, as some argue, merely “perpetuate the binary peace/war distinction.” 14 It is in reality an insistence on clear analysis and an embrace of the notion that peace and war are not the same. Their relationship is not binary; it is dialectical. War and peace are best defined in opposition to one another, as one is the antithesis of the other. If a state is engaged in armed conflict, it is at war. The armed conflict can be with another state or not. Clausewitz famously defines war as “an act of force,” one intended to achieve a political object. Lukas Milevski cogently observes that Clausewitz’s definition “elegantly encapsulates the three most important elements of war: violence, instrumentality,” and its adversarial nature. If the state is not in an armed conflict, it is at peace. Thomas Hobbes tells us that peace is the absence of war. 15 War should not be confused with warfare, which usually is defined as the undertaking of the military actions themselves. Understanding this is critical because we begin our analysis with the question whether the nation is at war. One must remember, though, that nations can be in competition with one another and not be at war and involved in killing the soldiers (and usually civilians) of the other state. Competition among all states, friendly or not, is a norm—and to be preferred. But allowing our analysis of wars or competition among states to rest on intellectual constructs that fail to honor the critical distinction between war and peace means we have lost the logical foundation for critical analysis.

### 2NC---Democracy

#### NATO poses as the defender of democracy to push narratives and justify unrestrained violence

Gunther Hellman, et. al, 17; Benjamin Herborth, Gabi Schlag, and Christian Weber—Professor of Political Science at Goathe University of Frankfurt, Assistant professor at the University of Groningen, Faculty of the Arts, critical security studies senior lecturer at the University of Tuebingen, Goethe University, Faculty of Social Sciences, “The West: a securitizing community?” Journal of International Relations and Development (2017) 301–330. doi:10.1057/jird.2013.9;

NATO’s strategic discourse and the self-authorisation of ‘the West’ While the first research area dealt with representations of ‘authoritarian regimes’ that are by definition categorised as being outside of the boundaries of ‘the West’, this research area focuses on the transformation of NATO, that is, the military alliance that is considered to be the institutional core of what we usually call ‘the West’ (e.g., Gress 2004; Brzezinski 2009). Obviously, transatlantic security cooperation has been a classical theme in IR, either from a realist vantage point, where NATO is primarily described as a defence alliance subordinated to national purposes (Waltz 2000: 18), or from a liberal perspective, where NATO is understood as an alliance of democracies (RisseKappen 1995: 4). In both perspectives, however, the dynamics of security cooperation between North America and Europe seem unproblematic as long as the allies are convinced of their common interest or their shared values.

NATO’s (lasting) ability to voice in-/securities — for example a ‘Soviet threat’, ‘terrorism’, or ‘new challenges’ — directs our attention to highly institutionalised dynamics of securitisation that, as the subsequent analysis will show, manifest themselves as a self-authorisation of ‘the West’ in order to defend its normative foundation. Such a tendency towards self-authorisation has become visible in different forms since the North Atlantic alliance was founded in 1949. During the Cold War, it primarily enabled a rather deep institutionalisation of military cooperation with an integrated command structure including US nuclear weapons, as well as common strategic planning and defence exercises. After the Cold War, this project was continued but it has certainly changed in form. Out-of-area operations and the development of a globally active alliance is one of the most visible expressions of such self authorising practices. These dynamics were central to re-constitute NATO during critical junctures and have been productive of a highly self-confident Western alliance today (Jackson 2003; Bially Mattern 2005; Behnke 2013).

The North Atlantic Treaty, signed in April 1949 by representatives of nine Western European states, Iceland, Canada, and the US, provided the Western alliance with a legal basis and outlined the key principles of cooperation, that is, consultation (Article 4) and collective defence (Article 5). Although the formulation of Article 5 was highly contested between the US and its European allies, it was perceived as the cornerstone of transatlantic security cooperation (Kaplan 2004: 4). In contrast to such a legal framing of Western security cooperation, the preamble of the Treaty invoked an inherently normative rhetoric when it stated that the parties ‘are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their people, founded on the principle of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law’ (The North Atlantic Treaty 1949). The construction of unity based on a common culture and even ‘civilisation’ (rather than merely a shared threat perception) transferred military cooperation and integration far beyond an interestdriven alliance (e.g., Klein 1990; Jackson 2003, 2006a). During these formative years of NATO, one central aim of formulating ‘strategic concepts’ was to construct a common security interest of the US and Western European states that was metaphorically framed in terms of an ‘indivisibility of allied security’.

Bearing these normative foundations in mind, NATO gradually evolved as a cultural project that was directed against communism — which made the inclusion of an autocratic state such as Portugal possible — rather than as a community of democratic states (Klein 1990; Jackson 2003; Sjursen 2004). The invoked narrative of shared norms, values, and a common heritage provided a sufficiently strong rationale for defending the North Atlantic Area against any potential threat. Moreover, it also legitimised taking whatever measures were deemed ‘necessary’ to defend its members. ‘Forward defence’ and ‘massive retaliation’ turned out to be such legitimate means. Nevertheless, in many ways the strength of Western rhetoric was also intended to polish over and counterbalance many of the underlying political conflicts that persisted throughout NATO’s post-war history. As a matter of fact, over the years it had become a standard formula in political discourse to refer to an alliance in ‘crisis’ as proof of its uniquely transatlantic vitality. In this sense the invocation of a normative foundation of shared ‘Western’ values, heritage and civilisation even against the background of internal political dissent was as much a securitising move as it was an expression of a particular ‘Western’ structure of conflict. One could conclude that transatlantic security cooperation was only manageable by invoking such a normative foundation of shared values, heritage, and civilisation.

The subsequent strategic concepts DC 6/1 (December 1952), MC 14/2 (May 1957) and the amended strategic guidelines were written with the intention to both ‘convince the USSR that war does not pay’ (NATO 1950) and to reassure the allies that continued and even intensified that security cooperation was necessary. Changing strategic concepts, most prominently from ‘massive retaliation’ to ‘flexible response’, restored the reliability of mutual defence because of altered security circumstances (e.g., Haftendorn 1996; Tuschhoff 1999; Kaplan 2004: 100). Although the concept of ‘flexible response’ eventually satisfied all allies and remained valid until the end of the Cold War, different interpretations of deterrence and its operational implications persisted (Daalder 1991: 41; Risse-Kappen 1995: 184–7). Once again a particular structure of conflict among NATO allies was observable in the sense that although a ‘crisis’ occurred, references to the common heritage, shared norms and values of the ‘free world’ restored sufficient coherence among them. In this sense, the decision over West Germany’s membership in 1955, the Suez Crisis in 1956, the withdrawal of France from the integrated military command structure in 1966, or NATO’s double track decision in 1979 were all incidents of alliance disruption that nevertheless did not lead to a break-up of the Atlantic alliance. In these situations strategic concepts turned out to be crucial in re-establishing coherence and unity by reaffirming the authority of the alliance and its ability to (re-)act. The strengthening of consultation mechanisms in the 1950s, the formation of ‘Allied Mobile Forces’ (AMF) in the 1960s, or the deployment of additional Pershing II missiles in the 1980s embodied the institutional consequences of these strategic re-orientations.

With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, many commentators expected that the Atlantic alliance would sooner or later vanish as well. Thus, NATO’s post-Cold War strategies of 1991 and 1999 were primarily aimed at justifying the institutional continuity of the Western alliance against the new setting of a decreasing Eastern threat (e.g., Ringsmose and Rynning 2009: 5). At the beginning of the 1990s, ‘Europe, whole and free’ (The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept 1991) became the obvious new rhetorical commonplace to legitimise a different future for NATO compared with the fate of the Warsaw Pact. It opened up the possibility of Eastern enlargement and paved the way for the institutionalisation of a new relationship with Russia (Wallander 2000; Williams and Neumann 2000; Schimmelfennig 2003; Adler 2008; Pouliot 2008) as well as initiatives for cooperation in the Mediterranean (Masala 2003).

In the same vein of institutional and geographical expansion, the ‘out-of-area’ debate in the mid-1990s rearticulated the necessity for a political and military engagement far beyond alliance territory and territorial defence.7 While the bipolar confrontation of the Cold War had largely constrained the alliance’s global military engagement, ‘safeguarding the freedom, common heritage and civilisation’ now ascribed a global mission to NATO’s members. Instead of supporting a culture of self-restraint and legal formalism, the allies even intensified a tendency towards self-authorisation in the name of defending human rights and the achievements of ‘Western civilisation’. Disregarding United Nations’ formal legal provisions in the case of Kosovo, NATO itself became a producer of a common law where the protection of human rights was deemed more important than respecting state sovereignty and non-intervention. The specific formation of NATO’s strategic discourse made such ‘humanitarian interventions’ intelligible as the new raison d’eˆtre. Public justifications for military interventions in Serbia or Afghanistan, for example, cited the attack on ‘Western’ values as a determining reason for taking military action. Ultimately, in its statement on terrorism, the North Atlantic Council said that ‘the lives of our citizens, and their human rights and civil liberties’ were threatened by terrorism and reaffirmed that the allies ‘condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. We, the 19 NATO Allies, are determined to combat this scourge. Our security requires no less’ (NATO 2001).8

During the Cold War, such a project of self-authorisation was primarily realised by institutionalising an integrated command structure, coordinated defence planning and common exercises. Today, the rhetoric of unpredictable risks and the global war on terrorism assigns an almost universal authority to NATO, in particular when ‘the challenge is not just to make our populations secure, but feel secure’ (de Hoop Scheffer 2009, emphasis added). ‘Europe’ and the ‘transatlantic area’ is the endangered subject of NATO’s strategic discourse justifying a durable and institutionally dense military cooperation of its member states and a nuclearisation of its defence strategy. Whenever allies pursued (national) security policies without consultation, conflicts and crisis within the alliance ensued. It was only through NATO that ‘the West’ could materialise its power position through a specific form of self-authorisation. NATO, respectively Western states, presented ‘democracy’, ‘human rights’, the ‘rule of law’, and ‘market economy’ as normatively unquestioned principles they had already realised. Others had only one choice: to comply or to resist. The normative attractiveness of ‘the West’, thus, also directs our attention to the temptations of securitising practices where a formalisation of IR through law is marginalised by unilateral acts of self-authorisation.

### 2NC---Disease

**Artificially constructed disease security rhetoric is produced by the ruthless profit-seeking of the corrupt military-pharmaceutical complex at the expense of people viewed as collateral damage --- it labels human rights as health risks, causing more disease and further entrenching the security paradigm --- turns case**

Paddy **Rawlinson 17** Associate Professor in International Criminology at Western Sydney University, February 2017, “Pharmatechnologies and the ills of medical progress” (book chapter in *The Routledge Handbook of Technology, Crime and Justice*) /lg

Technologies of health security

As with its military counterpart, the medical industrial complex in its current (perpetual) war on disease is developing an array of weapons for pre-emptive strikes against the enemy. Its apparently most effective (and lucrative) technology in preventative medicine is the vaccine. So significant has this technology become, that vaccination programmes are at the forefront of global health programmes. Support for the worldwide deployment of vaccine defence initiatives was evident in a statement by the WHO in 2005 which enthused ‘Immunization is one of the most successful and cost-effective health interventions ever. … We are entering a new era in which it is expected that the number of available vaccines will double. Immunization services are increasingly used to deliver other important health interventions, making them a strong pillar of health systems’ (WHO/Unicef [2005](https://www-routledgehandbooks-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/10.4324/9781315743981-13#ch12-bib-66): 3). As an integral component of the UN’s 2000–2015 Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and no doubt its successor, the post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda, vaccination sits at the heart of aspirational strategies for improving the lives of those in the developed world as well as the global south. According to the Vaccine Alliance network GAVI, a crucial partner in the MDG health programme, as well as preventing certain diseases, vaccination also ‘raises children’s IQ, improves their cognitive development, physical strength and educational achievements’ (Millennium Development Goals). Despite this expanding suite of advantageous outcomes and the overtly benign impetus behind the goals, a shadow has been cast regarding the ethics of the more covert incentives behind the programme. Some events have exposed the unhealthy relationship between national governments, intergovernmental agencies and the pharmaceutical industry, alliances based in part on ‘unwarranted influence’ and ‘misplaced power’ by the latter party and the pursuit of self-interest by each. In the case of the Indian clinical trials referred to above, one of the observations of the Parliamentary Standing Committee’s investigation into the HPV vaccine trials was that PATH, supported by funds from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (which also contributes substantial sums to GAVI) had ‘under the pretext of observation/demonstration project [*sic*] … violated all laws and regulations laid down for clinical trials by the Government’, a situation made possible by the lax attitude to regulations by the Indian Council of Medical Research. The report continued by concluding:

While doing so, its [PATH’s] sole aim has been to promote the commercial interest of HPV vaccine manufacturers who would have reaped windfall profits had PATH been successful in getting the HPV vaccine included in the UIP (Universal Immunization Programme) of the Country.

(*Parliament of India*[*2013*](https://www-routledgehandbooks-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/10.4324/9781315743981-13#ch12-bib-47))

In 2009 the WHO itself was caught up in a scandal when an investigative journalist uncovered conflict of interest on the expert panel advising the organization on the prospects of an influenza pandemic. It turned out that some of the advisory panel had professional links with pharmaceutical companies producing the flu vaccine H1N1 (Godlee [2010](https://www-routledgehandbooks-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/10.4324/9781315743981-13#ch12-bib-25)). The predicted pandemic never occurred and governments worldwide were left with stockpiles of tax-payer funded unused vaccines. GlaxoSmithKline, one of the vaccine-producing companies saw a 13 per cent increase in its profit margin based on sales of the vaccine (*Telegraph* online 2010). Here was yet another example of the lucrative nature of war – waged against threats real or imagined – and how government funding, as had occurred with defence contracts tendered to businesses such as Lockheed Martin, Boeing and Halliburton during the Iraq incursion (Hartnung and Berrigan [2005](https://www-routledgehandbooks-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/10.4324/9781315743981-13#ch12-bib-29)), feeds the **appetite of industry over** the **needs of citizens**.

In the **commercially driven process of securitizing health**, knowledge production plays a crucial role, operating both as a tool and a good. Security as a commodity requires the consumer (here the public, the state and the medical profession) to buy (literally) into a belief that the security products offered are effective in obviating or at least weakening the risk of disease or illness. This further involves ensuring that any risk involved in consuming the product, in this case the vaccine, is overridden by the threat posed by the disease against which it is affording protection. Creating a vigorous market for business in a competitive environment, as studies of corporate crime have consistently shown, can involve a range of deviant and criminal strategies and activities, including fraud, corruption, intimidation and bribery, activities that are ubiquitous and, in some cases, **systemic within industry.** Historically ‘Big Pharma’ has a poor track record for ethical behaviour (Braithwaite [1984](https://www-routledgehandbooks-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/10.4324/9781315743981-13#ch12-bib-11); Dukes *et al*. [2014](https://www-routledgehandbooks-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/10.4324/9781315743981-13#ch12-bib-17); Gotzsche [2013](https://www-routledgehandbooks-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/10.4324/9781315743981-13#ch12-bib-26); Griffin and Miller [2011](https://www-routledgehandbooks-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/10.4324/9781315743981-13#ch12-bib-28)). Healy observes that unlike other health-risk businesses such as tobacco and the chemicals industry, in which ‘the best studies systematically point to hazards where they exist’ and where company studies tend to be a small component of evidence-production, often viewed with suspicion as being partial, the same does not pertain to the pharmaceutical industry:

with pharmaceuticals often the only studies are those of the drug companies themselves, and these studies, as one might expect, all seem to point to the benefits of an ongoing use of the very chemicals that may in fact be causing the problem.

(*Healy*[*2012*](https://www-routledgehandbooks-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/10.4324/9781315743981-13#ch12-bib-30)*: 119*)

Alongside vested-interest knowledge production, the pharmaceutical industry engages in other nefarious activities. These include obstructing the publication of negative data from clinical trials in medical journals, which are often financially dependent on industry for advertising and the sale of reprints; intimidating whistle-blowers amongst medical researchers and doctors concerned about the safety of particular drugs; and the ubiquitous practice of aggressively promoting products to the medical profession including providing financial inducements to win support for a particular drug (Gotzsche [2013](https://www-routledgehandbooks-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/10.4324/9781315743981-13#ch12-bib-26); Healy [2012](https://www-routledgehandbooks-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/10.4324/9781315743981-13#ch12-bib-30); Moynihan [2001](https://www-routledgehandbooks-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/10.4324/9781315743981-13#ch12-bib-44)). Nor are these deviant and harmful practices occasional aberrations, but instead reflect recidivist behaviour embedded within the industry (Braithwaite [1984](https://www-routledgehandbooks-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/10.4324/9781315743981-13#ch12-bib-11); Dukes et al. [2014](https://www-routledgehandbooks-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/10.4324/9781315743981-13#ch12-bib-17)).

Despite a long history of insalubrious behaviour in the pharmaindustry, governments and intergovernmental organizations such as the WHO continue to focus on pharmaceuticalized solutions to what are arguably pharmaceutically constructed health risks. While obfuscating or down-playing the safety issues around the escalating administration of medical interventions, the pharmaindustry’s intensified participation in research and policy-making enables it to **construct narratives of high risk** around both the nature of diseases and their prevalence, and exaggerate the efficacy of its products, thereby creating an ever-expanding market (Healy [2012](https://www-routledgehandbooks-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/10.4324/9781315743981-13#ch12-bib-30); Gotzsche [2013](https://www-routledgehandbooks-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/10.4324/9781315743981-13#ch12-bib-26)). This is especially the case in a product that is administered to a population. The vaccine industry is highly profitable not only because of its numerical reach but because, in an increasing range of jurisdictions, vaccines carry a mandatory status.

These policies, which for critics of mandatory medical intervention, are regarded as a **blatant violation of human rights,** have been legitimized through the discursive modalities of securitization, in much the same way that torture and extraordinary rendition were reconstructed as necessary for the protection of the very phenomena they were consistently eroding (Chossudovsky [2005](https://www-routledgehandbooks-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/10.4324/9781315743981-13#ch12-bib-14)). In both cases, where the market operates as a crucial driver, in which defensive mechanisms are for sale, whether vaccines or arms, there must be no limitation to demand. Creating demand through the security narrative and ensuring supply through mandate enables the constant proliferation of an industry which simultaneously protects and destroys. Excessive **protection can only lead to destruction** (consider the proliferation of nuclear arms during the Cold War in what was termed MAD – mutually assured destruction). Esposito captures this in his consideration of the process of over-immunization as a political, juridical as well as bio-political phenomenon, whereby ‘the warring potential of the immune system is so great that at a certain point it turns against itself as a real and symbolic catastrophe leading to the implosion of the whole organism’ (2011: 17). Yet, as has been made clear in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the voracious appetite of the market in its neoliberal manifestation continues apace ignoring the social and economic cannibalism of excessive profit-seeking. For the pharmaindustry that involves the presence, real or imaginary, of a constant threat of disease and infection.

State of infection

In its 2006 action plan to ‘increase vaccine supply’ the WHO informs us that ‘Influenza vaccine development and employment are critical elements of pandemic influenza preparedness’. In explaining how serious this risk of a pandemic actually is, and the consequent justification for spending billions of dollars on flu vaccines globally, the WHO slips into ‘Rumsfeldian discourse’ describing the ‘the global burden of seasonal influenza’ as an ‘unknown’ (WHO 2006). We are now familiar with unknowns in their both knowable and unknowable states as being crucial to the extension of state power with its affiliate abuses. The ‘unknown burden’ of seasonal flu has occasioned not only the mass manufacture of a vaccine that, in its current stage of development has proven to be less than effective (Gallagher 2015), but also the introduction of mandatory policies around the influenza vaccine for health workers and other professionals (Babcock et al. 2010). Indeed, mandating a range of vaccines has now become established practice in a number of countries including the US, Australia, France and Canada, with the UK being a notable exception.

Mandatory creep has been occurring over the past few decades, overriding the hitherto right to abstain from vaccination programmes on the basis of religious or ‘conscientious objection’ (a term originally used for nineteenth-century vaccine objectors and subsequently adopted by the military for those who refused compulsory conscription on similar grounds) in many cases leaving medical exemption the only acceptable criterion for refusal. Vaccine programmes involve mass immunization or herd immunity in which a large percentage of the population is required to be vaccinated against a disease to ensure its control and hopefully gradual eradication, thereby protecting those who cannot be vaccinated against possible infection. Unlike other medical interventions, the focus here lies on the protection of the population rather than an individual. For Foucault, immunization represents a distinctive break from other medical relationships which seek to heal the individual, but operates as ‘a way of individualizing the collective phenomenon of the disease, or of collectivizing the phenomena, integrating individual phenomena within a collective field, but in the form of the rational and identifiable’ (2004: 60). This brings another dimension to the philosophy of reponsibilization that dominates the neoliberal concept of health, a paradoxical position that transforms individual accountability into sacrifice (for even the strongest advocates of mandatory vaccination admit there is no such thing as one hundred per cent safety). It is a subtly crafted moral sleight of hand that turns adherence to the market of and for pharmatechnologies into an abnegation of self, where the self operates not simply as part of the collective but as subservient to it: capitalism functioning through a ‘communist’ guise. Human rights can thus be dismissed as ‘nonsense upon stilts’ or perhaps worse still, as the greatest threat to human rights itself.

Given that the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights emerged from inter alia some of the most horrific medical abuses ever recorded it is even more ironic that the policy of mandatory vaccination is proliferating. It contravenes human rights contained within a number of conventions which establish individual autonomy regarding medical intervention. This includes Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights on the respect for one’s private life, that is ‘the right not to be physically interfered with’ (Liberty 2015) and more specifically, the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights protection against ‘torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation’ (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966).

The combined rhetoric of security and science, fundamental to the justification and waging of war, not only assuages the retraction of human rights obligations by the state but can render these rights themselves as presenting a threat. As the war on disease, together with that on terror, has no defined end, no clear moment of victory, being non-territorial insofar as it has no physical jurisdiction, the suspension or weakening of human rights will continue and further entrench the ‘paradigm of security as the normal technique of government’ (Agamben 2005: 14). In this environment vaccine objection easily slips into criminalized activity and criticism appears as unpatriotic. Concerns over conflict of interest, data manipulation, bribery and intimidation are turned into politicized opposition and those who voice these concerns become enemies of the people, a security threat, health terrorists. In this context, punitive measures against those who refuse, both for themselves or on behalf of those under their guardianship, are also becoming more draconian and can range from financial penalties, the exclusion of children from day care centres, loss of jobs (within the medical profession) or even prison (Willsher 2014).

Informed consent lies at the heart of the numerous instruments for the protection of the human body; the notion of bodily integrity underpins a series of rights that have been allocated to citizens in democratic states, including the right to abortion. When the information aspect of informed is either denied or contains negative data concerning safety it is rational to assume that consent might not be always forthcoming. Collusion between industry and politics is a major concern, as Eisenhower warned. Mary Holland’s critique of mandatory vaccination lays out the extent of these collusive relationships in the US, which were even admitted by politicians themselves:

In 2000, a Congressional report on Conflicts of Interest in Vaccine Policy Making identified notable conflicts of interests in the FDA [Federal] and CDC [Center for Disease Control] advisory bodies that make national vaccine policy. These include ‘advisers’ financial ties to vaccine manufacturers’ as well as ‘advisers’ permitted stock ownership in companies affected by their decisions’. (Holland 2012:77)

Declaring these activities in Congress has not deterred their occurrence. In 2007, an attempt was made by the erstwhile Governor of Texas, Rick Perry, to mandate the HPV vaccine in his state’s schools, a decision he was subsequently forced to overturn when it was revealed that Merck, the company that produced the Gardasil vaccine, had given donations towards his nomination (Eggen 2011). Nor will this be the last cosy relationship between politics and industry as mandatory vaccination policy continues to be applied to an increasing number of vaccines.

Conclusion

Pharmatechnologies manifesting as medical research, drug production and distribution, epistemological paradigms determining how health, disease and risk are to be conceptualized and negotiated, have now become a mode of governance in an increasingly authoritarian environment. This is not to detract from the benefits accrued from medical progress through pharmaceuticals and the important role played by vaccines in alleviating potential suffering. Yet, the benign discourses within which they operate can often obscure harmful outcomes, harms imposed as structural violence: opaque, unidentifiable and normalized (Žižek 2009). Victimization remains unseen or as a necessary price to pay for the greater good. In medical terms aspects of these harms are referred to as iatrogenesis, the unintended, often injurious, consequences of medical intervention. In this latter context it is akin to what military circles euphemistically term ‘collateral damage’, generally applied to the killing and maiming of noncombatants. However, some scholars who study state and corporate harms are less inclined to semantic generosity, not least when the majority of damage and injury inflicted falls on the same targets, the socio-economically vulnerable, gendered, racial, ethnic or other minorities whose lot it is to comprise the flotsam and jetsam of ruthless markets and the politics of indifference. Intention, or lack of, as they argue, cannot disguise the power relations at play as the usual suspects emerge as perpetrators and beneficiaries of systemic abuses.

If we are to accept the argument put forward by Tombs and Whyte that ‘The problems caused by corporations – which seriously threaten the stability of our lives – … are enduring and necessary functions of the corporation’ (2015: 4), a position supported by a plethora of cases, then all industry operating within a capitalist framework is intrinsically pathological. It is essentially a diseased entity, irrespective of the nature of goods and services produced or the rhetoric that designates it as benign. Ironically, this diseased entity in combination with an increasingly diseased political system, proclaims and even persists that it has both the authority and ability to produce and sell health. Yet, so strong is the belief in pharmaceuticalized health that so many literally buy into the ‘truths’ of pharmatechnologies failing miserably to discern how the contagion-riddled commodification of health is actually the greatest danger to health.

No business thrives on the elimination of demand for its goods. The technologies of war were justified through the eventual establishment of peace; so too the pharmaindustry legitimizes its existence through claims to health and healing. The existence of both is dependent on the perpetuation of the very phenomena they claim to defend us from, and in this they must continue to be producers of war and sickness. No longer does the potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exist, as Eisenhower warned, it has become fundamental to the industries of war and disease, to war on disease.

**Disease is inherently securitized because it’s transnational and has been integrated with public policy --- leads to persecution and suspension of human rights**

Sophia **Schröder 15**, Faculty of Culture and Society at Malmö högskola, Spring 2015, “Securitizing Communicable Disease: A case study of discursive threat-construction during the 2014 Ebola epidemic”, Malmö University /lg

3.2 Securitizing health

Ebola’s appearance on the agenda of the **U**nited **N**ations Security Council marks an unusual event, as it indicates the securitization of an issue predominantly understood as belonging to the field of public health. However, this is not a unique or unprecedented case of securitization in a public health context. A growing body of literature is exploring non-military dimensions of security, as mentioned above (see e.g. Ullman, 1983; Buzan, 1997; Buzan 2007; King&Murray 2001-02) and the increasing securitization of public health issues has given rise to a number of relevant studies and a rich academic debate.

This debate is for the most part grounded in the theory of securitization, which derives principally from the work of Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver and Jaap de Wilde (Buzan et al., 1998), which will be extensively discussed in chapter four. The basic principle of this theory is that **any kind of issue** can be distinguished from the merely political by being presented as existential threats to a referent object by a securitizing actor. This actor thereby “generates endorsement of emergency measures” (p.5) which may even extend beyond legal constraints and democratic principles. Thus, undergoing a discursive process of securitization, an issue becomes securitized which “grants the actor a right to violate rules that would otherwise bind” (Wæver, 2000:251).

Maclean (2008) argues that the securitization of health as a phenomenon predates the construction of the Westphalian state-form, and identifies the growing connections between health and security like McInnes (2008) as features of an increasingly interconnected, globalized world (p.475). She claims that bioterrorism and emerging infectious diseases are the primary health-related security concerns of today, having generated responses on both national and international levels. Maclean mentions Ebola along with other haemorrhagic fever viruses as fatal diseases that have been raising alarm outside their locations of infection, due to the implied risk of fast spread as a result of increased and facilitated international travel. With the emergence of HIV/AIDS and its rapid spread worldwide, this risk perception was reinforced. The international spread of fatal diseases far beyond the location of their index cases (e.g. as was the case with Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2002-03), has amplified anxiety and given way to an increasingly **transnational understanding of health** related risks resulting from the insight that such diseases can have a major impact on international relations and national competitiveness (Maclean, 2008:482).

Similar to Maclean, Kelle (2007) argues that the driving force behind the securitization of disease since the 1990s was an increased concern for bioterrorism or “deliberate disease” (p. 219) that had the whole population as a referent object – unlike biological warfare which was threatening only for the military. He claims that there was a need to integrate (international) public health governance in the security concerns of biological weapons in order to effectively deal with these new, large-scale threats. Kelle points to a notion of potential collaboration between the WHO – the key actor for disease prevention and mitigation on the international scale – and UNSC, as featured in the 2004 report of the UN Secretary-General High-level Panels on Threats, Challenges and Change (p. 228; UN 2004). Kelle’s research pinpoints the WHO even as a securitizing actor, although restricted to the promotion of the notion of health security in human security terms, instead of a more traditional, state-centred understanding of the security concept. He reasons that, with respect to public health, the securitizing moves have reinforced the state as an actor in the provision of international public health. Hanrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen (2014) on the other hand argue that the securitization of international problems has lead to the internationalization of emergency governance, and point to the emergency authorities which WHO has gained with respect to global health crises, especially since the SARS crisis in 2002.

3.2.1 Infectious diseases and securitization

HIV/AIDS constitutes the public health issue that received the most scholarly attention with respect to securitization. According to Maclean (2008), the security discourse around HIV/AIDS is – although not undisputed – by now “well established in both national and international security sectors” (p.483). Investigating the “legitimacy of ‘securitizing’ HIV/AIDS” (Selgelid & Enemark 2008:457), Selgelid and Enemark argue that an infectious disease may be considered a security threat when it “threatens the existence or stability of society and/or when emergency measures are required to address it” (ibid.). Referring to the UNSC Resolution 1308 (2000) as the first health issue officially framed a “threat to international peace and security” the authors discuss the effects of such a discourse. On the one hand, regarding HIV/AIDS as a threat to security has led several states to greater resource allocation towards containing the virus (e.g. the US Presidents Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) in 2003). On the other hand, a number of scholars are concerned with the implications of a security framework for the people suffering from HIV/AIDS, since the securitization of infectious diseases may involve **suspending human rights and liberties**. For example Elbe (2006) asserts that people living with HIV/AIDS have been “**ostracized and even persecuted** by some states for their illness” (p.128). He regards it therefore necessary to limit the occasions upon which extraordinary (draconian) disease measures can be implemented in the name of security.

Another reason for limiting the securitization of public health regards the nature of the security concept, which is expected to lose its meaning and usefulness in political discourse if applied too loosely (Selgelid & Enemark, 2008:458). Raising the bar for the securitization of diseases, i.e. reducing it to contexts of quick-spreading pathogens, would however rule out HIV/AIDS and other slow-spreading, endemic diseases. Such diseases do not generate as much dread as outbreak events, although they typically result in greater levels of illness and death, as well as long-term economic and social erosion (ibid.; Price-Smith 2002:15-16). The authors point out that **dread aggravates the effects of a disease** by generating major societal disruption, which is why dreaded diseases are “likely to touch the security nerve of people and politicians in ways that set them apart from other health issues” (p.460). On a similar note Smith et al. (2004) remark on infectious diseases’ powerful ability to engender fear which “often leads to rapid, emotionally driven decision-making about public health policies needed to protect the community” (p.1).

**Responses to disease from Western states and transnational organizations leads to securitization --- people are forced to govern their own bodies and associate disease with violence and terror**

François **Debrix &** Alexander D. **Barder 11**, Professor and Director of ASPECT of the Department of Political Science at Virginia Tech University & Associate Professor and Graduate Program Director for International Relationsat Florida International University, 08/29/2011, “2. Nothing to fear but fear itself: governmentality and the reproduction of terror” (book chapter in *Beyond Biopolitics: Theory, violence, and horror in world politics*) /lg

A telling example of this self-mobilization and self-immunization against one ’s body and ﬂesh can be found in the way **Western states** (or, rather, some of their governmental agents and agencies) **along with** some **transnational organizations** (the World Health Organization, the United Nations) asked populations the world over to preemptively take charge of their health, hygiene, and everyday routines in the context of the recent A/H1N1 (or “ swine ﬂu ” ) pandemic. In this popular health scare, as with many other instances of spreading epidemics over the past decade (SARS, the H5N1 “ bird ﬂu, ” but also AIDS before), individual beings were asked to be the primary layer of securitization and defense against terror by turning their bodies (and those of family members, neighbors, co-workers, and so on) into primordial sites of scrutiny, intervention, and indeed governance. With the “ swine ﬂu ” fear, a constant questioning of one ’s body movements and symptomatic features, along with one ’ s daily habits, became an automatic (and auto-immune) and mostly unquestioned safeguard against the epidemic. Humanity ’s bodies, the physiology of the human species, but also the meaning of what it means to be human (and whether humanity should be reduced to a management of the ﬂ esh) became the main targets of the pandemic terror but, just as crucially, of the containment terror that followed the revelation of the pandemic. This governance of the “ swine ﬂu ” and its scare (the **disease and its terror were** indeed **inseparable** from the moment a pandemic discourse was launched) was then based on a series of menial operations at the level of the human body and ﬂesh (do I have a fever? Is my cough a sign that I have been infected? Did I remember to wash my hands after riding the bus or the subway?). Of course, it also relied on several self-cancellation measures (I must stay home for days if I feel sick; I must wear a protective mask if I venture outside and have a runny nose; we must close entire schools for as long as necessary if we suspect that children in the community have the ﬂu).

In the end, the swine ﬂu terror also raised vital questions about what humanity today is by proliferating a succession of moral quandaries that actually sought to recon ﬁgure humanity as that which is always already primed for sacriﬁce. Among such so-called fundamental social dilemmas were questions like: Must I sacriﬁce my body and my self if my children are not yet sick but I am (and thus, I could infect them)? Will I have to allow myself to go without treatment (and possibly not make it) if it turns out that, as was reported, there are not enough vaccines for everybody? Must I segregate myself, and remove my body from the community of the living, so as not to let the remaining healthy bodies be even more at risk? The sacriﬁcial logic involved in the swine ﬂ u scare may evoke some of René Girard ’ s theorizations, particularly to the extent that this form of sacriﬁce appears to be aimed at the safeguarding of the community. But today’s self-sacriﬁcial or self eﬀacing logic goes far beyond the claim advanced by Girard that “ the sacriﬁce serves to protect the entire community from its own violence. ” 71 Or, for that matter, that the ritual of the sacriﬁce “ prompts the entire community to choose victims outside itself. ” 72 To the contrary, the encouraged sacriﬁcial ritual of the swine ﬂu pandemic terror is, to repeat, an auto-immune response or attitude that, far from casting violence away, actually seeks to keep it within and **strives to spread it**, sometimes in a horriﬁc fashion, to as many living members of the community as possible. In fact, by placing itself beyond the threshold of both life and death, and by questioning the meaning of the human itself (and suggesting that the human should be redeﬁ ed as that which is always ready for sacriﬁce), the swine ﬂu sacriﬁcial terror enters the realm of agonal politics and brings in the specter of a horror whereby humans must allow themselves to be quarantined, potentially culled, possibly manipulated and tested upon beyond death, and eventually left to decay in a condition of neither life nor death (not bios , not zoe , and not even thanatos ) where the human is rendered unrecognizable as human.

**The dichotomy between language of disease and military threats causes diseases to be viewed as an explanation of constructed threats --- stems from malevolent nationalism**

Mika **Luoma-aho 02,** Head of the Department of Social Studies and a Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Lapland in Finland, 12/01/2002, “Body of Europe and Malignant Nationalism: A Pathology of the Balkans in European Security Discourse”, Geopolotics, Vol. 7, Issue 3, p. 117 – 142 /lg

Cancer is a mysterious disease difficult to treat, and one that is often equated with death. Of all diseases, cancer has provided probably the most potent metaphor of illness since tuberculosis became treatable in the midtwentieth century.60 While tuberculosis is understood as a disease of one organ, cancer is understood as a disease that can turn up in any organ and one whose outreach is the whole body. It is a disease of growth – sometimes visible, more characteristically insidious – which may be arrested for periods of time, but is prone to recur. As defined by Mel Greaves, cancer is a collection of many disorders of cell and tissue function that have one special biological property in common: the territorial expansion of a mutant clone.61 Susan Sontag argued that when used as a metaphor, **cancer appears as a pathology** of space; its principal metaphors refer to topography – it may ‘spread, ‘proliferate’, or be ‘diffused’.62 This is also the **most striking single image** that can be found in almost all representations of malevolent nationalism in European security discourse: the threat of geographical escalation or spill-over from one part of Europe to another – most typically from east to west. Furthermore, the language used to describe cancer evokes a systemic catastrophe: ‘cells without inhibitions, cancer cells will continue to grow and extend over each other in a “chaotic” fashion, destroying the body’s normal cells, architecture, and functions’.63 Reliance on similar dichotomies, such as order/chaos and normal/abnormal, in the discursive economy of nationalism is striking and more than coincidental. What is also interesting is that in the discourse of cancer the **language of military strategy** is often applied: cancer cells do not simply multiply, but are ‘invasive’; they ‘colonise’ from the original tumour to far sites in the body by metastasising; and only rarely are the body’s own ‘defences’ strong enough to fight a tumour made of millions of destructive cells.

### 2NC---Drones

#### Securitizing lethal autonomous weapons enables violence against ‘illegitimate states’—rhetoric is used as a means of othering.

Ronja Schahira Kaya Metzger 21, Spring 2021, Faculty of Culture and Society (KS), Department of Global Political Studies, "Security or Security Issue of tomorrow? Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems", Malmo University, <https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1604606/FULLTEXT02.pdf> //AW

This section examines how LAWS are presented as a threat or security issue in the material. Furthermore, to which extend LAWS are not securitized or portrayed as threatening, in which a discourse of progress and growth play a role. The threats or vulnerabilities that lethal autonomous weapon systems create are linked to different thematic clusters and discourses. They can be summarised under key themes of technological discourse and threat of other actors, a military threat. Firstly, an important aspect in the construction of a threat in LAWS identified in the material is a cluster which will be referred to here as a new technology discourse. In this discourse, rapid technological advances are perceived as a security issue. The term new technology appears repeatedly in the material, though not always associated with linguistic means of threat production, but it is characterised as a discourse concerned with technological development. Where new technology is variously clustered with terms as: “cyber attacks” (E1) a “new technological age” (E2), “Hackers” (E1; E8)) and consequential terms such as “miscalculation”(E2), “manipulation”(E1), “misuse”(E1). To demonstrate this discourse element, I will use various examples from the material: New technologies are far more susceptible to proliferation, manipulation and misuse that conventional weapons. Hackers don´t need much more that a computer in order to carry out cyber attacks. (E1) 28 The second big driver of change and new technologies the topic of our conference today autonomous weapons systems have created the fear of killer robots that attack targets without human control. Cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure could paralyse entire countries. And while attribution remains difficult, retaliation could easily provoke unintended conflicts. (E2, cursive by me) These quotes exemplify the threatening or concerning discourse around new technology. In the first quote the threat is enacted in temporal and special terms of proximity, an ‘attack’ could occur at any moment inflicting some sort of personal harm as nothing more than a computer is needed. In the second quote, the modality marker ‘could’ contributes to the creation of an ominous threat. The source is not known or a ‘killer robot without human control’. All these construe images of speed, devastating effects, and imminence toward the recipient of the message. killer robots that Lord over life and death on the basis of autonomous datasets and entirely beyond human control are already a frightening real prospect today (…) fully autonomous weapons are susceptible to manipulation and also to miscalculation. Automatic escalations - ‘flash wars’ - and arms races are virtually inevitable. This is therefore a red line that we must not cross we are committed to this in Geneva [and] We need your support for this. (E1) Here, the metaphor of a red line is invoked concerning autonomous weapons systems, which is commonly used to symbolize a point of no return. Additionally, in the speech, analogies are used to induce fear. Analogies are often used to illustrate a threat, creating a link between a current crisis and a past situation in which neglect led to the fulfilment of the threat scenario (Cap, 2017). For example, in the 2019 speech, a link between the current crisis of technological developments and their possible impact on warfare to the discoveries of the German chemist Fritz Haber is made. Besides paving the way for “mass production of artificial fertilizers” (E1) which saved countless lives, Haber is known as the “father of gas warfare” (E1). Therefore, the example exemplifies the potential as well as threat emanating from new technologies. The linguistic creation of a threat emanating from LAWS and new technologies is more pronounced in the speeches of Foreign Minister Maas than in the small inquiries and the material of the CCW. An observation that coincides with the fact the speech genre functions in a broad category in which the speech is argumentative and supposed to entertain and persuade (Fairclough, 1995). While the statements from the CCW and the small inquiries fall more strongly in a category that is more argumentative, in which the text serves to inform and persuade. The statements for the CCW are published in an environment in which what is said is very controlled and the content is intertextually linked to prior statements which as Fairclough argues, signals continuity of discourse practices (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002). The threat discourse of new technologies closely links the threat of LAWS with a discourse of cyber threat. The perception of cyber space as a threat environment has developed in Germany in recent decades. Cyber security became part of the public debate in Germany in the early 1990s. Yet, it was not strongly perceived as a threat until the early 2000s with the fear of the Millennium, bug. Then the terror attacks of 9/11 led to increased attention to various security risks. These included cyber security. In Germany, the cyber threat is particularly perceived in connection to the protection of personal data. Besides the event of 9/11, especially Edward Snowden led to increased public attention. Snowden's disclosure of the US National Security Agency (NSA) documents led to the increased relevance of cyber security. It raised the threat perception in the general public in 2013 (Schallbruch & Skierk, 2018). Sandywell (2006) suggests that post 9/11 new technology and especially the cyber space caused new insecurities through a blurring of the boundary between the physical and virtual, the global/regional. Where “states of emergency settle into a condition of permanent societal instability” (p.48). That these insecurities create a field in which the extreme manifestations of the cyber threat are linked to the threat discourse of global terrorism. Sandywell (2006) suggests that both discourses are marked with boundary dissolving characteristics, which have intrusive attributes. Further,that the blurring of common and familiar binaries suggests a more general state of emergency. On the textual level, the temporal and spatial boundaries are dissolved, and the threat is emanating from an unknown intrusive other (Sandywell, 2006). It is this sociocultural context that the threat of new technologies and risk perception of LAWS is linked with within Germany. A second theme or cluster of threats in which LAWS is embedded is the threat of ‘other actors’ and the changing of capabilities that could come with LAWS. Particularly, other states and illegitimate actors. As previously mentioned delegitimization can be used as a counterpart to underpin own legitimization, which can be enacted through ideas of difference, negative representations and geographical or cultural boundaries (Cap, 2017). In the speeches a starker image of the ‘other’ is created in representations: ‘we are urging President Putin (…) to ensure that Russia returns to compliance with the INF treaty. Its termination would have grave consequences for Europeans` security. (…) as a result of infringements, trust, transparency, and stability which we have built up labouredly over decades [is] at risk of being forfeited’(E1) ‘Players such a China must also take responsibility for strategic stability’(E1) ‘I (…) therefore welcome the willingness shown by the US to conduct talks with North Korea on the North Korean nuclear programme’(E1) These quotes while taken out of direct context serve to demonstrate the creation of images of other states. Russia is represented as non-compliant ‘other’ and while the substantives serve as negative attributions toward Russia, they simultaneously positively represent the in-groups Europe and Germany. Thus, it reinforces the mental-geographical boundary of Europe as a whole and its common identity. Undergirding the call on China is implicit a lack of taking responsibility for strategic stability. Contrary, the US is portrayed as positive, willing to conduct talks, while North Korea becomes a passive other. Therefore, a representation of the world is reinforced with positive attributes to allies such as the US and representations of ‘other’ to Russia, North Korea, and China. The ‘other’ in terms of states in the CCW material is only visible in reference to ‘potential adversaries’(E8), however, there is a reference concerning illegitimate actors as “terrorists” (E1; E8), “criminals” (E1) “illegitimate actors” (E1), and “illegitimate groups” (E9) who are “expanding their capacity to indiscriminately inflict harm and inflict terror on civilians” (E8). There are also consequential threats present in the material which are in causal relation with the aforementioned threat of ‘other actors’, the threat of arms race and arms proliferation. The threat of arms race is mentioned in different ways. That with the development of LAWS “threat perceptions are likely to change under the impression that potential adversaries have or are in the process of acquiring such weapon systems” (E8, omitting underline) and that “Arms races are under way around the world” (E1). However, an increase of possible arms race is articulated as not being limited to the development of LAWS: [In] the German government's assessment, the development of autonomous functions for use in weapon systems can further strengthen the already existing armament trends. (E18) Noticeable is that while in the material of the CCW conference the threat of an arms race is discussed in future terms, it is declared as already ongoing in the small inquiries and speeches. An image of a growing threat is generated through increased capacities of other states, which are, however not named and thus contribute to an ominous external threat. Further, a consequential threat of proliferation is articulated. It relates to illegitimate actors and how “transfer of software” (E8) is “difficult to prevent and even harder to detect” (E18) and that “the risk of [LAWS or predecessor technologies] uncontrolled proliferation [is] significantly greater than the corresponding risks of uncontrolled proliferation of finished weapon systems” (E18). Acknowledgement of the problem is followed by arguments that: 32 these concerns are being addressed and regulated by national administrative laws, in particular weapon laws and transport and traffic law. This enables governments to effectively stop or limit the spread of dangerous dual use technologies, if necessary. (E18)

#### Securitizing through drone usage locks in failure and sanitizes mass violence—the use of drones dehumanizes war and embraces the logic underpinning the War on Terror.

Scott Romaniuk & Stewart Webb 15, researchers at the University of South Wales at the International Centre for Policing and Security and holds a PhD in International Studies, 2015 "(PDF) Extraordinary Measures: Drone Warfare, Securitization, and the "War on Terror"", ResearchGate, <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/287215792_Extraordinary_Measures_Drone_Warfare_Securitization_and_the_War_on_Terror> //AW

The utility of the WoT securitization, even in spite of its many critics who rebuke its leaders and supporters, has as a result of its attachment with such a universal issue that stands in sharp contrast and opposition to such beloved values, peoples, and ways of life (in principles all that America embodies and stands for) as referent objects led to the establishment of a powerful narrative (McCrisken 2011, 786). At the heart of this narrative lie the dramatis personæ: the US and the liberal democracies of the world, and AQ and the “evil tyrants and murderers that support it” (McCrisken 2012, 786). Such a narrative, linked inextricably to the events of 9/11 has assumed such rich symbolism, emotional value, and representation of a zero-sum game, that the WoT securitization has become “institutionalized and normalized” or engrained as part of American foreign policy (Jackson 2011). “It has,” in Jackon’s (2011, 391) words, “in the years since 9/11 become a powerful social structure (a hegemonic discourse) that both expresses and simultaneously co-constructs US interests and identity.” The WoT and US opposition to the threat of international terrorism has become overly manifest within the US’ national security structure and deep into American culture (McCrisken 2011, 786). If we are to accept the WoT to have become institutionalized by the majority of American society as just plain good sense, then we might reasonably assume that elites have no little or choice but to move stridently forward in addressing AQ and international terrorism as exceptional threats vis-à-vis extraordinary measures only even if an actor would prefer to find a solution through the (normal) political system. Having intertwined the existential threat with American society to such an extend and with such extensive institutionalization having taken place over the previous decade, “it is then,” states McCrisken (2011), “extremely difficult for any policy-maker or opinionshaper in the US, even a new president dedicated to ‘change’, to seriously challenge the underlying assumptions of the ‘war on terror’ and move policy significantly in a new direction” (786). Drone Warfare as an Extraordinary Measure The previous section touched upon the idea of the WoT exerts a degree of influence on the new security environment of the post-Cold War era than that of the post-9/11 environment by acting as a powerful narrative of that dichotomizes the international community according to the understanding of the “West and the rest,” or in the words of Bush, “Us vs. Them” and “Good vs. Evil” (Greenwald 2008; Soblic 2009). The WoT also functions as a normative organization that allows the leadership of the US (both the Bush and Obama administrations) to construct understandings of and sensitivities about security and threats to that security. Within this normative organization we can observe public perceptions of the existential threat and the policy designed and implemented by elites as mutually reinforcing. While many policies that were adopted by the US and other states allied in the fight against terrorism existed before 9/11, its main events and the WoT directly made them easier to introduce to the public and even helped legitimize “their application across a wider set of issues and areas than would otherwise have been the case (Buzan and Hansen 2009, 226). Taking into consideration that this section brings our attention directly to the marketability (to the public) and employment of extraordinary means to confront the existential threat posed by international terrorism, Buzan and Hansen (2009, 226) note: [a]s Realists, Liberals, and critical widening perspectives all point out: in times of (discursively constituted) war, the money and manpower allocated to the military increase, and encroachment on civil, liberal and human rights are more likely to meet with public acceptance. Concerns about terrorism were not entirely new by 2001 (although it was seen more as a peripheral problem in both public spheres and within IR by scholars), 9/11 elevated the prominence of terrorism to a new level. This might be said to have combined with the view that the events of 9/11 drilled the enduring truth into the hearts and minds those at all levels of American society that, “the absence of international conflict was not indication of an irreversible change [about the existence of violent and deadly threats in the world], but [merely] a temporary lapse in the ebb and flow of tensions within an anarchical system (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, 229). The extraordinary measures that have been implemented since 9/11 have served as some of the most explicit characteristics and definers of the WoT securitization program. Neither the Bush or Obama administrations have been enormously open about the use of any of them but when they have, a great deal of support, claims McCrisken (2011), was evident and often referred to the legitimacy of these measures as part of the US’ responsibility to protect its citizens, to defend itself, and act if there exists the imminence of threat. Both administrations have maintained the elevation of international terrorism as an extra-politicized and thus securitized state, subjecting it to measures deemed well beyond the parameters of normal politics. In the last decade, the WoT has provided the institutional framework for putting these extraordinary measures into practice: (a) Abrogation of civil, liberal, and human rights and freedoms of individuals a. Irregular rendition b. Systematic torture c. Military commissions d. Indefinite detention e. Political surveillance (b) US affording itself the right to attack based upon suspicion of further or imminent threat (c) State intervention and military campaigns such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan (d) Long-term military occupations and military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan (e) Acceptability of increasing military losses and collateral damage (f) Use of drones and unmanned military systems as part of an ever-growing TK campaign. The extraordinary measures represent a toolkit of security actions that the US has put to use in its response against the existential threat of international terrorism as part of the WoT’s core. One of the most direct means of defining these as extraordinary measure is simply by noting the extent of publicity as well as criticism and opposition they have received over the past decade, while viewing these actions as extraordinary measures can be achieved further still by signaling the level of discretion with which the US has treated to them. Policymakers and scholars alike have clearly accepted these as security actions in the WoT, many of which would unlikely claim that they do not stick out in the realm of normal politics. The considerable overlapping then seen amongst these various approaches as measures within the WoT can be taken as evidence that the use of drones falls within the field of extraordinary measures, particularly given that it constitutes an action that has both emerged and evolved within the purview of the WoT. We might also link the use of drones and TK more closely to those measures inescapably regarded as extraordinary in measure. With the closing of detention centers and an avowal to indefinitely abandon Guantanamo as a method of tackling (suspected) terrorists, the US invariably took a step back from one of its methods in the WoT. Here, two competing, but equally useful logics are at play and serve to frame the use of drones and TK as extraordinary means. First, viewing the use of detention and rehabilitation centers, not to mention the use of interrogation (whether in extreme forms or not) as an expression of normal politics, we can rightfully claim that this measure (undertaking predominantly by the US) was considerably ineffective in dealing with international terrorism for a number of clear reasons that center, at least in part, on: (a) The difficulty of capturing known and suspected terrorist abroad (b) Mitigating the efforts of those within prisons to radicalize anyone not fully dedicated to the cause of terrorism in the name of AQ or other groups or networks (c) The impossibility of guaranteeing that those released will not endow the existential threat by committing or re-committing themselves to terrorism’s violent cause. Stepping from the first logic considered we might consider this proposition in different light. If the practice of irregular rendition and detainment in such detention and interrogation centers as Guantanamo is taken as one of many extraordinary measures enacted in the fight against terrorism but that has come under increasing fire from domestic and international public spheres, there existed a need to step back from practice that can no longer be officially condoned and to fill the void with another measure capable of engaging with the threat. The rationale presented here is that while the acceptance of a certain degree of encroachment on civil, liberal, and human rights might occur, the continuity of any single measure that does so cannot necessarily be guaranteed or continued ad infinitum. Using drones as a part of the US’ evolving and expanding TK program (Obama’s “Kill-Not-Capture” program) (McCrisken 2011) was ideal for taking the place of irregular rendition and exchanging one set of legal challenges with another – one that might be easier to deal with. Retracting from a program of irregular rendition and the use of extreme forms of interrogation that have become the focus of intense legal debate might even serve to shrink the political, military, and social gap that lies between states and the WoT. The prospect of achieving this and subsequently renders the identity of the WoT far more likely to be deeply internalized and become more stable as a result (Lasmar 2010). The effectiveness of the US’ TK program remains a topic of immense debate. Previously, it was noted that the use of drones has been dragged into the security domain and reasonably tagged as an extraordinary measure given the level of public outcry and criticism attached to it. In hindsight it seems that it might have only been a matter of time before those who actually employ the tactic begin to question its viability for future counterterrorism efforts. It is suggested here that drone warfare has not only become a concrete part of the Bush administration’s 2001 securitization of terrorism and an iconic feature of the WoT, but TK as an extraordinary measure has by its direct effects and impact cultivated an understanding that it has come to represent a threat to toward the very objectives that it seeks to achieve. The drone program has undoubtedly given the US political and military leadership the mindset of having the strategic initiative – the ability to choose where and when to attack without constraint. Director of the Center for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service Daniel Byman has noted on multiple occasions that the use of drone technology has enabled the US to more accurately strike at terrorists as opposed to conventional weaponry at the US’ disposal (Lafontant, 2013). The marked different between AQ and like-terrorist groups’ offensive capabilities prior to 9/11 and after the establishment of the WoT can be attributed, suggests Byman, to the employment of drone warfare. They are relegated to a defensive position rather than being poised to strike wherever and whenever they like (Lafontant, 2013). Former-Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Leon Panetta, during the first year of Obama’s presidency stated bluntly that, it‘s [drone warfare] the only game in town in terms of confronting or trying to disrupt the al-Qaeda leadership,” and noted that AQ leaders no longer regard the tribal regions of Pakistan as “neither safe nor a haven” (Cable News Network [CNN] Politics, 2009). David Kilcullen reported to a congressional hearing in 2009: [s]ince 2006, we’ve killed 14 senior al-Qaeda leaders using drone strikes; in the same time period, we’ve killed 700 Pakistani civilians in the same area. The drone strikes are highly unpopular. They are deeply aggravating to the population. And they‘ve given rise to a feeling of anger that coalesces the population around the extremists and leads to spikes of extremism (McManus 2009). Although the claim is often made that the drone strikes are having a significant impact on the operationality of AQ and present a clear practical effectiveness, their use compromises the ability of the US and its allies in the WoT to gain valuable intelligence information from the eliminated target. Despite his support for the use of drones in the fight against terrorism, Byman (2009) reported a darker reality related to drone warfare that has raised concern regarding the idea that drones now pose a threat the US achieving its own objectives in the WoT, noting that, “[e]ven when they are effective, TK can create strategic complications. They create martyrs that help a group sell itself to its own community” (Byman 2009, 100). To build on the previous point: [a]fter an arrest, security forces can interrogate the suspect and learn about future plots and additional operatives, who can then be arrested too. Killing suspects prevents them from striking, but dead men also tell no tales (Byman 2009, 98-9). Collateral damage in these drone strikes also cultivates an environment where the indigenous civilian community will enlist or engage favourably with the targeted insurgents. An insurgency requires the indigenous populace’s “sympathy, acquiescence, silence, reaction to provocation, or fully active support” (Kilcullen 2010, 8). The collateral damage incurred by the drone strikes in Pakistan has become a relentlessly reoccurring issue between the American and Pakistani governments and has damaged bi-lateral relations. After numerous drone strikes, there have been protests with hundreds of protesters burning American flags and holding signs displaying anti-American slogans (Williams 2010, 872). Although the debate on whether anti- American sentiment is heavily instigated by the (collateral) damage incurred by the strikes continues, but there is a correlation to numerous temporary spikes in anti- Americanism. Anti-American sentiment in Yemen has been fuelled by the US drone strike program (Al-Haj & Batrawy 2012). The debate regarding the efficacy of the use of drones given the negative impact it might have within the WoT even in spite of its positive impact raises a certain set of assumption regarding, not that it can reasonably be considered an extraordinary measure but rather to what extent has it become too extraordinary a measure in the securitization of international terrorism by the Bush administration. Rather than being considered purely a response or a security action set-up in the defense of the reference object in the face of an existential threat, it might well be taken as a sort of threat in and of itself. The view, while shown to exist within the US among political elites, has become overtly evident given widespread opposition that has formed in multiple societies beyond the US, including those Western liberal democracies that they are used to defend. The secrecy of the drone program also creates a situation where it is difficult for the WoT to be desecuritized by the majority of the American population. States are permitted to securitize an issue through the consent of the population, even though the securitization message is controlled by in large by the government through the media. Five years after the 9/11 attacks with American forces deployed both in Afghanistan and Iraq, only three percent of Americans believed that that terrorists were a great threat to the US (Bobbitt 2008, 7). There is hubris in American mentality when it comes to the drone strike program (Gardner 2013, 212-34). There are a couple of factors that are instrumental in maintaining this hubris. With the drone program, no American lives are directly at stake by being in a hostile theater of operations as the drone pilots are hundreds (even thousands) of miles away. Therefore, there is a lack of domestic protests to bring the troops back home as they are at home or at safe operational bases. A second factor is that there is a general lack of widely distributed reports and images of the collateral damage incurred by the drone strikes in the Western media. This is in stark contrast of the desecuritization, (i.e., protest and opposition) movements in the Vietnam and Second Gulf Wars. The drone strike program not only allows for the strategic initiative to strike whenever and wherever deemed necessary, but also severely reduces the conversation within American discourse.

#### Securitization of drones has been used to justify the endless cycle of extensive sanctions

No Author, 6-23-2022, "Securitization of Iran's drone capability; Another sign that America has not changed its behavior," nournews, https://nournews.ir/En/News/81607/Securitization-of-Iran's-drone-capability;-Another-sign-that-America-has-not-changed-its-behavior//jc

NOURNEWS - According to US media reports, a number of members of the House of Representatives from both the Republicans and Democrats parties proposed a plan to counter Iran's drone program, on Tuesday. Democrat Gregory Meeks, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Republican Michael McCaul, Democrat Ted Deutch, and Republican Joe Wilson have introduced a bill called the Stop Iranian Drones Act (SIDA) in coordination with existing US sanctions against Iran's weapons program, also including the supply, sale or transfer of UAVs. The drafters of the anti-Iranian plan said the purpose of the Stop Iranian Drones Act (SIDA) was to prevent the Islamic Republic and its resistance forces from accessing drones that could be used to attack the United States or its allies. Gregory Meeks also claimed; Iranian deadly drones endanger US security and regional peace! He also said that the recent attacks by Iranian drones on US forces, merchant ships and against regional partners, along with the export of drone technology to areas where there is conflict, is a serious threat. Noting that the "Stop Iranian Drones Act (SIDA)" is in line with current US sanctions law, Gregory Meeks said the plan sends a strong message to the international community that the United States will not tolerate government support for Iran's drone program. In this regard, a few months ago, in early April of this year, General "Kenneth F. McKenzie", the commander of American terrorists based in West Asia known as CENTCOM, said in a written testimony to the Armed Forces Committee of the US House of Representatives: "Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen have targeted military, infrastructure and civilian targets in Saudi Arabia since January with more than 150 missiles and drone strikes." McKenzie warned that Iran's widespread use of small and medium-sized drones for reconnaissance and attack operations meant that for the first time since the Korean War, the United States had lost its air superiority for operations in the region. "Unless we can find a network to detect and defeat this superiority of drone use, Iran will remain aggressive in the region," the CENTCOM terrorist commander said. Simultaneously with these hostile atmospheres, the military and political figures of the Zionist regime also talked about the drone capability of Iran, together with the American officials, in order to provide security. Israeli War Minister Benny Gantz recently spoke of the dangers of Iranian drones for the security of the West Asian region and the world, and called on Westerners to take joint action to impose restrictions on Iran's drone industry. The US Treasury Department also sanctioned four Iranian citizens, including the commander of IRGC's aerospace unit, along with two other Iranian companies, for collaborating with the Iranian drone project. It seems that, contrary to the apparent statements of US officials that they are trying to reduce tensions between Tehran and Washington, they are working with some European countries, especially Britain, to try to reopen new security cases against Iran to justify the extension of a series of current unjust sanctions, or even its escalation, is in contradiction with Washington's claims. The Americans have shown that they have no real interest in ending their issues and conflicts with Iran. The US's main strategy is to engage Iran in an endless cycle of security cases, extensive sanctions and endless negotiations in order to contain Iran at the lowest cost in the region, on its consideration. General Mckenzie's remarks about the imbalance in the region and the inability of the US military to take full control of the entire West Asian sky due to the breadth and complexity of Iran's drone capability are clear signs of a shift in equations in the region. Saudi Arabia's widespread failure in the Yemeni war and the defeat of the naval war project against Iran, which included US-British piracy and Israeli attacks on Iranian-owned and private-sector oil tankers and merchant ships, are all signs of Iran's widespread retaliation. In this regard, the United States and its allies are announcing a shift in the security balance in the West Asian region. But can the Americans succeed on the Iranian drone issue? In the current situation, as a first step, as in previous projects aimed at securitization of Iran's environment, the language of panic and the media and speech apparatus of American, European and Zionist politicians are working, to gradually raise the issue of Iran's drone capability in a legal process as a threat, introducing it as an acute for regional and world stability. It should be noted that, unlike the nuclear issue, we do not face a global disarmament regimes with a global consensus or, like the missile issue, a control regime agreed upon by some major powers in the form of the MTCR. The issue of UAVs as a military tool in the context of arms control is a completely new case, about which there is still little legal literature, and Westerners are trying to establish a legal procedure by intimidating the world against Iran's UAV capability. In the last two decades, drones have been used more as a military tool in the West Asian region, and in recent years Turkey, Pakistan and the Zionist regime have begun to expand their drone industry, in addition to Iran. Given this, although the Americans can not provoke a global consensus against Tehran on Iran's drone capability, such as the nuclear issue, or bring some Western countries with them, such as the missile issue, they are trying to maintain the status quo on Iran's security case as an option to take advantage of it. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the inability of its Arab partners to successfully end the Yemeni war, and the failure of the naval war project with Iran are all signs of a shift in the security equation in the West Asian region. The Islamic Republic of Iran has repeatedly stated that its military equipment is manufactured entirely for deterrence and for purely defensive purposes, and that foreign military intervention in the last two decades on the borders of Iran with Afghanistan and Iraq is a sign of Tehran's right defense strategy that is neither negotiable nor will it involve disarmament.

### 2NC---Economy

#### Attempting to save the economy is a justification for securitization and retaliation which results in a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Bulman 2021 (David Bulman, Assistant professor of China Studies and International affairs at the John Hopkins School of China Studies and International Affairs,” The Economic Security Dilemma in US-China Relations” <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/787893/pdf>) //sethlee

China and the United States are caught in an economic security dilemma. In response to perceived economic aggression, both countries now feel impelled to bolster domestic economic security through protectionist and retaliatory measures that the other side perceives as threatening. In game theoretic terms, a mutually beneficial “Stag Hunt” coordination game devolved into an uncooperative “Prisoner’s Dilemma” after the global financial crisis. In the economic security dilemma that emerged under Trump and Xi, both sides unsuccessfully attempted to coerce opponent behavior, further harming both economies. Using a game framework—as opposed to a structural or leadership-based account—helps demonstrate that China’s recent reform reversal and revisionist approaches to the international economic order were not unavoidable parts of a long-term strategy, but rather developed partially as a response to perceived US aggressions. Two contrasting narratives now define the economic relationship between the United States and China. US policymakers perceive China as a revisionist economic power using “state-driven protectionist policies and practices” to threaten US economic vitality (White House 2020). Chinese policymakers in turn argue that the United States will “do everything in its power to use bullying measures” to prevent China’s rise and keep China from accessing key technologies, thus requiring a strong state sector to support technological self-reliance (Wang 2019; Wang and Xin 2018). The evolution of these contrasting narratives reflects an economic security dilemma: In response to perceived economic aggression, both countries now feel impelled to bolster domestic economic security through protectionist and retaliatory measures that are in turn perceived as threatening by the other side. The resulting downward ited degree, financial fronts, significantly harming both economies. In game theoretic terms, a mutually beneficial “Stag Hunt” coordination game prior to the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) devolved into an uncooperative “Prisoner’s Dilemma” over 2009–2016, in part due to growing misperceptions and faulty assumptions regarding domestic economic security. By the time of Donald Trump’s election, both sides thought the game had switched to “Chicken” and sought to force the other side to swerve. The actual payoff matrices still reflected a Prisoner’s Dilemma, however. Misidentification of the game led to coercive threats rather than attempts at reassurance, ensuring a further downward spiral. This game-theoretic framework helps interpret changes in US-China economic relations over the past three decades, enabling an understanding of the emergence of current economic tensions more nuanced than structural or leadership-based approaches. According to structural arguments, economic conflict is part of an unavoidable zero-sum great power conflict (Allison 2017; Walt 2018; Jin 2015; Li J. 2019). In contrast, leadership approaches blame economic tensions on Xi Jinping’s economic reform reversals, external aggression, and domestic repression, which necessitated a US response (e.g., Economy 2018), or Donald Trump’s (avoidable) decision to instigate a trade war in 2018 (e.g., Yang 2016). These frameworks explain part of the story: great power competition has become more prominent, with direct consequences for the economic relationship, and Xi and Trump indeed made choices that Li Keqiang and Hillary Clinton may not have. But structural arguments imply an inevitably that seems misjudged, and leadership accounts often underestimate or ignore the structural dimensions that constrain and inform leader decisions. A dynamic game framework is a more fruitful way of understanding developments, combining aspects of both of these frameworks: Structure and structural shifts help set payoff matrices, and leaders choose how to play the game given their own perceptions and the existing payoff distributions.

### 2NC---Environment

**Securitization of the environment has become a central aspect of US foreign and defense policy --- NATO’s statements prove it considers the environment a security risk that can lead to violence**

Peter **Hough 22**, Associate Professor in International Politics at Middlesex University with a PhD in International Relations from City University in London, 06/09/2022, “Ecological Security” (book chapter in *Rethinking Security in the Twenty-First Century: A Reader*), Middlesex University Research Repository, p. 183-194 /lg

Many states have come to take a widened approach to security since the 1990s and the resource wars literature was particularly influential on the Clinton Administration in the U.S. HomerDixon is known to have been invited to brief Vice President Al Gore and the State Department on several occasions in the early 1990s.13 In 1993, a new government position in the Defense Department was created with the Deputy Under Secretary for Environmental Security, and the Environmental Task Force set up as part of Washington’s intelligence network. The impact of all of this was made explicit in the 1994’s “National Security Strategy,” the US’s annual foreign policy manifesto.

Not all security risks are military in nature. Transnational phenomena such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, environmental degradation, rapid population growth and refugee flows also have security implications for both present and long term American policy.14

Other instances of governments making the environment the stuff of high politics have since emerged in North America and North Europe, most notably in several defense and foreign policy statements from Finland, Canada, the Netherlands, and the UK.15 In 2007, Foreign Minister Margaret Beckett used the UK’s presidency of the UN Security Council to push through, with some resistance from other members, the first discussion in that arena of on an overtly environmental topic. A major influence on this stance was the Stern Report of the previous year compiled by a British economist on behalf of the UK government, which provided an economic security rationale for prioritizing action on climate change. Stern calculated the cost of non-action on climate change as amounting to at the very least 5 percent of global GDP for evermore. Set against this, the costs of effective action to curb climate change would cost around 1 percent of global GDP per year.16 Perhaps, though, the **clearest illustration** of the environment becoming the stuff of widened security comes from its embrace by the cold warriors of NATO:

Based on a broad definition of security that recognizes the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors, **NATO is addressing security challenges emanating from the environment**. This includes extreme weather conditions, depletion of natural resources, pollution and so on—factors that can ultimately lead to disasters**, regional tensions and violence**.17

As the NATO statement indicates, securitizing environmental issues in practice has tended to be in the traditional national security manner of factoring such concerns into calculations of defense needs. Many governments have politicized issues of environmental change when there is no obvious military dimension, even trumping anthropocentric interests for eco-centric reasons (such as in the restriction of polluting organochlorine pesticides like DDT) but few have “securitized” them and treated them as matters of urgent political priority. An exception is the low-lying states threatened with literal extinction under the waves of the rising oceans. Following the Security Council discussion of climate change two years earlier, the UN General Assembly in 2009 took up this theme with a resolution drafted by the government of low-lying Nauru called Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications (A64/350), calling on all UN agencies to prioritize climate change. While the resolution was unanimously adopted, Nauru—and other similarly threatened island states like Tuvalu, the Maldives—are amongst the smallest of small fry in the international political system and few of the “big fish” have prioritized climate change to the point of seriously compromising their short-term economic interests.

**Descriptions of the environment as posing existential threats stem from state-centered imaginaries --- even academic research fuels the narrative**

Michael **Mason &** Mark **Zeitoun 13**, Associate Professor in the Department of Geography and Environment and Associate of the Grantham Research Institute for Climate Change and the Environment at the London School of Economics and Political Science & Professor of Water Security and Policy at the School of International Development of the University of East Anglia, December 2013, “Questioning Environmental Security”, The Geographical Journal, Vol. 179, No. 4, p. 294-297 /lg

Threats to and from ‘the environment’ inform geographical depictions of danger with **wide- spread reach in** political and **policy** circles. While these fears are partly replaying past neo- Malthusian concerns about limits to growth, they are also associated with a distinct millennialist anxiety about the lethality made possible by collapsing conditions of life. 'Dangerous climate change' is at the forefront of these apocalyptic imaginaries, but existential threats are seen to issue also from biodiversity extinction, fossil fuel depletion and endemic water shortages (Dalby 2009; Swyngedouw 2010). The 'securitisation' of environmental processes is at once both a consequence and **driver of** such **apocalyptic concerns**, and this discursive framing is intuitively straightforward for those who argue that it justifies urgent, even emergency, measures to prevent or miti- gate serious dangers. Security here denotes that which is evoked or invoked when acting to protect core institutions or freedoms in the face of serious ecologi- cal threats. This is the dominant notion of environ- mental security questioned by contributors to this themed section.

From a geographical perspective, environmental security straddles uneasily across a territorial/post- territorial axis, where tensions are immediately appar- ent between competing spatial performances of security. This expresses contrasting claims over the political subjectivity being secured. It is not surprising that state actors have invoked environmental security practices and discourses according to territorial doctrines of national security, whereby environmental risks supplement traditional threats to the state. Thus, 'climate security', 'biosecurity' and 'energy security' are employed to refer to the protection of state interests with regard to the projected and perceived con- sequences of environmental change, biotechnologies and fossil fuels scarcity. Numerous **think-tank and academic publications** have fed these state-centred imaginaries of environmental danger on the basis of disputed natural and social scientific scenarios (e.g. Klare 2008; Brown and Crawford 2009; Chellaney 2011). In apparent opposition to statist representa-tions of security are non-territorial notions of 'human security', which profess a universal concern for the protection of individuals or groups from serious threats to wellbeing. Constructions of human security have identified environmental dangers as potential threats to human welfare; for example, 'water secu- rity' and 'food security' mark out areas of practical application for international development and humanitarian organisations (Matthew et al. 2010; Cook and Bakker 2012).

### 2NC---Failed States

#### Discourse of failed states is merely a pretext to legitimize imperialism---it conflates being a failure with anything different from the classic European states

---Somalia is a good example for failed states debates

Aleksandar Pašagić 20, Aleksandar Pašagić holds an MA in International Security & works as a Chief Security Officer in the private sector, “Failed States and Terrorism: Justifiability of Transnational Interventions from a Counterterrorism Perspective,” Perspective on Terrorism, Volume 14, Issue 3, p23-25 \\pairie

Failed States, Counterterrorism and Interventionism

As securitization of states labeled as failed takes place in politics and the media, an increasing number of authors question not only the underlying assumptions, many of which have already been demonstrated as problematic, but also the political motives of those doing the labeling. A major critique aimed at using the failed state label is that it conflates being a failure and merely being different from what is envisaged as an ideal—“the classic European state.”[64] This view of what states should look and function like is supported by what Verhoeven calls “the Orthodox Failed States Narrative”—the idea that failed states present an unwanted by-product of globalization and an obstacle in the path of the liberal democratic order working towards global peace. State failure diagnosis is generally based on a Realist framework: the state is about power, and failure is the lack of power to exert control, be it over territory, population or instruments of coercion.[65] Non-standard states make the international system uncomfortable, as it does not know how to deal with such entities.[66] The failed state label, and the sometimes occurring term “collapsed state” even more so, seem to suggest that the phenomenon in question is of local origin; it implicitly assumes that there is no blame to be assigned to external actors.[67] It also isolates the failed state and removes its decision-making autonomy, rendering it dependent on “functioning” states,[68] thereby providing a level of credibility to an outside intervention as a potential remedy.

Examples of Afghanistan and Somalia are sometimes used to illustrate the flexibility with which the failed state label is applied, as well as potential implications. Ever since the 2001 attacks on the United States, Afghanistan has played a central role in the War on Terrorism—failed state discourse.[69] Some authors consider Afghanistan under the Taliban both a failed state and a threat to the US, though admitting that it was a rarity as such.[70] However, others question exactly to what extent that held true in practice, given that the US government conducted business-related discussions with the Taliban almost until the 2001 attacks.[71] This highlights the issue of “failed” versus “different” states, and brings to the fore the idea that the use of the failed state label may in fact be primarily based on whether the state in question is perceived as a threat to Western security and interests.[72] In Somalia, the failed state rhetoric “became actionable” with the emergence of a unifying Islamic force, the Union of Islamic Courts, an actor that in fact made some progress towards establishing order. Yet it has been suggested that, because the emerging order in Somalia resembled Afghanistan under the Taliban in the eyes of the US, its status was elevated to that of a threat to international security.[73]

When presented as an international security threat, failed states are usually mentioned as potential breeding grounds or sanctuaries for transnational terrorist organizations. If such reasoning is accepted by the public, a specific failed state (or failed states in general) can be securitized to the point where an intervention, including a preventative one, is perceived as a legitimate act of self-defense.[74] This is made easier by the fact that the War on Terror is already securitized by the media.[75] The threat of terrorism can be used to securitize the concept of state failure, which can then be applied to states deviating from the expected standard, effectively providing the tool for instant securitization, as the securitizing agent is spared from having to make the “failure as a security threat” move for every particular instance of state failure. This is additionally facilitated by the broadness of the failure concept that allows for a very arbitrary application. As the failed states—terrorism connection becomes more intuitively accepted by the broader public, it becomes possible to expand the range of potential candidates for intervention to entire regions, even continents; Abrahamsen argues that the entire continent of Africa is becoming increasingly securitized in Western political speech.[76] Many post-colonial states have always fit the broad definition of failure: their governments were never fully in control of their territory, had no monopoly on violence, they have failed to provide economic security for their citizens and sometimes threatened the security of neighboring countries, but were not labelled as failed until it suited the international community.[77] Such examples make it difficult not to raise the question whether the application of a failed state label is sometimes merely a pretext to generate support for foreign interventions.[78]

The majority of fatalities and injuries from acts of terrorism are not a result of transnational terrorist operations carried out by actors arriving from failed states[79]—it is states of origin that suffer most. In 2013 Iraq accounted for 35.4% of all deaths by terrorism in that year, followed by Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Syria, for a cumulative total of 82% or 14,722 lives in that year.[80] For comparison, over the same time period the total number of fatalities due to acts of terrorism in the European Union was seven.[81] Much of the terrorism in weak states remains confined to their territory and is perpetrated by organizations motivated by grievances of local origin, such as FARC in Colombia.[82] Additionally, international terrorists do not come predominantly or even significantly from failed states,[83] and it should be noted that recent developments have turned the threat of transnational terrorism around—Western countries exported more terrorists to Syria and Iraq than vice versa.[84] This also can be framed as a threat with roots in the failed states themselves: it is the failed state that is the source of radicalization aimed at citizens of more stable countries, providing them with skills and experience that could at a later time be used against their country of origin. Therefore, it could be argued that, once successfully securitized, failed states can be shown as threatening instead of being threatened even in situations when the direction of terrorism flow is clearly reversed.

Conclusion

Due caution should be exercised when presenting either counterterrorism as an additional benefit of statebuilding or the inverse in an attempt to garner additional support for an intervention into a state labeled as failed. As discussed, counterterrorism and state-building do not necessarily go hand in hand, and the optimal effort to achieve one objective might quite possibly be to the detriment of the other. Placing countries in the context of experiencing failure as a terrorism risk does little to contribute to the solving of their development problems, and may make their situation worse for a number of reasons, not least of which is providing external and internal actors with access to means normally considered unacceptable.[85] The securitized status of failed states leaves them vulnerable not only to presumably well-intentioned international interventions gone wrong but, as was the case with Somalia, to exploitation of that status by their immediate neighbors: Ethiopia used the situation in Somalia to gain support for military intervention and accompanying actions that did little to make Somalia a more secure or stable state.[86]

### 2NC---Hegemony

#### Hegemonic peace theory is a failure and a falsified concept to justify nonsensical violence—threat constructions risks global nuclear war

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The American Empire is playing a dangerous game with its nuclear weapons arsenal. The US-NATO and Israel alliance has declared directly and indirectly that Russia, China, North Korea and Iran are a threat to world peace and security.

Let’s be clear on who is the real threat to world peace and it is not the countries I just mentioned, it is Washington’s geopolitical ambitions to bring its enemies under their sphere of control. Washington’s geopolitical moves are antagonizing its enemies which can ignite a catastrophic world war that can go to nuclear at a moment’s notice. The threat of a nuclear war is at almost the same level of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, but if you listen to the main-stream media (MSM) you may never know what is really going on concerning world events.

The first woman and U.S. Democratic presidential nominee Hillary Clinton has threatened Iran with nuclear strikes while Israel maintains its own nuclear weapons arsenal which is also a threat to its neighbors in the Middle East, especially Iran.

Washington is placing NATO troops and Missile Defense Systems close to Russia’s borders and giving the U.S. Navy the green light to a possible confrontation with China’s naval fleet in the South China Sea. Washington’s bellicose actions are indeed provocative. As I mentioned in a 2013 article ‘Hawaii: 120 Years of US Occupation: Militarism and “America’s Pacific Century’ Hillary Clinton who was Secretary of State at the time wrote an article in 2011 titled ‘America’s Pacific Century’ for Foreign Policy Magazine where she defined what the U.S. role would be in the Pacific region:

Strategically, maintaining peace and security across the Asia-Pacific is increasingly crucial to global progress, whether through defending freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, countering the proliferation efforts of North Korea, or ensuring transparency in the military activities of the region’s key players

America’s strategy in the South China Sea is to isolate China at all costs while empowering their vassal states in the region with political, economic and military support. According to a July 12th article by The Guardian, China has rejected a ruling by an international tribunal in The Hague which claims that the Philippines has legal rights in the South China Sea “over strategic reefs and atolls that Beijing claims would give it control over disputed waters of the South China Sea.”

The ruling is a moral justification for the U.S. Navy to patrol the South China Sea while advancing Washington’s strategic goals. First it allows Washington to block any trade or cooperation agreements between China and its neighboring countries which can leave Western business interests out of the loop which is why the Obama regime continues to push the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) which gives US corporations unlimited power in the region. The TPP is one of the agreements under Obama’s “Asian Pivot” that puts corporate power over government’s who sign on to the TPP. Under the TPP, laws that protected the working-class people and labor unions before their governments sign on to the TPP would be diminished.

The agreement will also end regulations that effect health, safety and environmental standards and the list goes on. Corporations like Monsanto would become a major benefactor in agriculture sector throughout the entire region. Second, it gives Washington an excuse to remain in the South China Sea to protect its corporate interests and its allies from the “China Threat” following the objective of “Full-Spectrum Dominance” in the Asia-Pacific region.

Washington’s propaganda campaign against China reinstates the willingness and insanity of provoking a war against a nation who has a relatively strong military force of over 2.3 million troops on land, sea and air including its own nuclear arsenal. Not to mention China is America’s creditor which means in short “don’t bite the hands that feeds you!” Washington’s aggressive foreign policy stance has accelerated since Obama got into the White House.

The Obama administration (and a possible Hillary Clinton presidency to follow) is also risking a possible conflict with Russia. In the Democratic National Convention, Hillary Clinton said that “I’m proud to stand by our allies in NATO against any threat they face, including from Russia” following the same path as her “Neocon” supporters. Clinton’s speech shows what she will most likely do in Washington and that is to risk countless lives to further advance U.S. strategic goals.

The elites or the “Armchair Warriors” (because they instigate war from the comfort of their mansions where they throw costume parties wearing animal heads or from their offices in the White House, Downing Street, Tel Aviv and the Pentagon) do not in any way fight wars themselves, but support and even lobby for war that benefits the Military-Industrial Complex. We can also call them “Chicken Hawks” which are those who support and advocate for war as many do in Washington, but avoid any form of military service or draft (Bill Clinton and George W. Bush) when called upon to serve. Washington’s politicians are quick to use their own populations for their military adventures who are mostly from poor and in some cases from the middle class and their favorite “undocumented immigrants” (who are promised American citizenships) from Latin America. The U.S military and the Washington-backed NATO troops are pawns of unwinnable wars that can escalate into a thermo-nuclear war between the U.S. and Russia.

Wall Street, the Military-Industrial Complex, corporations and the politicians are willing to lead the world into an Armageddon-type scenario. Washington is confident that they can defeat its adversaries with their military power but the U.S. has never faced countries like Russia, China or Iran. Russia has more advanced military technologies including its air and missile defense systems known as the S-500 which can counter any US-NATO missile or fighter jet at a moment’s notice. Irrational decisions made by Washington’s establishment means two things, first, they must be really politically and historically ignorant on Russia’s stance when it comes to its sovereignty and they must really despise humanity, but one thing is certain; they want the U.S. to remain as the world’s standing superpower. Wars after war, countless lives have been lost on all continents over the last 250 years or so. War is America’s pastime. Wars contribute to the spread of disease and famine. Countless Western interventions in the last 100 years alone have caused chaos, economic despair for many nations who lay victim to Western Imperial agendas.

From Banking to GMO’s: The Armchair Warriors want Humanity under their Control

The armchair warriors advocate for economic policies that essentially enslave humanity with their banking institutions such as Goldman Sachs, the Federal Reserve Bank, and the International Bank for International Settlements (BIS), JP Morgan Chase, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Goldman Sachs is one of the financial institutions that managed to steer the world into debt peonage. Jose Manuel Barroso was an EU bureaucrat and President of the European Commission was just hired by Goldman Sachs is a prime example of the revolving doors between government and corporations.

Why are we as human beings subjected to this madness and despair so that the top 1% can control our natural resources and our lives? Western politicians, top-level military men (General Breedlove), think tanks such as the Council of Foreign Relations (CFR) or the Heritage Foundation, the Main-Stream Media (MSM) and multinational corporations are leading the world to destruction and chaos. They advocate the need to control humanity’s healthcare with their prescription drugs and vaccines that hurt and kill thousands of people annually. They advocate for Genetically Modified foods (GMO’s) and support corporations such as Monsanto who are producing the unhealthiest foods for public consumption. GMO foods do lead to future health problems which do guarantee permanent patients so that Pharmaceutical corporations can continue to earn profits from their “legal” drugs. A monopoly made in Washington.

The West will Suffer Major Consequences of a Nuclear War

Russia and China are prepared for any confrontation with the United States if any peace agreement were to fail (obviously, Washington does not want peace). Russia will not hesitate to retaliate if Washington and its NATO patsies were foolish enough to launch a pre-emptive strike on Russian soil committing the world to a nuclear war. China recently announced that preparations are underway for any possible confrontation with the U.S. and any of its allies in The Global Times; a Chinese-government source clearly states what is at stake concerning U.S. maneuvers in the South China Sea:

China should speed up building its military capabilities of strategic deterrence. Even though China cannot keep up with the US militarily in the short-term, it should be able to let the US pay a cost it cannot stand if it intervenes in the South China Sea dispute by force. China is a peace-loving country and deals with foreign relations with discretion, but it won’t flinch if the US and its small clique keep encroaching on its interests on its doorstep. China hopes disputes can be resolved by talks, but it must be prepared for any military confrontation. This is common sense in international relations.

Washington is also placing NATO Missile Defense Systems in Europe that threatens Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin faced off with Journalists in the Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum on June 17th and said the following in regards to a possible war with the West:

The “Iranian Threat” does not exist but the NATO Missile Defense System is being positioned in Europe. That means we were right when we said that their reasons are not genuine, they were not being open with us. Always referring to the “Iranian Threat” in order to justify this system, once again they lied to us, now the system is functioning and being loaded with missiles. As you (Journalists) should know these missiles are put into capsules, which are used in the Tomahawk long range missile system.

So, these are being loaded with missiles that can penetrate territories within a 500km range, but we know that technologies advance, and we even know in which year the U.S. will accomplish the next missile…this missile will be able to penetrate distances of up to 1000km, and then even further… And from that moment on, they will start to directly threaten Russia’s nuclear potential.

We know year by year what’s going to happen, and they know that we know. It’s only you that they tell tall tales to, and you buy it, and spread it to the citizens of your countries. You people in turn do not feel a sense of the impending danger — this is what worries me.

“How do you not understand that the world is being pulled in an irreversible direction? While they pretend that nothing is going on. I don’t know how to get through to you anymore”

Washington’s insanity will for sure destroy Western civilization with Europe taking the first nuclear strikes when Russia retaliates after a U.S. led NATO strike. Are the armchair warriors going to the front lines to fight alongside US-NATO soldiers? Of course not because they have their pawns in place that will be killed or seriously maimed if a war or a nuclear war was to take place, but no worries because they have the pharmaceutical drugs that will heal your life crippling wounds. Not only is the Obama administration threatening Russia’s borders, Hillary Clinton has threatened Iran in the past with a nuclear strike against any action they may take against Israel or “violate” any terms within the nuclear deal between the P5 +1 (Russia, China, France, the UK and the U.S. plus Germany) and Iran in 2015. Is a nuclear war inevitable?

#### The desire to perpetuate the hegemonic identity seeks to construct false threats for the justification of retalitatory and pre-emptive action

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Rather than the rationalist approach to national security, we adopt a narrative approach to unravelling the narrative process whereby national threats are constructed. Having encountered three successive national rivals since WWII, the United States has constructed three distinctive threat stories to safeguard its hegemonic identity. The Soviet threat consists in the story of two ideologically opposed rivals competing for world domination; the Japan-bashing narrative tells a victimhood story stemming from Japan’s unfair competition. China threat stories, however, are now more complex, conflating a story of US victimhood at the hands of China’s unfair competition, advocated by President Trump, with a widely embedded but malleable epic tale of power competition between a rising power and the ruling power, and a new, ‘deep state’ defence community-propagated Cold War script. All these threat stories have framed what is perceived and what should be done, but they are merely those from among other alternative narratives that eventually gained a dominant position at critical junctures. These so called national threats are hence no more than narrative constructs in a self-other manner of articulation rather than one of objective existence. Upon examining the narrative templates of US threat stories, we find striking differences among them. The Soviet threat spectrum ranges from the ideological to the political and military domains, and economic challenge is the focus of the Japan threat. But China represents the full spectrum of threats that previously featured in both the Soviet threat story and the Japan-bashing narrative. Upon zooming in, we further find that an ideological conflict constitutes the main thread of the Soviet threat storyline, but that the economic challenge of the China threat outweighs the ideological and political ones. On the political front, the Soviet Union’s totalitarian dictatorship is the polar opposite of liberal democracy, while China is often styled as an authoritarian state—a far less antagonistic wording. As to military threats, the Soviet threat is urgent and global, but the China threat is only a rising and regional one. To counter the economic challenge emanating first from Japan and then from China, the United States adopted different strategies to construct its victimhood story, namely, coining new concepts for Japan, and cashing in on stereotypes for China. In spite of the above-marked differences, however, we can also clearly discern continuity in the United States’ national threat stories. This is reflected not only in the United States’ consistently resorting to the victimhood narrative to counter economic challenges from both Japan and China, and unremittingly cashing in on its widely-shared mythologies and images regarding the Self and Others to achieve resonance, but also, more revealingly, in the underlying logic of US national threat-making. The United States will invariably adopt a zero-sum mindset in making a diametrical self-other story for any country—be it a formidable power with an antagonistic ideology like the Soviet Union, an ally like Japan, or a rising peer competitor like China—that might threaten its hegemonic identity. According to this logic, the American Self is always superior to Others, and articulating the threat confirms its superiority. Not surprisingly, when Others, like Japan or China, challenge its economic primacy, the United States, rather than examining its own problems, will always blame such others for playing an ‘unfair game’. This paper also provides us with a vantage point to appreciate the current debate on Sino–US relations. Clearly, we are in the second half of the critical juncture wherein the question is not whether the United States and China will compete with each other but in which way the competition will unfold, for the bankruptcy of the liberal international order discourse makes it unlikely to revert to yesteryear’s policy of engagement. As the three narrative threads of the China threat stories all point to competition and conflict, and can be self-fulfilling, we may witness increasing tensions between them. Specifically, the Japan-bashing victimhood story can shed considerable light on our understanding of Trump’s China policy. We find that the story President Trump advocates to a large extent matches the victimhood story that the revisionists concocted to deal with Japan in the 1980s. Trump’s rhetoric regarding unfair trade and industry targeting, slapping of trade tariffs amounting to blackmail on both China and US allies, results oriented approach to trade negotiation, and the US high-tech stranglehold that curbs or bars investment in the industry by US competitors can all be found in the Japan threat story toolbox. Having pivoted China policy towards conflict, however, there are few indications that Trump wants to act out a Cold War script. In accordance with the storytelling logic, should Trump retain his presidency in the coming election, the trade war will probably not end in a ‘fair’ trade agreement until such time as the US economy far outperforms China’s, because US superiority entails outperformance, failing which the blame must go on unfair play. That is what happened to Japan, that is to say, successive rounds of sanctions and negotiations until Japan drifted into the Lost Decade. China may, moreover, face even greater US hostility to its high-tech industry and investment, as happened in 1980s. These are issues that China’s political nature and growing military may further complicate. But it should be noted that China is not Japan and will neither give in easily as Japan did nor pose a solely economic challenge to the United States.

#### The attempt to return to the liberal order is harmful—the rhetoric functions as a continued driver for American primacy

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According to a view popular in Washington, D.C., and other capitals around the world, the United States used its power and idealism for more than 70 years to create a security and economic order that transformed the world. This world order was liberal because the United States was liberal. “Liberal” in this context means the pursuit of security both through the spread of liberty, in the form of free markets and democratic constitutions, and the rule of law, in the form of rule‐​based international institutions. Today, defenders of that order fear that President Trump and a set of regressive forces are laying waste to it. They claim the consequences are grave: we are witnessing the “end of the West as we know it,”1 the abandonment of “global leadership” by its “long‐​time champion,”2 and a “coming Dark Age.”3 Foreign Affairs, the house organ of the foreign policy establishment, recently asked 32 experts whether the “liberal order is in peril.” Most agreed it is, with 26 respondents registering a confidence level of 7 out of 10.4 Alarmed by the political tumult of our time, nostalgists recall the post‐​1945 moment of institution building and benign internationalism and call for its reclamation.

They are, however, in the grip of a fiction. Liberalism and liberal projects abounded in the past 70 years. But the dream of a unitary, integrated global system organized around liberalism is ahistorical. In truth, the pre‐​Trump world was a more brutal and messy place than the nostalgia allows. To be sure, there was liberalism, and it did help define postwar international relations. Broadly speaking, the post‐​1945 period was, on many measures, more prosperous, less violent, and more collaborative than what came before. One defect of “liberal order” nostalgia is that it exaggerates these qualities and simply leaves out too many contrary historical realities. Other critics have already noted the gap between nostalgia and history and that the postwar world was never “whole.” At times the liberal order was neither very liberal nor very orderly. There may be “islands of liberal order, but they are floating in a sea of something quite different.”5

Not only do nostalgists get the history wrong, they fail to confront what “world ordering” actually entails. The main critique in this paper is that the fetish for “liberal order” has obscured what is involved in the process of “ordering” — or attempting to order — the globe. The United States, as the leading actor in the orthodox narrative, emerges as a power that created order through a benign internationalist vision, consensus building, and institution creating. But the successes and failures of that order also flowed from coercion, compromise, and rougher power politics. As the ordering superpower, the United States did not bind itself with the rules of the system. It upended, stretched, or broke liberal rules to shape a putatively liberal order. Appeals to the myth of a liberal Camelot flow from a deeper myth, of power politics without coercion and empire without imperialism.

This fuller narrative is also a story of tragic limits. The world was not so easily subjugated. Efforts to spread liberalism often contained the seeds of illiberalism. Multiple orders collided and met the limits of their reach and power. Efforts to create a liberal order ended up accommodating illiberalism. Liberalism itself proved to be a conflicted thing. At times, projects to advance it had unexpected results. As it happens, the pursuit of “liberal order” is not just an antidote to the current difficulties suffered by the international system but a source of them.

Ideas about “order” matter and have weighty policy implications. Just as material power enables or forecloses certain choices, ideas condition and constrain a country’s grand strategic decisions. Those who lament the fall of the “liberal order” are saying, in effect, that some ideas are illegitimate and should be off the table. They worry that “populism” and “isolationism” endanger traditional ideas that were once dominant, leading America to abandon its manifold commitments overseas, in turn driving the world into disorder. When they call for the reclamation of the old order, they also call for the perpetuation of American primacy. By contrast, this paper argues that the exaggerated notion of the “liberal order” and its imminent collapse is a myth of the foreign policy establishment and leads America to overstretch.

This analysis is divided into three parts. First, I examine the lamentations for a lost world, unpacking what such lamentations claim about how the world “was” before its dissolution allegedly began. Liberal order nostalgia performs two functions: by denying the violent coercion, resistance, and unintended consequences of “world ordering,” it sanitizes history into a morality tale and delegitimizes arguments for revision and retrenchment. The lamentations also give an alibi to American primacy, attributing its demise to forces external to it. By reducing the issue to one of inadequate political will, and by blaming either elites or the public at large for failing to keep the faith, “liberal order” lamentations dodge the painful question of how such an excellent order could produce unsustainable burdens, alienate its own citizenry, and provoke resistance.

In the second section, I demonstrate that “liberal order” rhetoric is ahistorical and therefore largely mythical. The claim that a single, internally consistent, and consensual order predominated for more than 70 years, with liberal projects producing liberal results, fares poorly when compared with the major patterns of international relations from 1945, in the spheres of both security and commerce. Conversely, the claim that American statecraft is now being turned upside down is hyperbolic, and blind to the quiet victories that orthodox U.S. grand strategy is winning under the Trump presidency.

Lastly, I argue that “world order” nostalgia is harmful. There is a prudent case for retrenchment, and a diplomacy of deterrence, power sharing, and accommodation, through which the United States could pursue security in a multipolar world. For an overstretched superpower to address the imbalance of power and commitments, it will have to look beyond ritual incantations.

#### Discourse articulates the scope of hegemonic interests—securitization legitimizes interests to construct new political structures

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Language and articulation, discourse and practice. For positivism, language works as a transparent medium for the indexing of data giving us a clear view on reality while the interpretation of reality can rely on correlations and facts. In contrast, poststructuralism conceives of language as ontologically significant and productive. Such an understanding situates the study within theories that comply with the ‘linguistic turn’ in the social sciences: they refuse to conceptualize language as a means of representation, as a transparent medium or key for the researcher to investigate an objective perception of reality. ‘Reality’ cannot be objectively perceived; hence, there is no objective or ‘true’ meaning behind or beyond linguistic representations. The discourse functions as the theoretical horizon on which objects are constituted: all objects are objects of discourse, as their meaning depends on a socially constructed system of rules and significant differences (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000: 3). This is the tragedy of the old man: the productivity of language allowed him to turn the table in a rug and the bed into a painting; it allowed him to construct a world of his own full of things and objects with new meanings. But language is also a socially constructed and collectively shared system of rules, codes and conventions to which individuals have to comply in order to be understood and to participate in societal life, language can never be a private property – there is no private language exclusively for the old man (Wittgenstein 2001: 75/243).

To further understand language as political not only makes it a site of social interaction but also a space for producing and denouncing specific subjectivities within the political realm – language is a site of exclusion and inclusion. For instance, the understanding of drug use in the nineteenth century was radically different from today: drug use was a tolerated behaviour, people in various societal strata consumed drugs for pleasure, recreation or for medical reasons, and states even promoted the drug trade by claiming the monopoly on, for example, the trade with opium. Such a stance is inconceivable today, since the political nature of these formerly accepted practices became subject of contestations and, eventually, exclusions: states would not act as trader of drugs anymore and consuming drugs is considered as deviant, sick and illegal behaviour. Thus, drug prohibition (and equally terrorism) are not a mere liguistic reflection of processes or patterns of behaviour one can discover in the world ‘out there’ and described ‘as they are’. They are as much in need of interpretation as they open up space for interpretation. How they are interpreted and why some interpretations dominate and others do not is – as this book argues – a question of hegemonic orders.

By claiming that it is only through language that things acquire meaning, the imagination of an extra-discursive realm able to determine the meaning of an object is excluded. However, such a stance does not imply that objects of knowledge might not exist independently of language, that there is no materiality of say a body or a table outside of discourse. The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the realism/ idealism opposition. An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of ‘natural phenomena’ or ‘expression of the wrath of God’ depends upon the structuring of a discursive field. What is denied is not that such objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive conditions of emergence. (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 108)2

Hence, poststructuralism conceptualizes language in a twofold manner. First, language is highly structured, since – as Derrida once argued – it is a system of differential signs, and meaning can only emerge through a series of juxtapositions, where one element is valued over its opposite and not via the essence of the thing itself (Derrida 1980). In principle, signs are composed of the signifier (the letters on the page or the sound that bounces off our eardrum) and the signified (the concept that appears in our brain when we read or hear the signifier). Hence, a drug addict can only be identified as such through a differentiation from the non-user, a terrorist needs to be delineated from the legitimate freedom fighter and a state’s national identity acquires meaning via juxtaposition with a different national identity.

While signifier and signified capture the structured nature of language, meaning within linguistic structures is organized by articulation. Against the background of the ontological significance of language, poststructuralists valorize the role of articulatory practices in the structuring of social relations by claiming that every social process of putting elements together is to some degree articulatory. In this respect, and secondly, poststructuralists conceive of language not only as highly structured but also as instable at the same time. Due to this instable nature of language, the practice of articulation is ‘the construction of nodal points which partially fix meaning’ (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 113). By speaking of the partial ability to fix meaning only, Laclau and Mouffe highlight the instable nature of language. Signifiers are always referring to other signifiers without ever coming to an irrevocable meaning. Derrida circumscribed this process with his neologism différance: words and signs can never fully summon forth what they mean, but can only be defined or explained by using more words; thus, the ‘fuller’ meaning is always postponed in language, there is never a moment when one can say the meaning is complete (Derrida 1972).

Such diverse writers as Derrida, Julia Kristeva, Foucault, Roland Barthes, Jacques Lacan or Laclau and Mouffe acknowledge that the articulatory practice always alters the identity of each articulated element. ‘[C]ontingency now inhabits not only the different elements that are linked together to form a discourse, but also the hegemonic projects or subjects that strive to fix meanings’ (Glynos and Howarth 2007: 179). This brings about a conceptualization of discourse as ‘the structured totality resulting from the articulatory practice’ (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 105). Hence, discourses refer to systems of meaningful practices that form the identities of subjects and objects; they relate elements to establish meaning, since elements need to be set in relation to other elements to acquire meaning. This is implied when the meaning of a terrorist can only be established by juxtaposing it to a non-terrorist. Discursive structures are not cognitive entities, they are articulatory practices, which constitute and organize social relations.

Although being defined as a structured totality the process of constantly relating elements and organize meaning rules out the impression of discourse as a static, fixed structure. On the contrary, discourse is a structure penetrated by contingency and temporality, marked by fissures, ruptures and breaches. Attempts to halt the inherent dynamic that haunts discourses and to fix meaning around closed structures are in vain: ‘neither absolute fixity nor absolute non-fixity is possible’ (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 111). Thus, what counts for the articulatory practice also counts for discourses: meaning can be partially fixed because without partial fixations the very flow of differences would not be possible and no identity or social formation would ever be constructed. Partial fixations are achieved as any discourse situates itself as ‘an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity [. . .] to construct a centre’ (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 111–2) and subjects search for a constitutive decision articulating social meaning in one particular way rather than another – to paraphrase Derrida’s ‘undecidability’ of any text.

One central implication of denying the existence of an extra-discursive realm within which things and objects can be constructed consists of acknowledging that policies like the ‘war on terror’ and the ‘war on drugs’ are based on specific discursive representations of the security problem they want to address and on specific constructions of identities, of Self and Other. But how are linguistic representations and policies like the two ‘wars’ linked exactly? In this respect, the notion of practice is crucial. Practices are the ongoing, routinized forms of human and societal reproduction. As largely repetitive activities (not entailing a strong notion of self-conscious reflexivity), they contribute to the reproduction of wider systems of social relations. However, every practice is also articulatory ‘as human beings constantly engage in the process of linking together different elements of their social lives in these continuous and projective sequences of human action’ (Glynos and Howarth 2007: 104).

While such social practices and the identities they maintain tend to dissimulate the inherent contingency that inhabits social systems, the ghost of this contingency leaves its traces within the structure: discursive structures are precarious, they are full of breaches and gaps, i.e. any social edifice suffers from an inbuilt defect which may become visible in moments of dislocation (Lacan 2006: 693). Dislocation destabilizes a discourse due to events that cannot be symbolized by this very discourse – it refers to the ‘decentring’ of the structure through social processes which disrupt the structure (like a severe crisis), as they cannot be mastered by it. In such a moment, new opportunities arise, allowing (but also forcing) a subject to situate itself anew as its former points of identification have vanished in the process of dislocation. We will see later in how far the terrorist attacks at the Olympic Games in 1972 represent such a moment of dislocation as they could not be represented in the discourse on terrorism at that time.

Yet, dislocation is problematic and productive at the same time, since the dislocated social practices give rise to political practices, as in the moment of dislocation, of a crisis, grievances or dissatisfactions are publicly articulated as demands. Thus, political practices are about struggles challenging and transforming current norms, institutions and practices – or an entire regime of practices – in the name of a different, particular idea, ideal or principle (Howarth 2000: 108–9). If political practices are successful in challenging existing norms and institutions in the name of something new, they bring about a transformative effect, since they can modify or reorder an entire regime. Indeed, to the extent to which political practices are not only able to challenge an existing regime of practices but also link various forces and demands into a new regime of practices, they exercise an enormous transformative effect in the political landscape. Even more: political practices can be characterized as ‘more or less hegemonic depending on the degree to which the political demands articulating a grievance are formulated in terms that succeed in having more or less universal appeal’ (Glynos and Howarth 2007: 123). In this sense, a regime of political practices has a structuring function by ordering a system of practices against something else: the institution of a particular regime is always dependent on frontiers relating to what cannot be incorporated in the differential system of the regime. The establishment of these limits serves to exclude antagonistic otherness, represented by those elements that have nothing in common with the regime from which they are excluded. Quite obviously, defining a regime of practices in contrast to an antagonized regime shapes both of them. Labelling a drug addict as a criminal or defining her as a sick person leads to different practices on how to deal with her addiction – either by repressive and punitive measures or by prevention and clinical cure.

Furthermore, considering something as a threat, i.e. to ‘securitize’ an issue by designating it as an existential threat and request for extraordinary measures, is all but interest-free (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998: 23–6). It legitimizes the subject that securitizes to go beyond the limits of routine political behaviour and demand extraordinary measures and instruments. In most of these cases (since these types of demands are most frequently voiced by powerful stakeholders within a state), the measures serve to discipline the rest of society and reaffirm the rule of particular subjects over society. By invoking the extraordinary measures and practices to defend against the alleged threat, resistance to these practices becomes increasingly difficult. Moreover, resistance can easily be described as being subversive and playing into the hands of the threat.

To characterize practices and regimes, to account for their relationship, to explain how and why they change or resist transformations, we need to elaborate on the logics or modes of construction on which they are based. Most importantly, in order to address how and why specific regimes become hegemonic it is especially necessary to clarify what is understood by hegemony. This is the task of the next section.

### 2NC---Liberalism

#### Individual autonomy reproduces the securitization of structural dynamics that creates a cycle of Western dynamics

**Lazell 16**- (Lazell, Melita- political economist with diverse research interests traversing the fields of security, development and aid, and international relations, "Liberalism(s) and the critical securitization of development debate", 2016, University of Portsmouth, https://researchportal.port.ac.uk/en/publications/liberalisms-and-the-critical-securitization-of-development-debate)//mishelle

Through demarcating the multiple meanings of liberalism salient to the securitization of development debate, this article has proposed a number of additions and amendments to move the debate forward. Understanding liberalism as a coherent philosophy, as do a number of contributions to the debate, draws attention to the liberal political discourse of global governance. However, depicting global governance as unified through a liberal consensus endows a greater coherence to these discourses than they warrant. In doing so, internal contradiction, contestation and contingency is obscured. An approach to these related discourses which makes visible the ‘messy actualities’ (Larner, 2006) of global governance may reveal potential and spaces for specific emancipatory change. This would include acknowledging the different narratives linking security and development, which would engender a more robust understanding of this discourse. Utilising the idea of liberalism as a technology of governance gives insight into how development involves the production of freedom and entails limitations and coercion. It highlights liberal societal transformation as a key rationale of global governance and offers a salient theoretical tool for understanding ‘ownership’ and ‘participation’ within the global development agenda. However there is a need to establish greater clarity regarding the drivers of liberal societal transformation in the South and deeper engagement with the wider literature concerned with liberal societal transformation (Harrison, 2004) Applying neoliberalism as governmentality to the debate sheds light upon how the non-liberal practices of development intervention become acceptable to a global governance network that is essentially liberal. Finally, a theory of the securitization of development needs to pay greater attention to the structural dynamics of the global economy, including how these are linked to the production of discourse. The (important) focus on liberalism(s) as a coherent philosophy or technique of power, should not exclude an analysis of the underlying structures of global capital accumulation that perpetuate the very global inequalities that are currently framed as security issues by global governance networks. The security-development nexus reinforces the delinking of development assistance from the principle of solidarity and the redistribution of wealth. Instead, development interventions are understood as a tool of Western security. It is this that the securitization of development debate is seeking to critique. In delineating the three strands of liberalism this paper contributes to the debate by providing greater clarity and further tools through which to reveal the ‘underlying cartographies of power’ that inform the nexus. Furthermore, in demonstrating that complexity rather than coherence characterises networks of global governance, it also has implications for critical global governance studies that lean towards conceptualising global governance as a knowable, coherent unit.

### 2NC---LIO

#### The liberal international order is used as a scapegoat for policymakers to increase security rhetoric

Thomas Ambrosio, et. al, 20; Carson Schram & Preston Heopfner; professor of Political Science, PhD “The American securitization of China and Russia: U.S. geopolitical culture and declining unipolarity” *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, 61:2, 162-194, DOI: 10.1080/15387216.2019.1702566

A return to great power competition

Following the 2015 Ashton Carter statement which began this article, there was a substantive shift in the threat narrative delivered by American executive branch officials. According to the 2016 threat assessment: “Emerging trends suggest that geopolitical competition among the major powers is increasing in ways that challenge international norms and institutions” (S.Hrg.114-626 2016, 29). Although the international system was seen as still possessing opportunities for the United States, and even possible cooperation with Russia and China on certain issues, the threat narrative that emerged at this time was that an inflection point had been reached in which the global security order was fundamentally slipping away from the United States. Russia and China were depicted as increasingly confident and active in their goals of establishing spheres of influence through which they could “check U.S. appeal and influence in their regions” and then use them to act extra-regionally (S.Hrg.115-278 2018, 15). From this, they would be able to transform the international system contrary to American preferences. Consistent with securitizing moves, policymakers sought to make the case that these states now constituted an existential threat to American primacy, unipolarity, and the liberal-democratic world order. They did this in four ways.

First, the separate threats of China and Russia coalesced into a single narrative in which the United States was confronted by aligned, revisionist great powers throughout the Eurasian land mass. This newfound alignment was depicted as having a directly deteriorative effect on the international system itself and America’s position within it. The fears expressed in the 1998 threat assessment – of a shift in great power competition to the “military sphere” and “the formation of an anti-US great power alliance” – were now seen as coming to pass. The latter was highlighted as particularly important. Before, cooperation between Russia and China was mentioned largely in passing and depicted as not a threat to America’s global position. Following 2016, this was no longer the case: their revisionist goals were presented as having converged into a single, existential threat. Their opposition to the U.S. was described as increasingly coordinated and intense, and occurring across an expanded number of issue areas and geographic locations. During the 2016 Q&A session, the specter of the Cold War was directly referenced by the Director of National Intelligence as a touchstone for explaining the current international system (S.Hrg.114-626 2016, 71). In 2019, policymakers depicted a new Cold War-era bloc in an unambiguous comparison made between current China and Russia alignment and their alliance during the “mid-1950s” (Coats 2019, 4).

Second, there was little sense that this geopolitical shift was a consequence of American overextension, the benefits provided to other states by hegemonic stability, or, notably, a reaction to U.S. primacy based upon these countries’ perceptions of threat. Although “perceived U.S. unilateralism and interventionism and Western promotion of democratic values and human rights” were cited as partial motivations for their policies, the cause of this newfound great power competition continued to be depicted as largely arising from Russian and Chinese internal great power ambitions (Coats 2019, 4). From the 2016 report onward, great power ambitions constituted, on average, nearly 20% of the content about both Russia and China – an increase over the previous decade of approximately 43% and 33%, respectively. There was no explanation or context for these ambitions other than simply to cite them, with the implication being that they existed as an essential part of these states themselves –something consistent with the narratives preceding 2016. More importantly, these ambitions were expressed through a variety of actions by Russia and China to overturn the international status quo. This is reflected in Figures 2 and 4, in which we see references to intentions reaching all-time, post-Cold War heights for both states. From the 2016 report onward, 61% of references to China and nearly 74% of references to Russia cited this factor. Both states were repeatedly described as “active” and “assertive”, though Russia was the most consistently referred to as “aggressive”, which can, perhaps, account for why Russia was often depicted as a more serious and immediate threat, despite the differences in objective capabilities between the two.

Third, these reports highlighted that Russia/China sought to close the power gap between themselves and the U.S. by actively eroding three key advantages that America held over other powers which are necessary for maintaining its position in the international system: military technology, geographic reach, and alliances. These advantages were now seen as slipping away, accelerating the deterioration of the international system. In terms of their respective military forces, the U.S. had acknowledged for some time that the power gap between itself and Russia/China was shrinking, as they reached certain modernization thresholds which allowed them to emerge as regional peer competitors in conventional warfare, missile technology, and space/counterspace. In other realms, such as cyberspace, foreign intelligence, and influence/information operations, threats by these states emerged as particular concerns for American policymakers, as both countries boosted their respective capacities to carry out such operations. More concerning for Washington, however, was that they demonstrated an increased willingness to utilize these against the United States in ways that “intentionally blur the distinction between peace and wartime operations” (S. Hrg.114-626 2016, 29). Thus, it was not just the fact that they were building up their capabilities, but that they were actually using them or had developed offensive doctrines which facilitated their use in the future. Moreover, while America’s global position relied on the fact that it was the only truly global power, its competitors had stepped up their efforts to limit America’s influence within their respective regions. By the latter half of the 2010s, Russia had already established its dominance over the former USSR and continued to consolidate its position. China was seeking to do something similar in the Asia-Pacific region through its attempt to control the disputed South China Sea. Worse from the American perspective was that both states were upping their capacity to carry out extra-regional operations, demonstrated most significantly by Russia’s intervention in Syria and China’s massive investment in its Indian Ocean naval presence and the Belt and Road Initiative. The latter was specifically described as intended “to diminish U.S. influence” (Coats 2019, 25). Lastly, the U.S. had built a network of global alliances since World War II, which gave Washington influence, leverage, and reach in every corner of the world. However, U.S. officials noted that this, too, was eroding. While there were some hints that U.S. policy under President Donald Trump may be responsible for this in some way,20 testimony explained that both states were also actively seeking to bring this about by increasing their ties to traditional U.S. allies through selective incentives or by acting to divide the U.S. from its allies. While the former was China’s preferred mode, Russia was using influence/information and cyberspace operations to undermine “Western cohesion” (S.Hrg.115-278 2018, 25).

The fourth factor was the most significant for undermining the liberal democratic world order: America was losing control over global discourse and norms. This was first referenced in 2016 and became a central theme in subsequent reports, as Russia and China both sought to shape information in order to advance their interests and undermine American positions and messaging. Russian influence/information operations were depicted as the most active and serious of the two, given Moscow’s presumed actions during several European elections and, in particular, the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Consequently, “[the] forces for geopolitical order and stability will continue to fray, as will the rules-based international order” (S.Hrg.115-278 2018, 15). The 2019 report was particularly alarmist about “the coming ideological battle,” with references to how Russia and China were seeking to “shape global rules and standards to their benefit,” “threaten international support for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law,” and “[take] advantage of rising doubts in some places about the liberal democratic model” (Coats 2019, 24–25). Moreover, U.S. officials claimed that China was now actively promoting its model of authoritarian-capitalism “as an alternative – and implicitly superior – development path,” which, previously, was largely seen as just having a possible demonstrative effects (Coats 2019, 25). Now, for the first time since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, American policymakers described a global ideological rival to liberal-democracy.

While there was obviously mention of capabilities in these later reports, what was emphasized was the undesguised intent of Russia and China to transform the international system, building toward a global struggle between themselves as revisionist powers and the U.S. as defending the status quo. The 2019 report, in particular, was indicative of the fact that the U.S. government was openly adopting language that had been building for some time amongst commentators and foreign policy analysts, that the future dividing line in the international system would be between democracy and authoritarianism.21 This both fueled and was seen as fueling what has been called a “new red scare” (Neuhauser 2018). While not fully a return to the language of the Cold War, there were strong indications that this would emerge as the central American narrative moving forward, given that this great power challenge was described as “increasingly about values” and the incompatibility between forms of government (Coats 2019, 4).

### 2NC---NATO

#### NATO’s security discourse delegitimizes alternative governance and solidifies liberalism in Western identity.

Alexandra Gheciu 19, Professor at Graduate School Of Public and International Affairs, University Of Ottawa, Ottawa, Ontario, Canadacorresponding Author, 3-19-2019, "NATO, liberal internationalism, and the politics of imagining the Western security community", SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0020702019834645 //AW

In recent years, there has been renewed interest among International Relations (IR) scholars in the ability of the Western security community to protect itself from a variety of threats and challenges. In this context, longstanding debates concerning the role played by the organization that is widely regarded as the institutional expression of that community—NATO—have recently taken on new dimensions. Scholars and policymakers often disagree in their interpretations of the relative strength of NATO, but many agree that the alliance needs to play a central role in protecting the West from a mix of conventional and non-conventional dangers, ranging from an increasingly assertive Russia to transnational terrorism. One of the key assumptions underpinning many analyses is that NATO constitutes the institutional expression of a pre-existing Western security community united around liberal-democratic norms and values. However, a close reading of the alliance’s history shows that, far from simply representing a pre-given community, NATO has always been involved in constructing “the West.” At the heart of that process of social construction lie practices of collective (re)imagining of the Western world in specific ways, as well as the representation—and management of—internal tensions as feuds within a community united by shared liberal values. Today, the task of managing internal differences has been rendered particularly difficult by the rise of radical conservative political forces in several allied states. This has translated into a clash between liberal and illiberal interpretations of the Western security community, which has the potential to seriously complicate inter-allied relations in the foreseeable future. As this paper shows, contrary to conventional wisdom, middle powers have always played important roles in the constitution of the Western security community. More recently, they have also played significant roles in contesting liberal interpretations of the security community, and articulating an alternative, radical conservative vision of the West. Recent developments in allied countries such as Turkey and Poland are a potent reminder that not all middle powers are alike; on the contrary, based on their socially constructed, historically specific definitions of identity, they can perform a diversity of international roles—in support of, or, conversely, as obstacles to liberal internationalism. The narrative of Western unity and the politics of collective forgetting during the Cold War One of the most influential narratives of international security put forward by liberal IR scholars and practitioners centres on the Euro-Atlantic security community, consisting of a group of countries united around a set of key liberal norms and institutions that generate “dependable expectations” of peaceful resolution of conflicts that might arise among them.1 From that perspective, NATO is an institution that was created in the context of the Cold War to protect the pre-existing security community from the threats posed by the West’s dangerous other: the communist bloc. Yet, as a series of constructivist scholars have persuasively argued, there is nothing natural about the Western security community.2 In Emanuel Adler’s words, “security communities are socially constructed and rest on shared practical knowledge of the peaceful resolution of conflicts.”3 Furthermore, the absence of violence should not lead us to conclude that the construction of security communities in general and the Western community in particular were power-free processes. On the contrary, as Adler and Barnett explain, central to the establishment of a security community is the dialectic between power—primarily symbolic power—and knowledge.4 Thus, in the physically non-violent context of security communities, power is primarily “the authority to determine the shared meanings that embody the identities, interests and practices of states, as well as the conditions that confer, defer or deny access to goods and benefits.”5 Applying this logic to the specific case of NATO, we can see the alliance not as the institutional expression of a pre-given community, but, rather, as an organization that has been deeply involved in power-filled practices of construction and reproduction of that community.6 Historical evidence indicates that the founders of NATO—policymaking elites from the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, France, and the Benelux states—did not take the Western security community for granted. Instead, they engaged in a systematic set of practices aimed at constructing a sense of community around a shared set of liberal-democratic norms in the Euro-Atlantic area, and placed the newly created North Atlantic Treaty Organization at the heart of those practices. In the intergovernmental debates leading up to the establishment of NATO, the threat of military confrontation with the Soviet Union was regarded as less worrisome than the danger of communist subversion within the weakened societies of Western European states.7 In that context, as Louis St. Laurent—then Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs—argued, the best way to prevent a third world war was by confronting “the forces of communist expansion with an overwhelming preponderance of moral, economic and military force on the side of freedom.”8 At the level of top Western political elites, the fear of communism inspired a collective (re)definition of political identity in the Euro-Atlantic area. The “spectre of Communism” provided the defining other against which decision-makers on both sides of the Atlantic were able to subordinate their differences to a collective definition of a Western community. That community was seen as based on the common heritage of political and cultural ideas of member states; its defining mark was the set of shared values of individual liberal freedoms, the rule of law, and democracy.9 This view is clearly reflected in the preamble to the Washington Treaty (NATO’s foundational treaty), which stipulates that the alliance is based on principles of democracy, individual liberty, and law. Contrary to what conventional (realist) wisdom suggests, NATO was not simply set up as the hegemonic instrument of the US. On the contrary, political actors from other states—most notably Canada—played key roles in driving the process of establishing NATO and defining its key foundational principles.10 In fact, one of the key articles in the Washington Treaty is informally known as the “Canadian” article, precisely in recognition of the influential role played by Canadian policymakers in its formulation.11 Article 2 clearly shows that NATO was expected to play a role that went far beyond that of a conventional military alliance. That article succinctly summarizes the precepts of the Kantian-inspired democratic peace theory, as it stipulates: “The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being.” To decision-makers locked in a competition with forces regarded as representing communist otherness, it was imperative that countries of Western Europe, Canada, and the US cultivate a sense of shared liberal-democratic identity—set in opposition to communism—among their peoples. In that context, they sought to articulate a narrative of Western unity, and disseminate it as widely as possible in the countries of the Atlantic Alliance. As Erik Ringmar has argued, identities are constructed, maintained, and transformed via the telling of “constitutive” narratives.12 Narratives provide a set of meanings within which an actor’s identity, the situation within which they are located and the actions deemed appropriate are brought together.13 The process of telling constitutive narratives is especially important during periods of fundamental transformation, when new identities are being formed and old ones are being pressured to evolve.14 In the eyes of Western leaders, the narrative of unity among NATO members had to not only cultivate a sense of shared identity, but also to delegitimize—by casting them as inconsistent with Western identity—communist forces that were becoming increasingly powerful in many allied states. Once again, some of the most influential voices in favour of disseminating a narrative of Western unity and using that to legitimize community-building practices within NATO were its middle powers—particularly Canada. For instance, the Canadian Foreign Minister, Lester Pearson, repeatedly argued in the early 1950s that NATO’s long-term goal had to be the creation of a community of free nations in the Atlantic area. More broadly, Canadian officials, together with NATO supporters from Norway, the Netherlands, Denmark, and the UK, were acutely aware of the fact that, in order for the alliance to be able to help build “a community of free nations” united around liberal values, it had to find a way to help publics from allied states transcend recent memories of war among Western states. What was required, in other words, was a collective reinterpretation—and a selective forgetting—of the recent past.15 After all, the newly identified enemy, communist Soviet Union, had emerged from the war as a hero in the eyes of many in the West. The view of the “West as one” became central to a collective (re)reading of Western history following the establishment of the alliance.16 Collective efforts at history (re)writing found expression not only within the public discourse articulated by NATO, but also in confidential documents. Recently declassified documents from the 1950s reveal a set of shared understandings among NATO’s decision-makers regarding the way in which the history of member states should be interpreted in order to foster a sense of Western community. In addition, NATO mobilized its substantial material and symbolic power to widely disseminate the discourse on Western unity in all the allied states and, simultaneously, to delegitimize alternative readings of history—especially those that focused on ideas of solidarity—and memories of friendship—with the Soviet Union.17 In particular, as Patrick Jackson has demonstrated, the discourse of Western civilization played a key role in orchestrating the collective (re)reading of Germany as a member of the Western community, and on this basis legitimating its incorporation into NATO. This is not to suggest that the West was an essential entity that objectively determined a field of outcomes. Rather, “Western civilization” needs to be understood as “rhetorical commonplace,” used by allied policymakers as a discursive resource for de-legitimating policy options opposed to Germany’s incorporation into American-led institutions.18 In the official NATO discourse, Germany was interpreted as a member of the Western family that, under the Nazi regime, had temporarily deviated from its core values. Following the end of that regime, however, (West) Germany—acting under the close supervision of allied states—could and should be reintegrated into the Euro-Atlantic community. Against the background of the constitutive discourse on Western unity, disagreements and tensions that continued to occur among member states could be represented as “family” feuds, and managed within the framework of shared norms and a persisting sense of community. A full analysis of inter-allied disagreements during the Cold War is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is worthwhile to briefly examine what could be seen as one of the most significant set of disagreements within NATO: arguments concerning the accession to the alliance of states that did not comply with the liberal-democratic norms and values around which the Western community defined itself. Particularly interesting were arguments over the inclusion of Portugal in 1949, as well as the accession of Greece and especially Turkey (completed in 1952). In that context, middle powers like Canada and Norway emerged as strong proponents of the view that countries which did not respect basic liberal-democratic values did not belong—and should not be included—in the alliance which represented the Western community.19 In the end, however, all the allies were persuaded to support the inclusion of those “problem” countries. Several factors were crucial to the emergence of that consensus: a shared recognition among the allies of the geostrategic importance of those countries in the context of growing confrontation with the Soviet Union, and a sense that, in that particular context, the inclusion of strategically vital but normatively deviant states was an acceptable compromise in the name of protecting the community of liberal values. The prevailing view came to be that the integration of states like Portugal and Turkey could be managed in a way that would not necessarily endanger the core values of the West. Furthermore, inclusion into the Western community was seen by some allied policymakers as a course of action that could help those countries evolve into stable liberal democracies. It is revealing, in fact, that a normative compromise that was eventually seen as reasonable in the cases of Portugal and Turkey was regarded as inappropriate in the case of a country whose political regime was perceived as an active threat to liberal-democratic values: Franco’s Spain.20 As Mark Smith put it, “Turkey could be accommodated, and Portugal’s dictatorship had less Fascistic origins than Spain’s. Significantly, neither had a history of active antagonism toward Western European liberalism. Admitting Franco would be admitting a regime of the very sort that had overturned European democracy in the 1930s and 1940s, and as such was wholly unacceptable.”21 The “triumph” of the West and the spread of the liberal security community in the early post-Cold War period The end of the Cold War was accompanied by a sense of triumph by the West over its defining other, and, as a corollary to this, a shared view among allied decision-makers that a new security environment was emerging in Europe. In a context marked by the breakdown of the Soviet bloc and the eruption of violence linked to ethnic conflict and the breakdown of states (most notably in the former Yugoslavia), there was a shift away from definitions of security focused on military power, and toward a heavy emphasis on “good governance” within states. In essence, security came to be associated with the liberal-democratic norms and institutions; negatively, risks came to be seen as emerging from the absence of liberal-democratic structures.22 In a situation in which there was no clearly identified enemy state, but in which developments within the transient former communist countries threatened to undermine international security, a consensus emerged that the promotion of “good” liberal-democratic norms and institutions within those states would be vital for European and international security in the new era. In that context, the project of disseminating liberal-democratic norms into the former Eastern bloc also became central to NATO efforts to redefine its mission—and thus demonstrate its continued relevance in the new era.23 In essence, NATO became deeply involved in reconstituting Central and Eastern European polities through systematic practices of socializing military and political elites as well as next generations of leaders into liberal-democratic norms and institutions.24 In other words, the alliance engaged in performing its liberal-democratic narrative via practices of disseminating liberal-democratic dispositions and institutions of “self-restraint” into the former communist bloc.25 The idea was to provide the Central/East European political and military elites with Western, liberal-democratic scripts for rebuilding their societies, and to turn those elites into “responsible,” self-disciplined actors, who would take Western-prescribed liberal-democratic norms for granted.26 Special emphasis was placed on socialising Central/Eastern Europeans into Western-defined norms in the area of security, including norms governing the relationships among different branches of the state involved in the formulation and implementation of defence policies, and the relationship between the state and civil society.27 NATO’s ability to provide authoritative definitions of the legitimate meaning of liberal-democratic identity, and more specifically, guidance on how to correctly enact norms of security provision that corresponded to that definition, was a reflection of the substantial symbolic power exercised by NATO vis-a-vis the pro-West elites of Central and Eastern Europe.28 That power was grounded in the latter’s recognition of NATO not just as a military alliance but as a key institution of the Western community with which Central/Eastern European reformers identified.29

#### In-depth meta-analysis of NATO’s public and official discourse show a distinct securitization of Russian disinformation.

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Our analysis has shown that NATO has developed two disinformation-related communication strategies for two outlets: a more up-to-date and faster-developing threat discourse for its Twitter presence, and a more traditional, slow-moving threat presence visible in its official documents. This is particularly interesting and acutely visible in more 20th century military topics like command and control cohesion, missile defense, air defense architecture, naval defense, satellites and military intelligence-related topics that are more frequently mentioned in official documents, and much less referenced on Twitter. However, the overwhelming majority of disinformation, misinformation, hybrid war, information warfare and fake news-related communication topics are securitized on Twitter. This shows the emergence of two NATO discourses: one for its official documents, and one for its social media presence and messaging. The advent of digital communication technologies and social media has been significant for the evolution of securitization. Since securitization entails production and dissemination of insecurity frames through discursive networks, a more dynamic, interconnected information ecosystem is more conducive for collective meaning-making. On social media, the formation of insecurity processes are more rapid and interactive, and are able to influence and alter traditional, boring securitizing acts of elites. To that end, media outlets like Twitter provide a more interactive and fast-paced securitizing environment where elites and non-elites can set the security agenda and mobilize masses. The most clear expression of this novel medium, as demonstrated in our results, is that NATO’s Twitter securitization efforts change much faster, and spread more widely than traditional outlets like official speeches, texts and reports. This could be interpreted in two ways: first, that NATO may prefer securitizing disinformation exclusively on Twitter, since such threats are generally more visible and debated on social media platforms. The second interpretation is that NATO’s official statements and documents could largely be focusing on macrolevel doctrinal issues that pose a direct military security threat to its members, rather than disinformation, which is a nuisance, but poses no direct military threat. Since disinformation is being discussed in contemporary policy debates within the context of electoral integrity and social polarization, their actual military relevance may be less relevant to be taken into account in formal NATO documents. In either case, our study of the NATO lexicon demonstrated that disinformation and related terms are constructed as uniquely ‘Russian’ nuisances. This isn’t surprising since most of these terms - at least their digital interpretations - have entered the NATO lexicon after the Russian military involvement in eastern Ukraine and Crimea. However, since then, Russia remained the only country against which NATO has constructed its disinformation narratives, indicating that Russia is NATO’s sole disinformation concern. Although very recently China has emerged as a runner-up country within the context of COVID-related disinformation concerns, Russia is largely the main threat in NATO’s lexicon. This could be counterproductive to long-term NATO efforts to combat disinformation, given the global prevalence of fake news and information meddling. While Russian disinformation efforts are observably valid, cornering a universal problem like disinformation into the limited space of NATO’s interactions with a single country may lead to conceptual contraction. This in turn, may prevent NATO from mobilizing full alliance resources against disinformation, defined as a global and universal problem.

#### Here's that study.

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In order to explore how NATO has securitized disinformation in recent years, we have scraped 238,452 tweets from NATO and official affiliated accounts from January 2014 to February 2021 and extracted more than 2000 speeches, press releases, reviews, official texts, archival documents and publications from the NATO e-library (?). Out of this sample, we have extracted documents and content that contained the keywords ‘disinformation’, ‘misinformation’, ‘fake news’, ‘propaganda’, ‘hybrid warfare’ and ‘information warfare’, and logged the number of their occurrences within these texts by date. Since this study doesn’t focus on the semantic differences between these keywords and consider them as different references to disinformation as a discursive strategy, we code and merge them singularly as variable ‘disinfo’. Our preliminary analysis shows that NATO has used these keywords most frequently in tweets, followed by speeches, reviews and publications. However, when analyzed proportionally, NATO publications focus on disinformation most frequently (75% of all documents), followed by tweets (40%), reviews (36.97%) and official texts (21.05%). In this study, we employ structural topic modeling (STM) - a text analysis approach that finds ‘topics’ in an unstructured corpus based on covariate information (Roberts et al., 2019). It follows a statistical logic that measures co-occurrence likelihoods of keywords and terms that are more likely to appear with each other and derives topical meanings out of those likelihoods. Topic modeling is increasingly used in the study of large volumes of text in social sciences such as large archival documents, or social media text datasets by producing “each word on the basis of some number of preceding words or word classes,” and “generate[ing] words based on latent topic variables inferred from word correlations independent of the order in which the words appear” (Wallach, 2006). In recent years topic modeling has become a widely-used method to study large Twitter datasets, and political discussions that happen on other social media platforms (Giles, 2012; Hong, Davison, 2010; Liang, Fu, 2015).

#### NATO forms its alliances by securitizing for its own selfish protection—results in the threat generation and allying with powerful states

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Many scholars would probably state that much has changed since the early 1990s. Eastern enlargement has made NATO’s membership and strategic discourse more diverse, disputes over the Iraq war in 2003 were regarded as the most serious crisis in NATO’s history and the conflict in Ukraine and the progress of ISIS in Syria and Iraq symbolise the sorts of challenge the Alliance will have to face in years to come. Statements that NATO is in crisis, the ‘alliance crisis syndrome’ as Thiess (2009: 2) has aptly named it, are nothing new but do direct our attention to more substantial questions: what is NATO (for) – and why has it endured for so long despite its history of crisis? ST’s examination of NATO’s past provides some helpful insights in these regards. In a strictly positivist sense, ST does not explain the foundation, transformation and/or continuity of the Alliance where norms, interests or common threat assessments might be described as the major causes of cooperation. What STdoes, however, is provide a conceptual toolbox for describing causal mechanisms (Guzzini 2011) – what happens, in other words, when actors speak security and move political questions on (re-securitisation) and off (de-securitisation) the security agenda. It shows the specific regional patterns of de-/securitization in the transatlantic regional security complex with its unique and overlapping institutions (NATO, EU, OSCE). Thus, ST might be a critical resource for (neo)realist accounts of NATO. Alliance formation, as Walt (1985: 4) has **prominently argued, can be regarded ‘as a response to threats’, either in terms of balancing the source of danger or allying with the most powerful state**. As simple as this argument may sound, it leaves open the question of who poses a danger to whom, and how and why insecurities might change over time. ST is able to give an empirically grounded answer to these questions. Accordingly, a comparative study on patterns of securitisation/de-securitisation across time and institutions would be highly valuable in order to understand how different NATO is. Threats and insecurities have not ceased to exist even if North America and Europe are zones of peace(ful change) among states. The main puzzle, then, is not the continuity of the Alliance after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, but rather its ability to invoke and often hegemonise what security means while consolidating non-violent relations internally. Addressing NATO’s future, ST also suggests some conclusions. Although reliable predictions are always difficult and risky (as neo-realist claims of NATO survival show),13 it is possible to argue that the Alliance will endure as long as actors (member states as well as NATO officials) succeed in articulating insecurities of different kinds and thus legitimise NATO as the central institution where these problems are negotiated and dealt with. The example of NATO’s post–Cold War re-orientation through its 1991 Strategic Concept and subsequent strategic discourse illustrates how the Alliance has navigated this challenge. At the Cold War’s end, the Alliance seemingly confronted a situation of de-securitisation as its erstwhile Soviet adversary disappeared from the stage. Indeed, de-securitisation was the premise of policy as NATO embraced former Warsaw Pact states through enlargement and embarked upon a structured partnership with Russia. But in parallel**, NATO securitised other issues by widening its remit of responsibility, an act given authoritative expression in the Strategic Concept and then extended in successor documents in 1999 and 2010**. These strategic articulations were manifest in a wholesale shift of mission evidenced most obviously in interventions in the Balkans in the 1990s, as well as later in Afghanistan and Libya. **The culmination of this process is the re-securitisation of Russia which has occurred as a consequence of the crisis in Ukraine**. As for the question what is NATO (for), an answer here is more complicated and might contradict assumptions that the Alliance has retained its relevance through securitising (or, indeed, de-securitising and re-securitising) specific threats. NATO has been more than a military alliance from its very beginning, symbolising a special bond between Europe and North America. Continuous articulations of threat assessments make NATO members work and even fight together but they are not the foundation of the Alliance as such: it is, rather, the invocation of a community of like-minded states (and societies) which share something important (democracy, human rights and a market economy) in common and deemed worthy of protection. Thus, Thomas Risse-Kappen (1996: 4) has argued that the Alliance is not based primarily on common interests and threat perceptions, but on a collective democratic identity symbolising an ‘alliance of democracies’. His claim is persuasive but it needs qualifying (Sjursen 2004). Since the foundation of NATO, its members have invoked the Alliance as the cornerstone of Western security cooperation based on common symbolic values. Whenever these values have been endangered, the allies have been able to mobilise and legitimise new policies in order to (re-) affirm NATO’s unity, including a lasting institutional structure of political and military cooperation, coordination and even integration. It is the capacity of the members to articulate the values they stand for as universal and the alliance they form as legitimised to defend them at home and, if necessary, to realise them abroad, which attaches true value to NATO. In other words, the presumed ‘democratic identity’ of each member and of NATO itself cannot be taken for granted but is the performative effect of a shared security discourse which changes its content over time. As Behnke (2013: 1) has argued ‘the continued existence and political relevance of the Alliance rests on its ability to repro-duce “the West” as a geo-cultural space that serves as its security referent object’. Processes of securitisation and de-securitisation are the symbolic, yet powerful expression of this community.

### 2NC---Prolif

### General

#### The Aff’s prolif impact constructs the world in imperialist terms – Western analysts obsess over the danger that nations in East Asia and the Global South pose to global security while owning triple the nuclear weapons. This double standard condemns the global South to constant violent intervention

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David Mutimer (1997) has argued that the use of the metaphor 'proliferation' carries certain entailments. That is to say, it structures our understanding and handling of the problem. In particular, he refers to the "image of a spread outward from a point or source", and the "technological bias" introduced in the discourse (Mutimer 1997:201-2). As concerns the first point, 'proliferation' presupposes a center at which WMD are to be held and controlled, and from which these weapons disseminate into the body of the international society. To the extent that this process gets out of the center's control, certain measures have to be taken to 'suffocate', limit, or curb the 'spread' of these weapons. As concerns the second point, Mutimer (1997:203) points out the peculiar agency implied in the concept: "Notice that the weapons themselves spread; they are not spread by an external agent of some form - say, a human being or political institution". The fact that a large number of these weapons were actually 'spread' by Western states is consequently hidden through this discursive structure. These points are also relevant for the Mediterranean Initiative. We can add a third entailment to the list which appears through a critical reading of the NATO/RAND narrative. As the RAND authors (1998:15) observe, "The mere existence of ballistic missile technology with ranges in excess of 1,000 km on world markets and available to proliferators around the Mediterranean basin would not necessarily pose serious strategic dilemmas for Europe."

In fact, we might even agree with the neorealist proposition that 'more might be better', above all in terms of nuclear weapons. This is certainly the preferred solution of John Mearsheimer (1990) for the stabilization of European political order after the end of the cold war. After all, conventional wisdom has it that nuclear weapons and the threat of mutually assured destruction preserved stability and peace during the Cold War. The RAND authors, however, fail to grasp the irony in their identification of WMD proliferation, which ends up denying this central tenet of cold war strategy. According to them, "the WMD and ballistic missile threat will acquire more serious dimensions where it is coupled with a proliferator's revolutionary orientation. Today, this is the case with regard to Iran, Iraq, Libya, and arguably Syria" (RAND, 1998:16).

What preserved the peace during the cold war -- mutual deterrence -- is now re-written as a strategic problem:

As a result of proliferation trends, Europe will be increasingly exposed to the retaliatory consequences of U.S. and European actions around the Middle East and the Mediterranean basin, including the Balkans. ... As a political threat and a weapon of terror capable of influencing the NATO decisionmaking during a crisis, their significance [of conventionally armed ballistic missiles] could be considerable (RAND, 1998:16).

Two implications of these arguments deserve elaboration. First, there is the reversal of the traditional relationship between WMD and rationality. For what makes the presence of WMD in the South so worrisome is the absence of the requirements of reason and rationality. Within NATO's discourse on the South, 'revolutionary orientation' accounts for the undesirability of distributing these weapons to such unfit hands. In order to qualify for their possession, reason and rationality must be present -- as they are obviously assumed to be in the West. The discourse of proliferation consequently produces a third entailment by constructing the relationship between West and South in 'orientalist' terms. In this rendition, the South becomes the quintessential antithesis of the West, the site of irrationality, passion, and terror (Said, 1995). Within this site, different rules apply, which are not necessarily subject to Western ideals of enlightened reason. 'Proliferation' articulates a hierarchical structure in global politics, with the West as the privileged site of from which to surveil, control, and engage the rest of the world.

This privilege is further dramatized in the above complaint about the possibility of retaliation. For the South to achieve the possibility of influencing NATO decisionmaking is to violate the epistemic sovereignty of the West. 'U.S. and European actions' and interventions have to be unrestrained in order to constitute proper crisis management. NATO demands a docile subjectivity and accessible territory from the South, the latter's identity cannot be ascertained against the West. Its arms have to be surrendered, its retaliatory capabilities to be revoked.

'Information' is the third mode besides 'Securitization' and 'Proliferation' within which we can discern the subjugation of the South to the strategic Western gaze. A central purpose of the Mediterranean Initiative/Dialogue is to improve 'mutual understanding' and to 'dispel some of the misperceptions and apprehensions that exist, on both sides of the Mediterranean' (Solana, 1997a:5). And both the RAND Corporation and NATO put some emphasis on public information and perception. Yet the structure of this relationship proves to be unbalanced and virtually unilateral. As mentioned above, for NATO, the prime task is above all the "further refinement of its definition of security" (de Santis, 1998). The general identity of the South as a site of danger and insecurity is consequently never in question. Western perceptions are never problematized. Knowledge of the South is, it appears, a matter of matching more and better information with proper conceptual tools. On the other hand, (mis)perceptions take the place of knowledge in the South. NATO is perceived widely as a Cold War institution searching for a new enemy. That is why the best course to change the perception of NATO in these countries is to focus more on "soft" security, building mutual understanding and confidence before engaging in "hard" military cooperation. Measures should be developed with the aim of promoting transparency and defusing threat perceptions, and promoting a better understanding of NATO's policies and objectives (de Santis, 1998:34). To interpret political misgivings about NATO and its post-cold war diplomacy as 'misperceptions' which can be put straight by "educat[ing] opinion-makers in the dialogue-countries"(RAND, 1998:75) tends to naturalize and objectify the Western rendition of NATO's identity. The possibility that from the perspective of the 'Southern' countries NATO's political and strategic design might look quite different is lost in this narrative. NATO's identity is decontextualized and objectified, the productive role of different cultural and strategic settings in the establishment of identities and formulation of interests denied. To maintain such a lofty position becomes more difficult if we let the Mediterranean participants voice their concerns openly. Far from being 'misperceptions and misunderstandings', these countries' less than enthusiastic attitudes towards NATO are based on, for instance, the establishment of powerful Western military intervention capabilities off their beaches. Also, NATO's attempts to institutionalize a military cooperation is interpreted as an attempt to gain a strategic foothold in the region in order to monitor the flow of missile technology and the possession of WMD (Selim 1998:12-14). In other words, we encounter rather rational and reasonable security political and strategic concerns. The fact that NATO is unwilling or unable to acknowledge their concerns once again demonstrates the 'imperial' nature of the purported dialogue. Conclusion: The Imperial Encounter In her exploration of Western representations of the South, Roxanne Doty (1996:3) describes the relationship between these two subjectivities as an "imperial encounter" which is meant "to convey the idea of asymmetrical encounters in which one entity has been able to construct 'realities' that were taken seriously and acted upon and the other entity has been denied equal degrees or kinds of agency". Her focus is on an aspect of power which has received increasing treatment within critical International Relations (IR) theory during the last years, that is, the power to define and articulate identities and to determine the relations between them. As was argued above, the Western invention of the South during the cold war can be interpreted as an imperial gesture. The South was rendered into a West-in-the-making, with its own distinguished historical, cultural, and social features reduced to indicators of 'underdevelopment'. Ultimately, the narrative proclaimed, the South would become part of the Western 'Empire', the latter would be able to expand into 'barbaric' areas of the world -- provided it could win the war against Communism. The end of the cold war saw this 'expansionist' logic give way to a exclusive posture. The relations between the West and the South are no longer mediated through time. Instead, a spatial differentiation now structures the imperial encounter, the South is no longer to be 'developed' and 'Westernized'. It is to be surveilled, controlled and disciplined, its 'spillage' of crisis and instability to be contained. NATO's Mediterranean Initiative is a cornerstone in this new rendition. For while we so far cannot observe any direct military intervention by the Alliance in the Mediterranean region, NATO's discourse on the South in general, and the Initiative in particular render it accessible and available for such action. Strategic knowledge is produced as an expression of, and in anticipation of, strategic power. The 'self-determination' of NATO as a continuously capable and competent military agent is effected through a discourse that inscribes a particular, securitizing, strategic order upon the South, positing it as a site of danger, irrationality and insecurity against the West. In this context it is interesting to observe the exclusion of states from the Mediterranean Initiative that are not considered to be 'moderate, Western-looking [and] constructivist' (RAND 1998:57). This differentiation between insiders and outsiders appears to be based on the degree to which the respective countries are willing to subject themselves to the imperial encounter with the West, and to open themselves to the strategic gaze and control of NATO. The imperial encounter is then made possible and supported by what one may call the Emperor's two bodies. On one hand, the West appears as a cultural identity among others, located in space (North of the Mediterranean) and time (in the post-cold war era). In this sense, the West is the entity that needs to be protected from the dangers and threats which 'spill over' from the South through adequate strategic means. On the other hand, the West is presented as a 'site of knowledge', as the source or author of the proper and objective 'world-picture' that depicts the realities of post-cold war global politics. In this sense, the West becomes the metaphysical grounds from which knowledge can be gathered and disseminated. And in its different versions -- securitization, proliferation, and information -- this knowledge draws on and reproduces this metaphysics. There are consequently reasons to be skeptical about NATO's ability to conduct a 'dialogue' with an other it is unwilling to listen to.

### Realism/Neo-Realism

#### The AFF’s realist understanding of nuclear proliferation and deterrence relies on a Cold War Era use of ‘rationality’ that otherizes non-Western states as ‘irrational’, putting the ‘West’ on a pedestal that is isolated from the realness of conflict

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The traditional neo-realist security paradigm perceives nuclear weapons as either “deterrents against overwhelming conventional military threats or as coercive tools to compel changes in the status quo,” (Sagan 1997, p. 57). Realist and neo-realist nuclear perspectives were underpinned by the MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) doctrine – wherein state actors maximise their security by behaving ‘rationally’, given the anarchic nature of the world (Seliktar 2011, p. 190). For neorealists, the end of the ‘Cold War’ marked the end of the bipolar distribution of power that was considered to be more stable than the introduction of the post-Cold War multipolar arrangement of power. This resulted in the acceleration of nuclear proliferation (Chafetz 1993, p. 127). Anxiety over proliferation persisted after the Cold War due to the fact that those considered ‘rogue states’ were among those hoping to join the ‘nuclear club’, thus igniting serious debate on ‘rationality’ (Seliktar 2011, p. 191). Promoters of ‘planned’ or ‘managed’ proliferation such as Waltz see the proliferation of nuclear weapons as both inevitable and not a cause for alarm, given the overwhelming power of nuclear deterrence; “the ability of a state, not to defend itself, but to threaten an adversary with unacceptable damage if attacked,” (Gavin 2012, p. 574). Many neorealist political scientists, including Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, William Riker, and John Mearsheimer have promoted the ‘managed’ or ‘planned’ proliferation argument, advocating for the spread of nuclear weapons into key areas, such as Ukraine and Germany, where non-nuclear states face nuclear armed enemies, based on the belief that “the chance of bilateral conflict becoming nuclear decreases to zero when all nations are nuclear armed,” (Sagan 1994, p. 66). The basis for the neorealists’ confidence in deterrence is the ‘long peace’ maintained between the United States and the Soviet Union during the ‘Cold War’ (Sagan 1994, p. 66). However, even supporters of ‘managed’ or ‘planned’ proliferation in the neorealist school do not agree with uncontrolled nuclear proliferation (Frankel 1993, p. 39). In the debate surrounding deterrence and its applicability to ‘rogue states’, Mearsheimer stated that the “logic of controlled proliferation might not extend to Third World dictatorships,” (Seliktar 2011, p. 192).

For realists, IR theory is based on great power politics (Barkawi & Laffey 2006, p. 331). Neorealist and realist perspectives on nuclear proliferation are based on ‘rationality’ constructed via Western dominated narratives of World War II and the ‘Cold War’ (Biswas, forthcoming 2012; Frankel 1993, p. 40). The Eurocentric IR paradigm regards the weak and powerless as “marginal or derivative elements of world politics,” (Barkawi & Laffey 2006, p. 332). Rationality and objectivity are firmly attributed to ‘great powers’ as demonstrated by the scholarly analysis of the ‘Cuban Missile Crisis’. Cubans were depicted as politicised, whereas Americans and Soviets were characterised as apolitical (Barkawi & Laffey 2006, p. 338). Agency rests on the ‘great powers’, while the security interests and actions of ‘weak’ states in the ‘Global South’, such as Cuba, are conveniently ignored or disregarded (Barkawi & Laffey 2006, p. 329; Biswas, forthcoming 2012). The one-sided and Eurocentric logic of ‘planned’ proliferation, which promotes horizontal proliferation to those states that neorealists deem ‘rational’ and ‘objective’ is merely a reproduction of the superpower-based ‘Cold War’ era thinking. These ideologies disregarded the agency of the ‘weak’ and ‘powerless’, and the importance of the Global South or ‘Third World’ in affecting international affairs, and arbitrarily assigned rationality and objectivity to the great powers.

While the end the ‘Cold War’ transformed and ameliorated much of the security concerns of Europe and the West, it did little to resolve the widespread feelings of insecurity elsewhere in the world (Biswas, forthcoming 2012; Singh 1998, p. 41). The ‘Cold War’ in many nonWestern parts of the world, including Vietnam, Korea, Afghanistan, and the many other states that served as proxies for superpower rivalry, were in fact very real and very ‘hot’ (Biswas, forthcoming 2012). The deterrence logic that serves as the fundamental basis for neorealist proliferation theory has been derived from the postwar period of bipolarity (Frankel 1993, p. 40). Through the myopic lenses of neorealist proliferation theory, no consideration is given to ‘vertical proliferation’ of the great powers, specifically in the United States and Russia. Such proliferation is not viewed as a problem, nor is the possibility of a global convention abolishing nuclear weapons, as proposed by various nonaligned nations, especially India, been discussed as a practical solution to the security dilemma that nuclear weapons pose (Gusterson 1999, p. 114). The ‘managed’ proliferation solution that many neorealists ascribe to is nonetheless racialised and Eurocentric. Waltz suggests that in a new multipolar world, Germany, Japan, and possibly Italy should be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons (Seliktar 2011, p. 192). ‘Planned’ or ‘managed’ proliferation is simply a convenient euphemism for deciding which state should receive approval to acquire nuclear weapons based on an arbitrary, Eurocentric, and subjective assessment of rationality. The neorealist perspective merely serves to perpetuate an already flawed and unequal system, continuing to put the ‘West’ or the ‘North’ on some type of intellectual pedestal that affirms its own image of rationality and objectivity, thereby denying any meaningful agency or possibility of equality for all states in the world.

### Liberalism

#### Liberal uses of nuclear deterrence are an effort to otherize non-western regions – the west uses ‘liberalism’ and ‘freedom’ as a cover of for asserting their superiority over the ‘south’

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Unlike neorealists, liberals do not entirely disregard the existence of ‘weak’ states, but they are merely of interest, “primarily as bearers of rights and objects of emancipation…for their normative value in Western political theoretic terms,” (Barkawi & Laffey 2006, p. 333). Whereas “realist approaches to security studies are Eurocentric in that they locate agency and history with the great powers,” liberal approaches are equally Eurocentric, in addition to defining the West “in ethical and progressive terms,” (Barkawi & Laffey 2006, p. 340). In the Western imagination, discourse on nuclear proliferation is deeply entrenched in relation to the Third World, dividing the world into states that can be trusted with nuclear weapons and those that cannot (Gusterson 1999, p. 113). Liberals and conservatives alike hold the following orthodox belief: “the proliferation of nuclear weapons to nuclear-threshold states in the Third World, especially the Islamic world, would be enormously dangerous,” (Gusterson 1999, p. 112). Nuclear apartheid is justified in the liberal mindset, since western democracies have the moral imperative and ethical superiority to impose their will for the good of the ‘other’.

Edward Said asserts that Orientalist discourse demarcates the world in a binary opposition that presents the ‘Orient’ as the mirror image of the West, “where ‘we’ are rational and disciplined; ‘they are impulsive and emotional; where ‘we’ are modern and flexible, ‘they’ are slaves to ancient passions and routines; where ‘we’ are honest and compassionate, ‘they’ are treacherous and uncultivated,” (Gusterson 1999, p. 114). This Orientalist process has an effect of creating an immense sense of ‘Otherness’ separating the Third World from liberal Western democracies, thereby rationalising and internalising a sense of liberal ‘superiority’ (Gusterson 1999, p. 114). Empirically, this construct of ethical superiority in the liberal West requires Orwellian self-delusion. As purported by Barkawi & Laffey (2006, p. 341), the Holocaust presents a challenge to the liberal faith in the “Western myths of progress and ethical superiority.” To maintain the Western belief in liberal superiority, the “sins of Western civilisation” are displaced “onto an intrusive non-European Other…Germany, that quintessentially Western society, somehow becomes not Western,” (Barkawi & Laffey 2006, p. 341). Furthermore, the brutal and barbaric slaughter and loss of life amongst ‘natives’ was a normative feature of European colonisation and expansion into the non-European world (Barkawi & Laffey 2006, p. 343). As observed by Sven Lindqvist, “the Holocaust was unique – in Europe. But the history of Western expansion in other parts of the world shows many examples of total extermination of whole peoples,” (Barkwai & Laffey 2006, p. 343).

Liberal ideology legitimates domination over the Global South. This can be observed via liberal Western discourse on nuclear proliferation as it “legitimates the nuclear monopoly of the recognised nuclear powers,” (Gusterson 1999, p. 115). Much like neorealism, rationality and objectivity is arbitrarily assigned to the West, while the Global South or ‘Third World’ is considered to be subjective, irrational, or even ‘rogue’ and therefore incapable of the responsibility of a nuclear arsenal. The inherent Eurocentricism in liberal ideology directly results in a “taken-for-granted politics that sides with the rulers, with the powerful, with the imperialists, and not with the downtrodden, the weak, the colonised, or the post-colonised,” (Barkawi & Laffey 2006, p. 344)

For example, Iran has been demonised by the United States since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, when citizens of the Islamic Republic laid siege to the US embassy compound in Tehran, and took fifty-two American hostages for 444 days (Zenko 2012). Their suspected nuclear weapons program and alleged sponsorship of terrorism have deemed them a ‘rogue state’ (BBC 2001; Munoz 2012). US President Obama issued a warning to Iran in a September 2012 speech to the UN General Assembly, stating unequivocally, “The United States will do what we must to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon…It would threaten the elimination of Israel, the security of Gulf nations and the stability of the global economy,” (ABC News 2012). North Korea, an NPT non-signatory and nuclear state is perceived to pursue “alien objectives which are normative anathema to the rest of the ‘civilised’ international system,” leading to the assumption that the North Korean state is acting fundamentally outside the norms of the global community, and is therefore clearly a “rogue state” (Smith 2000, p. 115). Nicholas Eberstadt wrote that, “the North Korean regime is the North Korean nuclear problem,” (Smith 2000, p. 118).

These Eurocentric and racist assumptions in liberal IR theory have led to obvious and problematic ‘double standards’ and inequities in the treatment of non-Western states, exacerbated by the existing Northern dominated nuclear non-proliferation regime. While Iran has suffered debilitating economic sanctions over suspicions of an unconfirmed clandestine nuclear weapons program, Israel, one of only four NPT non-signatories, and the sole state in the Middle East that actually possesses nuclear weapons, has remained free from any meaningful, significant, or even symbolic international oversight (Steinbach 2011, p. 34). Warren Kozak (2012) epitomises the unashamed and blatant Eurocentricism of the liberal Western perspective on the issue of nuclear proliferation:

“Few people lost a wink of sleep over the American nuclear monopoly in the 1940s and when the Saudis or Syrians or Egyptians have turned off their lights over the past half-century, the last worry on their minds has been being blown to bits by an Israeli nuclear bomb…the sound mind understands that [Israel], the only stable democracy in the Middle East, is also one of its few rational actors.”

### 2NC---Russia/China

#### Securitization of Russia and China is a natural biproduct of American geopolitical culture---the inherent desire for power recreates the security dilemmas of the 1AC

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This article used a consistent set of primary sources, an explicit methodology, and both qualitative and quantitative data to account for the evolution of the current securitization process which portrays great power competition, in the form of Russia’s and China’s open challenge to America’s position in the international system, as an existential threat to America’s place in the international system. While at some level the specific elements of this new narrative – revisionism, the democracy-autocracy binary, and spheres of influence – are revivals of Cold War tropes, this analysis allowed for a better understanding of the broader issues involved in how this narrative shift reflects U.S. geopolitical culture, how it believes this challenge has occurred, and how it perceives America’s role in the changing international system. From these, the likely future of American grand strategy and geopolitical culture is coming into clearer focus. It is the open recognition that the geopolitical status quo is actually slipping, a situation which some IRT scholars have been saying for some time (Schweller and Pu 2011; Layne 2012; Mearsheimer 2019), which has precipitated this narrative shift. **This demonstrates exactly how closely tied U.S. self-identity and geopolitical culture are to the preservation of primacy, unipolarity, and the liberal-democratic world order. Should one or more of these conditions fully collapse, then we are likely to see a dramatic rupture in American geopolitical culture – with a difficult redefinition of its place in the world, a popular backlash, and unpredictable results**. Moreover, the quantitative data reveal that this narrative shift has had less to do with the growing capabilities of Russia/China than their ultimate goal to promote a new global architecture based upon multipolarity. The ability of Russia’s and China’s nuclear programs to end the physical existence of the U.S. has remained virtually the same since the end of the Cold War, and while these states have begun closing the military and technical gap between themselves and the U.S., this new geopolitical narrative more closely corresponds to a notable rise in references to their intentions, rather than capabilities. This is seen most clearly by the fact that Russia’s more overt challenge has resulted in it being singled out as the more significant threat over China, which, based upon raw current and future capabilities, is objectively a far larger danger. This raises important theoretical questions about threat perceptions and securitization processes which seemingly have more to do with perceptions about current and future aggressiveness than capabilities. This invites further study. Finally, LeGreco and Tracy (2009) noted that an equally important aspect of discourse/narrative tracing is to track what is not said. There was little acknowledgment from the American side that it had a substantive hand in precipitating these changes by either promoting a security dilemma between itself, on the one hand, and China/Russia, on the other, or that it has engaged in a grand strategy which has led to overextension and imperial decline. Therefore, according to this (self-)limited understanding on Washington’s part, there appears little that it can do to ameliorate the situation, and no course correction is seen as necessary except for confronting these states when their actions run contrary to U.S. interests. If the pattern leading up to the 2019 threat assessment is any indication, we are likely to see a closer alignment between this intensified threat narrative and a reinvigorated mission to preserve the status quo, without any self-awareness that this policy may be self-defeating. America appears to be firmly in the “’Try Harder!’” phase of strategic thinking, to use Legro’s (2005, 37) formulation. This is reflected in the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS), which appears to double down on the strategy of pursuing American primacy, even to the point of direct confrontation (Clarke and Ricketts 2017). By doing so, these officials are neither preparing American foreign policy nor its citizens for a revised geopolitical culture better suited to ensure a soft-landing of unipolarity. Consequently, it is likely that the United States “won’t see [the end] coming until it’s too late,” as Schweller (2011) speculated. Thus, a full accounting of why this broader structural change is occurring will likely elude American policymakers for the foreseeable future, leading to an even weaker United States and more fraught great power relations as the defining features of the international system and America’s place within it.

### 2NC---Security Cooperation

#### **The discourse of Western notions of security cooperation enables continued construction of identities that seeks to maintain power**

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How political relations among European and North American states have developed and how they have contributed to shaping global politics more broadly has been at the centre of IR debates for several decades. Taking issue with both realist and institutionalist scholarship on the origins and mechanisms of inter-state alliances, the literature on security communities (Adler and Barnett 1998) has highlighted the constructivist bedrock argument that political order can be conceived of only as the result of ongoing processes of social interaction. Hence, at least two reasons as to why the security community literature provides an instructive starting point come to mind. First, the security community approach originated as a perspective attempting to transcend the state-centric perspective of IR and, in particular, security studies. It thereby allows us, second, to conceive of ‘the West’ as a political space characterised by transnational processes of political association and integration. Political entities such as security communities are not perceived as just being ‘out there’, but are seen as the result of transformative processes such as the formation of collective identities through social learning. Hence, as we share these premises, choosing the security community literature as a foil to develop our own argument means to engage relatively close kin. We can thus not only deliberately refrain from restaging the arguments vis-a`-vis realist, liberal, and institutionalist accounts, we can also focus more specifically on the dynamics by means of which ‘the West’ is invoked, reproduced, and eventually transformed, for this is precisely where we beg to differ with the storyline conventionally presented by proponents of a security community approach. In a nutshell, we argue that the literature on security communities simply does not go far enough in stepping outside of the imaginative geographies characterized above.

The initial work on security communities that was conducted in the 1950s by Deutsch et al. (1957/1968) was driven by an interest in identifying the complex processes and mechanisms which enabled the permanent elimination of war between states, in particular in the ‘North Atlantic area’. They focused on ‘integration’ as a complex process by which security communities might come about. Most importantly they were interested in examining how a ‘sense of community’, central to their account of ‘integration’, could take shape in diverse and unique historical circumstances.

In discussing the issue of how one ought to distinguish between ‘integration’ and ‘non-integration’ Deutsch and his collaborators argued that the achievement of a security community would have to involve ‘something like the crossing of a threshold’. The problem was that [s]omewhat contrary to our expectation [y] some of our cases taught us that integration may involve a fairly broad zone of transition rather than a narrow threshold; that states may cross and recross this threshold or zone of transition several times in their relations with each other; and that they might spend decades or generations wavering uncertainly within it. (ibid.: 32–33)

Thus, not only did integration turn out to be a rather complex process involving at least a dozen ‘essential conditions’ (ibid.: 58), it was also evolving along unique historical trajectories in uneven ways. As a result, Deutsch and his colleagues concluded that a ‘sense of community’ should not be applied ‘as a matter of static agreement’ and that ‘more could be learned by viewing it as a matter of dynamic process’ (ibid.: 37).

This keen sense of the processual complexity and non-linearity of political integration got by and large lost in subsequent research on security communities in general and in research on the transatlantic security community in particular. Rather than taking Deutsch’s warning about the ‘uncertain wavering’ between integration and non-integration seriously, the research agenda on security communities was increasingly shaped by a premise ‘that community exists at the international level’ (Adler and Barnett 1998: 3, italics added). Moreover, rather than dwelling on the Deutschian twilight zone between integration and non-integration, Adler and Barnett suggested looking for various groups of states that seemed to have abandoned the use of force in their relations in order to determine whether they fit the definition of a pluralistic security community. In particular, researchers were advised to ‘look for communities where actors have shared identities, values, and meanings, many-sided relations, and long-term reciprocity’ (ibid.: 33). If these criteria were met, and the citizens of these states held ‘dependable expectations of peaceful change’, then we would have reason to speak of a security community.

Not only does such a perspective neglect Deutsch’s interest in open-ended transformative processes, it also embraces a strong methodological preference for detecting something, which is both theoretically proclaimed and normatively embraced. Researchers, then, may lose a thorough and systematic reconstruction of social dynamics and contingencies out of sight. Pointing to the 19th-century heritage of the term, Charles Tilly (1998: 397) offers a particularly clear-cut elaboration of the problem: A haze of Paradigm Lost still surrounds the word ‘community’ in popular parlance, the social sciences, philosophy, and history. Calling up idealized images of solidarity and coherent identity in compact settlements before the advent of today’s complexity, the term almost inevitably evokes a mixture of description, sentiment, and moral principle. Users of the term with respect to international relations are usually hoping to create or restore solidarity among nations. This volume [Adler and Barnett 1998], with its quest not merely to identify but also to promote security communities, manifests just such a hope.

Much like Tilly, we share the hope but remain troubled when it seems to impinge on the actual research process. In his work on the endurance of the transatlantic security community after 1990, Thomas Risse, for instance, similarly focused on postulating the existence of such a community as the key variable in explaining transatlantic cohesion. Instead of taking NATO as an institutional solution to deal with a multifaceted set of threats and risks (as realists would do), he argues that the alliance was the expression of an underlying community of shared values built on ‘mutual sympathy, trust, and consideration’ (Risse-Kappen 1996: 368). In this reading a ‘Western’ perception of a ‘Soviet threat’ certainly helped to foster a sense of common purpose within NATO, but according to Risse ‘it did not create the community in the first place’. Rather, ‘the collective identity led to the threat perception, not the other way around’ (Risse-Kappen 1995: 32). In this view the creation and persistence of the North Atlantic Alliance could be explained as the institutional expression of ‘the values and norms embedded in the political culture of liberal democracies’, which together constituted the ‘collective identity of a security community among democracies’ (Risse-Kappen 1996: 370; Schimmelfennig 1998: 213–4). As long as these values and norms are not seriously challenged by its members, ‘the West’ appears as an impressively stable security community in which conflicts are still resolved peacefully (Pouliot 2006; critically Cox 2005).

In contrast to Deutsch’s initial work, this type of research is not particularly interested in the complex processes that lead to the creation of security communities in the first place. Instead, it takes the existence of a transatlantic security community already for granted and appears to accept, at least implicitly, an essentialist conception of community. Once again, a ‘we-concept’ is taken to be based on a set of values and norms, which are always already there. To be sure, most scholarship on security communities acknowledges that security communities are constructed in social interaction. However, rather than focusing on such interactions and reconstructing the ensuing complex processes empirically, Deutsch’s successors often propose models with preestablished definitions of ‘conducive factors’ and ‘necessary conditions’ that supposedly foster the development or persistence of security communities. Adler and Barnett (1998: 37), for instance, concede that they do this in a ‘highly stylized manner’. Yet, they feel obliged to do so in order to overcome two drawbacks associated with Deutsch’s operationalization of security communities: (1) the concept was resistant to precise operationalization because it was fuzzy and ill-defined; and, (2) while Deutsch’s behavioral methodology was able to capture increased transboundary movements that suggested interdependence, it could not detect a greater sense of cohesion and community based on mutual responsiveness, value orientation, and identity. The current challenge is to devise indicators that overcome these shortcomings. (ibid.: 48–49, italics added)

In other words, where Deutsch’s processualism cautioned against a constricted fixation on abstract ‘indicators’, the approach adopted by Adler and Barnett narrowly circumscribes the problem of how inter-state communities emerge by formal definitions from the very beginning. The actual efforts are then directed at identifying already existing security communities and then to determine whether they qualify as ‘loosely coupled’ or ‘tightly coupled’. Hence, the second generation of security community researchers not only assumes that communities and shared values already exist, but also focuses methodologically on identifying indicators instead of analysing processes. However, while many of the substantive claims of the second generation sound quite plausible, it remains methodologically unclear how to decide, for example, whether groups of states do indeed have ‘shared identities’ or whether their relations are characterised by ‘long-term reciprocity’. Some critics have therefore objected that Adler and Barnett’s framework was ‘not backed by a compelling method of empirical investigation’ (Bially Mattern 2000: 303). Their discussion of questions of research design suggests that scholars could easily identify features of security communities that self-evidently exist, just waiting to be discovered. This understanding seems to rest on the belief that security communities were ‘out there’, independent of the concepts social scientists apply (Jackson 2008: 134–43).

Yet, to treat democratic values or human rights, for instance, as attributes that specific societies possess or acquire is to conceal the intersubjective construction of these concepts and to ignore their productive, even hegemonic power. This is the reason why Iver Neumann and Michael Williams have proposed that constructivist analyses of NATO’s enlargement should consider the alliance’s self-description as a ‘democratic security community’ not as an unproblematic fact but as a way of exercising symbolic power. Claiming a democratic identity can then be interpreted as a political practice that assigns legitimacy to NATO’s actions and at the same time structures the realm of possibilities for acceptable Russian self-conceptions. Hence, the ‘capacity to claim such identities, and to grant and deny them to others, is a source of social power’ (Williams and Neumann 2000: 364).

An approach that treats references to common Western values as evidence for an alleged reality — the existence of a transatlantic security community — risks committing an essentialist fallacy by taking the invocation of these depictions at face value. One problematic consequence of such an account is that it becomes methodologically impossible to distinguish between a political assertion of ‘shared values’ and its performative effects. Assuming an already existing transatlantic security community with certain ‘shared values’ and a ‘collective identity’ tends to reify prevalent notions of political discourse instead of interpreting them as an element in processes of social construction. In our view, claims to a democratic identity of NATO or public commitments to human rights constitute a valuable body of empirical material that social scientists ought to be interested in. However, instead of treating them as evidence for an alleged ‘Western’ identity, we suggest treating them as a distinct and powerful move in a political struggle (Jackson 2006b). Invocation of ‘Western values’ or a ‘democratic identity’ can then be interpreted with regard to their performative effects and institutional consequences.

Thus, instead of presupposing the existence of an Atlantic security community, we are interested in reconstructing processes of community formation, that is, processes that lead to the evolution, reproduction and transformation of an inter-state political space commonly described as ‘the West’ (e.g., Jackson 2003; Bially Mattern 2005). Just like Deutsch and his colleagues, we assume that political orders are integrated via the construction and reproduction of a sense of community in complex and non-linear dynamic processes. However, in contrast to the initial work on security communities, which focused on measuring the quantity and density of transactions, we propose that the emergence and the reproduction of a sense of community should be studied by focusing on the productive power of representations in contingent processes of signification. As these processes of community formation are open ended and nonlinear, they can be reconstructed from within by interpreting how contentious references to ‘the West’ operate in political discourse.

### 2NC---Space

**Satellites play a crucial role in ontological securitization --- their technical capabilities cause fear about the end of the Earth and the ability to diagnose environmental threats**

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Environmental security as ontological politics

To account for the materiality of the visual and for the special role of visual technologies in the construction of environmental security, I reread the existing literature on environmental security through the lens of ANT and the notion of ontological politics. In short, ANT radicalizes the assumptions of linguistic or visual constructivism. Instead of viewing texts, images, and other semiotic systems as representations of a pre-existing single reality, it holds that the interplay of expert practices, scientific discourses, technologies, and visuals constitutes *multiple realities* ([Hind and Lammes, 2016](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399): 81–82). Annemarie [Mol (2002)](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399), for example, shows through her long-term ethnographic research in Dutch hospitals how different medical practices and diagnostic tools produce multiple versions of atherosclerosis. To assume that phenomena are multiple implies they are ‘more than one but less than many’ ([Mol, 2002](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399): 55). According to this understanding, ontology ‘is not given in the order of things but … ontologies are brought into being, sustained, or allowed to wither away in common, day-to-day, sociomaterial practices’ ([Mol, 2002](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399): 6). As Ingunn [Moser (2008](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399): 99) puts it, natural realities become ‘matter-real’ and are ‘mattering’ only through their ‘continued enactment and re-enactment in situated practices’. Following these assumptions, environmental security can be understood as a form of ontological politics, in which the ontological status of phenomena such as climate change, deforestation, or natural disasters – as well as the ways of knowing them – becomes the subject of debate ([Barry, 2013](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399): 7; [Schouten, 2014](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399)).

I argue that visual technologies such as satellite remote sensing play a crucial role in the ontological politics of environmental security. Consider Mol’s seminal work in the ontological politics of disease. A large share of the practices that render a disease such as atherosclerosis ‘matter-real’ are based on visual technologies: X-ray units, MRI scanners, microscopes, molecular imaging techniques, etc. The same holds true for the realm of environmental security. Here, visual technologies, including computer modeling, satellite remote sensing, data visualization, hotspot mapping, and graphs of future scenarios, enact different versions of ‘the environment’ as security risk ([Randalls, 2014](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399)). Rather than producing mere representations of pre-existing environmental risks, visual technologies essentially **bring them about**: ‘The world does not exist before these ways of sensing’ ([Hind and Lammes, 2016](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399): 90). For, as [Mitchell (2013](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399): 233) crucially reminds us, ‘Nature is unable to speak for itself…. The facts of nature speak only with the help of measuring devices and tools of calculation’. To render a phenomenon such as climate change visible, intelligible, and thereby ‘matter-ing’ and ‘matter-real’, a global assemblage of visual technologies – including satellites, weather stations, computer simulations, researchers, and mechanisms of international cooperation – is required ([Edwards, 2010](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399); [Wark, 2015](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399): 166–182).

To study visual technologies as part of the ontological politics of environmental security, I first draw on the notion of immutable mobiles ([Latour, 1986](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399)). Bruno Latour has coined this term to explain the power effects of ‘technologies of visualisation and inscription’ ([Latour, 2013](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399): 77), such as the printing press, cartography, photography, or the computer, that allow inscribing parts of the real world into flat and mobile artifacts ([Latour, 1986](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399): 17). Through these technologies, reality becomes flattened**,** mobile but immutable. Inscribed into pictures, maps, or charts, inscriptions of local realities – such as a piece of soil – can be circulated globally, reproduced, or combined with other inscriptions of reality. Pictures of different origin and different scale can be layered ([Latour, 1986](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399): 7).

Second, I draw upon the notion of *visual assemblage* ([Bleiker, 2014](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399): 76) to account for the fact that environmental risks and threats are never produced by a single technology – never become visible on a single image – but become enacted by a complex web of linked inscription devices, practices, and discourses ([Latour and Hermant, 2006](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399): 29). The notion of assemblage refers to a temporary form of order of heterogeneous elements ‘whose unity comes solely from the fact that these items function together, that they “work” together as a functional entity’ ([Patton, 1994](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399): 158). The visual assemblage of environmental security can be understood as exactly such a heterogeneous network of visual technologies and related infrastructures, people, laws and regulations, discourses, and practices ([van Munster and Sylvest, 2016](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399): 2). The immutable mobiles (satellite pictures, global climate models, vulnerability maps), which circulate through this assemblage, create new associative relations between actors as diverse as satellite operators, climate scientists, environmental activists, or military officials ([Mayer, 2012](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399)). Together they turn ‘nature’ into a range of calculable, perceivable, and governable risks through a series of calculations, transformations, and translations ([Hind and Lammes, 2016](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399)). The notion of visual assemblage makes it possible to account both for the socio-material character of the visual and for the messiness and multiplicity of practices and discourses of environmental security.

Using the framework in practice

The perspective of assemblage calls for a pluralization of methods in the study of visual politics ([Bleiker, 2014](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399)). To grasp the social/technical/discursive/visual character of visual assemblages, I combine three analytical layers. The first analytical layer is a semiotic visual analysis ([Rose, 2016](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399): 106–146). A corpus of highly visible demonstration images – provided on websites, in demonstration reports, in social networks, or in demonstration videos – has been compiled in each case. Such showcase images are particularly promising for the objectives of this article because they are pre-selected by the respective actors to demonstrate the whole range of possible applications and capabilities of satellite imagery. A set of heuristic questions helps to structure the analysis: What do the images show and what is hidden? Are there common visual characteristics or patterns? How are images arranged and how are colors used? And what are the aesthetic and political effects of decisions on the composition, color, framing, or resolution of images?[1](javascript:popRef('fn1-0967010617709399')) Second, a discourse-analytical layer reveals the interdiscursive context of images through a study of the reports, homepages, flyers, or policy documents in which they are embedded ([Rose, 2016](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399): 186–219). Here, I ask how the different texts ascribe meaning to the images, and how the latter become linked to broader concepts, narratives, and storylines in environmental security discourse. A third layer focuses on the performativity of images as immutable mobiles and their function in broader visual assemblages. So, here the question is what visuals do rather than what they show: How are images produced by broader visual assemblages? How are they circulated or blocked? And how do they enact different versions of the environment? To study this third layer, I draw on a comprehensive review of the relevant secondary literature, combined with a thorough document analysis of legislation, regulations, and related policy documents in each case.

The co-evolution of remote sensing and environmental security

The roots of the visual assemblage of environmental security can be traced back to the militarization of geophysical research in the early years of the Cold War ([Dalby, 2013](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399): 41). With its successful launch of the Sputnik satellite in 1957 during the so-called International Geophysical Year, the Soviet Union fired the starting pistol for a technological and scientific race between the two superpowers. As a crucial part of this race, satellite remote sensing emerged as a dual-use technology, or ‘cyborg science – the result of an irreparable fusion of scientific and military concepts, materials and skills’ ([Elam, 1999](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399): 106). At the same time, the strategic communities’ interest in the atmospheric impact of nuclear weapons boosted advancements in numerical weather modeling, which in the 1960s were further developed into the first simulation models of global climate change. The ever more detailed global models at the same time produced ‘an insatiable thirst for data from every corner of the world’ ([Edwards, 2010](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399): 24), which since the late 1970s and 1980s was increasingly satisfied by satellite-based remote sensors. In addition, in 1972 the US administration established the Landsat program within the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) as the first civilian satellite remote sensing program. The program’s eight satellites provided multispectral Earth imagery at moderate spatial resolution – perfectly suited for land (change) monitoring – and thereby contributed considerably to the discovery of macro-scale environmental problems, including deforestation, land degradation, and the ozone hole ([DeLoughrey, 2014](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399): 261).

NASA’s Landsat and other emerging remote sensing programs can be considered as parts of an emerging visual assemblage of heterogeneous human and non-human components ([Barry, 2013](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399): 14; [Edwards, 2010](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399)). This assemblage includes hardware such as satellites, sensors, ground stations, and data centers; imagery-processing-and-analysis software; data such as images or digital maps; human actors like system operators, policymakers, scientists, and national security personnel; and legal and regulatory frameworks ([Thompson, 2007](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399): 2). The capacity to ‘see’ environmental problems, and to see the planet from a distance, is distributed across this visual assemblage. Neither the satellites, which translate the electromagnetic radiation reflected from the Earth’s surfaces into numerical grey-values, nor the operators in the control room, which process ‘wavelengths in false colours’ ([Latour and Hermant, 2006](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399): 8), nor the software tools that turn the data into realistic true-color images, nor the analysts or algorithms that interpret the resulting images would be able see anything were it not for the other elements in the assemblage.

A securitization precursor

I would argue that there was a close co-evolution between the emergence of a global visual assemblage of satellite remote sensing and the emerging discourse on environmental security in the 1980s and 1990s. The notion of co-evolution stresses the reciprocity of this development. While the satellite gaze made it possible to **conceive of environmental change as a global threat** in the first place ([Van Munster and Sylvest, 2016](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399): 6), environmental security also became inscribed into technical decisions, for example when Landsat’s remote sensors were optimized to monitor land change and resource degradation. The mutual imbrication of satellite technology and environmental security played out at several levels. First, the militarization of geophysical research during the Cold War created new associations between geoscientists and security actors that were crucial for the emerging imaginary of the environment as a security problem. [Marzec (2014](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399): 244) describes how this emerging actor-network led, for example, to the US defense and intelligence community’s interest in climate change in the early 1990s:

In 1992 the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) began to establish relations with climate scientists in the program Measurements of Earth Data for Environmental Analysis, or MEDEA, when it declassified satellite imagery for ‘patriotic’ climate scientists.

Second, the described visual assemblage enabled a new ‘way of seeing’ the Earth and the human environment, which might be called a planetary gaze ([DeLoughrey, 2014](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399); [Jasanoff, 2004](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399): 44). The new possibility to look at the planet from the outside produced a sense both of the earth’s singularity and of its radical fragility. The planetary gaze produced a certain uncanniness – a feeling of being detached from planet Earth ([DeLoughrey, 2014](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399): 264). In so doing, the planetary gaze invoked deep-rooted **‘apocalyptic fears about the end of the earth**’ ([DeLoughrey, 2014](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399): 266). This sense of urgency created by satellite remote sensing resonated well with the early environmental security debate in the 1990s and its alarmist tone ([Marzec, 2014](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399): 235). Yet the planetary gaze of the described visual assemblage did not simply produce another discursive frame of a pre-existing environment. Rather, it constituted a whole new reality of the Earth as a singular, interconnected, and fragile system ([Van Munster and Sylvest, 2016](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399): 4–8). This fragile Earth system became ‘matter-real’ through the immutable mobiles – such as true-color satellite images, simulation models, graphs, or numerical calculations – produced by two central inscription technologies: satellite remote sensing and computer modeling ([Edwards, 2010](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399): 2). By developing these technologies into a comprehensive global monitoring system, it was believed it would be possible to monitor, **predict, control, and manage the Earth system** ([Jasanoff, 2004](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399): 42; [Marzec, 2014](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399): 245). This global monitoring approach, which highlighted the role of national leaders as planetary or environmental managers, considerably influenced the early environmental security debate.

Third, the focus of the early environmental security debate in the 1990s was on large-scale global problems such as scarcity-induced conflict or migration ([Rothe, 2016](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617709399)). The detection of these large-scale problems was closely linked to the **technical capabilities of satellite remote sensing**, for to detect large-scale, slow-onset changes like land degradation and resulting scarcities, an abstracted, distant view from above was required. What is more, multispectral sensors, such as those carried by Landsat satellites, made it possible to visualize processes of plant degradation in the infrared range of radiation. To be precise, these large-scale environmental changes were considered as drivers of conflict and migration in the early environmental security discourse. Remote sensors and their planetary gaze thus considerably influenced the epistemological horizon of environmental security thinking.

#### Discourse surrounding the threat of China’s cyberattacks on satellites and space assets is based on a realist sense of security --- empirics

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During this period, the theme of China’s cyber-technology dominated American print media. This focus reflected two related changes in U.S. foreign policy. Both Washington and Beijing grew increasingly worried about their each other’s cyber-capabilities (Lindsay, Cheung, and Reveron, 2015; Reveron, 2012), and the newspapers captured a clear securitization of the U.S.-China relationship. In February 2010, less than a month after the Google attack, in another front-cover, the media explained the Obama administration’s decision to “explicitly [accuse] China’s military of mounting attacks on American government computer systems and defense contractors” to map “military capabilities that could be exploited during a crisis.”41 Washington’s accusation that Beijing had a “deliberate, government-developed strategy to steal intellectual property and gain strategic advantage”42 was based on an annual Pentagon report indicating that 90% of cyber-attacks against the U.S. came from China. The China-Threat discourse was taking hold not merely in the political field, but in the White House as well. In 2011, with China in mind, President Obama wrote that “the cyber threat to our nation is one of the most serious economic and national security challenges we face” (in Lindsay, 2015:2). The same article citing the Pentagon’s report includes several securitizers’ views describing a typically alarmist offensive-realism worst-case scenario in which China’s increased military power (e.g., drones, air flights, icebreakers, satellites) was equated with imminent belligerent behavior. Consider the following example: “China […] has now leapt into the first ranks of offensive cybertechnologies […] in an effort to blind American satellites and other space assets, and […] push the United States military presence into the mid-Pacific nearly 2,000 miles from China’s coast.”43

#### Satellite images can be used by presidents to define reality in a way that makes it impossible for the public to critique or question the notion of a threat --- causes threat construction and pre-emptive action

Avery Henry 16, Assistant Professor of Public Address/Debate in the Communication Studies department at Southeast Missouri State University, 1/1/2016, “Interactive Security: The Rhetorical Constitution Of Algorithmic Citizenship In War On Terror Discourse”, Wayne State University, <https://www.proquest.com/docview/1817028942?parentSessionId=EG2phuaMWUV2mQ2oMs8guYJGp86fVzuaw1k9hbrV14A%3D&pq-origsite=primo&accountid=14667> /lg

Presidential definition. The last function or technique of presidential public address that I examine in this chapter is the use of definition. President Bush’s attempts to shape public memory highlights the fluidity of social reality. In a postmodern sense, social reality is fluid, pliable, and full of potential. It is not a given, natural, or predetermined state of affairs. Instead, it is chosen from a multiplicity of possibilities. Zarefsky (2004) contends that political actors contribute to the production of social reality and that people actively participate in shaping and giving meaning to the world around them. The primary way that people constitute their social reality is through naming the world around them. By naming a situation, people shape the context for understanding social reality and determine the parameters for engagement. Therefore, the ability to define and name is rhetorically very powerful. Defining is the power to identify, name, and bring forth or allow something new to emerge into a field of signification. In addition to allowing new meanings and signs to be constituted and emerge, definitions also frame how something should be understood. It dictates what something is, what value it has, and the meaning that it signifies.

Zarefsky (2004) argues that the office of the president has a sustainable ability to define political reality. The president has unique access and authority to communicate with a wide range of audiences. For instance, the president can address the nation through an electronic broadcast, communicate with the press and shape the context in which the public encounter specific events, and speak directly with policy-makers in Congress. By choosing to define political situations in specific ways with these audiences, the president is able to frame reality as if it were natural and uncontestable rather than selected and open to critique or discussion. Furthermore, through framing, the president can dictate what constitutes credible and worthy arguments, data, and proof (Zarefsky, 2004). Take for example, the evidence offered by the Bush administration to prove that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. The Administration provided satellite images of what it considered to be proof that Iraq possessed WMDs. However, the satellite data could only be analyzed and understood by technical experts. Consequently, Bush was able to define Iraq as a threat to U.S. national security by controlling what counted as sufficient evidence. This control of what constituted data prevented the public from challenging the presidential definition of WMD threat because it was incapable of analyzing the evidence that was being presented to them and contesting was it was ample proof. Therefore, the way that the American public understood the situation in Iraq was framed in terms of threat construction that foreclosed or discredited any discussion about whether or not Iraq posed an actual threat to national security.

Additionally, by defining Iraq as a terrorist and WMD threat, Bush was able to control the discussion about appropriate courses of actions in response to the risk. If Iraq has WMDs, then the U.S. was justified in taking pre-emptive action to eliminate WMD use. Furthermore, presidential definition invited moral judgments that concluded that Saddam Hussain and his regime was evil and oppressive and warranted elimination. This was done in two parts: first, Iraq was included in the “Axis of Evil” that was defined as the primary enemy facing the U.S.; second, Hussain’s regime was bad enough to justify one war against it and now there are claims of WMD possession. Such an evil and oppression regime necessarily had to be invaded through the definitional logic of the Bush administration.

#### Modern, post-apocalyptic governments are forced to counteract imagined threats like solar storms --- citizens expect to be sheltered from unimportant or unlikely scenarios

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Those who, with Beck, Adam, and others, consider our present-day timescape to be a secular apocalyptic one, also have to acknowledge the fact that today’s security policies are completely imbued with this way of thinking and living (Beck 1986, 1999, 2002; Adam and Van Loon 2000; Mythen and Walklate 2006). Governments and international institutions have to deal on a daily basis with the control paradox that calls for human and technological resources to solve problems that are themselves caused by new scientific discoveries and techno- logical innovations or at least come to us via that route. Terrorist organizations, such as isis, which inundate the world ‘24/7’ on YouTube and Twitter with images of death and destruction, quickly appropriate new technologies to fur- ther their cause. These wreakers of havoc and horror are, of course, themselves products of modern times: they use the most modern weapons and means of communication and they are, as in the case of isis, sometimes the product of human intervention and military mismanagement in the Middle East.

An important characteristic of contemporary safety thinking is the expan- sion of security in time and space into the realm of the imaginary. Security is a linear concept. Old-fashioned security policy assumes a concrete threat, somewhere on the horizon, the harm of which can be assessed using all kinds of calculation and planning resources. How long will it take before the hostile army is at the gates, the rocket has reached its goal, the water level has risen so high that the dam will break those kinds of calculations. A risk relates to probability and imagination. A risk cannot always be calculated, or the risk is so small that it is statistically insignificant, yet bad enough that it must surely be included in the plan, such as a terrorist attack or a solar storm. The current safety culture is more a risk culture in which imagined futures and worst-case scenarios are visualized, using the latest computer simulation techniques. This then leads to all kinds of exaggerated expectations that governments need to respond to with equally comprehensive and proactive measures because before you know it, ...3

This brings us back to the definition of the beginning: security is not just about a physical state of being, but also about our future expectations and there- fore about our feelings and the things that capture our imagination. And in the current timescape these feelings and images tend to get overheated quickly. The criminologist Hans Boutellier explained that today’s feelings of insecurity and uneasiness are bolstered up by our post-Cold War condition of living in a ‘network society’. This is a society that is characterized by the loss of familiar social settings, by increased diversity, and complexities greater than ever be- fore (Boutellier 2002/2005; Castells 1996). Boutellier then states, following the sociologist Zygmunt Baumann (Baumann 2001a, 2001b), that the moral uncer- tainty that these shifting sands engender is exactly what generates additional calls for security (Oppelaar and Wittebrood 2006, 34). The disappearance of familiar hierarchies and institutions has made citizens more sensitive to inse- curity sooner. The aforementioned Ulrich Beck likewise made the case that the post-materialistic citizens of the free West simply have difficulty coping with personal mishaps, failures, or setbacks. Individual development and manufac- turability have a downside: breakdown and tragedies are no longer accepted. Modern citizens work harder at insuring (‘protecting’) themselves against damage, inconvenience, or misfortune. But they also increasingly demand of the state that it shelter them from threat and harm. Even though many neoliberal governments are not in a position to provide that level of security, all the while the reported number of threats (real and imagined) is increasing.

One security expert wrote cynically that the only thing left for authorities in this post-apocalyptic modern timescape to do is ‘to feign control over the uncontrollable’ – as though the only thing that seems to matter nowadays is the appearance of security and effective risk management (Beck 2002, 41; 1999). Risk management has thus also become a mode of governance; risk researchers speak of ‘risk governance’, (Van Asselt 2005; Van Asselt and Van Bree 2011) or of risk management as a paradoxical (because it is per defini- tion uncontrollable) ‘taming of the future’ (Aradau and Van Munster 2008). In fact, primary risk management (trying to control the actual risk) is, as a result, increasingly being replaced by secondary risk management: a form of deci- sion-making aimed at covering (up), or at least hedging, the secondary risk of administrative failure. What happens then is that a lack of clarity regarding who is accountable in uncertain situations – which is a typical characteristic of the ‘new security thinking’ – tends to reduce decision-making to a set of stan- dard protocols and security scenarios, which in effect offers a formalized, but often highly superficial, short-sighted and façade-like grid to allocate political responsibility for ‘decisions which must be made in potentially undecidable situations’ (Power 2004, 10). Although this may present itself as accountable and effective decision-making and control, the primary risk of the impending threat has, of course, not properly been addressed.

**Space infrastructure is securitized by European policymaking --- it’s viewed as essential for military defense and causes European agencies to feel threatened**

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4.2. Boundary expansion I: Galileo merging science and politics

The first attempt of a jointly developed space infrastructure by both organisations was the navigation satellite constellation Galileo. For the EU, Galileo had been driven by worries that Europe would be overly dependent on the US American Global Positioning Systems (GPS), with user requirement standards and certification schemes for the security-relevant equipment being set outside of Europe (EC Communication [1994](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2021.1890039)). EU policymakers had just made the experience of what techno-political dependence means for decision-making processes in conflict situations: During the Balkans conflicts in the 1990s, US authorities denied European actors access to US satellite data of conflict regions. As Darnis *et al*. ([2020](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2021.1890039)) have argued, this was a “wake-up call for Europe” in many different ways: not only was an armed conflict taking place on European soil after decades of peace, but satellite capabilities for data gathering and communication could be easily disposed of by the US and Europe was lacking its own.

Space technology was now seen as critical enabling infrastructure for defence, leading several EU members to increase or create space capabilities also for security and military usages. Most notably, after the Balkan wars, **“space for security**” had emerged as a **powerful paradigm in EU space policymaking** (Darnis *et al*. [2020](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2021.1890039), p. 4).

However, the different actors involved in setting-up Galileo began to draw boundaries around its security and military usage. Galileo is owned and funded by the EU, but designed and operated by ESA. Despite its technopolitical legacy, Galileo is defined as “a civil program under civil control” which does, however, not exclude military usages of its encrypted regulated service (Hoerber and Stephenson [2017](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2021.1890039)). According to the EC, Galileo, “constitutes sensitive infrastructure, the deployment and usage of which are susceptible to affect the security of the European Union and its Member States” (EC [2014](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2021.1890039)). As a form of doing techno-politics – “the strategic practice of designing or using technology to constitute, embody, or enact political goals” (Hecht [1996](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2021.1890039), p. 15). Galileo and European (space) security were now much more closely tied to visions of European integration in a changing world. In addition, space development was now framed as “the concrete translation of a common democratic European political project”, with applications like Galileo being “directly linked to Europe’s role in the world” (Giegerich [2007](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2021.1890039)). Galileo was seen as a collaboration between the EU’s political interests in using space for security and ESA’s scientific and technical expertise in the field of navigation, and it laid the foundation for ESA’s involvement in military space activities and subsequent boundary work. Interestingly, both actors framed Galileo’s purpose in different ways.

The EU emphasised that Galileo as a “European system for European citizens” would give “Europe freedom in its security missions” (Darnis *et al*. [2020](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2021.1890039)). In turn, ESA aimed at downplaying the crucial military components of Galileo in public accounts and instead stressed the benefits for the general public, such as environmental protection and its use for science (Slijper [2008](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2021.1890039), p. 40).

Yet, the experiences from collaborating with the EU on Galileo and the subsequent need to adapt to EU security regulations when handling classified information started a long and controversial process of “institutional soul-searching” (IP2) about ESA’s involvement in military and security-related space activities. Several debates were held at ESA’s ministerial Space Council – the forum where ESA members meet to discuss the agency’s future direction – about the questions whether ESA’s mission and the vision of its founding fathers of an exclusively peaceful organisation for space would be compromised by taking part in military-related European space activities (IP 4; IP 12; cf. Sheehan [2009](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2021.1890039)). A senior ESA employee remembered that it was a “very tough discussion in the mid-2000 when the question (of security tasks) was formerly raised in the Space Council: What does exclusively peaceful mean in the convention?” (IP8).

4.3. Protection of autonomy: security should pose (no) problems

In this debate on where to draw which boundaries concerning ESA’s partaking in security and military space activities, the agency’s director-general commissioned a group of “Wise Men” to explore these questions further (Bildt *et al.* [2000](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2021.1890039)): The former Swedish prime minister Carl Bildt, the then-president of Credit Lyonnais, Jean Peyrelevade, and Lothar Späth, the CEO of Jenoptik AG, a major German Arms and Space company, concluded that ESA should evolve into an organisation capable of developing both civilian and military flight hardware to ensure that space would and could be part of the evolving common European foreign and security policy (Hobe *et al*. [2006](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2021.1890039), p. 540). In the words of Bildt, this was just “logical” and “should pose no problem” (Slijper [2008](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2021.1890039), p. 34). Interestingly, the group of Wise Men represented the fields of politics, economy and industry, but not science or engineering – the major pillars of ESA’s work. This is also reflected in an article which appeared in the magazine *Science* on the report, and that summarised the findings as follows:

Space is too important to Europe to be left to scientists alone, according to a report on the future of the European Space Agency (ESA) (that) concludes that better coordination between ESA and the business and defence sectors is essential to Europe’s development. (Watson [2000](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2021.1890039), p. 1287)

This statement also highlights what was seen as necessary boundary work, namely that it was less a question of whether ESA should build *different* space technologies for security usage, but rather if their intended use by EC agencies in fields such as border security or defence policy could be aligned with ESA’s mission statement. More precisely, it was a question of legitimacy – what were legitimate “security tasks” to which ESA could contribute to? And it was, according to an interviewee who was involved in the process, a wicked question: The boundaries between military and civilian space Earth observation satellites, for instance, was blurry from the outset (IP5; cf. Neufeld [2018](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2021.1890039)). The operation of navigation and communication satellites was already overlapping with more traditional defence activities – such as using encrypted satellite communication during military missions, so “that one could not be achieved without the other” (IP4, cf. Peter [2005](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2021.1890039), p. 290). Another interviewee reflected on this process of negotiating institutional boundaries by stating that the pressure on ESA to stay “relevant” in the changing European space-scape and vis-à-vis a more active EU gradually increased with the number of commissioned reports. At a certain point, he mentioned, “it was then more or less accepted by the ESA leadership that security-related aspects could be dealt with, but no armament and arms procurement, and nothing aggressive of course” (IP 5).

The involvement of the military in European space activities – even if only through the backdoor – was not what ESA’s founders had envisioned for the agency (cf. Sheehan [2009](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2021.1890039)), yet ESA’s boundaries as a civilian organisation were set in a different period of European integration and global political orders (Slijper [2008](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2021.1890039)). When asked about his opinion on that, a senior ESA member told me: “Well, then the founding fathers should have been clearer about what they meant with exclusively peaceful!” (IP8). This statement points to the core of expansionist boundary work at ESA regarding its involvement in military-related activities, that is, the dynamically changing interpretation of the first paragraph of its convention that eventually allowed ESA to “move into policy areas previously denied” (Sheehan [2009](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2021.1890039), p. 32).

4.4. Boundary expansion II: “Space has a security dimension, and security has a space dimension”

The securitisation of space in Europe was further spurred by adopting a White Paper on European Space policy in 2003 by the EC. The paper’s title “Space: A New European Frontier for an Expanding Union – an Action Plan for Implementing the European Space Policy” (EC [2003](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2021.1890039)) signals that while space might be a new frontier for the EU, it is a call to action to implement one European Space policy instead of aligning what have so far been multiple policies. What is particularly interesting here is how the paper strategically uses expansion as a mechanism of boundary work by calling for all stakeholders

to mobilise behind new goals and to rise to new challenges as the time has come to place (space activities) on the Union’s political agenda and at the heart of the European construction process by putting space applications linked to inspirational goals at the service of the enlarged Europe. (EC [2003](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2021.1890039), p. 5)

For the first time, space is now fully recognised as a horizontal policy of the enlarged European Union to “support the Union’s key policy goals”: economic growth, sustainable development, or stronger security and defence.

Linking the need for further European integration to the objective of securing Europe’s strategic independence by maintaining autonomous access to space, the paper stated what later became a common saying: That “space has a security dimension and security has a space dimension” (EC [2003](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2021.1890039), p. 19). The White Paper can thus be understood as a form of boundary work par excellence: It includes, first, novel political practices – the implementation of a single European Space Policy. Second, we see the accession into a particular collective (the space sector as dominated by ESA) or paradigm (that space activities in Europe are civilian) by what was previously outside of it (the European Commission). Lastly, it shows how new fields and activities (space for security and defence) get incorporated into existing practices.

What is more, the White Paper directly links the envisioned European integration in space to the broader project of European political integration. It does so by framing space as a catalyst of European integration that preserves the security of the EU and mentioned space security technologies as providing “a linchpin of European policy” and contributing to the building of an ”EU political project” (Silvestri [2003](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2021.1890039)).

As one interviewee stated about the White Paper, it seemed that if Europe was to be further integrated through common security policy, then ESA had to be part of that, too (IP 1, cf. Sheehan [2009](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2021.1890039)). The White Paper postulated that “Standing still is not an option” for the European space sector (EC [2003](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2021.1890039), p. 21), urging ESA to expand its boundaries towards more security-related space activities while simultaneously challenging the agencies’ autonomy. This process intensified with the framework agreement of 2003 between the EC and ESA as a strategic partnership between the supply-side of space systems (ESA) and the demand-side for space systems (the EU). The agreement established the Space Council that merges the Council of the EU and that of ESA at the ministerial level (cf. Reillion [2017](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2021.1890039)). As a coordination forum, the Space Council has the mandate to provide broader political views to the formulation of space programmes and to deepen their security aspects (cf. Pasco [2009](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2021.1890039)). Therefore, both the Framework Agreement and the Space Council can be seen as attempts to reorder the messy European space-scapes once more by drawing boundaries line between ESA’s and the EU’s responsibilities and tasks.

When the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 2007, the EU reinforced[3](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2021.1890039) its aim to become the “natural point of reference for a European space policy driven by demand” (EC [2003](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2021.1890039), 36). On a broader level of EU policy formation, the Lisbon Treaty confirmed the European Union’s commitment to the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy mainly through the so-called space clause that gave the EU a space competence and the possibility to develop and implement an industrial policy in the space sector. However, while this is often discussed as a novelty with fundamental consequences, von der Dunk ([2011](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2021.1890039)) has argued that this competence is rather formalising practices of jurisdiction regarding outer space activities which the Union had exercised since the 2000s, albeit in a somewhat “accidental” fashion. An ESA senior staff member describes the process of boundary expansion by the EU follows:

So typically, the EU does the following; It has a treaty which defines its perimeters and from day one after adopting this Treaty, they transgress their boundaries and try to grab the next piece. And they do so until de facto they have it, and then the following Treaty comes and more or less puts that into a legal text what has already been done in practice. (IP7)

ESA, according to the Framework Agreement of 2003, should formally become the implementing agency of the Union. As such, ESA would have to integrate into the EU framework and modify its convention accordingly – a step that was seen as having profound consequences for those ESA member states that are not members of the EU (von der Dunk [2011](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2021.1890039)). What is more, ESA interviewees saw this as an unnecessary multiplication of actors responsible for space, as plans had already been circulated that the EU is eventually planning to set up its space agency.

At the latest with the Lisbon Treaty, this “arm twisting between two organisations that are different in membership, are different in scope but responsible for space” started (IP1).

A result of such “arm twisting” was the European Space Policy (ESP) that ESA and the EC jointly adopted in 2007. Although celebrated by both as a milestone achievement, the ESP covers the same priorities as previous regulations and communications, except for a stronger focus on security while maintaining the peaceful exploration of outer space. Thus, it is consistent with the securitisation framing of previous documents that all emphasised the need for increased synergies between the space sector’s civil and defence communities. However, seven years later, we see an interesting shift in the ways that ESA leadership extends the boundaries of the agency in public representations. In 2014, following a cooperation agreement with the European Defence Agency to “better support Europe’s security and defence needs” (ESA DG), the then Director-General of ESA was asked in an interview[4](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2021.1890039) if he foresees a militarisation of space in the next decade. Departing from the principles on which ESA was founded and which had been at least publicly rehearsed and stabilised for many decades, he stated:

(…) as concerns military space activities, this represents so far the largest deficit of Europe as compared to other space powers (…). However, there is an increasing number of programs that, even though civilian, may have military or security-related users – such as Galileo or Copernicus. The ESA itself is not a civilian agency. It is an agency for peaceful purposes and may have programs with a security component. If and when Europe needs space as an enabling tool for its security and defence policy, ESA will be prepared to develop the required programs.

These statements can be understood against the background of ESA’s attempt to stay relevant for both its non-EU members as well as for an EU increasingly integrated in the fields of defence policy. In 2016, however, the European Defence Action plan was adopted by the Commission which proposes in a press release[5](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2021.1890039) “to promote the contribution of sectoral policies, such as the EU Space Program to common security and defence priorities” (EC [2016](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2021.1890039), p. 3).

Some interview partners described the securitisation of space in Europe as an “unpleasant spiral”. (IP5). With Europe so heavily relying on a functioning space infrastructure, now **fears would grow** that this infrastructure is being attacked, leading to calls for increased defence measures. As IP 3 mentioned, “this is now only the beginning of an arms race in outer space (…) where you say: **I feel threatened, I have to aggress**”. According to two interviewees, it is not so much a question if Europe will at some point set-up a Space Force, “like it or not” (IP4), but rather if this is to be left on the national domain of individual member states such as France and Germany or if “we can Europeanize it” (IP5).

**Rhetoric of the “Chinese space threat” proves space threats are often constructed --- it was labeled “existential” but nothing happened**

Cameron **Hunter 18**, PhD in philosophy from University of Bristol, 09/25/2018, “The Rise of China in Space: Technopolitical Threat Construction in American Public Policy Discourse”, University of Bristol, <https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/en/studentTheses/the-rise-of-china-in-space> / lg

Almost every American source that cares to mention China’s space program agrees that its recent surge to prominence constitutes a grave threat to the national security of the **U**nited **S**tates of America. A streak of technological determinism was a recurring feature of within these debates, particularly after 2000 (see Parts 2 and 3). Chinese space technologies were instrumentalised as tools for the destruction of the US, contextualised with wider representations of China as a reckless and aggressive space power (see Chapter 6). Coupled with the instrumentalisation of American space technology as essential, in an ontological sense, to the nation, the “Chinese space threat” narrative became existential in scope. According to many of the proponents of this discourse, China’s rising space power would inevitably entail a mix of fear, conflict and space (arms) racing. Yet the irrefutability of the “Chinese space threat” in US public policy discourse conceals a multitude of tensions and inconsistencies.

Asking “how” the threat came to be has revealed its uneven construction, and thus by extension demonstrated how misguided technologically determinist arguments about the “rise” have been. Part 1 showed both how the “threat” has varied over time, in some instances becoming side-lined in favour of cooperation in space. It also demonstrated how space has inconsistently appeared in broader American debates about China’s “rise” more generally, sometimes cited as evidence of the “rise,” elsewhere obscured by other foreign policy concerns. Part 2 showed how advocates of the “Chinese space threat” differed in which aspects of American identity, and which corresponding technologies, they valued and portrated as imperilled by China’s “rise” in space. Finally, Part 3 underlined the appearance of unevenness by inquiring after the policies and procurements which were undertaken in the name of the “Chinese space threat.” Beyond the maintenance of the ITAR restrictions already in place at the start of the century and the limitations on NASA-China interaction imposed in 2011, no new policies were sanctioned in line with what by any other measure was an incredibly dominant discourse. This disjuncture is the most pressing evidence for the uneven construction of China’s “rise” in space, and sets up a puzzle for future research to address. Despite this puzzle, the lack of a technological response is itself is best understood as a part of technopolitical contestation within American public policy discourse. Viewed in this light, the determinism of the “**Chinese space threat” remained unmanifested.** In other words, the “Chinese space threat” was a kind of “**dog that didn’t bark**” where the omission of response is itself evidence worthy of consideration.

### 2NC---Terrorism

#### Fear of terrorism is grounded in interventionist logics that propels military interventions and legitimizes state violence

Tina G. Patel 17, “It’s not about security, it’s about racism: counter-terror strategies, civilizing processes and the post-race fiction”, Humanities & Social Science Communications, p4-7 \\pairie

In combination, these and other counter-terror measures draw on somewhat normalized notions of the “Islamic terrorist” to justify and gather support for discriminatory practices. They continue to construct Muslims as suspicious bodies with criminal tendencies, in need of increased surveillance, control and regulation, and thus “legitimise a pre-emptive, interventionist and securitizing approach” (Coppock and McGovern, 2014: 242). As Ansari (2004: 31) notes, this then serves to “terrorize the Muslim community in Britain”. Each day, the Muslim community have their social, religious and political activities observed, interrogated and stigmatized, presented as suspect terror networks (Ansari, 2004: 31). Having “relegitimised state racism” (Bhattacharyya, 2008: 75), counter-terror measures have also “involved derogation from human rights provisions and established elements of due process” (Rowe, 2012: 160). Any negative impact that they may have on the Muslim population is considered to be relatively justified, almost as collateral damage in comparison to the perceived wider threat. In this sense, Muslims are not considered worthy of human rights, they are after all goes the civilizing logic, rejecting attempts to assimilate and be part of Western civil society. This logic is not unique or new to Muslims in post-colonial Britain. Recall for instance the use of this logic in the treatment of other BMEs around the world, for instance, Australia’s Aborigines, Native Americans, New Zealand’s Maori, and the African Slaves transported across the Atlantic. In all these cases, attempts were made to excuse and justify exploitative behaviour on the basis that the (exploited) subjects were naturally positioned, either biologically, intellectually or in accordance to (the Christian) God’s plan, as inferior. Thus, legitimized, morally at least, that the control of BME bodies was necessary and good for society as a whole.

Civilizing, consuming and controlling brown bodies

Surveillance and control measures under counter-terror strategies have without doubt drastically redefined the lives and experiences of Muslims. Under counter-terror measures, Muslims in particular are presented as posing a crime and security threat. In addition, the anti-Muslim rhetoric that underpins the counter-terror logic presents Muslims, and brown bodies more generally as incompatible and a threat to civil society, both morally and legally. Consider for instance, the popularity of Donald Trump’s Presidential campaign (illustrated not least with his win) in the United States, which ran with the tagline of “Make America great again”—a sentence which forces the voter to feel shame at having lost a status of greatness, seemingly awakening them from their zombie-like acceptance of overly liberal policies, and finally delivering a rallying-cry for them to take action and regain their status of greatness (by voting for Trump, in the first instance). Key parts of the campaign were delivered with such enflamed anti-Muslim rhetoric that was never before seen in American politics, not even in George W. Bush’s style of “cautious Islamophobia”, or Barack Obama’s reference to Muslims within a national security context. For example, Trump called for “a total and complete shutdown of Muslims” entering the country (Trump, 7 December 2015)Footnote3 and fought publicly with the Gold Star Khan family (whose son Captain Humayun Khan died while serving in Iraq in 2004), suggesting that Mrs Ghazala Khan was not “allowed to speak” by her husband at the Democratic convention because of their Muslim faith.

Within the counter-terror narrative runs a logic that presents brown bodies as unable or unwilling in the least, to attain a civilized state. They are seen as a threat to the social, moral, religious and political order of Western society. This is the basis of anti-Muslim ideology. This logic remains steadfast in the wider imagination due to the persistence of a “post-colonial fantasy”. This fantasy was created during imperial and colonial encounters, and remains long in its de-colonized aftermath. During this time, the “black Other” was seen as savage, sub-human and uncivilized. Presenting the colonized subjects in this way, reaffirmed the colonizers’ self-perception as morally and intellectually superior—God-like almost, which allowed them to embark on rescue missions to lift colonized subjects, usually through forced removal and re-allocation of subjects, as in the case of Australia’s Aboriginal children (the “Stolen Generations”) or African slavery in America and its colonies. Of course, the “lifting” was never to an equal or higher state, and always resulted in advancing the economic position of the colonizers.

The post-colonial fantasy remains a form of institutionalized power and systematic control over subjects of ex-colonies. Some have argued that the fantasy, taken from a scholarly and artistic perspective, evidenced an evolutionary movement because it signified the West’s positive interest in other countries and cultures. However, this form of exoticism has been critiqued given that the interest was in reality superficial and selective, not least because it focused on the female colonial subject (Gindro, 2003: 112‒113). Therefore, there remained a selective othering of the post-colonial subject which was filtered through a Western Imperialist gaze and misrepresented for its own satisfaction. Hooks (1992) argues that such exoticism was especially applied to lighter-skinned BMEs who are seen as being able to more safely satisfy the Western male’ sexual desire and colonial fantasy, in comparison to their darker-skinned, and thus animalistic and savage counterparts. Unsurprisingly, male BME bodies, especially the darker-skinned ones, have been constant victims of colonial rule.

This article argues that male BME post-colonial subjects are consumed in far less favourable ways. For instance, Boskin (1986, cited in Moody-Ramirez and Dates, 2014: 17) notes how the use of the “Coon”, “Jim Crow” and “Sambo” images in America, especially as objects of laughter, sought to strip the black African American male of his masculinity, dignity and self-respect—qualities that would otherwise present him as a sexual competitor, warrior and economic adversary. Similarly, consider the use of sexual stereotypes about “the black man and his mythical penis” which not only served to ridicule, but more actually indicated “the insecurities of the powerful” (Bhattacharayya, 2008: 87–88). Still, today there remains other examples of race-consuming which highlights the persistence of the post-colonial mindset, for instance, consider the “Black Pete” (Zwarte Piet) celebration in the Netherlands, which despite criticisms have remained a core celebration of Dutch culture (see van der Pijl and Goulordava, 2014). Indeed, artist and political activist, Spike Lee (quoted in Ebert, 16 October 2000) argued that elements of “gangsta rap” music videos, with their reference to “my ho’s” and “my bitches”, can be held up as contemporary popularized examples of race-consumption performance, namely minstrel performance, despite their BME/black African-American artists and producers, because there is an over-exaggerated, stereotypical, crude and ignorant performance of blackness for the purpose of entertainment and socio-political commentary.

Specifically, under the counter-terror pre-occupation, the post-colonial mind-set re-uses established practices of “race-consumption” to control brown bodies. Race-consumption within counter-terror strategies occur in very much the same way, by stripping the brown body of its human qualities. They are presented by the media, politicians and news outlets as sexually deviant, insular and intellectually limited. This representation permits brown bodies to be consumed, that is for them to be stripped in the white (Western European) imagination of their threatening status, and for hierarchies of inferiority/superiority to remain in place. The consuming of race in this sense then remains focused on alleviating white fears and presenting BME populations as (physically, intellectually and morally) inferior. As pre-colonized subjects, brown bodies are rendered powerless through a continued colonial narrative, that is a representation and a forced performance of colonial ideas about a supposed passive, immature and animal-like character, and a “backwards” and “oppressive” culture (Patel, 2017). For instance, consider the presentation and discussion around brown families and communities, with presentations of them as abusive fathers/husbands and subservient daughters/wives who come from insular and backward cultures supposedly steeped in anti-Western views (see Sian, 2012). Now, they have come to be represented as Muslim radicals, Islamic extremists and terrorists, or at least sympathizers of this ideology. Brown bodies are once again openly popularized as unruly. Within the terrorist narrative, brown bodies are seen as more dangerous, given that they are presented as an even more dangerous type of terrorist, in comparison with the terrorist of previous eras (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009). According to this logic, Muslims need to be more closely watched, scrutinized and controlled, even if this is at the sacrifice of their fundamental human rights.

The race-consumption practice and post-colonial fantasy are important features of the counter-terror narrative. In her analysis of Muslim men and processes of deviant labelling within the “war on terror” context, Bhattacharayya (2008) argues that popularized racialized mythologies about “the dangerous Muslim man” have come to embody “a dangerous hypermasculinity and a mutilated deviation from proper manhood…portrayed as impenetrable, secretive, enmeshed in an alien culture that inhabits the secret places of an unsuspecting host society” (89). A variety of outlets are used to construct the brown body in these ways. For instance, the entertainment industry has a long history of locating the brown body (or brown space) as villainous, who threatens national security, freedom and civilization itself—a space only to be neutralized by the white saviour/hero, for example, consider the popular (1998) American film, “The Siege” which relies heavily on Muslim/Arab stereotypes of them as violent and ready for martyrdom, and presents Islamic ritual practices within close context of violent (terrorist) behaviour (Ameli et al., 2007: 36). These images are found in more recent films, whether it be subtly such as in “Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles” (2014) with the evil Foot Clans’ wearing of the Palestinian Keffiyeh scarf as part of their military uniform, despite their original Japanese heritage and non-Muslim/Arab connection, or more openly as in “American Sniper” (2014) where not only are the American soldiers the glorified heroes, but all the Iraqis are militant fighters, with the only non-militant civilian Iraqi being one family … who are killed by Iraqi militants. Various news outlets, especially those located in the centre-right of the political spectrum, have delivered a constant barrage of “news stories” that have situated the brown body in a dangerous position. Consider for example the “Asian sex gangs” and “Asian groomer” stories that dominated the British press in 2015 and 2016 (Patel, 2017), where rather than presenting the abuse as an interplay between gender and power, stories focused on the “Asian-ness” of the abusers: “Vulnerable schoolgirl raped by at least 60 men after being preyed upon by Asian grooming gang”, reported one tabloid newspaper (Mirror, 18 May 2015), and “‘All white girls are s\*\*gs’: Asian sex gang found guilty of raping and sexually assaulting three teenage girls in Rotherham”, reported another (The Sun, 17 October 2016). These headlines were typical of references made throughout the reporting of the child sexual exploitation cases. More recently, social media has been used to host anti-Muslim racism to a scale unimagined only 10 years ago, for example, consider the volumous anti-Muslim rage that dominated social media during Britain’s “Brexit” vote and America’s presidential elections. This character-construction (or, character-assassination) of the post-colonial subject has ultimately justified the heightened surveillance and restrictions on the human rights of those marked out brown. Society has gone full-circle (again): having had a state of multiculturalism and equality of opportunity, the narrative presented is that these have been thrown back in our generous faces—we (by which I mean white bodies) are the ones who have been exploited, and the result is a state where the enemy lies within, unable to devoid itself of its inherent and/or cultural dark traits, waiting to strike at the heart of (Western and thus, natural) civilized order. Although conceptually basic and proven to be problematic by a volume of scholarly work, this narrative remains constant and dangerously powerful.

It is important to recognize that within the counter-terror context, attempts to consume and control the brown body have not gone unchallenged, especially by those experiencing first-hand anti-Muslim racism and the curtailed freedoms resulting from counter-terror strategies. Consider for instance, one British case, “Project Champion”, where a CCTV camera surveillance system, funded by the Government’s “Terrorism and Allied Matters Fund”6, was erected in neighbourhoods in the city of Birmingham which were predominantly populated by Muslims. Having been told that the system of 200 CCTV cameras was part of a general crime-reduction strategy, in particular to protect residents against vehicle crime, drugs offences and anti-social behaviour, residents challenged the use of the cameras, noting its negative impact on their human rights, as well as their broader Islamophobic underpinnings (Awan, 2012; Iskajee and Allen, 2013; Patel, 2017). By June 2011, all the cameras had been dismantled, and the case can be held up as a excellent example of how community-level challenges in response to Islamophobic over-surveillance measures can heighten instances of victimization as well as hold officials accountable for their discriminatory behaviour. However, the case also highlights the power and lived reality of contemporary counter-terror logic that all Muslims are terrorists or, at the very least, potential terrorists, as one resident said: “Whether we like it or not, we are the 7/7 bombers. We are the ones who bought down the twin towers. We are Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden. That’s how people see us. We’re the new Jews and we’re the new blacks” (Young Muslim female interviewed in the aftermath of Project Champion, cited in Isakjee and Allen, 2013: 752).

Concluding comments

The ready association of Muslims with terrorism has been developed within a particular context largely emerging from “‘War on Terror’ propagated by President Bush in the aftermath of 11 September 2001 attacks, co-joined by Blair, and continued in practice, if not on political rhetoric, by their respective successors” (Rowe, 2012: 159). This has resulted in “an uncritical and simple-minded acceptance of the notion of a ‘new’ kind of ‘religious terrorism’” (Jackson, 2009: 177), which has in turn allowed for the closer scrutiny of all Muslims and an acceptance of limited human rights. It is argued that the presentation of the “Muslim-terrorist”, or “Muslim super-villain” (Sayyid, 2008: 1) has been so readily digested because of the civilizing narratives found in the old-racism of previous-eras, that is, Said’s (1979) Orientalism. The re-presentation of brown bodies as problematic draws on firmly established practices of “race-consumption”, popularized in recent history during imperialism and colonialism, where brown bodies were presented as uncivil, inferior and inhumane, and thus in need of enlightenment and governing.

In drawing on a post-colonial fantasy and established practices of race-consumption, this article critiques the claim that we are now living in a post-race state. Rather it argues that the fallacy the post-race condition actually serves to perpetuate and excuse anti-Muslim hostility. Anti-Muslim sentiment has once again become popularized, fashionable almost, and certainly considered an acceptable basis upon which the political agenda can be shaped. It is clear that aside from not living in a truly post-race era, there is currently the normalization of anti-Muslim racism and a range of formal measures that victimize members of the Muslim population are commonplace. This supports the idea that what we have is actually a not yet post-race state. More so, the ease with which anti-Muslim racism powerfully permeates society suggests that there will never truly be a post-race state.

## Impacts/AT: Impact Turns

### 2NC---Endless War

#### The colonial logic that underpins the security dilemma locks in endless wars.

Harnett 2022 (Liane Hartnett, Australian National University, [Luke Glanville](javascript:;), [Cian O'Driscoll](javascript:;), [Lauren Wilcox](javascript:;), [Alexander Bellamy](javascript:;), [Brent Steele](javascript:;), “Winning? The Politics of Victory in an Era of Endless War“ <https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viac006>) //sethlee

In his 1904 letter on the Russo–Japanese war, Leo Tolstoy—the literary figure turned prophet of peace—admonished against the possibility of endless war (Tolstoy 1904, 4; Moyn 2020). Tolstoy may have foretold of this era of endless war that has besieged us since the “war on terror” was first waged over twenty years ago, yet it is also written into the very logic that shapes the study of international relations and its approach to war and worlds. Implicit in the realist embrace of the tragic, contained in the Augustinian conviction that “to the end of history the peace of the world … must be gained by strife” (Niebuhr 2013, 256), promulgated by a liberal pursuit of perpetual peace that fails to interrogate how it propagates perpetual war, and contained in the constructivist doxa that war-making is world-making, the specter of endless war seems destined to haunt our horizons. The ubiquity of “victory” in war talk is coupled with an ambiguity of what it actually means to win a war, which only serves to exacerbate and inscribe war’s endlessness. Despite the burgeoning literatures on endless war (Wertheim 2020; Moyn 2021) and indeed victory (Martel 2011; Hom, O’Driscoll, and Mills 2018; O’Driscoll 2019), there is little substantive engagement with how these themes intersect when thinking ethically about the question of war and what passes for peace. This forum seeks to spark a conversation to address this gap. We ask: What might we render visible and redress by thinking critically of the politics of victory in an era of endless war? Further, to the extent that just-war theory has long offered a grammar for the ethics of war, how does it help or hinder this quest? Beyond the claim that engaging with these questions reveals something about the ethical elision of the tragedy (O’Driscoll 2019) or absurdity (Hartnett and O’Driscoll 2020) of war, this conversation aims to both unsettle the abstractions, which inhere in the ethics of war, and recover its promise to pay heed to the particularity and plurality of life and lived experience. This forum begins by revealing the ironic: endless wars are never won, yet the pursuit of victory perpetuates and perhaps even presupposes them. Lauren Wilcox, therefore, invites us to consider war as the ongoing practice of transforming injuring and killing into world-making. In their emphasis on the historic, Lauren Wilcox, Alex Bellamy, and Luke Glanville articulate how the moral categories of just war are predicated upon contradictory yet co-constituted conceptions of power and justice, and a flawed temporal and colonial logic. Focusing on practices of protection, reparation, and restitution, Alex Bellamy and Luke Glanville ask how to reconceive responsibility in an epoch of enmeshment, where it is no longer clear when war and its legacies begin or end. Finally, Brent Steele and Cian O’Driscoll seek to recuperate just-war theory, beyond war, traditionally conceived, and its canon. Brent Steele reimagines just war as a just struggle against the Covid-19 pandemic, while Cian O’Driscoll writes of an ethics of war that begins to theorize from our bare existence. Attentive to irony, the conversation, then, continues in hope: in its calls to interrogate the logics of victory and violence, to reckon with responsibility, to reimagine an ethics of war that centers on life, we collectively seek an ethics of war and peace tethered to the pursuit of justice.

### 2NC---Prototype Warfare

#### The 1AC’s rhetoric of the “technological race” feeds into a new experimental form of warfare that embraces failure as a productive force---that legitimizes endless self-perpetuating violent interventions as a means of testing new technology

Marjin Hoijtink 22, Assistant Professor at the International Relations & International Security @ VU Amsterdam, “”Prototype warfare”: Innovation, optimization & the experimental way of warfare”, European Journal of International Security (2022), 04/13/2022, p1-12 \\pairie

Abstract

In recent years, the concept of ‘prototype warfare’ has been adopted by Western militaries to accelerate the experimental development, acquisition, and deployment of emerging technologies in warfare. Building on scholarship at the intersection of Science and Technology Studies and International Relations investigating the broader discursive and material infrastructures that underpin contemporary logics of war, and taking a specific interest in the relationship between science, technology, and war, this article points out how prototype warfare captures the emergence of a new regime of warfare, which I term the experimental way of warfare. While warfare has always been defined by experimental activity, what is particular in the current context is how experimentation spans across an increasingly wide range of military practices, operating on the basis of a highly speculative understanding of experimentation that embraces failure as a productive force. Tracing the concept of prototype warfare across Western military discourse and practice, and zooming in on how prototype warfare takes experimentation directly into the battlefield, the article concludes by outlining how prototype warfare reconfigures and normalises military intervention as an opportunity for experimentation, while outsourcing the failures that are a structural condition of the experimental way of warfare to others, ‘over there’.

Keywords

Artificial Intelligence

Experimentation

Military

Technology

Innovation

Type

Research Article

Information

Introduction

In April 2017, the US Department of Defense (DoD) published a memo announcing the Algorithmic Warfare Cross-Functional Team, codenamed Project Maven, to accelerate the incorporation of ‘artificial intelligence and machine learning across [DoD] operations’.Footnote1 The work of Project Maven focused on the development and deployment of machine learning algorithms to automate the extraction of ‘objects of interests’ and relevant activity across US surveillance footage. In the summer of 2018, Project Maven came under public scrutiny when it was revealed that the US DoD had contracted Google to help military analysts detect objects in video images. In a letter addressed to Google CEO Sundar Pichai, over four thousand Google employees stated that Google ‘should not be in the business of war’ and demanded the contract to be cancelled.Footnote2 After months of protest, Google ended its work on Project Maven, although it maintained that it was ‘eager to do more’ for the US DoD in other fields of activity.Footnote3

The case of Project Maven has become central within academic and wider public debates related to the role of artificial intelligence (AI) in war and the emergence of so-called lethal autonomous weapons systems specifically.Footnote4 Promoters of Project Maven have claimed that the project merely renders existing practices of data analysis more efficient and precise. Critical voices, however, point out that such investments ‘are poised to automate the process of identifying targets, including people’ and may well serve as the basis for the development of autonomous weapons.Footnote5 Similarly, critical scholarship on security has situated Project Maven against the background of an already problematic targeting regime that operates on the basis of algorithmic calculations and ‘pattern-of-life’ analysis, and which has become entangled with pre-existing and more affective registers of race and gender.Footnote6 As pointed out by Lucy Suchman, the automation of data analysis as pursued within Project Maven ‘can only serve to exacerbate military operations that are at once discriminatory and indiscriminate in their targeting’.Footnote7

My own interest in Project Maven derives from a different observation, related to how the project represents a wider ambition on the part of Western militaries to rethink and revise our very way of warfare. As explained by Air Force Lt Gen. Jack Shanahan, in charge of the project, Project Maven served a wider purpose beyond the development of computer vision algorithms. It was supposed to be ‘that pilot project – that pathfinder – that spark that kindles the flame front for artificial intelligence across the rest of the department’.Footnote8 Understood as such, Project Maven marked the beginning of what Shanahan called ‘prototype warfare’.Footnote9

Prototype warfare, as described by Shanahan, centres on an overarching imperative of military innovation set against the backdrop of an increasingly fierce technological competition on the global stage.Footnote10 At its core, prototype warfare represents a shift in how Western militaries develop and acquire technology and weaponry. It promotes moving away from a focus on the mass production of high-end weapons to the development, rapid fielding, and testing of prototypes in specific operational environments, ‘where units can fail early and fail small, to scale fast and learn fast’.Footnote11 As formulated by the UK army as part of its own strategic conceptualisation of prototype warfare, prototype warfare this way involves more than the modification of existing acquisition processes.Footnote12 It represents a broader ‘mindset’ or ‘new approach’ to military activity, which ‘seeks to mimic the pace and intensity of wartime transformation by prioritizing experimentation and adaption’ and encourage warfighters ‘to take calculated risks with a higher than normal tolerance for failure, enabling them to learn, succeed and exploit catalytic ideas that deliver asymmetric advantage’.Footnote13

Tracing recent conceptions of ‘prototype warfare’ across Western military discourse and practice, my objective in this article is to map the contours of a new regime of warfare, which is emerging against the background of an overarching imperative of military innovation and speculative understanding of the potential role of ‘AI’ in warfare. Broadly defined, regimes of warfare are constellations of discourses, practices, interactions, technologies, and rationalities that constitute and organise war in a specific and (largely) shared way. As argued by Antoine Bousquet, historically, such shared ways of thinking about and organising the conduct of war have strongly been informed by an overarching scientific rationality.Footnote14 What Bousquet defines as ‘the scientific way of warfare’ refers to this systematic and extensive deployment of scientific ideas ‘to inform thinking about the very nature of combat and the forms of military organization best suited to prevail in it’.Footnote15 As the regimes that Bousquet identifies are connected to the prevalence of a specific set of scientific ideas and technologies in a given period, this means that they are historically variable and always subject to change.

My argument in this article is that prototype warfare represents such a shift and is reflective of a broader transformation, or new regime of warfare. Specifically, I argue that the concept of prototype warfare captures the emergence of a profoundly experimental way of warfare, which is driven by an overarching experimental rationality,Footnote16 and largely conducted ‘by-experiment’.Footnote17 While warfare has always been underpinned by experimental activity, what is particular in the current context is how experimentation spans across an increasingly wide range of military practices, into the actual (or simulated) battlefield, and across novel military-corporate assemblages. What explains this spatialisation of experimental practice and its ubiquity in contemporary warfare is a particular, highly speculative, understanding of experimentation that is increasingly detached from a more narrow interpretation of experimentation as a scientific practice of replication and controlled testing and that embraces uncertainty and failure as a productive force. As Michelle Murphy writes, this kind of experimentation legitimises continued intervention and is largely self-perpetuating, hailing ‘life as composed of composed of potential, of chances, of possibilities for becoming, of manipulable relations that can be triggered and altered, if only the right protocol and technique can be employed’.Footnote18

As I will argue, this speculative understanding of experimentation in the context of war has serious political implications. Driven by this kind of experimental rationality, the experimental way of warfare is largely immune to failure, or uninterested in the costs or aftermath of the experiments being deployed. Any result represents valuable data gained, and so failures only serve to advance further experimentation. This way, the experimental way of warfare is largely insulated from critique, as militaries can always point to lessons learned or to the future potential of the ‘next’ experiment. As part of this development, war and conflict become reconfigured mainly as an opportunity to experiment. Our wars become endless and everywhere, not because of the (discursive representation of) the enemy, but because of the broader experimental infrastructure that is created and that needs to be maintained.

In developing these arguments, empirically, my analysis traces the emergence of conceptions of prototype warfare across Western military discourse and practice, with a particular focus on how prototype warfare is taking experimentation directly into the battlefield, specifically when it comes to experimental practices of data collection and analysis, which are seen as foundational to the role of AI in warfare.Footnote19 In so doing, I acknowledge, following Dan Öberg, that ‘Western military discourse is by no means unitary’, but ‘traversed by logics depending on service branches as well as on power structures and debates within them.’Footnote20 At the same time, tracing prototype warfare across different national contexts and levels of engagement, I do find that an overarching regime of warfare defined by experimentation can be identified. In analysing this regime or experimental way of warfare, I rely on a variety of publicly available sources, such as official policy documents, speeches, blogs, defence magazine articles, project descriptions, newspaper articles, video recordings of panels at defence trade shows, and information coming from freedom of information requests. Zooming in on how prototype warfare takes experimentation into the battlefield, my focus is on examples from the US, UK, and The Netherlands, which can be considered important drivers of prototype warfare, although my arguments are also relevant for other Western militaries. My objective is not to provide a full mapping of existing prototypes in this field, as this would be extremely difficult given the evolving and experimental character of these projects, as well as because of a more general lack of oversight of military practice and operations, but, rather, to map the broader contours of prototype warfare and the experimental way of warfare that it is shaping by relying on the sources mentioned.

My argument proceeds in four steps. I first examine the emergence of the experimental way of warfare as a distinct technoscientific regime of warfare, drawing on recent literature at the intersection of Science and Technology Studies (STS) and International Relations (IR) that examines how wars are made and made possible, with a specific focus on the entanglements of science, technology, and war. Next, I trace the concept of prototype warfare from its inception in the early 1990s to its current invocations across Western military discourse and practice, focusing on how the experimental way of way of warfare takes shape under this very term within the US, UK, and The Netherlands. Third, I zoom in on how prototype warfare takes experimentation into the actual or simulated battlespace, focusing on the case of the Land Information Manoeuvre Centre (LIMC), an ‘experimental data center’ established by the Dutch Army in March 2020 to collect and assess data to help crisis response and fight disinformation during the COVID-19 pandemic.Footnote21 I conclude by calling for a more sustained research focus on the ways in which the experimental way of warfare contributes to the notion that our wars are endless and everywhere and accelerates and deepens existing vulnerabilities and asymmetries in war.Footnote22

The experimental way of warfare

This article builds on scholarship at the intersection of IR and STS investigating the broader ‘configurations of people, things and processes that come together to make war possible and shape its mutable characteristics’.Footnote23 Specifically, I am following a growing field of scholarship that focuses on the role of science and technology in assembling and executing warfare.Footnote24 Antoine Bousquet has examined this relationship between war, science, and technology in detail in his book The Scientific Way of Warfare, starting from the premise that ‘an ever more intimate symbiosis between science and warfare has established itself, with the increasing reliance on the development and integration of technology within complex social assemblages of war.’Footnote25 In his book, Bousquet's interest is not so much with the direct role of science or scientists in building military technology, but with the diverse and historically situated ways ‘in which scientific ideas have been systematically recruited to inform thinking about the very nature of combat and the forms of military organization best suited to prevail in it’.Footnote26 What he terms ‘the scientific way of warfare’ refers to the ‘array of scientific rationalities, techniques, frameworks of interpretation, and intellectual dispositions which have characterised the approach to the application of socially organised violence in the modern era’.Footnote27

According to Bousquet, while the overarching role of science in shaping warfare has remained stable since the eighteenth century, the specific ways in which science and technology have informed our thinking about and conduct of warfare are historically variable and dependent on the prevalence of a particular set of scientific ideas and technologies in a given period. Bousquet identifies four distinct regimes of the scientific way of warfare, which are mechanistic, thermodynamic, cybernetic, and chaoplexic warfare.Footnote28 At the core of each regime is a specific set of scientific ideas and a paradigmatic technology, respectively the clock, the engine, the computer and the network. Each of these technologies has shaped military organisation and the conduct of war in considerable ways. At the same time, all of these technologies could only become thinkable or possible as part of a broader regime of warfare and a distinct set of scientific rationalities. As Bousquet clarifies elsewhere, ‘technology [does not] appear ex nihilo: it is the product of a particular human engagement with the world.’Footnote29

Building on the concept of the technoscientific regime of warfare, in this article I identify another transformation of warfare – or an emergent regime of warfare – that is linked to a highly speculative understanding of the current role of AI and digital technologies in warfare,Footnote30 and defined by an overarching experimental rationality. Of course, the conduct of war has always been underpinned by experimental activity. There is a long history of experimentation with technology ‘out in the field’ of war and conflict, or as part of colonial, interventionist projects.Footnote31 For instance, much has been written about medical experimentation on populations in war and on the production of gendered and racialised bodies for experimentation.Footnote32 Popular histories of the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), such as Sharon Weinberger's The Imagineers of War Footnote33 or Annie Jacobsen's The Pentagon's Brain,Footnote34 have similarly shown how war and experimentation with technology and weaponry have a long and entangled history. More recently, experimentation has been linked to counterinsurgency warfare and the deployment of future-oriented action (scenarios, exercises, gaming) and creative design thinking in the context of the Western wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.Footnote35

What is specific within the current context, however, is how experimentation has become truly distributed, informing an increasingly wide range of military practices and spanning across novel military-corporate assemblages. As such, experimentation has become centre stage in military thinking about the organisation of warfare, what I refer to here as the experimental way of warfare. In conceptualising the experimental way of warfare, I draw on recent work within anthropology and associated disciplines on ‘experimentality’ as a mode of governing that operates ‘by-experiment’ and that is driven by an overarching experimental rationality.Footnote36 In her analysis of experimentality in 1970s Bangladesh, Michelle Murphy describes how experimental practice became ubiquitous, spreading across a distributed field of experts and producing a ‘transnationally attached, locally organized patchwork of unevenly distributing funds, technologies, practices, infrastructure, experts, services, collectivities, and workers’.Footnote37 Observing a ‘creative explosion of Bangladeshi trials, pilot projects, and experiments’ over the course of the 1970s, Murphy points out how experimentation transitioned from being a more or less centralised and spatially confined scientific practice limited to the lab, clinic, or field site, to a broader way of governing life and population as part of development practices.Footnote38 As part of this process, Bangladesh became a key site for experimentation with new techniques and technologies, as well as a global model for this kind of governing by-experiment.

What makes experimentality in this and other contexts so generative, argues Murphy, is that it operates on the basis of a highly speculative or anticipatory vision of the experiments being deployed.Footnote39 This speculative understanding of experimentation is what makes experimentality as a mode of governing largely self-perpetuating. As Vinh-Kim Nguyen argues, experimentality inverts ‘the classical model whereby evidence of efficacy permits intervention’, in the sense that, ‘in this case intervention drives the need for self-validating evidence (that is, the intervention was effective).’Footnote40 Even more so, experimentality distinguishes itself in the way in which it thrives on uncertainty or failure. Writes Murphy, ‘if an experiment does not work, [this only means that] a better experiment is needed.’Footnote41 The outcome is the reproduction of ‘the infrastructure of experiment itself’.Footnote42

Extending these insights on experimentality to the context of war, I am approaching the experimental way of warfare as an emerging technoscientific regime that relies on experimentation as a shared way of thinking about and organising warfare today. As part of this development, experimentation increasingly spans across all levels of military engagement and brings together a diverse group of actors, including the military, tech start-ups, and venture capitalists, into experimental assemblages and informal partnerships.Footnote43 The experimental way of warfare operates on a particular understanding of experimentation that is increasingly detached from a more narrow interpretation of experimentation as a scientific practice of replication and controlled testing, favouring a more speculative and entrepreneurial vision of experimentation (dominant within the surroundings of Silicon Valley) that is about acting fast, taking risks, and accepting, or adapting to, failure.Footnote44 It is this speculative vision of the experiment that makes the experimental way of warfare largely immune to criticism linked to effectiveness or failure, as one can always point to lessons learned and a process of ‘moving forward’ to deflect from failures.

Strategic conceptions of prototype warfare, as they are currently being pushed by Western militaries, capture these aspects, while also taking experimentation as an embodied form into the battlefield. For example, a leading UK defence company defines prototype warfare as ‘experimentation in contact’, which ‘centers on a willingness to use experimental technologies, tools and techniques at an earlier stage of readiness in live environments as part of a continuous cycle of learning and optimization’.Footnote45 Similarly, a UK General conceptualises prototype warfare as ‘a new, democratized approach to experimentation and innovation’, which ‘will extend to the battlespace, with deployed operations becoming the ultimate laboratories for innovation’.Footnote46 Below, I will further examine this extension of prototype warfare into the battlespace, where experimentation serves primarily as a proof of concept or vehicle for constant learning (by doing). The next section, however, first traces the emergence of prototype warfare as a strategic concept across Western military discourse and practice, examining how the experimental way of warfare is taking shape under this concept.

Tracing prototype warfare

While the concept of prototype warfare has recently gained traction across Western military discourse, it was first coined in 1998 by a US Lieutenant Colonel, Robert R. Leonhard. In his book The Principles of War for the Information Age, Leonhard aimed to revise military doctrine ‘as warfare progressed through the Industrial Age into the Information Age’.Footnote47 He argued that in order to create technological advantage in the Information Age, militaries needed to adapt to prototype warfare as a radically different approach to warfighting. Leonhard observed that while technological change in the Industrial Age developed at a moderate tempo and that, as a result, ‘mass production was the sine qua non of Industrial Age warfare’, future warfare would ‘feature a constant myriad of technological advances that [would] come at a tempo that disallows mass production’.Footnote48 This meant that a new approach to technology development was needed that would favour the deployment of limited-production prototypes tailored to specific missions. In turn, such an approach would entail a new and more ‘dynamic relationship among economy, organization, and training’,Footnote49 as well as a more general disposition towards experimentation, as part of which ‘military forces [would] become comfortable with deploying novel weapons, supported by novel tactics, in hopes of achieving an operational advantage against an opponent’.Footnote50

Clearly, Leonhard's thinking on prototype warfare at the time was shaped by existing debates on the so-called Revolution of Military Affairs of the late 1990s. His ideas were also informed by military strategic thinking as it developed within the doctrine of network-centric warfare, as part of which military strategists proposed to decentralise military organisation, drawing from insights and the vocabulary offered by complexity theory and the information sciences.Footnote51 Leonhard writes for instance that ‘[o]ne of the most exciting technologies of twenty-first century warfare is that of “situational awareness”’, which is to be attained through a ‘network of computers’ through which a military commander and his subordinates would see each other digitally.Footnote52 This network of computers would free militaries ‘forever from the need for mass-based control’ and allow them ‘to come at the enemy in a patternless fashion that defies anticipation and complicates the enemy's understanding’.Footnote53 Prototype warfare would entail a shift away from mass as a means of control and towards ‘patternless maneuver’ or ‘precision maneuver’ enabled by digital communications and a decentralised and networked military command structure.Footnote54

Tracing its origins this way, we can see how prototype warfare does not present a clear epistemological break with conceptions of decentralised control and information superiority as they have been central to the doctrine of network-centric warfare. Indeed, to a large extent, the emergence of the prototype warfare concept appears to be about fulfilling earlier promises of a fully legible and malleable battlefield, this time by taking advantage of the technological advances that AI and new digital technologies appear to afford. Understood as such, the emergence of prototype warfare as a concept within Western military discourse and practice should be situated against the background of a highly performative and speculative rhetoric around the transformative potential of AI, specifically in relation to its proclaimed ability to improve and accelerate military decision-making,Footnote55 or the way in which it can ‘sift through today's data-rich environment’, as a report by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) puts it.Footnote56 At the same time, prototype warfare is rooted in the widely shared belief across Western militaries that existing military innovation and acquisition strategies are excessively cumbersome and slow, and insufficiently capable of incorporating the latest technological advances. This is seen as particularly problematic in the context of what is presented as a wider technological competition in which competitors such as China and Russia are contesting Western technological superiority, or are at least narrowing the technology gap. Set against the backdrop of this global ‘technological adoption race’,Footnote57 prototype warfare, as it is being articulated by Western militaries, represents and calls for a distinct approach to military innovation that centres on the rapid deployment of, and ongoing experimentation with, a smaller quantity of tailored systems. The main rationale is that prototyping enables militaries to adopt new technologies quicker, produce them at a lower cost, and increase the level of surprise.Footnote58 Experimentation underpins this practice of prototyping as it ‘puts prototypes into the Warfighter's hands for assessment in an operational context’ and allows for an ongoing process of adaptation and learning.Footnote59

Within the US context, prototyping and experimentation first appeared as central strategic concepts within the context of the so-called Third Offset Strategy that was announced by the US DoD under President Barack Obama to sustain US military dominance within the broader field of AI.Footnote60 Under the Third Offset, the US DoD launched a range of new programmes and offices, including Better Buying Power 3.0, a set of policies aimed at strengthening and streamlining US DoD innovation, which focused on ‘increas[ing] the use of prototyping and experimentation’,Footnote61 and the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx, now DIU), which was meant to be ‘accelerating the adoption of commercial technology throughout the military and growing the national security innovation base’.Footnote62 In so doing, DIU partners with the private sector ‘including firms and academic institutions outside DoD's traditional orbit’,Footnote63 and operates on the basis of a new type of contracting, called Other Transactions, that can be used for prototyping activities. This allows the DIU to award ‘prototype projects without the onerous rules and regulations of the traditional defense acquisition process’.Footnote64

In parallel with these strategic initiatives at DoD level, different service branches within the US military have established and expanded initiatives to increase the use of prototyping and experimentation. For instance, the US Army is investing, prototyping and experimenting under Army Futures Command, a new command structure founded in 2018, based in Houston, Texas. Army Futures Command hosts the annual Army Expeditionary Warrior Experiment, which is described as a ‘live prototype assessment’ with soldiers and units, and a ‘perfect laboratory to bring industry, army labs, academia and the acquisition community together’.Footnote65 Army Futures Command also leads Project Convergence, described as ‘the centerpiece of the Army's campaign of learning’,Footnote66 as part of which the Army organises experiments every two weeks, culminating in an annual demonstration, to ‘take the service's big ideas for future warfare and test them in the real world’.Footnote67 Similarly, the US Air Force established the Research Laboratory's Strategic Development Planning and Experimentation Office in 2016 to ‘institutionalize experiments as regular practice in the Air Force’.Footnote68 Part of the Air Force Laboratory is AFWERX, a dedicated innovation unit that serves to facilitate the integration of commercial technology into the Air Force and that operates its own investment fund, AFVentures, to attract private investment and target early stage companies working on emerging technology.Footnote69

In the UK, the prototype warfare concept has also gained traction and informed a wide range of new activities and programmes. The British Army embraces prototype warfare as their main new approach to warfighting, defining it as ‘a pathway to deliberately enable research, innovation, experimentation, demonstration then delivery – rapidly’ and as ‘an opportunity designed to secure competitive advantage via trial and error and adaptation’.Footnote70 Prototype warfare within the British Army is driven by the Army Rapid Innovation and Experimentation Laboratory, an innovation unit that ‘aims to bring expertise and cutting-edge technologies into direct contact with Army users’, thereby ‘challenging perceived barriers to the rapid prototyping and exploitation’.Footnote71 In 2022, the Army will open its new British Army Battle Lab, which will feature as the physical manifestation of the Army Rapid Innovation and Experimentation Laboratory, or as an ‘engineering workshop’ where soldiers and industry meet in a shared space to develop ideas and experiment with technology.Footnote72 Experimentation will also take place as part of the Army's newly established Enhanced Light Force Battalion (ELFB), a unit that sits ‘at the vanguard of the Army's approach to prototype warfare and develop capabilities to be tested on exercises and operations’.Footnote73 Stationed in Cyprus, the main purpose of the unit is to be ‘“supercharging experimentation”’ by trialling new technologies and integrating them into actual Army operations and way of fighting.Footnote74

To give a final example, in The Netherlands, the Defense Innovation Strategy, which was published by the Dutch Ministry of Defense (MoD) in 2018, strongly relies on prototyping and experimentation as a means of innovation.Footnote75 Among the range of initiatives announced by the strategy is the deployment of Concept Development & Experimentation (CD&E), described as a specific approach to innovation that is based on the implementation of small-scale experiments and shorter innovation cycles.Footnote76 In operationalising this CD&E approach, the Dutch MoD has established a variety of so-called field labs, where the military implements and tests specific ideas and technologies in collaboration with private partners, such as start-ups and (technical) universities. The Dutch Army has taken the lead in this space, creating, among other ‘labs’, the Robots and Autonomous Systems (RAS) unit and the Land Information Manoeuvre Center (LIMC), further discussed in the below. Both have embraced prototyping and experimentation to gain ‘real-world’ experience with new digital and autonomous technologies and demonstrate their value to the Dutch armed forces, seizing opportunities and taking action outside of formal frameworks of military acquisition and often without formal permission.

In summary, while not a new concept, prototype warfare has in recent years been gaining traction across Western military discourse and practice. Driven by a highly speculative rhetoric around the potential of AI technology and the problematisation of existing military innovation and acquisition strategies in the context of a performative global technological competition, prototype warfare operates as the strategic concept under which the experimental way of warfare is taking shape, assembling a range of new and experimental practices, technologies, and interactions. Prototype warfare is also the concept under which experimental practice and experimentation with new technologies is taken more explicitly into the (simulated) battlespace, or near the edge of battle. As a US Army Colonel puts it, ‘the idea is the sooner we can bring things out here, get them in the dirt, get them in soldiers hands, the sooner we can learn’.Footnote77 Again, while the military has a much longer history of engaging in experimental learning in actual operations or as part of simulated exercises, gaming and scenario planning, what is different in today's context is how experimentation becomes very much the end goal. In prototype warfare, the aim is to experiment on a constant basis, with the purpose of constant learning, optimising, and innovating. In this context, experimentation is supposed to happen throughout, in peacetime training and in actual combat, as part of a continuous cycle of learning and optimisation, and uninterrupted by failure.Footnote78 By extension, I argue that this means that military intervention becomes itself reconfigured – and justified – as a learning experience and opportunity for further experimentation. Politically, much is at stake here: if warfighting becomes in and of itself experimental and failure instructive, how can we then resist military intervention in the experimental way of warfare?

### 2NC---Serial Policy Failure

#### Turns the case---the logic of the US “lagging behind or “losing the race” is used to generate more threats – this serves to justify the expansion of the US war machine and results in serial policy failure

Nima Shirazi & Adam Johnson 20, Nima Shirazi is a co-creator & co-host of citation needed podcast and Board Member @ Proteus Fund, Adam Johnson is a co-host of citation needed, “Episode 117: The Always “Lagging” U.S. War Machine”, Citations Needed, 09/09/2020, <https://citationsneeded.medium.com/episode-117-the-sl-lagging-u-s-war-machine-52b8960aedc3> \\pairie

We just can’t win. We’re perma-lagging. So this was written by Charles Beames. The bio in the op-ed says Beames, quote, “is executive chairman at York Space Systems” which is kind of buried, without mentioning that York Space Systems at the time was up for a major government contract that would have benefited greatly from the policies the piece was lobbying for. In Spring of 2020, Beames’s small firm was awarded a $450,000 contract for “SPACE VEHICLE MAINTENANCE, REPAIR, AND CHECKOUT SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT V126 TRANSPORTATION/TRAVEL/RELOCATION- TRANSPORTATION: SPACE TRANSPORTATION/LAUNCH.” So that’s just one contract, they may have others. So here you have someone who’s, I mean, so much of these things, again, whether or not they’re laundered through think tanks are directly the corporate CEOs themselves or they are military brass whose careers are based on the acquisition of funds, they’re just marketing tools basically. This is just like any other, anyone who’s ever worked in marketing, getting an op-ed on CNN saying, ‘Man, we really need to buy all this stuff. Oh, incidentally, my firm happens to sell this’ would seem like a sort of conflict of interest you’d want to disclose but again, if you sort of keep it a half a degree removed, then it’s just normal journalism.

Nima: Right now I know we’ve mentioned the United States outspending every other country on the planet by a lot when it comes to military spending. It’s very similar in terms of the US outspending its supposedly adversaries like China and Russia when it comes to this space race. You wouldn’t know it from these articles — we’re always lagging behind — but according to account by the Massachusetts-based Union of Concerned Scientists, the US military and other government agencies, universities and private companies together operated over 1,300 satellites as of March 2020. China, in contrast, operates 363 satellites and Russia itself has 169 satellites. So the United States has exponentially more satellite capability. NASA’s 2020 budget was more than $22 billion, while the White House’s 2021 federal budget request allotted $15.4 billion to the newly formed Space Force. So yeah, the US leads the world in space spending. It’s not even close. Closest behind the US budget in this regard is China, which spends a mere $8 billion, according to the Space Foundation, a US nonprofit that tracks these things, and despite the impression that China wants to accelerate military combat in space, China is actually called the Space Force a, quote, “direct threat to outer space peace and security” end quote. Meanwhile, Russia’s own government run space agency has kind of pulled back on its own budget. In 2014 it was about $5 billion, six years later, this year, 2020, it is only $1.7 billion.

Adam: So one of the things I can’t do is I can’t tell you how many times in the stories the US has simultaneously said to be lagging behind, and then the very next section they say, the US’s dominance is being threatened.

Nima: (Laughs.) Right.

Adam: And I think what they mean by lagging behind, they mean if I’m the LA Lakers and I’m playing a high school basketball team, and we’re only up 20 points, they’d be like we’re lagging behind the expectations to be up 40 points. So of course no one’s really being lagged behind here but the average reader reads that and they think, ‘Oh my gosh, you know, we’re going to lose primacy to the evil Chicoms and Ruskies.’ This is also very common in cyber security and other technology. CNN in November of 2017, quote, “US risks losing artificial intelligence arms race to China and Russia,” reads the headline. Note the headline doesn’t even bother with “according to US officials” or “according to NATO” or “according to US military spokesman,” it’s just asserted as fact. The whole premise is propped up by statements from Deputy Defense Secretary Robert Work. Quote, “More than 60 years after a space race rivalry with the Soviet Union ushered in a new era of ballistic missile development, the US is facing another ‘Sputnik moment.’” A lot of these articles talk about the Sputnik moment. It’s sort of think-tankese for ‘Oh, we could be caught off guard by being inferior. We were beaten for 10 minutes in 1957.’

Nima: It’s the same way any article about Iran talks about the hostage crisis. It’s that kind of poke in the eye that will never be forgiven, and therefore the US foreign policy of vengeance will continue in perpetuity.

Adam: Other sources of the article in fact, the only other sources included in the article, are a September report from the RAND Corporation, which of course is 90 percent funded by the Defense Department, State Department and, quote, “former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel.” So again, it’s just the military saying the military needs more money. Not a surprise. I wish citations had more money. Marketplace.com, August of 2018, headline reads, “U.S. lagging behind in race for tech supremacy.” The article uncritically cites a report from the Atlantic Council, which was done in tandem with the company Qualcomm.

CNBC, the next year, the headline read, “The US is falling behind China in crucial race for AI dominance.” This was written by Frederick Kempe, President and CEO of the Atlantic Council who was the main source of the previous article we mentioned. The Atlantic Council, of course their major funders are, aside from oil companies and US and state governments are very much weapons contractors. Major donors include Lockheed Martin, Boeing, BAE Systems, Raytheon, Palantir, as well as direct financing from NATO itself.

So you’ll be surprised to learn that the Atlantic Council always thinks we’re behind. The Hill, July 2019, the headline reads, “US risks falling behind China on technology and innovation, if we don’t reset our priorities.” It’s potentially a paid op-ed. The Hill’s unusual in that it actually lets people pay you to write for them, which is not usually standard practice. It’s actually very frowned upon. But this is an op-ed by Robert Hormats, who’s VP of Kissinger Associates, a global consultancy firm with a ton of weapons contractor clients and government clients, sort of a who’s who of the deep state as it were.

Nima: Don’t let the name fool you, it actually does mean Henry Kissinger.

Adam: He is a former vice president of Goldman Sachs and is on the board of directors of, you guessed it, the Atlantic Council. So again, you have this idea that we’re always lagging being because that’s what they get paid to say. As one would expect the US budget exceeds that of the countries we’re allegedly falling behind. The US is legitimately lagging in some areas of technological development, we should be clear, and there are certain aspects like we have less naval ships than China, for example, but we also have far less naval ships than North Korea, because naval ships includes little tiny little boats, we also have far more aircraft carriers than China, which is really what matters. So people always sort of find it, you know, Mitt Romney did this line where he says the US’s Navy is smaller than it was during World War I and Obama replied, ‘Well, we also have less horses and buggies and bayonets.’ So like, you can always sort of twist anything and make it look like we’re behind but the one sort of objective reference point is how much money is allotted to it. That’s sort of a good way of looking at it and no matter how you look at it, the US out spends everyone on nukes, on ships, on AI capacity, on online disinformation, you name it, we spend more money. So either we’re spending the money badly, or we’re just pissing away money, or the US isn’t actually really lagging behind, it’s just a kind of permanent threat.

For example, the US cybersecurity budget in 2020 was $17.4 billion, almost $800 million increase over the previous year, whereas China’s government cybersecurity project was $7 billion. So again, we go back to the budget, we’re sort of not lagging behind. Before we talk to Jim, I want you to envision a headline, in cnn.com, you open your browser window and you see the headline, ‘US government officials: Actually we have all the money we need.’ Or imagine this headline in NPR, ‘NATO spokesman or the RAND Corporation New Report: US’s Military Supremacy in Pacific is Fully Funded and Totally Okay,’ you would never see that. God forbid you would even see this, which is, you know, a headline in NBC.com. ‘US General: We actually have more money than we need, we’d like to give this excess billion dollars to healthcare or to give to first responders of coronavirus healthcare,’ this would just not happen right? Because all they do all the time is say they don’t have enough money, because what the fuck else would you say? That’s what your job is, your job is like any other startup or any other business, which is you’re always fundraising, you’re always raising money and think tanks provide the foe academic veneer of an industry who’s like any other industry, especially ones that are totally parasitic, which they mostly are, which is to just keep fucking sucking the blood off of the public till.

Nima: And that’s why everything is always positioned as a race. There’s a space race, there’s an arms race, there’s an AI arms race, the cybersecurity arms race, the propaganda arms race, we don’t want to lose the race and so when you position things as a race, we’re always trying to catch up and overtake and win and when you position things like that, you can just continually make the argument that we need more power, more speed, more money. So to talk more about this, we are going to be joined by friend of the show Jim Naureckas of Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting, FAIR, where he has edited FAIR’s print publication Extra! since 1990. Jim will join us in just a moment. Stay with us.

### 2NC---Turns Asia War

#### The liberal international order is just military orientalism---it causes Asian war---Korea military occupation proves

Inderjeet Parmar 18, Parmar is a professor of international politics @ the University of London & an honorary research Fellow @ then university of Manchester, “The US-led liberal order: imperialism by another name?”, 2018, International Affairs 94 [\\pairie](file:///\\pairie)

CFR and State Department wartime planning was therefore driven above all by a vision of global–imperial leadership exercised by US elites, strongly supported by Britain’s ruling elites, via an international order of organizations and relationships.61 The aim was, acting in concert with Britain’s elites, to resurrect European Great Powers by means including the restoration of shattered colonial trading and economic and financial linkages. The Marshall Plan viewed European reconstruction in just that global context.62 The UN was envisaged as a key international agency for American imperial internationalism, at least in its earliest days63—and, as its role in the making of South Korea shows, it remains the official basis of America’s role in that country today. And, as I will show below, the building of a hegemonic multilateral order indicates the significance of a Gramsci–Kautsky synthesis.

The UN and Korea

The manner of America’s division of Korea, including its military occupation, its foundation of the republic in the South and the war to sustain the division, is highly instructive as to the character of the new world order that the superpower sought to build and of its actual conduct as opposed to its publicly stated claims. Observable behaviour fell far short of the tenets of human rights, the rights of civilians, and the rule and due process of national and international law. The building and consolidation of a South Korean ruling elite and its narrow but important base in civil society—incorporating critical friends and friendly critics—undermines liberal explanations and supports the Gramscian–Kautskyian perspective.

Shortly after detonating two atomic bombs over Japan in August 1945, the United States divided the Korean peninsula at the 38th parallel, offering the Soviet Union the northern sector and claiming the southern for itself. At that time, the Soviet Union chose not to take control of the entire peninsula, despite American forces’ unreadiness to effect an occupation of any portion of the Korean peninsula. Upon subsequently occupying southern Korea several weeks later, however, the United States declared it ‘semi-hostile’ territory and applied military law, using Japanese colonial laws and police methods, reinforcing the national police and bringing in the extreme right-wing, anti-communist Syngman Rhee, who had been absent from the country for decades, as putative leader to head the fight against the popularly established people’s committees that had declared a provisional government.64

In brief, popular uprisings in support of an independent unified Korean government led to massive repression even before the outbreak of the (civil) war. The violence preceding the outbreak of war in June 1950 saw the deaths of 100,000 people. Thereafter, the United States, going into action even before the UN had passed a Security Council resolution authorizing military action, waged a military campaign against North Korea of rare ferocity. Obliteration and saturation bombing led to millions of deaths. The American mission in Korea was formally undertaken under the banner of the UN, but the UN had little or no voice in the ‘police action’.65

The creation of South Korea as a separate independent state resulted from extreme US pressure on the UN Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) which was authorized by the UN to hold national elections in the whole of Korea (North and South).66 The United States effectively forced UNTCOK to go ahead with elections in the South in 1948 against the will of the majority of its inhabitants, apart from Syngman Rhee’s conservative party and the national police, the two most extreme right-wing organizations in southern Korea. All other organizations from across the political–ideological spectrum—including labour organizations, farmers, women, students and youth groups—had opposed elections on the grounds that right-wing violence had made free and fair polling a virtual impossibility. Hence the declaration by UNTCOK that elections were fairly held in South Korea was used as a pretext by the United States in the UN to win recognition of the Republic of Korea as a sovereign state. UNTCOK observed a mere 2 per cent of polling stations during the 1948 elections.67 After the declaration of the Republic of Korea, the North also declared itself a sovereign state as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Thus the very creation of South Korea entailed a violation of agreements made at the UN and between the United States and the Soviet Union.68

American military violence in Korea has been characterized as ‘military orientalism’,69 in which racist attitudes about the character of Koreans and Chinese and assumptions of their general inferiority play a prominent part.70 According to Bruce Cumings, Anglo-American atrocities outnumbered those carried out by North Korean and Chinese troops by a proportion of six to one.71 Reginald Thompson, the Daily Telegraph correspondent in Korea, noted that US marines considered Koreans apes, not humans, and rained death on them on an unprecedented scale. It was machines versus men, warfare reminiscent of colonial-era wars, with liberal use of napalm in obliteration bombing by B-52s that inflicted ‘holocausts of death’, eliminating distinctions between combatants and civilians.72

General MacArthur ordered relentless bombing to create ‘“a wilderness of scorched earth”’. North Korea was carpet-bombed for three years with 635,000 tons of bombs (half the total dropped on Germany in the Second World War, and more than in the entire Pacific theatre between 1941 and 1945) and 32,000 tons of napalm. Massive casualties resulted: deaths of somewhere between 2.5 and 4 million Koreans, 900,000–1,000,000 Chinese, 54,000 Americans and nearly 700 66 The UNTCOK papers in the UN archives in New York show, among other things, the near-total lack of legitimacy of the foreign occupation and of any elections planned by the US military government. 67 UNTCOK papers, UN archives, New York, S-0684, box 2, file 1. 68 The UNTCOK papers for 1947–8 catalogue right-wing repression and violence, the control of UNTCOK by the US military government, the anti-communist framing of Korean conditions by US Commanding General Hodge, the violation of election laws, intimidation and murder. The forces of repression were policing the elections. See also interview with Harding Bancroft, UN Political Affairs officer in the State Department, UN Oral History Project, 17 Dec. 1990 (UN archives). 69 Tarak Barkawi and Keith Stanski, eds, Orientalism and war (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012). 70 UNTCOK papers, S-0684, box 2, file 1. 71 Journalist James Cameron reported atrocities committed by South Korean troops at a concentration camp in Pusan: ‘I had seen Belsen, but this was worse. This terrible mob of men—convicted of nothing, un-tried, South Koreans in South Korea, suspected of being “unreliable” had been starved and chained while US officers took photographs.’ When Cameron took the report to UNTCOK, he was told: ‘Most disturbing, yes; but remember these are Asian people, with different standards of behavior’: Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, Korea: the unknown war (London: Viking, 1990; first publ. 1988), pp. 92, 146. 72 Reginald Thompson, Cry Korea (London: MacDonald, 1951). The US-led liberal order: imperialism by another name? 165 International Affairs 94: 1, 2018 Britons.73 Almost from the very beginning of the war, Truman and MacArthur threatened to use atomic weapons;74 MacArthur advocated dropping 20 small atomic bombs across Korea to create a no-man’s-land between South Korea and China. There was a general belief that Asians were weak and could not possibly stand up to relentless high-technology American firepower; but also a feeling of humiliation among military and civilian leaders that the weakest ‘communist satellite’—North Korea—was beating the United States. US military operations in Korea cost around US$70 billion. A small, largely rural country saw between 40 and 90 per cent of all its urban areas destroyed; even after just a few months, North Korea had no targets of any worth to bomb.75

Military orientalism prolonged the war and increased casualties.76 It also created the main barrier to ending hostilities by preventing an agreement on the return of prisoners of war. As this was defined as a war between races and cultures as much as between freedom and slavery, barbarism and the rule of law, both Truman and the military commanders on the ground wanted to make Asians pay for their resistance.77 Hence, in violation of the Geneva Conventions on compulsory and swift return of enemy prisoners of war, the Anglo-Americans demanded all prisoners be ‘screened’ to see whether they wished to return to North Korea or China, thereby prolonging the war.78 The veil of ‘voluntary repatriation’ allowed the torture and punishment of Chinese and North Koreans in prison camps run by Syngman Rhee and Kuomintang forces, leading to thousands of killings, as reported by numerous press agencies, the International Commission of the Red Cross, and British, Canadian and US troops who had policed the PoW camps.79 Anglo-American allegations of torture of western troops in Chinese and North Korean camps were undermined by later US Army studies of released US PoWs who reported generally good treatment rather than torture.80

After the ceasefire of 1953, the United States helped build a repressive state in South Korea with consistently high levels of military and economic aid that sustained a dictatorial regime headed by Rhee until his overthrow by popular rebellion in 1960. Simultaneously, but at a highly restricted level—in contrast to generous aid for police and military institutions, training, arms, etc.—the 73 Halliday and Cumings, Korea, pp. 201, 115. 74 Truman ordered Strategic Air Command to dispatch atomic bombs to the Far East (30 Nov. 1950) and authorized dummy runs from waters off North Korea: see Halliday and Cumings, Korea, pp. 123–4. 75 Parmar, ‘Racial and imperial thinking’. 76 ‘As soon as those North Koreans see an American uniform . . . they’ll run like hell’, was the general belief. See Russell A. Gugeler, Combat actions in Korea 3, Army Historical Series (Washington DC: Center of Military History, 1970). Military historian Walter Karig called Korea an example of ‘Indian warfare’ because the foe ‘scorns all rules of civilized warfare’: Bruce Cumings, ‘Occurrence at Nogun-Ri Bridge’, Critical Asian Studies 33: 4, 2000, pp.509–526. The war’s racist character was clear to State Department officers at the UN; see interview with Harding Bancroft. 77 John Dower, War without mercy (New York: Norton, 2000). 78 Wilfred Burchett and Alan Winnington, Koje unscreened (Beijing: Britain–China Friendship Association, 1953). 79 David Morgan, ‘AP: US allowed Korean massacre in 1950’, CBS News, 5 July 2008, http://www.cbsnews. com/news/ap-us-allowed-korean-massacre-in-1950/, accessed 15 November 2013. For more on the 138 massacres by US forces, see Dong Choon Kim, ‘Forgotten war, forgotten massacres—the Korean War (1950–53) as licensed mass killing’, Journal of Genocide Research 6: 4, 2004, pp. 523–44. 80 Eugene Kinkead, Why they collaborated (London: Longman, 1959). Over 20 Americans chose to live in China; not a single soldier tried to escape; large numbers collaborated with their captors. Inderjeet Parmar 166 International Affairs 94: 1, 2018 social basis was laid of a narrow elite democracy, or at least a ‘liberal’ leadership: a modernizing elite in a parastatist civil society (state-sanctioned/approved/ permitted), working within the system as friendly critics or critical friends of the regime.81 In effect, this was an elite fostered in preparation for a period in the future when repression and dictatorship would become unsustainable in a radical nationalist populace with leftist tendencies and a desire to reunify the country. Indeed, by the 1980s, as popular unrest grew, US strategy had shifted towards ‘democracy promotion’ (the initial move in this direction actually beginning with the end of the Vietnam War) as the basis of ‘stability’.82

### 2NC---Turns Russia War

#### Turns case---their fear of a Russia war is self-reinforcing and is just part of a broader narrative of US exceptionalism

Kari Roberts 16, Kari Roberts joined the Policy Studies Department in 2009. She received her BA (Hons) and MA in Political Studies from the University of Manitoba and her PhD in Political Science from the University of Calgary in 2004, “Why a Normal Relationship with Russia is so Hard: Russophobia in Clinton-era American foreign policy discourse and the decision to expand NATO,” Mount Royal University, 05/21/2016, p7-9 [\\pairie](file:///\\pairie)

Lieven speculates that the intellectual basis for this Russophobia may stem from 19th Century British propaganda regarding Russian expansionism and its inherent wickedness. Lieven notes that this demonization of other peoples, sometimes taking on a racist tone, has long been present within Western, and American, foreign policy making. 34 Moreover, there is a tendency to assume that what was once assumed about a nation and its peoples shall forever be true about them, even in the absence of supporting evidence. This sort of historical determinism denies a nuanced appreciation for cultural evolution and very much denies the potential for American leaders to view post-Soviet Russia’s disappointing struggles with democracy for what they are. Instead, they have been viewed against the backdrop of Russia’s Tsarist and Communist experiences and are therefore “wicked.”35 This is evidenced by Henry Kissinger’s 2000 remark that Russian imperialism has continued for centuries, characterized by subjugation of its neighbours and “overawing those not under its direct control” and in Zbigniew Brzezinski’s assigning of blame for Stalinist-era policies to present day Russians.36 For Lieven, to view past conduct as less a product of history and more a product of culture or “national DNA” of sorts, comes perilously close to racism. There is a certain essentialism in the American discourse on Russia that equates these acts with “Russianness.” Perhaps, as Tsygankov suggests, demonizing Russia continued to help justify US strategy toward the USSR in the Cold War. For Lieven, this legitimized the military buildup, the containment, the worldview and actions that stemmed from the need to balance Soviet power.37 Yet, as Lieven importantly notes, even those who demonize Russia for its past seem to have little problem embracing Communist China, 38 so perhaps it is not communism in Russia’s past the Western leaders fear, but rather something cultural, something innately “Russian.”

Lieven concurs about the self-reinforcing nature of Russophobia, noting the US’ “need for enemies”39 as an instrumental component of its own narrative of exceptionalism. Perhaps the result of viewing Russia as the enemy for so long is the reason it has become one. Russophobia has enabled the judging of Russia “by utterly different standards than those applied to other countries.”40 Tsygankov and Lieven are correct to suggest a linkage between Russophobia and America’s own mythologies about its place in the world. America’s destiny is to be a cultural hegemon atop the global hierarchy of nations. The perception of American superiority seems to require an “other” to assume a position of inferiority. Russia has long represented a new cultural frontier and a divergent history, one that was assumed to be far less “exceptional” than the American experience. Challenges to the presumption of American hegemony have often been met with not simply disagreement, but a de-legitimizing of the very existence of the ‘other.’ Russia is not immune from ideas of exceptionalism and the two nations have perpetuated a soft rivalry that possesses “nationalist phobias” 41 that can be mutually reinforcing.

Gertan Dijkink acknowledges that this “gross distinction between East and West as opposite cultures” is part of the US discourse on Russia.42 For Dijkink, this does not have to be addressed directly, or be part of a public discussion, because it has become “naturalized,” or considered to be common sense. He notes that experience and discourse create an imaginative geography of the outside world, which contributes to the construction of visions of the world.”43 Dijkink notes that, after all, “American foreign policy aims to perpetuate, serve and affirm the American way of life,” 44 thus helping to explain why Russia’s alternative to “the American way,” presents a challenge. Georg Lofflman confirms the impact of 32 Ibid., pp.. 67, 71. 33 Anatol Lieven, “Against Russophobia,” World Policy Journal 17:4 (Winter 2000-2001), p. 25. 34 Ibid., p. 26. mythology on discourse and the influence on foreign policy outcomes.45 Myths shape identity, become themselves part of identity, and influence action. It is reasonable to suggest that American exceptionalism influences Russophobia. If the US is unique, its values superior, and therefore its preeminence in the international system assumed, and if Russia fundamentally challenges these values – America’s very identity – in some way, then fear of what Russia represents may be a consequence. Putin himself famously warned Americans in 2013 of the dangers of seeing themselves as exceptional.46

Richard Sakwa notes the difficult time US leaders have had accepting Russia as an equal.47 Russia did not see itself as a defeated power after the Cold War and conducted itself as such, a view in opposition to the prevailing Washington narrative. Sakwa notes that Russia as a democratic state was no less revisionist than Russia as a communist state and that this was threatening to the existing world order that presumed the hegemony of western liberal ideas. 48 Even though Russian foreign policy was actually fairly unthreatening, and could even be characterized as collaborative for many years, it was not universally viewed this way because of the geopolitical threat it was perceived to represent.49 Sakwa also claims that some of the anti-Russianism has a strong basis in history, as Russia has never really been considered to be a part of Europe. Its very presence has motivated European integration; post WWII European identity was constructed on the basis of Russian exclusion, a reality that was confirmed by decades of the Cold War. That the fear of Russia and the exclusionary attitude toward Russia persist, driven largely by the United States and the derivative suspicion of Russia from the Cold War period, is problematic but not surprising.50

Russophobia in Western discourse has been written about, by Russians themselves - poets and writers - for nearly two centuries.51 Some have suggested that Russian fears of American Russophobia fuel a siege mentality present within Moscow since the end of the Cold War. Russophobia has had an impact; it has influenced the manner in which Russia approaches its own relations with the West. Valentina Feklyunina confirms that the assumption of American Russophobia by Russians themselves has shaped Russia’s self perception, and more importantly it has shaped Russia’s expectations for how foreign nations will engage with them. 52 Russian leaders anticipate anti-Russianism in their dealings with the West, which shapes and perpetuate an “us vs. them” discourse among Russian decision makers that may be reinforcing the narrative of fear in Washington.

## AT — Realism

### 2NC — AT: Neorealism

#### Neorealism structurally guarantees resource conflicts through securitization.

Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed 12, an international security analyst specialising in the historical sociology and political ecology of mass violence. He is Executive Director at the Institute for Policy Research and Development, and Associate Tutor at the Department of International Relations, University of Sussex, “The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society,” Global Change, Peace & Security, 23:3, 335-355, DOI: 10.1080/14781158.2011.601854 [ML]

Ultimately, this theoretical hypothesis on the causes of environmental or resource-related conflict is incapable of engaging with the deeper intersecting global structural conditions generating resource scarcities, independently of insufficient government management of the internal distribution of resources in weak states. It simplistically applies the Hobbesian assumption that without a centralised ‘Leviathan’ state structure, the persistence of anarchy in itself generates conflict over resources. Under the guise of restoring the significance of the biophysical environment to orthodox IR, this approach in effect actually occludes the environment as a meaningful causal factor, reducing it to a mere epiphenomenon of the dynamics of anarchy in the context of state failure. As a consequence, this approach is theoretically impotent in grasping the systemic acceleration of global ecological, energy and economic crises as a direct consequence of the way in which the inter-state system itself exploits the biophysical environment. The same criticism in fact applies to opposing theories that resource abundance is a major cause of violent conflict. Bannon and Collier, for instance, argue that resource abundance and greed, rather than resource scarcity and political grievances, generated intra-state conflicts financed by the export of commodities in regions like Angola and Sierra Leone (diamonds) or West Africa (tropical timber). In other regions, abundance rather than shortages of oil, drugs and gold fuelled and financed violent secessionist movements in the context of widespread corruption and poor governance.57 Ultimately, this departs little from the theoretical assumptions above, with weak central state governance still blamed for generating anarchic conditions conducive to conflict over abundant resources. Furthermore, as Kaldor shows, this simplistic perspective overlooks the wider context of the global political economy – the evolution of regional ‘war economies’ was often enabled precisely by the devastating impact of neoliberal structural adjustment programmes, which eroded state structures and generated social crises that radicalised identity politics.58 Under traditional neorealist logic, a strategic response to global environmental crises must involve the expansion of state-military capabilities in order to strengthen the centralised governance structures whose task is to regulate the international distribution of natural resources, as well as to ensure that a particular state’s own resource requirements are protected. Neorealism understands inter-state competition, rivalry and warfare as inevitable functions of states’ uncertainty about their own survival, arising from the anarchic structure of the international system. Gains for one state are losses for another, and each state’s attempt to maximise its power relative to all other states is simply a reflection of its rational pursuit of its own security. The upshot is the normalisation of political violence in the international system, including practices such as over-exploitation of energy and the environment, as a ‘rational’ strategy – even though this ultimately amplifies global systemic insecurity. Inability to cooperate internationally and for mutual benefit is viewed as an inevitable outcome of the simple, axiomatic existence of multiple states. The problem is that neorealism cannot explain in the first place the complex interdependence and escalation of global crises. Unable to situate these crises in the context of an international system that is not simply a set of states, but a transnational global structure based on a specific exploitative relationship with the biophysical environment, neorealism can only theorise global crises as ‘new issue areas’ appended to already existing security agendas.59 Yet by the very act of projecting global crises as security threats, neorealism renders itself powerless to prevent or mitigate them by theorising their root structural causes. In effect, despite its emphasis on the reasons why states seek security, neorealism’s approach to issues like climate change actually guarantees greater insecurity by promoting policies which frame these ‘non-traditional’ issues purely as amplifiers of quite traditional threats. As Susanne Peters argues, the neorealist approach renders the militarisation of foreign and domestic policy a pragmatic and necessary response to issues such as resource scarcities – yet, in doing so, it entails the inevitable escalation of ‘resource wars’ in the name of energy security. Practically, this serves not to increase security for competing state and non-state actors, but to debilitate international security through the proliferation of violent conflict to access and control diminishing resources in the context of unpredictable complex emergencies.60 Neorealism thus negates its own theoretical utility and normative value. For if ‘security’ is the fundamental driver of state foreign policies, then why are states chronically incapable of effectively ameliorating the global systemic amplifiers of ‘insecurity’, despite the obvious rationale to do so in the name of warding off collective destruction, if not planetary annihilation?61

### 2NC — AT: Realism — T/L

#### **Realism fails — neglect of psychological elements.**

Tuomas Forsberg 21, Professor of International Politics at the University of Tampere and Deputy Director of the Centre of Excellence on Choices of Russian Modernization at the Aleksanteri Institute of the University of Helsinki; Christer Pursiainen is Professor of Societal Safety and Environment at the Department of Engineering and Safety, Faculty of Science and Technology, Arctic University of Norway, 2021, “The Psychology of Foreign Policy,” Palgrave Studies in Political Psychology, <https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-79887-1> [ML]

Realism, in its various formulations, has always had a somewhat ambivalent relationship to psychology (Donnelly, 2000, pp. 43–80; Edinger, 2021). Hans Morgenthau (1955), the founder of political realism, warned against the search for the clue to foreign policy exclusively in the motives of state leaders because it was both futile and deceptive. Yet many political realists have still paid a great deal of attention to major figures in international politics and their actions, starting from some implicit psychological analysis on the basis of the leader’s experience or moral characteristics. Political realism assumes rationality as the methodological starting point for analysis, yet Morgenthau (1946, p. 154) himself fundamentally doubted the extent to which foreign policy decision-makers or any human being can be rational; indeed, he called the idea of human rationality a “rationalist superstition.” To the extent that rationality in realism would be tantamount to basing one’s actions on power alone, Reinhold Niebuhr (2013, p. 4; see also Meinecke, 1957, p. 433) in turn admitted that in reality this is not the case: “Politics will, to the end of history, be an area where conscience and power meet, where the ethical and coercive factors of human life will interpenetrate and work out their tentative and uneasy compromises.” Yet neither Morgenthau nor other classical realists provided a clear account of the psychological aspects of foreign policy other than the general deficiency of human nature. Structural realism (neorealism) shifted the angle of the older political realism away from state leaders to the structural conditions of the international system (Elman, 1996). In a vulgar reading of structural realism, it is sometimes maintained that any statesperson would behave in a similar way in given structural conditions. The most visible scholar of offensive realism in the past twenty years or so, John Mearsheimer, argues that Russia’s actions in Ukraine in 2014 should be seen as a self-evident reaction to the West’s aggressive grand strategy: “No Russian leader would tolerate a military alliance that was Moscow’s mortal enemy until recently moving into Ukraine. Nor would any Russian leader stand idly by while the West helped install a government there that was determined to integrate Ukraine into the West” (Mearsheimer, 2014, p. 82, italics added). Hence, the psychological idiosyncrasies of individual decision-makers are completely neglected. Yet Mearsheimer titles his article ‘Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions that Provoked Putin’, revealing the clear psychological microfoundations of the author’s overly structuralist argument.

#### Any amount of complexity shreds realism.

Ross Douthat 22, a *New York Times* columnist and *The Atlantic* senior editor, March 9th, 2022, "They Predicted the Ukraine War. But Did They Still Get It Wrong?" *The New York Times*, <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/09/opinion/ukraine-russia-invasion-west.html> [ML]

It’s a curious feature of Western debate since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine that a school of thought that predicted some version of this conflict has been depicted as discredited by the partial fulfillment of its prophecies.

From the 1990s to the 2010s, from George Kennan’s opposition to NATO expansion to John Mearsheimer’s critique of American involvement in Ukraine, thinkers associated with foreign policy realism — the school known for its cold-eyed expectation of great power conflict, its doubts about idealistic visions of world order — argued that the attempt to integrate Russia’s borderlands into Western institutions and alliances was poisoning relations with Moscow, making great-power conflict more likely, and exposing nations like Ukraine to disastrous risks.

“The West is leading Ukraine down the primrose path,” Mearsheimer averred in 2015, “and the end result is that Ukraine is going to get wrecked.”

But now that Ukraine is, in fact, being wrecked by a Russian invasion, there’s a widespread view that his realist worldview lies in ruins too — that Mearsheimer has “lost his reputation and credibility” (to quote the Portuguese thinker Bruno Maçães) and that the realist conception of nations as “pieces in a game of Risk” with “eternal interests or permanent geopolitical orientations, fixed motivations or predictable goals” (to quote Anne Applebaum of The Atlantic) should be discarded on the evidence of Vladimir Putin’s invasion and the Ukrainian response.

The larger critique of realism that Applebaum and Maçães are speaking for goes something like this: Yes, realists like Mearsheimer predicted some kind of conflict over Ukraine. But realism’s predictions still did not describe reality, for three reasons. First, the predictions imagined a defensive logic to Russian strategic conduct, oriented around the protection of a sphere of influence, a fear of encirclement by NATO. But the decision to invade seems to have been motivated more by Putin’s professed and very personal desire to restore a mystical vision of greater Russia — a grand ideological idea that the mere Western pledge not to admit Ukraine to NATO was unlikely to appease.

Second, the realist predictions underestimated the agency and strength of Ukrainians themselves, treating Russia’s near abroad as a landscape where only great-power force projection really mattered, ignoring Ukraine’s potential capacity — now demonstrated on the battlefield — to resist Russia and rally global support even without direct military support from the United States or NATO.

Finally, the realist predictions drained the moral dimension out of global politics, effectively legitimizing imperialist appetites and “blaming the victim,” as it were, when the moral responsibility for aggression ultimately rests with the aggressor, not with nations merely seeking self-determination or mutual defense.

As someone who considers himself a realist (to the extent that it makes sense for a newspaper columnist to claim such affinities), I think part of this critique has bite. For instance, my sense is that because today’s realist thinkers mostly operate within the liberal West and define themselves against its pieties — especially the globalist utopianism that had so much purchase in the post-Cold War era — there is a constant temptation to assume that nonliberal regimes must be more rational actors, more realist in their practices and aims, than the naïve idealists in America or Europe. And thus when a crisis comes, it must be the unrealism of the West that’s primarily, even essentially, at fault.

You can see this temptation at work in the interview Mearsheimer gave to Isaac Chotiner of The New Yorker, published soon after the Russian invasion began. On the one hand the interview offers a perspicacious realist critique of how idealism led America astray in the George W. Bush era, via a naïve theory of how aggressive war might democratize in the Middle East.

But then when it comes to Putin’s aggressive war, Mearsheimer seems to assume that the Russian president thinks like him, the realist, rather than like the utopian politicians of the West. Putin, he says, “understands that he cannot conquer Ukraine and integrate it into a greater Russia or into a reincarnation of the former Soviet Union.” And if the United States only worked harder “to create friendly relations” with Moscow, Mearsheimer argues, there could be a tacit American-Russian “balancing coalition” against the rising power of China.

But why should Putin necessarily be immune from the hubris and delusions of Western leaders? Why should we assume that he doesn’t dream of reintegrating Ukraine and Belarus into a greater Russia? Why should we take for granted that the right diplomatic strategy will bring him into an American coalition against China, when he might instead be committed to a sweeping ideological vision of Eurasian power aligned against the decadent West?

Why should we assume, in other words, that structural and schematic explanations of Putin’s war are more important than personal and ideological explanations? After all, as the historian Adam Tooze points out, it appears that very few members of the Russian foreign policy elite — all presumably opponents of NATO expansion, all “devotees to Russia’s future as a great power” — actually believed that Putin would invade. And if so many participants in Putin’s regime, all good servants of the national interest as realists define it, wouldn’t have made his fateful choice, then did realist premises actually predict the war itself?

Just as important, did they predict the way the war has played out so far? I myself did not: My assumption was that Ukraine might mount a strong resistance in the western part of its territory, but that Russia would sweep pretty easily to the Dnieper and probably put Volodymyr Zelensky’s government to flight. (Some version of this assumption was shared by U.S. intelligence, which was predicting the quick fall of Kyiv two days into the war.) After almost two weeks of stalled-out offensives and mounting Russian casualties, that faulty assumption does look a bit like a Risk-board view of the world, where all that matters is positioning and pieces, not patriotism, morale, leadership and luck.

And there are a lot of ways that this kind of Risk-board mentality can deceive. Flash back a few decades, for instance, to the late Cold War, and a crude realist analysis might have insisted that Poland would always be in some kind of deep thrall to Russia — because it had so often been dominated by Moscow, its geography left it so open to invasion from the east, and so on — and that it was strategic folly to imagine otherwise. But Polish leadership and patriotism, Soviet weakness and unexpected historical events all contrived to change that calculus, so that today Poland’s strategic independence and Western alignment, while hardly invulnerable, both look relatively secure.

Is it unrealistic for Kyiv to aspire to what Warsaw has gained? Right now I would still say yes. But is it impossible, in the way that some realist thinking tends to suggest — as though some law of physics binds Ukraine to Russia? No: I think anyone watching this war so far, watching both the struggles of the Russian military and the solidifying of a Ukrainian national consciousness, would have to give more credit to long-term Ukrainian ambitions, and a little less to the inevitability of Russian regional dominance.

So those are two places where realist theory, or at least certain intellectual temptations associated with realism, has suffered from its contact with the reality of war so far.

#### Realism can’t explain complex interactions — omits every domestic variable.

Jeremy Garlick 16, Director of the J. Masaryk Centre of International Studies and Associate Professor of International Relations and China Studies at Prague University of Economics and Business, 2016, “Not So Simple: Complexity Theory and the rise of China,” SAGE Publications, DOI: 10.1177/0009445516661884 [ML]

For Waltz, states in the anarchic international system are, according to the well-worn metaphor, like billiard balls bouncing off each other and jostling for position in order to serve their own interests. Waltz’s theory implies that China, like all other states, will compete for power, territory and resources amid the Hobbesian anarchy of the Westphalian system of sovereign states. Waltz’s neorealism is a parsimonious theory which depends on a structural analysis of the international system to predict a dog-eat-dog world of competing states. However, the very parsimony of the theory means, as Humphreys (2006) points out, that its explanatory power is limited and unsatisfactory. For Humphreys, the main problem with Waltzian neorealism lies in the fact that it inexplicably attempts to reduce the complexity of the international system to a single independent variable (anarchic structure). This means that Waltz perceives the international system in a linear fashion, with the independent variable of anarchy (i.e., the ‘war of all against all’) exerting a direct causative effect on states’ behaviour in the international system, leading them to pursue strategies of self-help. The linearity of Waltz’s theory may appear parsimonious and compelling, but, as neoclassical realists and complexity theorists point out, fails to account for complex phenomena in terms, for instance, of how foreign policy impacts upon and is impacted by developments in international affairs (see for instance Bousquet and Curtis 2011; Kavalski 2007; Rathbun 2008; Rose 1998). In the specific case of China’s rise, Waltz’s focus on anarchy tells us that China will compete with other states, but not how. In essence, he does not tell us enough to enable us to see anything beyond a vague picture of China and self-help, undifferentiated from all the other ‘like units’ (states). Waltz’s neorealism cannot predict in what direction China’s rise will take both it and the world in general, beyond a general expectation of competition and increasing influence as China’s capabilities increase. Thus, it does not provide us with any detailed or useful explanation or prediction beyond what is already quite obvious. This is largely because of what Waltz consciously leaves out. He claims that the logic of his structural analysis necessitates omitting ‘attributes and interactions’, by which he means ‘questions about the cultural, economic, political, and military interactions of states’, as well as ‘the kinds of political leaders, social and economic institutions, and ideological commitments states may have’ (1979: 80). Questions concerning ‘environment, situation, context and milieu’ are, according to Waltz, ‘vague and varying systemic notions’ which can be entirely replaced by the analysis of structure alone because they have no explanatory value in a theoretical sense (1979: 80). Waltz does attempt to account for differences in the sizes and capabilities of states, but does not satisfactorily build these factors into his states-as-like-units model. For understanding a rising China, then, there is ostensibly little more that can usefully be gleaned from Waltzian neorealism beyond the general expectation of Hobbesian self-help in an anarchic international system. Because Waltz believes that the international level of analysis has to be sharply demarcated from the domestic, and so he thinks it is necessary to omit all information about China’s culture, economy, politics, and so on, his theory cannot reveal anything about the detailed mechanics of China’s rise on the international stage as the nation interacts and develops its relationships with other actors. On the other hand, neoclassical realism offers an interesting development of Waltzian neorealism, in that it attempts to analyse the complex impact of domestic policy on international affairs. Neoclassical realists such as Rose (1998), Christensen (1996), Wohlforth (1993) and Zakaria (1999) base their theorising on Waltz’s emphasis on structure and anarchy, but attempt to develop his theory further by giving more weight to domestic factors in foreign policy decision-making. Christensen’s (1996) study is particularly interesting for students of China because it attempts to apply a ‘two-level’ analysis of international and domestic factors to Sino-US relations between 1947 and 1958. Neoclassical realists, in essence, claim that neorealism, by focusing exclusively on the international level of analysis, does not account for ‘domestic politics and ideas’ (Rathbun 2008: 294) in its analysis of states’ behaviour at the international level. However, there is disagreement about the value of neoclassical realism, and also about whether neoclassical realists are really doing something different to neorealists in general or just expanding on its ideas about structure and anarchy (see Legro and Moravscik 1999; Rathbun 2008; Vasquez 1997). Two notable neoclassical realists (Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder) have even further muddied the waters by going so far as to decline to take part in a debate about whether they are neorealists or not; they do this on the basis that they neither want to be ‘apologists for neorealism’ nor to attempt to ‘reconcile the heterogeneous arguments’ of scholars who are generally labelled ‘neorealist’ (Christensen and Snyder 1997: 919). The other major weakness of the neoclassical realist project is that it has not yet come to fruition in terms of being fully expounded in theoretical terms. To be specific, while there is value in pointing out that domestic variables need to be incorporated into realist theory, neoclassical realism has not yet managed to convincingly posit an explicit theoretical framework within which this can be done. It is for this reason perhaps that neoclassical realism has been criticised for being ‘an ad hoc and theoretically degenerative effort to explain away anomalies for neorealism’ (Rathbun 2008: 294), ince neoclassical realists’ ‘use of whatever tools are necessary to plug the holes of a sinking ship’ results in ‘paradigmatic incoherence and indistinctiveness’ (Rathbun 2008: 295). There, therefore, remains an obvious need to develop a clear and convincing theoretical framework for neoclassical realism’s attempt to take neorealism in a direction which systematically accounts for the effect of domestic variables on foreign policy. Thus, the possibility that CT might be able to provide the missing link from neorealism to neoclassical realism, by supplying some conceptual tools with which to study the way in which foreign policy interacts with international phenomena, is an intriguing one. In this article it is not possible to do more than point out the need for more research into the possibility of CT providing a set of tools for filling out the internal mechanics of neorealism and neoclassical realism, and to suggest that this could be done in order to attempt to develop a more complete theoretical framework within which to analyse complex international phenomena such as China’s rise.

#### Offensive realism is empirically disproven — WW2 transition from Britain to the US.

Jeremy Garlick 16, Director of the J. Masaryk Centre of International Studies and Associate Professor of International Relations and China Studies at Prague University of Economics and Business, 2016, “Not So Simple: Complexity Theory and the rise of China,” SAGE Publications, DOI: 10.1177/0009445516661884 [ML]

John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism, derived from the same structural principles as Waltz’s ‘defensive’ realism, states unequivocally that a rising power will always challenge a hegemon militarily, an outcome he designates ‘the tragedy of great power politics’ (Mearsheimer 2001). Mearsheimer, thus, consistently and confidently predicts that a rising China will inevitably clash with the USA (Mearsheimer 2006, 2010). Mearsheimer’s hard-and-fast prediction of war between USA and its challenger China gives offensive realism a clear edge over neorealism and constructivism in terms of theoretical falsifiability. Eventually, such a war will either occur or it will not. If global leadership passes from USA to China with or without military confrontation at some point in the 21st century, then Mearsheimer will be proved right or wrong: it is simply a matter of waiting to see. However, Buzan and Cox (2013) point out that there is already one historical case of peaceful power handover that casts doubt upon Mearsheimer’s hypothesis: the transition without military confrontation from British to USA world hegemony in the aftermath of the Second World War. This, they suggest, invalidates Mearsheimer’s assertion of the inevitability of a US–China war, and thus also upon offensive realism’s main tenet. Even if historically the majority of rising powers have challenged hegemons militarily, one exception is sufficient to negate the theory’s predictive power, and to suggest that a peaceful power transition is possible. Mearsheimer also does not expound upon non-militaristic aspects of China’s rise (such as economics and soft power), but focuses exclusively on security issues (see Mearsheimer 2010). So, like neorealism and constructivism, offensive realism emphasises one aspect of China’s rise to the exclusion of all others and thus offers a clear, parsimonious, but not a complete theoretical picture.

### 2NC — AT: All IR theories

#### Every IR grand theory lacks explanatory power — insufficient structural factors.

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We hold that while power relations, societal and cultural norms and identities, or domestic systems and politics, cannot be overlooked as structural conditions or causal factors, in the case of most important foreign policy decisions, this will not suffice. Such structural factors or variables provide the necessary but not sufficient conditions for something to happen. Left alone, as structures without agency, they are nothing more than a frame for various non-predictable actions, some of which may blow back at these structures and modify them. Indeed, a good test case for the predictive and explanatory power of IR grand theories is the aforementioned Russian behavior in respect of the Crimean crisis in 2014. In a poll conducted among 905 American researchers about a week before Russia invaded Crimea (only) 14% of those interviewed responded affirmatively to a question on whether Russia would interfere militarily in Ukrainian affairs. No major differences between the schools—such as realist, constructivist, or liberal—could be detected, although area studies (in-depth knowledge of Russia and the post-Soviet area) performed somewhat better (Maliniak et al., 2014; Voeten, 2014). The striking fact remains that a couple of days prior to the invasion, all IR grand theories failed to anticipate Russia’s behavior on the basis of their respective and rather stable structurally oriented explanatory models, but their advocates still rushed to provide their expected singlefactor explanations of the case right after it materialized (McFaul et al., 2014). This reminds us that concepts such as power, identity, regime type or domestic political determinants are so vague that one can always use them to retrospectively explain an event that was regarded as unlikely beforehand on the basis of the self-same concepts (Forsberg & Pursiainen, 2017). The structural factors, or the dynamics of the agent-structure relationship, are hence not sufficient to fully explain or understand a foreign policy decision, and we may need to consider the psychological factors involved in such a situation. Without understanding the psychological dimension of the main decision-maker(s), namely the notion that beliefs, cognitive biases, personality, and interpersonal relations may play a role, we are not really able to explain some aspects of any decisions. This is not a revolutionary conclusion, but suffices to raise the question of when and how psychology matters. While psychology is always present in human decision-making, some decisions are rather clear-cut from the explicitly pronounced psychological perspective and others more complex. In some cases, psychological factors matter more than in others. We can regard it as an empirical issue when it comes to how much they matter in comparison with a particular baseline. It is one thing to argue that there are psychological mechanisms involved in decision-making and we need to study them, but quite another to say that they are the most important or decisive factors. Peter Hedström and Petri Ylikoski (2010, p. 60) argue that “only those aspects of cognition that are relevant for the explanatory task at hand should be included in the explanation, and the explanatory task thus determines how rich the psychological assumptions must be.” Although psychological mechanisms can only provide partial explanations, they can however sometimes make a crucial difference. Knowledge of rare or weak mechanisms still increases our understanding. When conducting research, we may gain more by revealing new or surprising explanatory mechanisms than proving that the most obvious explanation for an event or a pattern of behavior has something to do with it.

### 2NC — AT: Rational Choice Theory

#### Collapses in on itself.

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The key problem with thin rational choice theory is that it cannot be directly tested. The very meaning of rationality is too broad, and open to post hoc formulations. If the idea of utility is subjective, any action can be explained rationally. Self-interest understood as utility may mean whatever one wishes, including altruism or self-destruction. However, the more open the concept of utility is rendered, the less useful it becomes. When preferences are deduced from the action, they are tautological as explanations and rational choice loses its celebrated predictive power. If rational choice theory explains everything, it explains nothing (Nicholson, 1996; Smelser, 1992, p. 403), in which case it is of little help in explaining human choices. Some IR rational choice theorists think that rational choice is only a partial theory insomuch as it explains states’ behavior when they are behaving rationally (Glaser, 2010, p. 27), but this reasoning becomes circular. The logic is reminiscent of Hans Morgenthau’s (1955) view of political realism concerning the life sphere of a ‘political man’, but not that of a ‘moral’ or ‘religious man’. Further, rational choice theory’s popularity is not necessarily based on rational reasons. Its theorists have not been open to criticism and have been reluctant to consider alternatives to their theory. For example, Donald Green and Ian Shapiro (1994, pp. 6–7) have argued that a large number of rational choice propositions have not been tested empirically. They contend that empirical research applying rational choice has been theory-driven rather than problem-driven, and they suspect that rational choice hypotheses are often formulated in ways that are inherently resistant to genuine empirical testing. Even if they have been tested, they have not been compared with other possible explanations. Hence, proponents of rational choice theory have not followed their own doctrine in weighing the available alternatives and choosing the best among them. In order to be more than a formal theory of modeling, rational choice needs to be modified to a middle-range theory. In this way, it can be part of a larger conceptual toolbox upon which a social theorist can draw when devising tractable theoretical explanations of social phenomena (Rutar, 2020a, 2020b). Yet in order to be a middle-range theory, providing testable hypotheses to begin with, it has to assume more than the idea of utility maximization in the abstract (Wolbring, 2020). In security studies, scholars such as Stephen Walt (1999, p. 8) have seen little value in the increasing volume of very technical research based on rational choice. In his view, “while the formal techniques have facilitated the construction of precise and deductively sound arguments, the problem is that rational choice theorists have generated comparatively few new hypotheses and have for the most part not been tested in a careful and systematic way.” An interesting question arises as to when states rely on a rational choice type of decision-making in practice. A cost–benefit calculus and a probability assessment make sense when the alternatives are numerical. This is the case in trade policy and economic bargaining where the alternatives are known at least with some certainty and can be compared. If there is considerable uncertainty about the expected consequences, a decisionmaking calculus becomes more abstract and various cognitive factors start to play a more significant role. Many rational choice theorists have assumed that the theory is universal; any individual would behave similarly in a similar situation. Positing that this is not literally true—as in reality the adoption of a rational choice type of decision-making depends on the cognitive styles of individuals, or the organizational culture—but an abstraction, rational choice theorists do not see that sensible scope conditions were available. However, Brian Rathbun, Joshua Kertzer and Mark Paradis (2017) have argued that there are individual differences that are traceable to psychological microfoundations, at least on a sliding scale: rationalist foreign policymakers are ego-centric and possess high epistemic motivation. The instrumentally rational archetype, homo diplomaticus, is reflective, engaging and active. In Rathbun’s (2019) view, an instrumentally rational leader relies on an objective analysis of the situation, including taking how the adversary interprets one’s own actions seriously, and conducts careful deliberation before making decisions. Although such leaders do not necessarily have to be realists, a policy of Realpolitik is not possible without such rationality. Rathbun believes that very few state leaders or advisors actually follow such a model of instrumental rationality with any consistency

## Alt

### 2NC---Cosmopolitanism

#### The alternative is to embrace a cosmopolitan ethic

Burke 2015 (Anthony Burke, Professor of Politics and International Relations at the University of New South Wales, “Security cosmopolitanism: the next phase”, <https://doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2015.1065109>) //sethlee

Hence, I disagree with Robinson that we can jettison moral principles or rules entirely in favour of ‘practices of responsibility that emerge in the thick context of sustained social interactions among moral subjects’ or, differently, in favour of what Arendt termed ‘thinking without a banister’, relying on ‘the silent dialogue between me and myself which, since Socrates and Plato, we usually call thinking’ (Arendt 2003, 45). To be sure, there is great value in cultivating practices of social and internal dialogue that resist the reduction of ethics to unthinking habits and procedures, or undemocratic structures of institutional command. However, such practices of responsibility need to be embedded in a deeper level of guidance and commitment, so that we know what ends we should seek, whose voices and interests matter, and what kind of world we ought to try to collectively create on the basis of what we take to exist there. Cosmopolitan calls to move beyond the nation-state, and posthuman calls to push beyond anthropocentrism, are precisely efforts to reshape that fundamental matrix for ethics and politics by expanding our understanding of what exists and matters. In the era of Fox News, Islamic, Christian, and market fundamentalism, anti-scientism, climate denial, and right-wing populism, we cannot rely on the iterative wisdom of social interaction by itself, because there are already background discourses working furiously to instantiate a crippled and divisive vision of common ends that are – quite literally – working to destroy our planet. In the space of international relations, cosmopolitan and posthuman perspectives are of enormous value because they are a metaphysical challenge to existing, architectonic visions of realist-cumliberal global order (Burke 2013b). Such visions of order already prescribe a moral and ethical system that has sunk deep roots in our social and political worlds. It seems selfdefeating to oppose the articulation of alternative visions because of an automatic (and historically warranted) poststructuralist suspicion of universalism. Vulnerable communities and ecologies need the protection of a just and responsive global order, yet many of my critics disdain even thinking on the plane of that order. In this light, cosmopolitanism and the categorical imperative of security have a crucial function that many of the commentaries fail to recognise. By universalising the right to security, by emphasising the determining demand of equality between all humans and the planetary ecology (indeed the moral priority of the ecologies in which humans are existentially embedded), the theory insists that it is no longer permissible to prioritise one state or group’s security over another, or humanity over nature. It is no longer permissible to license structures and responses that undermine fundamental rights or damage the security of others, including non-human others, in defense of the imagined self. The self is dispersed into the world, into the past and future, and our ethics must honour that. The ethics of security cosmopolitanism in fact encodes contestability and context, while setting up crucial boundaries and principles of balance. Principle 1 requires an ongoing and complex dialogue within and between governments, communities, groups, scientists, and policymakers over how to create systems that will preserve the planetary ecology and ‘protect the vital core of human lives in ways that enhance human fulfilment’ across multiple spheres of activity and risk (Burke 2013a, 21; quotations from CHS 2003). Groups may perceive ‘survival, livelihood and dignity’ in different ways; their voices must be heard and honoured, but it is when these differences generate threats to others or a clash over security needs, that dialogue, compromise, and active forms of ameliorative politics must come into play. This includes the discursive dimension: groups must be willing to redefine their understanding of security to take account of the security needs of others and the biosphere. Principles 2 and 3 similarly require dialogue and deliberation, but also science and expertise, because of the challenge of mapping potential futures, the technical complexity of many domains, and the profundity of the responsibility that these principles enact. As earth systems ecology and the nuclear space highlight, there is a challenging need to combine predictive scientific models, probabilistic reasoning, the precautionary principle, and public dialogue to consider potential futures and their associated responsibilities in the now. I regard these future-oriented principles to be the most significant part of the entire theory. Climate scientists and ecologists implicitly grasp their import: as the group that warned the world to restrict global warming to less than 1°C concluded, ‘continuation of high fossil fuel emissions, given current knowledge of the consequences, would be an act of extraordinary witting intergenerational injustice’ (Hansen et al. 2013, 1).

### 2NC---Desecuritize Cybersecurity

#### The alternatives solves the AFF---reject the AFF’s securitization discourse in favor of desecuritizing the cyber threats

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Desecuritisation and cybersecurity

The Kosovo War, the Millennium Bug, and the war on terror acted as catalysts for the emergence of a form of cyber securitisation at a crucial early period in post-Cold War history and demonstrated both how cyberconflict could spill over into the physical realm and geopolitics could spill into the cyber realm. They also provided the political context and ordering ideas and concepts that fed into the emergence of social media networks in the mid-2000s and the recent growth of system-wide cyberattacks, such as Wannacry. But while much of the academic literature on securitisation describes the process by which issues become securitised, the reverse process, where issues are desecuritised, is undertheorized (Coskun 2008) and has not yet been substantively applied to cybersecurity debates and issues. Articulated most clearly by Buzan and Wæver (2003, 489), desecuritisation is ‘a process in which a political community downgrades or ceases to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object and reduces or stops calling for exceptional measures to deal with the threat’. But how can this be achieved and what are the potential obstacles and barriers to cyber desecuritisation more specifically?

If securitisation is a process driven by ontological insecurity, defined here as an erosion of identity and an anxiety created and fuelled by globalisation, then the place to start in a process of cyber-desecuritisation must be to reframe discourse and present cyber ‘threats’ in less apocalyptic, fearful tones. This involves moving towards a normalised and less polemic political debate in which cybersecurity is not continually treated as an emergency but rather as a regular feature of modern political interactions. It also means avoiding the Cold War, WW2, and biological analogies that have dominated cybersecurity discourse. Changing cyber metaphors in this way could lead to better cyber policy and placing emphasis on more positive environmental language, such as ‘healthy ecosystems’, might generate wider discursive progress (Lawson 2012). In other words, if securitisation involves framing an issue as an existential threat, a process of desecuritisation must do the opposite – highlight the real impact and not the expected or likely impact – to ease tensions and fear created by cyberattacks, and to manage threats rather than overreact to them. This will necessarily involve recognising that cyberattacks exacerbate identity divides and working consciously to move past characterisations of cyberattacks as technical tools of state conflict, portraying them instead as extensions of historical, cultural and political disputes within and between states and societal groups. Cyberattacks may have serious consequences, but pose less threat than natural disasters, climate change, nuclear weapons, and biological agents and pandemics. This observation has come into stark relief in the context of COVID 19, which has caused over a million deaths, as opposed to cyberattacks, which, as a result of a recent attack against a hospital in Germany, appear to have now caused just one (Wetsman 2020). As this article has shown, however, the fear they create drives responses that are out of sync with the level of threat involved.

The Copenhagen School itself recognised the utility of these options, describing three core processes that desecuritisation can be based upon. The first is to not talk about issues in terms of security in the first place (Wæver 2000). Cleary, the rhetoric that cyberattacks have created over the last two decades render this option obsolete. However, changing the language from now on, being more cautious about presenting cyberattacks as an existential threat, and toning down the cyber rhetoric could help the process of desecuritisation. Specific policy commitments could be made by governments not to further securitise cyber, to construct common language across domestic and international political entities that does not fuel securitisation processes and, considering the influence of commercial and media entities in the cases described above, to encourage responsible reporting and advertising that does not create fear either to sell newspapers or cybersecurity products.

The second option when an issue has already been securitised, as in the case of cybersecurity, is to avoid creating security dilemmas (societal and interstate). Securitisation in cyberspace has involved the implementation of defensive measures to protect computer networks. These include technical, human and virtual tools. But defensive actions can be interpreted as offensive ones. This is the nature of the security dilemma. The blurring of the disti2nction between cyberattack and defence, and the creation of modes of ‘active cyber defence’ and pre-emptive network intrusions, has furthered the mistrust and misperception that exist between prominent cybersecurity actors. In the most substantive analysis of security dilemmas in cyberspace, Ben Buchanan (2016) argues that intelligence collection, or cyberespionage, creates and exacerbates cybersecurity dilemmas, especially as there is a strong link between intelligence collection and network attack. It is unreasonable to suggest that intelligence agencies are going to stop intruding on adversary networks – this pattern of activity seems to be widely accepted and commonplace in the contemporary era. However, progress has been made in limiting the activities of intelligence agencies and prosecuting foreign adversary hackers when involved in commercial cyberespionage, and there has been some attempt to reach agreements between the leading powers to limit the scope of commercial cyberespionage, as in the case of the agreement between Xi Jinping and President Obama in 2016. Avoiding security dilemmas will also involve ongoing dialogue and negotiation between the states even within a context of ‘cheating’ – measures taken to circumvent existing agreements, which is what has occurred since the agreement between the US and China, with a notable increase in Chinese espionage observed during the Trump administration (Harold, Libicki, and Cevallos 2016). Buchanan further argues that mitigating the cybersecurity dilemma involves building baseline defences (these will be particularly important in the societal sector), building trust between adversaries (difficult in the existing deteriorating environment, but not impossible), taking unilateral steps to increase international stability (including, for example, reporting zero-day vulnerabilities, and establishing and communicating a posture for dealing with the intrusions when they inevitable do occur). These steps, when combined with a discursive commitment to lower the cyber rhetoric and hyperbole, may constitute significant progress towards desecuritisation.

### 2NC---Transform Discourse

#### Vote neg to reject China securitization in favor of transforming our discourse and knowledge production

Rogelja and Tsimonis 2020 (Igor Rogelja, Fellow at European University Institute, and Konstantinos Tsimonis, Lecturer at Lau China Institute “Narrating the China Threat: Securitising Chinese Economic Presence in Europe”, <https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article/13/1/103/5739302?login=true#199079137>) //sethlee

The structure is thus complete. In this securitising narrative, China’s actions in Europe are wholly political, designed to sow dissent and discord and aided by a number of collaborators and sleeper agents. Yet as we have argued, the securitising discourse rests on rhetorical devices, de-contextualised cases, and a callous disregard for alternative, more convincing and falsifiable explanations which do not take CCP propaganda at face value. The resulting image of Chinese companies, associations, and individuals as the long arms of the Chinese state is a distortion, and one can easily identify many areas of overlap with the original version of the 1990s China Threat scenario in the USA.

What is missing in these reports is, first of all, a case-by-case examination of the deals, the agency and the degree of involvement of different actors, the behaviour of Chinese companies within existing regulatory frameworks, and a contextualisation through comparison with companies from other third countries. This would include fine-grain academic research on Chinese-financed projects, analysing their actual impact, and assessing their individual and collective implications without recourse to disparaging comparisons to so-called ‘banana republics’.[124](javascript:;) An analytical approach that gives precedence to facts over perceptions would also contribute to a calmer assessment of the broader issues of EU–China trade reciprocity and market access which need to be resolved. In this regard, the ‘China Threat’ frame advocated by many think tanks, journalists, and politicians risks transforming these issues into a zero-sum game, thereby reducing the political space for negotiation and compromise.

Another common problem in these reports is that think tanks widely disregard areas of immediate concern to European citizens, such as the impact of Chinese SOEs on industrial relations, environmental standards, and local economies and societies. This bottom-up problematisation is missing in the top-down securitising narrative, possibly because the negative impact of Chinese investment in these areas is sometimes in accord with the dominant developmental paradigm of the EU and its member states. In addition, a more careful line of analysis would need to consider how current and prospective EU member states can best benefit from the availability of Chinese investment and financing at a time when austerity and economic stagnation put the European project in question. In this regard, the EU investment screening mechanism must not prioritise the interests of high-tech sectors of the wealthy North over the labour-intensive industries of economically weak countries, or risk further discord among member states.

Lastly, the securitising discourse ultimately reveals an underlying hegemonic assumption that a ‘core’ of one or two major European powers will decide the EU’s terms of engagement with China, according to their own economic interests and domestic political mood changes. This assumption runs the risk of entrenching divisions among EU states on an issue that does not represent a threat to European unity. In response, a balanced analysis of the challenges and opportunities that Chinese investment brings needs to emphasise the EU’s tested ability to synthesise different views and interests, which is a fundamental promise to its members.

### 2NC---Reread World Minus NATO

#### We need to reread the world outside of NATO---it solves best

Giovanni Ercolani 11, “Keeping Security and Peace: Behind the Strategicalization of NATO’s “Critical Security Discourse””, Security Strategies Journal, Vol 7, Issue 14, Dec 2011, p76-80 [\\pairie](file:///\\pairie)

Conclusion: We Have to Reinvent Ourselves I would like to conclude this paper by stating that the human species is living in a particular moment in which globalisation has made the world smaller and where not everybody is a NATO model reader. NATO readers should need to reinvent themselves and face the world outside their GPNF, and this is a discourse close to the concept of “emancipation” developed by Ken Booth.

“As discourse of politics, emancipation seeks the securing of people from those oppressions that stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do, compatible with the freedom of others. It provides a three-fold framework for politics: a philosophical anchorage for knowledge, a theory of progress for society, and a practice of resistance against oppression. Emancipation is the philosophy, theory, and politics of inventing humanity” (Booth, 2007, p. 112).

Undoubtedly, the NATO Reader has to re-read the world because he can not pretend to live as an immortal human being in a NATO-kept castle and forget or ignore not only the two clocks but even the world outside it. The Alliance structure would really like that its clock could be as the one of Benjamin Button and run backwards into the time of its youth, and NATO definitely act as it will live “in aeternum”. And this is because, despite the NATO narrative, despite the fact that NATO is “the most successful alliance in human history” (Ash, 2011), outside the NATO GPNF-cave, and NATO lines other realities are taking shape.

1. Other countries like China (with a population of 1.5 billion) have produced their own concept of war. “Unrestricted Warfare” is a book on military strategy written in 1999 by two colonels in the People's Liberation Army, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui. The book rather than focusing on direct military confrontation examines a variety of other means which can be summarized in the Formula: Schwartzkopf + Soros + Xiaomolisi + Bin Laden (Liang and Xiangsui, 1999).

2. At the G20 Seoul meeting (2010) even the map of the world financial crisis was changed. Despite the western countries depicted the financial crisis as a global one, its perception from other global actors and emerging economies was completely different. According to O'Neill (Goldman Sachs), policy makers in Asia were referring to the global credit crisis as the “North Atlantic Crisis” (BBC News, Today, 2010). Thus, and for the first time, the “others” defined our military alliance as a financial system.

3. When we look at the “Multiple Stress Zone” map presented by the NATO General Soligan in 2009, how can we not see that is the exact copy of Pentagon Map which was produced in the year 2004 (Barnett, 2004) to highlight the grand strategy for the American foreign policy? Furthermore, the Pentagon Map is much more than a simple cartographic representation of the planet, it is a division of the world countries between the Functioning Core, characterized by economic interdependence, and the Non-Integrated Gap, characterized by unstable leadership and absence from international trade. The Core can be sub-divided into Old Core (North America, Western Europe, Japan, Australia) and New Core (China, India). The Non-Integrated Gap includes the Middle East, South Asia (except India), most of Africa, Southeast Asia, and Northwest South America. Thus using a realist terminology the Functioning Core can represent the land of order while the Non-Integrated Gap the land of anarchy and disorder and also it can be seen as a tentative to “ethnicalize” the world (Aime, 2004, p. 73-100). And if what can happen in the Non-Integrated Gap can produce security concerns to the NATO countries (which are part of the Functioning Core) and justify a military intervention in their internal affairs then “fear is something that is actually missing in a situation of international anarchy, and because it is missing it must be invented and skilfully deployed” (Weber, 2005, p. 23).

4. World Population Growth Rate: “By 2003, the combined population of Europe, the United States, and Canada accounted for just 17 percent of the global population. In 2050, this figure is expected to be just 12 percent. (…) Today, roughly nine out of ten children under the age of 15 live in developing countries. (…) Indeed, over 70 percent of the world’s population growth between now and 2050 will take place in 24 countries, all of which are classified by the World Bank as low income or lower-middle income, with an average per capita income under $ 3,855 in 2008” (Goldstone, 2010 and Minois, 2011).

5. Consumption factor. We have already seen that the estimated one billion people who live in developed countries, which, coincidentally, is the same number of NATO people (the “our”), have a relative per capita consumption rate of 32, while the rest of the “others” (the 5.5 billion people that constitute the developing world, have relative per capita consumption rates below 32, mostly down toward 1). How will it be possible to “secure our future” and then maintain a consumption factor of 32 when the “others” will want to consume like us? “The World Bank has predicted that by 2030 the number of middle-class people in the developing world will be 1.2 billion (a rise of 200 percent since 2005). This means that the developing world’s middle class alone will be larger that the total populations of Europe, Japan, and the United States combined. From now on, therefore, the main driver of global economic expansion will be the economic growth of newly-industrialized countries, such as Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and Turkey” (Goldstone, 2010).

6. Life expectancy rate. Will the people living in the “multiple stress zone” (the non- integrated gap) accept their dramatic living conditions, and live less than the people living in other parts of the globe? Will they accept the status quo that has produced their misery or will they rebel? And the peace that NATO will impose on them will be a “positive peace” or a “negative peace” which will reproduce the same “structural violence” that provoked unrest and internal conflict, and not seeing instead the “civil war as a system” (Keen, 2009, p. 11-24)?

We should accept the reality and we should reinvent ourselves. And the first step to take will be to re-read the world out-side the NATO narrative because we have to be aware of the advice which one of the supposed fathers of Realism gave to the Prince: “Therefore it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good qualities I have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to have them. (…) because the vulgar are always taken by what a thing seems to be and by what comes of it.”20 Then conscious that in front of us there is a narrative which “has to appear” we have to free ourselves and not act as the Pavlov’s dog but illuminated by the doubt in front a narrative which pretends to narrate the reality and re-read the world outside the NATO keep.

It is the gift of the doubt which, as the Italian writer Leonardo Sciascia wrote some years ago, distinguishes the intellectual from the charlatan. Because “in the historical and human history the truth can appear confused and the lie can assume the appearance of veracity” (Sciascia, 1963).

Then it is in the intellectual intention to emancipate the reader from a well-defined image-interpretation of a supposed reality that the “security analyst needs to engage as a political philosopher. This is because the value of security is in constant tension and interdependence with other values, most prominent of which are the values of freedom, prosperity and justice” (Dannreuther, 2007, p. 8).

Thus emancipate the “homo videns”, who is entrapped in a NATO GPNF which reminds us of Plato’s Cave and means to give him back his capacity of abstraction and return to him his ability to think, and act autonomously and responsibly and not as a proficient apparatus. And instead of “securing our future” in which “our” means the NATO people, replace it with “we”, the international society, because we have to accept that in this earthly life there are two clocks and the evolution of the human being has to be continuous. We are responsible for the coming generation to which country, race, religion, and the like belong because “we” are all human beings, all “Homines sapientes”.

### 2NC---Rethink Security

#### Vote negative to rethink security

Burke et al 2014 - Associate Prof and Reader in International and Political Studies at UNSW Australia; Anthony, Katrina Lee-Koo, and Matt McDonald, *Ethics and Global Security*, Routledge, p. 19-21

A final point is necessary on the relationship between security and ethics as we conceive it, by way of introduction to this book. To develop a cosmopolitan ethics of security is not simply a case of applying "cosmopolitanism" to a particular issue area in global politics (security), but rather, rethinking how we understand and practice security. What limits existing accounts of the relationship between ethics and security is the tendency to ignore or downplay the particular politic of security: its centrality to the political legitimacy of the key actors in global politics; its capacity to define the core values of communities, and the manner in which they might be protected or advanced; its capacity to mobilise particular political responses or the actors undertaking them. -Fins is particularly applicable to discourses of "human security'', for example, and to some extent, critical engagement with security grounded in concerns with emancipation (Booth 2007). It is for these reasons that security is often seen to belong to the realm of "high politics": the most important objective of states, wherein the naming and relationship of "security" and "threat" designates political priority and can trigger extraordinary (and frequently illiberal and antidemocratic) responses, such as the violation of human rights or international law. This political function of security makes an analysis of the ethics of security more urgent, in part because of what is at stake in debates about security (definitions of community and values, and responsibilities to the self and others, for example). But this politics of security also complicates the simple application of cosmopolitan thought. In our view, what is needed is sustained engagement with the "politics of security" that argues for moral progress, while taking seriously the dangers of securitization and the apparent constraints placed upon the articulation of radical security alternatives. When taking account of the politics of security here, we particularly focus on the 'function of representations or discourses of security in defining group identity, enabling particular policy or legitimating particular actors as security providers' (Browning and McDonald 2013). Engagement with the politics of security in this way has tended to come from theorists ofs ecurity in the post-structural tradition. For such thinkers, representations of security define political community or integrate individuals into an abstract notion of political community or national values (Burke 2008a; Campbell 1998a; Weldes 1999). Security, in this sense, can become a form of governmentality that shapes and moulds individuals for political ends. David Campbell's (1992, 1998a) analysis of the function of Cold War discourses of the communist threat in the United States is perhaps the most obvious case here. For Campbell, national security discourses served to define American identity in a narrow and highly, politicised way. In the process of constructing external threats to which the state ( in this instance) positions itself as the actor capable of providing security, those with power can exclude dissenting voices and political alternatives, and shut down needed debates about policy. For the so-called Copenhagen (or "securitization") School, security can be understood as a social construction, brought into being through "speech acts" that define particular dynamics, actors or things as existential threats. In the process, these issues are elevated above the realm of "normal- politics and into the high politics arena of security, where they are dealt with through urgency and secrecy. While its proponents do not deny the possibility that such developments may be progressive, ultimately their preference is for desecuritization: the removal of issues from the security agenda. This is most frequently based on the claim that security has an illiberal logic, limiting the possibility for dialogue and locating responsibility for providing security to those with power. But such a sedimented view of the logic of security can also apply to its meaning. For Ole Wxver (1995), at the heart of the concept of security 'we still find something to do with defence and the state' ( see also Berki 1986; Neocleous 2008). These alternative conceptions of security will be examined in more detail in the Chapter 1. They suggest something distinct about the study of security that makes it qualitatively different from other issue areas or "promises" of government. In this, we would agree, and reaffirm the need to take seriously the politics of security. But if these critics have most explicitly engaged with the politics of security and its dangers, their proposed response to the dangers of securitization—resisting or escaping security and its logics is problematic (Dillon and Reid 2009; Dillon 1996; W;,ever 1995). For these scholars, security is something that should be resisted, escaped or challenged. We think such critics go too far. They are right to identify the dangers of an unthinking embrace of security as a site of progress, and right too in drawing attention to the ways in which the promise of security for some can all too easily be defined on the basis of the continued suffering and marginalization of others, both within a particular political community and beyond. Yet, in acknowledging the pathologies of a dominant security discourse, and in failing to articulate a progressive alternative, they mistake this discourse for the timeless essence of what security means and does, paradoxically reinforcing its centrality in international relations. In rejecting the possibility that a range of actors can and do enact progressive notions of security, they deprive marginal actors and communities of a site of contestation and change. This pessimism has been contested in a range of " positive. " critical accounts of security (Booth 2007; Burke 2013a; Floyd 2011; Nunes 2012; Hoogensen-Gjory 2012; McDonald 2014; Roe 2012). What is needed, then, is an approach that is at once attuned to the dangers of embracing security—given its history of contributing to exclusionary practices and the status quo—while refusing to give up on defining a cosmopolitan conception of security oriented towards an integrated global society, and the rights and needs of the least powerful and most vulnerable. In a related way, we are concerned to see global security as a major priority that can be addressed as a part of the normal (not exceptional) practice of government and civil society action that are democratically and internationally accountable. In part, this is because exceptionalist practices have tended to reinforce nationalism and alienation, privilege the security of the few and undermine it for the many, and gravely damage global cooperation and consciousness. When international organisations become involved in global security governance, it is imperative that their practices and objectives either reflect the global interests and international norms painstakingly developed over decades, or seek to improve them in the cause of a just global security order that supports human dignity and flourishing.

# Answers to Security K

## Link Answers

### 2AC---AT: AI Securitization (Inevitable)

#### The link is non unique---securitization is a global trend and an ongoing process---no reason why the AFF is uniquely bad OR triggers the impact

Jinghan Zeng 21, Jinghan Zeng is a professor of China and International Studies, “Securitization of Artificial Intelligence in China,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 08/14/2021, [\\pairie](file:///\\pairie)

The article also explores how the Chinese AI approach and its security logic are embedded in China’s historical, geopolitical, and domestic contexts. China’s desire for AI sits in the wider context of the country’s pursuit of modern technologies. China’s high anxiety over technology competition arises from the historical discourse that blames China’s “century of humiliation” on its past under-performances in global technology competition. In this regard, the historical experience of “humiliation”—not just in being militarily invaded, but also failing to keep pace with technical development, justifies the need for contemporary mobilization, thus to avoid history repeating itself. Geopolitically speaking, China’s national approach towards AI and moves to make it a security matter are fuelled by ever more competitive United States– China relations. Each side’s perception of the other’s AI advancement as a threat accelerates the securitization process. In the domestic arena, where the primary concern is the regime security of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the practical use of AI and its relevant discourses are geared to securing authoritarian rule. In this regard, China’s bold AI experiments practice a unique digital technocracy, making its AI approach quite distinct from that in Western societies.

Currently, this securitization is an ongoing process. Although the extent of its impact on targeted audiences, namely, local governments, market actors, intellectuals, and the general public, remains unclear, all nevertheless enthusiastically echo the central government’s AI campaign. In this regard, such securitization appears to convince domestic actors. However, it also generates unintended consequences. They are: (i) creation of a nationalistic environment that makes China less attractive to global AI labor and capital; (ii) impaired industrial efficiency by virtue of focusing on self-reliance; (iii) obstruction of China’s global AI governance leadership; (iv) reinforced technological rivalry due to disregard for potential global AI cooperation; and (v) constraints on the global access of Chinese AI companies. All could undermine China’s key objectives of fostering a booming AI economy and becoming a global AI leader.

Theoretically, this article echoes the call to develop a global Copenhagen School of security studies by expanding its non-Western politics agenda.

7 Emphasis added, Graham Webster et al., “Full Translation: China’s ‘New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan’ (2017),” New America, 1 August 2017, https://www.newamer ica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/digichina/blog/full-translation-chinas-new-generation-artificialintelligence-development-plan-2017. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2021, Vol. 14, No. 3 419

Attendant difficulties notwithstanding, it shows that securitization has considerable explanatory power in the Chinese context. Empirically, this article develops a more accurate understanding of China’s AI politics, and also connotes an emerging research agenda for studying the relationship between AI and security. AI’s potential to transform our society has profound implications for security politics. As this article will discuss, the securitization of AI is not solely a Chinese practice, but rather a global trend. Nowadays, AI is often framed as a national— and international—security matter in both the United States and Europe. In this regard, securitization of AI, including, but not limited to China’s practices, merits more attention from the Copenhagen School and the wider security community.

Analytical Framework: Securitization

The concept of securitization in critical security studies is primarily associated with the so-called “Copenhagen School,” and the works of its leading scholars, including Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, who consider security as a “speech act”8 —“by saying, something is done.”9 Securitization refers to the discursive process whereby actors, usually elites and state actors, transform a particular issue into a security matter. During this process, actors will label a particular issue as a security threat and incorporate it into a security agenda to justify extraordinary countermeasures. Securitization is considered successful when the relevant audience accepts that the issue in question is a security threat, thus empowering emergency measures.

The securitization process involves a series of key terms, including “securitizing actor,” “securitizing move,” “referent object,” and “audience.”10 Securitizing actor refers to the person or actor who labels a matter as a security issue, an attempt that is a securitizing move. Referent object refers to that labeled as an object, which needs to be protected from the claimed security threat during the securitizing move. Audience is the group for whom this securitizing move is performed which must be convinced in order that the extraordinary measures to deal with the security threat are accepted.

Originating in the Western-centric Copenhagen School, most studies on securitization are based in a Western, or perhaps more accurately, European, democratic context. After all, securitization is a process whereby an actor shifts a particular matter beyond the “normal” state of affairs to an emergency national security agenda.11 This usually requires a liberal democratic society to represent the regular democratic polity from which such emergent national security politics 8 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998); Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations (Colchester: ECPR Press, 1983). 9 Jonna Nyman, “Securitization,” in Paul Williams and Matt McDonald, eds., Security Studies: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 2018), pp. 97–110. 10 Ibid. 11 Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis. 420 The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2021, Vol. 14, No. 3 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article/14/3/417/6352222 by University of Michigan user on 26 June 2022 can appear. As, however, this inevitably makes securitization theory less useful for understanding security in a non-liberal-democratic political order, it both limits the scope of the securitization agenda and fails to realize international relations. In the context of global power transition, wherein Western dominance is in decline, many, including Buzan, call for a more global understanding of international relations and securitization.12 This requires considerable attention to security politics in non-Western societies.

It goes without saying that this admirable non-Western politics agenda faces critical challenges, because security politics operates in a very different way within a non-democratic, often authoritarian, and illiberal setting. Nevertheless, early attempts have been made to apply securitization theory to explain security dynamics from the Middle East, including Egypt,13 Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain14; Africa15; Latin America, including Brazil and Mexico16; North America, including Cuba17; South Asia, including India18; to Central Asia, including Kyrgyzstan.19 In the case of China, securitization has proven useful to understanding climate and energy politics.20 Vuori’s research, for example, shows its 12 Saloni Kapur and Simon Mabon, “The Copenhagen School Goes Global: Securitisation in the Non-West,” Global Discourse: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Current Affairs and Applied Contemporary Thought, Vol. 8, No. 1 (2018), pp. 1–4; Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, “Why Is There No Non-Western International Relations Theory? An Introduction,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 7, No. 3 (2007), pp. 287–312; Juha Vuori, “Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization: Applying the Theory of Securitization to the Study of Non-Democratic Political Orders,” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2008), pp. 65–99. 13 Maja Greenwood and Ole Wæver, “Copenhagen–Cairo on a Roundtrip: A Security Theory Meets the Revolution,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 44, No. 5–6 (2013), pp. 485–506. 14 Simon Mabon, “Existential Threats and Regulating Life: Securitization in the Contemporary Middle East,” Global Discourse: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Current Affairs and Applied Contemporary Thought, Vol. 8, No. 1 (2018), pp. 42–58. 15 Edwin Ezeokafor and Christian Kaunert, “Securitization Outside of the West: Conceptualizing the Securitization–Neo-Patrimonialism Nexus in Africa,” Global Discourse: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Current Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 1 (2018), pp. 83–99. 16 John Gledhill, “Securitization, Mafias and Violence in Brazil and Mexico,” Global Discourse: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Current Affairs and Applied Contemporary Thought, Vol. 8, No. 1 (2018), pp. 139–54. 17 Martin Holbraad and Morten Pedersen, “Revolutionary Securitization: An Anthropological Extension of Securitization Theory,” International Theory, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2012), pp. 165–97. 18 Saloni Kapur, “From Copenhagen to Uri and across the Line of Control: India’s ‘Surgical Strikes’ as a Case of Securitisation in Two Acts,” Global Discourse: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Current Affairs and Applied Contemporary Thought, Vol. 8, No. 1 (2018), pp. 62–79. 19 Claire Wilkinson, “The Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is Securitization Theory Useable Outside Europe?,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 38, No. 1 (2007), pp. 5–25. 20 Jonna Nyman and Jinghan Zeng, “Securitization in Chinese Climate and Energy Politics,” Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2016), pp. 301–13; Yan Bo, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2021, Vol. 14, No. 3 421 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article/14/3/417/6352222 by University of Michigan user on 26 June 2022 explanatory power in studying political crises in the eras of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin, suggesting that in the Chinese context the principal audience of the securitizing move is not the general public, but elites who have the power to shape the security agenda.21

The article expands this non-Western security politics agenda by studying AI in China. Previous security studies have explored the relations between securitization and technology.22 The work of Hansen and Nissenbaum, for example, uses securitization theory to analyze the concept of cyber security.23 Using Estonian digital structures in 2007 as a case study, it develops a framework to theorize cyber-security as a distinct sector on the security studies research agenda. This article draws the security studies community’s attention to how a top emerging technology, i.e. AI, has been securitized in the Chinese context.

Indeed, securitization of AI has progressively become a global movement. In the United States and Europe, for example, the AI advancements of geopolitical competitors, especially Russia and China, are often perceived as a potential threat to national and international security. The relevant speech act frames AI not as a normal technology, but as a national security matter that justifies the enablement of extraordinary actions from the state and society. In effect, it signifies the urgent need to deploy more resources and support, for example, in the US case, not only to the American AI-enabled military sector, but also the AI commercial industry.

Moreover, American AI policy discourses often label China as the United States “most serious strategic competitor”24 or “closest competitor.”25 It thus “Securitization and Chinese Climate Change Policy,” Chinese Political Science Review, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2016), pp. 94–112; Maria Trombetta, “Securitization of Climate Change in China: Implications for Global Climate Governance,” China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2019), pp. 97–116. 21 Vuori, “Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization.”; Juha Vuori, How to do Security with Words: A Grammar of Securitisation in the People’s Republic of China (Turku: University of Turku, 2011). Other notable works on securitization and China include Juha Vuori, Critical Security and Chinese Politics: the Anti-Falungong Campaign (London and New York: Routledge, 2014); Liu Tianyang Liu and Yuan Zhenjie, “Making a Safer Space? Rethinking Space and Securitization in the Old Town Redevelopment Project of Kashgar, China,” Political Geography, Vol. 69 (2019), pp. 30–42; Cui Shunji and Li Jia, “(De)securitizing Frontier Security in China: Beyond the Positive and Negative Debate,” Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 46, No. 2 (2011), pp. 144–65. 22 Myriam Cavelty, Cyber-Security and Threat Politics: US Efforts to Secure the Information Age (London and New York: Routledge, 2008); Lene Hansen and Helen Nissenbaum, “Digital Disaster, Cyber Security, and the Copenhagen School,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 53, No. 4 (2009), pp. 1155–75. 23 Hansen and Nissenbaum, “Digital Disaster, Cyber Security, and the Copenhagen School.” 24 NSCAI, “The Interim Report of National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence,” National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, 2019, p. 6, https://drive.google.com/ a/nscai.org/file/d/153OrxnuGEjsUvlxWsFYauslwNeCEkvUb/view?usp¼sharing. 25 Hoadley and Sayler, Artificial Intelligence and National Security, p. 21. 422 The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2021, Vol. 14, No. 3 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article/14/3/417/6352222 by University of Michigan user on 26 June 2022 becomes an inevitable topic and useful reference point for American AI strategy. As a US Congress report on AI and National Security points out, “most analysts view China’s unified, whole-of-government effort to develop AI as having a distinct advantage over the United States’ AI efforts.”26 Thus, many are calling for a similar “national-concerted” and “whole-of-government” approach towards AI in the United States. Here, China’s ambitious AI plans are often labeled as a serious threat to the United States. To Webb, for example, “Beijing’s AI push is part of a coordinated attempt by President Xi Jinping to turn China into the world’s unchallenged AI hegemon,”27 “while market forces and consumerism are the primary drivers in America.”28 Thus, according to Webb,29 “the United States— working with its democratic partners—urgently needs to play catch-up and develop the strong, solid muscles it will need to win the AI race.” These analyses implicitly and explicitly frame China’s AI strategy as coherent, top-down, and geopolitically driven, which inevitably neglects the nuanced development of China’s domestic AI politics and thus exaggerates the geopolitical threat of China’s AI advancement and plans, as the article will discuss later. Nonetheless, regardless of whether those analyses reflect the reality, they have contributed to the anxieties of China’s near competitors.

For American tech giants, an exaggerated China threat is also helpful in fending off criticism of their monopoly by appealing to American national interests. Thus, market actors in the United States have taken advantage of this China threat to further their cause. For example, under pressure to break up Facebook, China is referenced in order to justify Facebook’s monopoly. Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg once warned that Chinese tech companies would dominate if Facebook were dismantled. According to Zuckerberg:

if the (US) government here is worried about — whether it’s election interference or terrorism — I don’t think Chinese companies are going to want to cooperate as much and aid the national interest there.30

#### Our threats are real and not constructed---China is pursuing AI dominance

Jinghan Zeng 21, Jinghan Zeng is a professor of China and International Studies, “Securitization of Artificial Intelligence in China,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 08/14/2021, \\pairie

Historical Context: AI Supremacy for National Survival?

As earlier mentioned, the State Council considers national security and economic growth as the two comprehensive goals of China’s ambitious AI plan. Given that economic growth represents China’s most important source of political legitimacy,43 its AI plan to pursue a booming AI economy is quite understandable.

39 New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan. 40 Webster et al., “Full Translation: China’s ‘New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan’ (2017).” 41 Ibid. 42 China’s Military Strategy (Beijing: The Information Office of the State Council, 2015), http:// english.www.gov.cn/archive/white\_paper/2015/05/27/content\_281475115610833.htm. 43 Zhao Dingxin, “The Mandate of Heaven and Performance Legitimation in Historical and Contemporary China,” American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 53, No. 3 (2009), pp. 416–33; Wang Zhengxu, “Political Trust in China : Forms and Causes,” in Lynn White, ed., Legitimacy: Ambiguities of Political Success or Failure in East and Southeast Asia (Singapore: World Scientific Pub Co Inc, 2005), pp. 113–40; AndrA˚ LalibertA˚ and Marc Lanteigne, “The Issue of Challenges to the Legitimacy of CCP Rule,” in AndrA˚ LalibertA˚ and Marc Lanteigne, eds., The Chinese Party-state in the 21st Century : Adaptation and the

However, why is national security listed as an equally important goal? And why does security occupy such a dominant place in China’s overall strategic thinking on AI? This should be understood in the wider historical context of China’s pursuit of cutting-edge technology. Although China’s AI plans caught public attention on the global stage during the period 2016/2017, they have long historical roots and their development is clearly path-dependent. All such plans were broadly consistent with China’s 13th Five-Year Plan and the state-driven “Made in China 2025” industrial plan issued in 2015. For example, the AI concept appeared in the State Council’s 13th FiveYear Plan in March 2016, along with 5 G, big data, and cloud computing, also considered national priorities.44 The advancement of AI, therefore, is part of the tech package to develop China as a leading technological power.

Chinese discourse on its modern history substantially shapes China’s ambitious AI strategy, and more broadly its technological aspirations. China is in a constant state of high anxiety about lagging behind again in the game of global technology competition. This obsession with technology is relevant to the Chinese discourse on the relationship between China and previous industrial revolutions.45 Discussing AI is common practice in the discourses on industrial revolutions in many international analyses, but the Chinese angle in this regard is crucial to understanding China’s technological aspirations.

Reinvention of Legitimacy (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 1–21; David Shambaugh, “The Dynamics of Elite Politics During the Jiang Era,” The China Journal, No. 45 (2001), pp. 101– 11; Elizabeth Perry, “Chinese Conceptions of ‘Rights’: From Mencius to Mao—and Now,” Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 6, No.1 (2008), pp. 37–50; Paul Krugman, “China’s Ponzi Bicycle Is Running Into A Brick Wall,” The New York Times, 25 July 2013; Wang Zhengxu, “Before the Emergence of Critical Citizens: Economic Development and Political Trust in China,” International Review of Sociology, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2005), pp. 155–71. 44 Guowuyuan guanyu yinfa shisanwu guojia zhanlvxing xinxing chanye fazhan guihua de tongzhi (Notice of the State Council on printing and distributing the plan for the development of strategic emerging state industries in the 13th Five-Year) (Beijing: The State Council, 2016), http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-12/19/content\_5150090.htm. 45 Zhang Tiwei, “Zhongguo buneng cuoguo disanci gongye geming (China can not miss the third industrial revolution),” Zhongguo Qingnian Bao (China Youth Daily), 13 August 2012, http://zqb.cyol.com/html/2012-08/13/nw.D110000zgqnb\_20120813\_4-02.htm; Li Daokui, “Zhongguo hui cuoguo disici gongye geming ma (Will China miss the fourth industrial revolution?),” Xin Caifu (New Fortune), 2016; Jin Canrong, “Disici gongye geming shi zhongguo judade lishi jiyu (The fourth industrial revolution is a huge historical opportunity for China),” Beijing Ribao (Beijing Daily), 19 August 2019, http://bjrb.bjd.com.cn/html/2019-08/19/content\_ 12138618.htm. This industrial revolution discourse is also evident in official policy documents. As the Chinese State Council’s 2017 “New Generation AI Development Plan” points out, “AI has become the core driving force for a new round of industrial transformation, [which] will advance the release of the huge energy stored from the previous scientific and technological revolution and industrial transformation.” Webster et al., “Full Translation: China’s ‘New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan’ (2017).”

In the Chinese official discourse, China, as the Middle Kingdom, was the leading superpower until the 19th century, when it suffered its first defeat by a Western power—Britain. To many in China, it was the first industrial revolution—constituted by the invention of the steam engine—that took place in Britain in the 18th century that made Britain a leading power46 with enough military might to defeat the Qing Dynasty, then ruler of Asia, if not the world.47 Some argue that it was the Qing Dynasty’s failure to keep pace with the current technological innovation that impelled China’s decline into the so-called “century of humiliation.”48

This defeat exacerbated China’s unfavorable position during the second industrial revolution49 of the early twentieth century of being in transition from the last feudal dynasty (i.e. the Qing Dynasty) to a republic (i.e. the Republic of China). Political and social turmoil robbed the country of the opportunity to develop and progress.50 When it came to the third industrial revolution, or digital revolution, in the latter half of the twentieth century, the nascent People’s Republic of China was embroiled in domestic disorder and international tumult. Consequently, China missed its chance again—although some argue that it caught up somewhat in the second half of that epoch.51 As leading Chinese public intellectual and policy advisor Jin Canrong observes:

Obviously, those three industrial revolutions have one common feature—all occurred in the West and consequently enabled the West to stay ahead of productivity. On the contrary, China failed to grasp any of those three industrial revolutions and its productivity thus lagged behind. As a result, despite years of efforts, China remains a developing country.52

The relevant historical discourses on technological revolutions are explicitly raised in Chinese official documents and top leaders’ remarks. As Xi Jinping observed during a national conference on science and technology,

historical experience shows that scientific and technological revolutions can always profoundly change the world’s development landscapes... some countries have seized the rare opportunity of scientific and technological revolutions to achieve a rapid growth in economic strength, scientific and technological strength, and national defence strength, and a rapid increase in overall national strength... during over 5,000 years of civilization development, the Chinese nation has achieved world-renowned scientific and technological achievements... (however), since modern times, due to various reasons at home and abroad, our country has repeatedly missed the opportunity of

46 Jin, “The Fourth Industrial Revolution is a Huge Historical Opportunity for China.”; Wang Yuanfeng, “Wang Yuanfeng: disici gongye geming zhende laile? (Wang Yuanfeng: is the fourth industrial revolution coming?),” Global Times, 27 January 2016, https://opinion.huan qiu.com/article/9CaKrnJTsU0. 47 Jin, “The Fourth Industrial Revolution is a Huge Historical Opportunity for China.” 48 Zhang, “China can not Miss the Third Industrial Revolution.” 49 Li, “Will China Miss the Fourth Industrial Revolution?.” 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid. 52 Jin, “The Fourth Rndustrial Revolution is a Huge Historical Opportunity for China.”

scientific and technological revolutions and fallen from a world power to a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country that was bullied by others. Our nation has experienced more than a century of aggression by foreign powers, endless wars, social turmoil, and people’s displacement.53

To many in China, including Xi Jinping, the rise of new technologies, including AI, Internet of Things, cloud computing, big data, new energy, and 3 D, marked the beginning of the fourth industrial revolution.54 Unlike previous industrial revolutions, when China’s economic resources were insufficient and the country lacked a favorable socio-political environment, China is now keen not only jump into but also lead this fourth revolution.55 As Jin Canrong elaborates:

the fourth industrial revolution is China’s biggest historical opportunity. Logically, if China grasps this opportunity, in the future it will be site of humanity’s best technology and industry. So, we must grasp this opportunity.56

In short, the lesson China has learned from its modern history is that it must master the leading technology as a matter of national survival, and that this wave of technological development is the “train” that China cannot afford to miss.57 Although whether or not those discourses are an accurate reflection of history is debatable, they nevertheless wield considerable influence on the Chinese quest for technological leadership.

Of course, behind these historical discourses and Chinese technological aspirations is China’s quest for national rejuvenation—the desire for China to take advantage of this wave of technological revolution led by digital technology, including AI, to resume its “rightful” place, i.e., superpower status prior to being defeated by Britain in the nineteenth century. In this regard, the country’s technological ambitions will inevitably clash with American supremacy and take China into the arena of great power politics, which the next section will explore.

Geopolitical Context: Competing for AI Supremacy?

In view of the above historical context, China feels compelled to master key technology. But reliance on foreign technology is considered a “security risk.”58

53 Xi Jinping, “Xi Jinping: wei jianshe shijie keji qiangguo er fengdou (Xi Jinping: strive to build a world technological power),” People’s Daily, 1 June 2016, http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/ 2016/0601/c64094-28400179.html. 54 Li, “Will China Miss the Fourth Industrial Revolution?.”; Wang, “Wang Yuanfeng: Is the Fourth Industrial Revolution Coming?.”; Xi, “Xi Jinping: Strive to Build a World Technological Power.” 55 Li, “Zhongguo hui cuoguo disici gongye geming ma (Will China miss the fourth industrial revolution?).” 56 Jin, “The Fourth Industrial Revolution is a Huge Historical Opportunity for China.” 57 Zhang, “China can not Miss ‘the Third Industrial Revolution’.”; Jin, “The Fourth Industrial Revolution is a Huge Historical Opportunity for China.” 58 Graham Webster, et al., “China’s Plan to ‘Lead’ in AI: Purpose, Prospects, and Problems,” New America, 2017, https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/blog/chinas-planlead-ai-purpose-prospects-and-problems/.

Recent conflicts with the Trump administration have heightened Chinese risk awareness. Many in the United States consider China’s technological aspirations, such as the aforementioned “Made in China 2025” package that includes AI, as a security threat. This has led to considerable tension between the two countries. By cutting off China’s tech companies, namely Huawei and ZTE, from global semiconductor suppliers59 the Trump administration plunged the telecom giants into an existential crisis. United States sanctions also targeted Chinese AI startups, and restricted the export of American AI software to China in hopes of slowing down their development.60 Meanwhile, the United States has made unilateral efforts to pressure its European partners into stemming the flow of advanced technology to China. One example is the Trump administration’s lobby campaign, on the grounds of security interests, to block the sale of Dutch-manufactured computer chip-making machines to China.61

The serious damage American sanctions have inflicted on Chinese tech companies has heightened China’s awareness of both its technological weakness and feelings of insecurity in regard to global reliance. Understandably, therefore, China wants to master leading AI technology independently. As Xi Jinping elaborates:

accelerating the development of a new generation of AI is an important strategic handhold for China to gain the initiative in global science and technology competition...We need to ensure that the core AI technologies are firmly in our own hands.62

China’s AI aspirations extend to global leadership. Since China’s rise, the US-led global order has left China dissatisfied due to the limits it places on China’s say in global norms and rules.63 Rather than a norm-taker, China now aspires to be a norm-shaper, or even a norm-maker. Many Chinese scholars argue that current established norms are geared primarily to serving interests other than those of China.64 To maximize Chinese interests, therefore, future norms should be defined by/for China, and on Chinese terms.

#### The link is terminally non-unique AND our threats are real---even the Chinese government is securitizing AI---that proves that a competition is inevitable

Jinghan Zeng 21, Jinghan Zeng is a professor of China and International Studies, “Securitization of Artificial Intelligence in China,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 08/14/2021, [\\pairie](file:///\\pairie)

A Successful or Failed Securitization?

If the central government is indeed making a securitizing move, has it achieved success? Securitization is still ongoing in China. The trend of labeling AI as a security matter will become, or perhaps more accurately, is becoming more obvious, in light of growing United States–China tensions over technological competition and also in the wider geopolitical fields. At this stage it is difficult, if not impossible, to measure the impact of the securitizing move quantitatively because the causal relations are difficult to establish. There is no doubt that local states have got onboard with the central government’s AI plan, and are enthusiastically supporting its AI campaign. Many local AI policies were released immediately after the central state’s AI plan in 2016/2017, a fact that existing AI analyses often cite as evidence in support of their claims regarding China’s national-concerted approach towards AI. However, local governments are primarily driven by the estimated regional gains of a booming AI economy. As previously mentioned, many such provinces made their regional AI plans years before that of the central state was issued. Therefore, it is unclear to what extent they are motivated by the securitization move per se rather than the economic benefits that the AI industry generates.

The economic interests AI offers play a more obvious role in driving market forces. AI hype is a global phenomenon, and China is no exception. The Chinese central state’s ambitious AI plan has expanded the hype to the extent of engendering concerns about an AI bubble.121 China’s market actors, moreover, have been manipulating the fuzzy definition of AI to redefine AI products, technologies, and companies in order to win, or even connive state funding.122 In this regard, although market forces support the central government’s AI agenda, they are motivated largely by potential business interests.

Similarly, it is difficult to quantify the impact of securitization on public opinion. The absence of social resistance to state use of AI has put China in an advantageous position to grow its AI algorithms. However, this is mostly due to China’s domestic political system and the state capacity to shape public opinion and national debates. The State Council’s AI plan explicitly declares that “guiding public opinion” is part of its AI strategy. Under the call to promote more AI propaganda, positive reporting about AI, such as its contribution to enhancing public security—including anti-child trafficking123 and crime prevention124—has been prominent in the Chinese media. In this regard, the outcome of public cooperation is shaped not only by securitization but also, and more importantly, by China’s political environment. It remains to be seen how the public will respond when the pain of social transformation, such as massive unemployment, that AI brings about becomes more obvious.

Concluding Remarks: Securitization, So What?

This article shows that the Chinese central government is performing a securitizing move by labeling AI as a security matter in order to convince local states, market actors, intellectuals, and the general public. But if AI is indeed being securitized, so what? Although it is difficult to quantify the exact impact of this securitizing move, it undoubtedly helps the Chinese central government’s mobilization of domestic actors towards advancing its AI agenda. Nevertheless, this move also generates unintended consequences for the securitizing actor’s goal in the long run. According to the State Council’s AI plans, its three-step AI plan carries the specific goals of fostering a booming AI economy, and a grand goal of becoming a global AI leader.125 Securitization may undermine these key objectives for several reasons.

### 2AC---AT: Cybersecurity---Perm

#### Perm do both---solves best---combining desecuritization and cybersecurity policies can create the most effective responses

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Conclusion

In this contribution, we demonstrated that Swiss cyber-security politics can be fruitfully approached with constructivist research, more specifically, one that draws on practice approaches. Of the three securitization logics as described by Hansen and Nissenbaum, all three are present in the Swiss case, with technification being the dominant one at present. For democratic politics, technification is a particular challenge. Assigning an issue to the technical realm has a depoliticizing influence, which removes it from democratic deliberations. By making cyber-security an issue of the ‘genius few’, technification makes contestation from those with less technical expertise very hard if not impossible or makes it easy for those with the most valued expertise to discredit others without it. In addition, 6 See e.g. the power of technical expertise comes with a claim of being ‘neutral’ or ‘a-political’, and hence, of being more valid than anything that seems emotional or based on morals.

The Swiss case also highlights interesting aspects for securitization research and beyond. In theory, securitization assumes that there is one powerful actor who can make a convincing case for the exceptional nature of a policy issue. The entire Swiss political system works against this. There are always multiple voices and multiple audiences to convince – which makes it much harder to be successful in a simple securitization move based on urgency. In such a political system, less ‘visible’ bureaucratic actors need to be studied more thoroughly. Security is not mainly the domain of security elites and politicians. Instead, the research focus needs to shift to everyday security practices, to less traditional security actors, and to actors outside government that have a central role in the creation of danger knowledge and everyday security.

Beyond securitization research, it is evident that looking closely at the intricacies of political systems, power distribution and political culture, as studied by scholars in comparative politics and similar fields, becomes necessary to understand security logics in any policy field. Bringing the two research traditions more closely together in some form of conversation across sub-disciplinary boundaries could be beneficial for both.

### 2AC---AT: Desecuritize Cybersecurity

#### Desecuritizing cybersecurity is impossible---it’s constantly reinforced everywhere

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5.4 THE LIMITATIONS OF DESECURITISATION

One of the main reasons that cyberspace is difficult to desecuritise is that securitisation is now well established, constantly re-enforced, and the audiences which accept these securitisations have become entrenched in their views. As the preceding chapters have demonstrated, securitisation has been achieved through hyper securitising rhetoric that portrays surveillance and national security threats as existentially threatening, and this rhetoric is strengthened with linkages to fears of authoritarianism, totalitarianism, anarchy and terrorism.

202 Audience acceptance of threats is also influenced by political ideology, with those fearful of the state placing much greater trust in the securitisations of whistleblowers25 such as Edward Snowden and those more fearful of external threats, such as terrorism, placing far greater trust in the securitisations of the state. In addition, cyberspace securitisations are constantly re-enforced by daily events, with instances of terrorism or cyber breaches re-enforcing the national security threat, and daily reports on the state’s surveillance powers re-enforcing the state surveillance threat.

It is also far easier to securitise an issue than it is to desecuritise it. Once an audience has accepted the existence of an existential threat, it is difficult to convince them that this threat does not exist, or is far less dangerous than first thought. This is most evident in reactions to terrorism and the war on terror, although can be applied equally to cyberspace. In 2010, 25% of the British population believed that the threat of terrorism had grown in the past five years compared to 17% who believed it had shrunk. By 2016, the percentage of people believing that the threat had grown was 74% compared to only 1% who believed it had shrunk (YouGov, 2016) (see Figure 5.3). Supporters of all political parties believed that the terror threat had increased, but this belief was stronger on the right of British politics (Conservative -84%, UKIP – 83%, Labour – 71%, LibDem – 74%). In the US, when 25 For his supporters, Snowden is a whistle-blower, but for his detractors he is a criminal who has illegally disclosed millions of classified documents. Figure 5.2: American views on terrorist threat 203 asked how they would rate the chances of themselves or a member of their family or a good friend being killed or wounded in a terrorist attack, 12% of people responded with ‘Very high’ or ‘Fairly High’. This belief appears at odds with the fact that the US had not suffered a mass casualty terrorist attack since 2001.

There have been several attempts to explain the discrepancy between the fear of terrorism and the actual risk of being affected by it (Nellis, 2009; Altheide, 2016; Braithwaite, 2013). These demonstrate how the visceral images of terrorist attacks such as 9/11, the constant re-enforcing of the threat, hatred of ‘the other’ and the uncertain nature of the threat, combine to create an emotional response to terrorism. Studies have also demonstrated that it is not necessary to have been present at a terrorist attack or to have been directly affected by one, to experience significant symptoms of anxiety and stress in otherwise healthy citizens (Collins, et al., 2001).

This emotional response to the threat of terrorism renders logical arguments against it less effective and psychological studies have repeatedly demonstrated that logical arguments are rarely effective against existing views. An experiment in Stanford, for example, demonstrated that when students were provided with fictitious information, they still based their opinions on this information even when it was revealed that the data was false (Ross & Mark Lepper, 1975). A related study at Stanford a few years later revealed that not just opinions, but people’s beliefs and values, which had been formed based upon false information, were not changed even when the information that lead them to form these beliefs was shown to be false (Anderson, et al., 1980). According to another study ‘corrections actually increase misperceptions among the group in question’ (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010, p. 303). The authors call this the backfire effect and suggested that if people Figure 5.3: British view on terrorist threat 204 counter-argue unwelcome information they may end up entrenching views that are more extreme than those originally held.

Fear and anxiety play a significant role in risk perception.. And for those in fear, encountering those who deny the existence of the threat can lead to greater anxiety since the burden of facing that threat is considered greater when others do not accept its existence. Common advice to help people reassure those with anxieties is that fears should not be invalidated, but should be accepted as real to those who hold them. When confirmation bias (which explains how people selectively interpret new information to support their existing beliefs) is also considered, it becomes clear that challenging attitudes to cyberspace threats is not as simple as presenting the case for the other side. Once an issue has become securitised, it is extremely difficult to convince the audience that their acceptance of the threat is wrong. This difficulty was demonstrated following the enactment of the IPA. Some at GCHQ thought that the act would ‘defeat claims of mass surveillance’ but this notion was dispelled after its passing when the ORG described it as ‘one of the most extreme surveillance laws ever passed in a democracy’ (David, 2016) (Killock, 2016).

### 2AC---AT: Hegemony

#### Securitization of hegemony necessary for understanding and continuing normal politics

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Hegemony theory can go some way in this respect as it is able to consider in more detail the dynamics and structures that lead to power within discourse. The power to securitize then lies within rules of the social – all of which are, essentially, discursively constituted. It is the structure of discourses that determines which subject-positions may carry legitimacy as well as which institutionalised positions carry weight and meaning under which circumstances. The power to securitise then essentially lies on the level of differences within discourse, while the power of securitization is the constitution of an antagonist divide. Both levels, of course, cannot be analysed independently of each other. Hegemony theory offers a perspective to combine the analysis of these two levels. It allows us to move beyond the speaker-audience dichotomy, and offers a view on the processual formation of identities through the drawing of antagonist lines. Its explanatory power hence extends to both the question of the boundaries of the discursive formation and simultaneously allows to account for change in this formation. The hegemony approach articulates an understanding of politics as the conflictual negotiation of that which represents the common space. 64 In this understanding, securitization is not the end of normal politics but part of it.

#### Security doesn’t explain how hegemons act- no root cause

**Kaygusuz no date**- (Özlem Kaygusuz- assistant professor at Mersin University, “SECURITIZATION IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL HEGEMONY: US-TURKISH RELATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE” Mersin University-Department of International Relations, https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.408.7396&rep=rep1&type=pdf)//mishelle

There is one important point, however that should be underlined here. The emphasis on the cognitive element as a common ground or a point of connection between hegemony as the structure and securitization as the medium, should not mean that the states’ behaviors are determined by structure of ideas as they are by material structure of the neorealist hegemony that is by coercive force (McSweeney, 1999: 132-33). The internalization of ideas, values, and the security truths by the actors is not a mechanistic process of acceptance. The actors participate into the construction and consolidation of security truths through their security practices, acts and decisions in the international field. In other words, the subordinated units under hegemony are not only consumers but also producers of securitization. In this study, the enrichment of the idea of securitization as a medium in the mutual constitution of hegemonic structure and agents is based particularly on Bill McSweeney’s study on security and identity which is developed on the basis of Giddens’s Structuration Theory. The Structuration Theory can be utilized also to analyze the social relations and the constitution of identities at the international level. According to the theory any social order, including the international order cannot be considered as an independent phenomenon, external to acting units within it. The structure and the agent are ontologically interdependent (McSweeney: 138-145). In such a framework, security identity at the state level cannot be viewed as a dependent variable with respect to hegemonic security structure and accordingly, securitization is not a one way process. Here, as McSweeney proposed, the concept of political spillover can be utilized to explain the harmonization of security interests produced intersubjectively in the international field (McSweeney, 1999: 170-171) Concerning the subject of this study, that is to establish a connection between securitization and functioning of hegemony, again an understanding of spillover can be used. As in the integration to a security community, the adherence to a hegemonic order also necessitates the shifting of loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new security truth and the secondary states learn to identify their interests with the hegemon. Here, structure is used by actors to produce meanings of domestic conduct and in that moment, it is drawn into the temporal, contextual dimension of action, thus to be reinforced and modified by usage and repetition. In a sense, actors subject themselves to the constraints of behaving within the confines of habit. Actors learn and relearn their security interest in interaction with the sub-state level actors, with other states but mainly with and with the hegemon. Such a perspective towards securitization will provide us a richer conception of security and the functioning of hegemony. Giddens’s Structuration Theory puts forward that far from being passive receptors and reproducers of an assumed consensus about meaning and norms, actors draw strategically upon such consensus to establish an agreement or to repair a relationship, in short they manage the rules that make the game interaction possible. In the same way, under hegemony, the patterns of meaning about what is to be secured or the shared knowledge of what is the threat are reproduced through typified behaviors of state actors that simultaneously sustaining it.

### 2AC---AT: Failed States

#### No link---failed states discourse doesn’t cause Western interventions or violence

Sebastiaan Debrouwere 11, “Are Failing and Failed States a Post-Cold War Phenomenon”, E-International Relations, -07/16/2011, <https://www.e-ir.info/2011/07/16/are-failing-and-failed-states-a-post-cold-war-phenomenon/> [\\pairie](file:///\\pairie)

As early as 1651, political theorists, such as Hobbes, warned that in societies where government fails and no laws exist, there would be “a coercive Power to tye [sic] their hands from rapine, and revenge” that would doom their citizens to “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” lives marked by “continual fear, and danger of violent death” (Hobbes, 2003 [1651], p. 89). Is the phenomenon of the failed state, in vogue with security analysts and political scientists alike since the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion, an expression of the Risorgimento of Hobbesian fears? Or, are failed states, to which academic literature includes examples as varied as Afghanistan, DR Congo, Myanmar, and Somalia (François & Sud, 2006), really a unique new challenge for the post-bipolar era? Since the end of the Cold War, debates over international order and threats to security have changed in nature, and so has their lexicon. Where hazards were once identified as coming from “tyrannical rogue states”, post-1989 challenges are seen as originating in various “arcs of instability” composed of “weak or collapsing states” (Ignatie , 2002, p. 114; Ayson, 2007). The 21st Century’s benighted states are “un-governed, under-governed or mis-governed” (Lamb, p. 15) dysfunctional societies, where global threats such as terrorist breeding grounds and transnational crime are present. The real question is, however, to what extent is the concept of failed and failing states, and their underlying assumptions and implications, the product of the politics of language and “a political agenda of security-concerned Western powers” (Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 32). By first defining the concept of failed states, then scrutinizing its political implications and the extent to which the idea is politicized, and finally considering its relevance in the contemporary world, this essay will argue that the discrepancy between these ideas and their meaning for the multipolar world is minimal, and they do not merely represent a taxonomical-linguistic issue. Instead, this terminology is seen as a logical and valid product of a changed world, a world where the Westphalian model of international politics, such as the interactions between equally sovereign states, presents an unrealistic conception of insecurity.

Defining Failed States

The ‘basic unit’ of evaluation concerning state failure is how the state is defined and understood, as this determines how failure is defined. Broadly speaking, the modern paradigm is marked by two conceptions of the state, one ‘thin’ and one ‘thick’. The notion of the ‘thin’, or neo-Machiavellian, state focuses on the coercive-regulative aspects of government, as defined by Weber. Definitions stemming from the Weberian school focus on the state’s success in terms of its consolidation of the monopoly of violence. Subsequently, the use of force is seen as the basic element of a functioning state, for which all other conditions such as respect for human rights, and the delivery of social services will depend (Ignatie, 2002, p. 112). Thus, a state is successful insofar as it “upholds a claim on the “monopoly” of the “legitimate” use of violence in the enforcement of its order” (Weber, 1980 [1921], p. 30). In this understanding, territories where power is primarily wielded illegitimately by warlords or kleptocrats are seen as failed states. The ‘thick’ conception is contractarian in nature and based on the Hobbesian-Lockean understanding of the state as a “neutral umpire” that protects lives, liberty, and the property of those within its territory (Locke, 1988 [1689], p. 212). Proponents of this conception see the monopoly of violence as an important aspect of state legitimacy, but argue that additional factors, such as an essential respect for human rights need to be included. For them, state failure has nothing to do with “an anomalous response to some sort of irregular or periodic stress” (Eisenstadt, Abitbol & Chazan, 1988, p. 236) and the associated interruption of legitimacy, but has much more to do with the state’s collapse in basic function. The absolute threshold of collapse is defined, then, through a threefold proviso: the loss of sovereignty, the end of the state as “a tangible organization of decision-making” (Dawisha & Zartman, 1988, p. 7), and the collapse of the state as the “security guarantor” for its citizens, and the citizens of other nations (Zartman, 1995, p. 5).

Politicized Language?

Defining states in thick or thin terms has vast implications on how the threat is perceived, and thus, how it should be dealt with. Labeling states as having ‘failed’ is considered to be highly controversial because it makes them a candidate for internal intervention and preventive military invasions. Indeed, the idea that a state can be successful or unsuccessful in adhering to a particular set of principles is vaguely reminiscent of the colonial preoccupations in the 20th century, when state failure was a pretext for great power interventions. Belgian colonials, for example, justified their colonization of the resource-rich Congo by claiming that “the indigenous peoples had failed at self-governing themselves and establishing [Christian] civilization” and that its intervention was merely a humanitarian matter of “alleviating these throes” (Clark, 1964, p. 136). Quite similarly, colonial powers have often intervened in the Pacific to quell social disorder, “simply because it threatened their security and trade interests” (Dor, 2000). In 1893, British intervention in the Solomon Islands served “to curtail what we would now call transnational crime, especially blackbirding”, and more importantly, to “ensure that no other imperial power established a presence there” (Wainwright, 2003, p. 19). Though, it can be argued that the Solomon Islands, and their “collapsed, institutions”, “paralyzed government”, “simmering ethnic tensions”, and “social malaise” (Nguyen, 2005, p. 2) came close to what could now be considered a failing state, it is beyond doubt that the British Empire’s intervention “was concerned with more than just some local outlaws à la Harold Keke that terrorized the region” (Wainwright, 2003, p. 487). It should be no surprise that those with a skeptical view on the contemporary failed state debate consider its rhetoric to be the reflection of an ethnocentric political agenda, with the wider purpose of reforming developing countries, so as to adhere to the worldview of hegemonic states (Boos & Jennings, 2005, p. 394) or even to “demonize the other as a pretext for intervention” (Adibe, 1994, p. 492). Some go even further in asserting that “the idea of failed states…and Western anxieties over ‘new security threats since 9/11…are political constructions” and “an example of threat inflation” (Thrall & Cramer, 2009, p. 10). This reductionist approach to the failed states debate sees the concept itself as analytically void, and at most, a vehicle to legitimize its policy implications for interventionist hegemons.

Such a stance, however, displays an essentially flawed understanding. First, by assuming that malevolent threat-exaggeration and militarized response dominate the majority of the debate, it gravely misinterprets the goals and purposes of securitization (Münkler, 2004, p. 61). For states in a capitalist, multipolar, and post-imperial world, security is not so much about military presence as it is about regional stability and trade facilitation. Violent conflict in “declining states” (Vayrynen, 2000, p. 43), even on the local level, most likely is not the optimal situation for any actors. Second, they ultimately seem to value the importance of sovereignty over the well being of citizens, while realities suggest a different prioritization. Robert Jackson’s thesis on the ‘sovereignty game’ shows the danger of considering sovereignty as the main variable, by pointing out that the populations of some states which “lack the ability to meaningfully function or provide public services, including order” can live under ‘negative sovereignty’ whereby the de jure sovereignty provides “legal freedom from outside interference”, even in cases of gross human rights abuses (Jackson, 1990, p. 1; p. 30; p. 74). He notes that since the 1960s, new and weak “quasi states have been incorporated into the international community” based on norms of anti-colonialism, self-determination, and egalitarianism, despite being “juridical more than empirical entities” (p.5). The resulting ‘negative sovereignty game’ allows these states to enjoy an “unqualified right to exist and high prospects for survival despite their domestic disorganization and illegitimacy” (p.24) only because of this “uncritical and widespread faith in self-determination or equal sovereignty” (p.10).

Ultimately, the primary concern that arises from this, for both the well-being of citizens and the international community, is that these societies are identified as being dysfunctional, so that adequate remedies can be proposed. Though intervention is amongst these remedies, it is most likely a last resort, rather than a preferred option. Examples of multilateral international policy in recent years, such as the Security Council’s affirmation of the Responsibility-to-Protect principle1 and its recent recall of that principle in the debates over a Libyan no-fly zone2, indicate that state failure is increasingly accepted and is not a priori seen as a merely political construction by intervention-savvy states. There also appears to be a consensus that failing states present significant threats to the international community and must, at least, be closely monitored, as illustrated by Robert Cooper’s poignant assertion that “the Roman Empire, was not brought to fall by the well -organized Persian Empire… but [by] the Barbarians”(Cooper, 2004, p. 68).

### 2AC---AT: Space

#### Space threats are real and should be considered security threats based on the many existential possibilities --- satellites solve ag, fisheries, and environmental damage --- military protection is key

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Security has been defined as “the assurance people have that they will continue to enjoy those things that are most important to their survival and well-being” (Soroos [1997](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-1-4614-2029-3_47#CR13), p. 236). For something to be defined as a “security” issue, there needs to be a sense in which it poses a real threat to human well-being or survival. If a “security” issue requires that there is such an “existential” threat, can the environmental issues in Earth orbit be seen as security issues? Is interference with the optimum efficiency of a frequency, or damage to an inanimate piece of metal, an “existential threat” in any meaningful sense?

In fact such issues can be seen as security questions and in a very real way. Satellites are used for an enormous range of purposes, and many of them have the potential to produce large-scale loss of life if the satellite capability is lost. A 2011 report by the British Royal Academy of Engineering noted that global navigation systems alone are crucial for the following functions for UK users: “transport, agriculture, fisheries, law enforcement, highways management, services for vulnerable people, energy production and management, surveying, dredging, health services, financial services, information services, cartography, safety monitoring, scientific and environmental studies, search and rescue, telecommunications, tracking vehicles and valuable or hazardous cargoes and quantum cryptography” (Royal Academy of Engineering [2011](https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-1-4614-2029-3_47#CR11), p. 13).

Threats to orbiting satellites, whether from military or environmental sources, are crucially important precisely because satellites have come to play such a fundamental part in providing security to human beings on Earth. Because of the expansion in the general meaning of security that has taken place in recent decades, satellites are clearly relevant to providing these kinds of security. Although discussions of space security have historically tended to be dominated by debates about “space weaponization,” the reality is that most states and commercial entities exploit space for a vast range of civil purposes, so that space has now become crucial for human prosperity and security on Earth.

The impact of satellite capabilities on human security can be seen in a wide range of areas. One such is disaster management, which has been reflected in the signing of the “Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations” of 1998 and the “Charter on Cooperation to Achieve the Coordinated Use of Space Facilities in the Event of Natural or Technological Disasters” of 2000. Satellites were used to coordinate disaster relief operations after the Haiti earthquake of 2010 and the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011.

But the scope of satellite contributions to terrestrial security goes well beyond disaster response and now embraces almost all aspects of human security. Examples include educational programs, including school and college use, but also programs for education of remote rural populations on issues such as crop management and birth control. Meteorology is used by most countries, but in those subject to particularly severe weather such as tropical storms, they serve a crucial purpose in allowing shipping and coastal communities to prepare for the effects of life-threatening weather systems. Satellites play an increasingly important role in the continuation of the green revolution in developing countries, allowing monitoring of environmental damage, from both natural and human causes. Soil temperature and moisture content of soils are monitored from space to allow the choice of optimal planting times; crops are also monitored for the presence of disease infestation and threats such as drought, floods, and migrating pests such as locust swarms. Monitoring of snow lines in areas such as the Himalayas allows early warning of flooding in India and Bangladesh. Satellites are used to detect underground water supplies and mineral resources, to track shoals of fish, and to plan irrigation systems. India uses satellites to assess the quality of land being considered for building or road development, so that areas of high agricultural productivity will not be lost, and uses them to direct its fishing fleets to minimize their time at sea. In January 2012, satellite imagery was used by the United Nations to monitor the conduct of the referendum in southern Sudan on separation and independence from Sudan. On a broader scale, satellite imagery was crucial in detecting the expansion of the holes in the ozone layer and in monitoring the increase in global temperatures and associated effects such as loss of polar ice cover, which confirmed the dangers of global warming. In these and countless other ways, satellites now directly contribute to human security.

This is important in defining space security in two ways. It means that the military dimension of space security is critical not just in terms of the impact such conflict might have on terrestrial warfare, or even of the damage to the space environment itself, but also that the huge knock-on effect on human security must be considered if these satellite capabilities were lost. Secondly, it means that the terrestrial dimension of human security needs to be considered as one of the components of space security in its own right, thereby highlighting the enormous stake that humanity has in the continued secure exploitation of space.

## Impact Turns

### 2AC---Russian Cybersecurity Threat

#### Russia cybersecurity threat is real---we’re the only team that’s read statistics---if we prove it is, it proves we’re not securitization

Frank Konkel 22, Frank is Nextgov’s executive editor & has a degree from Michigan State University, “Microsoft: Russia Stepping Up Hacking, Cyber Penetration Efforts on 42 Ukraine Allies,” Nextgov, 06/23/2022 <https://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2022/06/microsoft-russia-stepping-hacking-cyber-penetration-efforts-42-ukraine-allies/368514/> [\\pairie](file:///\\pairie)

Four months into its war on Ukraine, Russia is carrying out cyber operations on much more than its neighbor, according to a report released by Microsoft Thursday.

In the report, Microsoft said it detected Russian network intrusion efforts in 128 organizations in 42 countries outside Ukraine, with the majority of its “strategic espionage” focused on governments, think tanks, aid groups and businesses. Russia has most often targeted the U.S. and other NATO countries, including Poland, where military logistics and humanitarian assistance is being coordinated.

“Since the start of the war, the Russian targeting we’ve identified has been successful 29 percent of the time,” the Microsoft report said. “A quarter of these successful intrusions has led to confirmed exfiltration of an organization’s data, although as explained in the report, this likely understates the degree of Russian success.”

Brad Smith, president and vice chairman of Microsoft, said in a Thursday conversation with the Washington Post’s David Ignatius that Russia’s successful attacks “tend to be in certain kinds of” on premise networks. Smith said cloud networks, secured by companies “whose core competencies” are in IT security, are safer than on premise networks. Smith said globally, private sector companies have moved to the cloud more quickly than government, a phenomenon especially true in Europe, putting them at increased risk.

Smith also emphasized the importance disinformation is playing in Russia’s war effort, highlighting an 80% increase in Russian propaganda in the month after Russia launched its attack.

“We need to address this new cyber threat as well,” Smith said, adding, “it is directed at the core of our democracy.”

### 2AC---Reps of Russia-NATO War Good

#### Representations of Russia-NATO war are real – necessary to avoid war

**Wilhelmsen and Hjermann, 22** --- (Julie Wilhelmsen- senior research fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. She holds a PhD in political science and conducts research and Anni Roth Hiiermann- Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Norway , "Russian Certainty of NATO Hostility: Repercussions in the Arctic", March 2022, Arctic Review on Law and Politics, https://arcticreview.no/index.php/arctic/article/view/3378/6336)//mishelle

Our empirical analysis in 3.1-3.4 shows that Russian official discourse in the years following the conflict in Ukraine construes NATO as “genetically” set on grabbing ever more geopolitical space while claiming to seek security for all states. Russia generally represents NATO as a two-faced actor, hiding its true agenda of incessant expansion behind the “invented” “thesis” of Russian threat and distractions like “instrumentalized” universal values. This idea of a **false West hiding the real reasons for its value agenda has deep roots in Russian thinking.**184 Our analysis shows that this view fundamentally structures Russia’s interpretation of NATO, in turn illustrating how discursive change – the making of hostility through intense securitization and naturalization – takes place on the background of continued, long-nurtured rhetorical tropes. Our analysis has also shown how all spheres and actions are entangled, seen as part of NATO’s war-like campaign targeting Russia. The Russian leadership conflates Russia-critical statements and conventional military build-up into a single package of hostility. We conclude that MOD and MFA representations post-Crimea attach a near-total level of danger to NATO and associated Western others. Here we wish to emphasize the extreme density and repetitive nature of these representations in our material. They confirm previous scholarly claims that the entrenched worldview in the Kremlin is that the West with NATO is threatening to destroy Russia.185 Our study has shown how such a worldview is constructed through official statements on a day-to-day basis, becoming naturalized. Further, the overall impression is that Russia deems conspiracy as the signature tune of both NATO and the USA. The “lesson learned” as per official speech post-Crimea thus seems to be that Russia should never trust NATO promises again – anywhere. From our analysis of texts on NATO in the Arctic we find that the dramatically heightened level of securitization of this Western antagonist is almost fully replicated in this polar region. We cannot ignore the pattern of representation of NATO as hostile by nature, with its every move in the Arctic as the next step in a planned offensive against Russia. This image is achieved through use of predicates, juxtapositions of selves and others (Russia embodies cooperative Arctic in the face of NATO threat), the recirculation of rhetorical tropes of enmity and discursive merger of social entities that might have been framed as distinct and “friendly”. By these mechanisms, relations with individual Arctic NATO states are increasingly rephrased through the prism of NATO hostility, with Norway as a prime example. Although our findings may indicate the impossibility of compartmentalizing the Arctic away from rising Russia–NATO enmity, our material also shows Russian resistance to the securitization of relations in this region – as when interactions and institutions in the Arctic are recirculated as benign encounters and arenas or when official language invokes dual identifications of NATO countries, using historical tropes or predicates of amity. Indeed, the discursive lumping together of different Western political entities into one hostile agent is not complete in the Arctic context. Entering these findings into the framework and debate about the securitization dilemma, locating them as part of a broader Russia–West interaction pattern, addresses several questions. As to how misplaced certainty about the other party’s intent emerges, we suggest that Russia creates certainty about NATO’s hostility through the way it repeatedly and with increasing fervour speaks of this political entity. Moreover, with NATO’s growing European presence and concerns over the “Russian threat”, Russian leaders increasingly indicate that the West’s previously hidden agenda is now out in the open. This “uncovering” cements the view of NATO’s intent as undeniably hostile. As to the question of distrust, so often said to be the driver of security dilemma dynamics, we hold that the power of spoken words is underrated.186 Although assessing such emotional qualities is beyond the reach of our methodology, we would highlight the contingent nature of trust – thus rejecting distrust between Russia and NATO as something given and unchanging. The historical animosity between Russia and NATO does matter for the growing securitization dilemma in the Arctic and elsewhere in Europe, because political speakers make it matter – for example, by repeatedly re-inserting Cold War references into the debate and re-phrasing Cold War relations as sheer hostility. Also, trust can be rebuilt, by imagining and giving voice to positive identifications of and cooperative experiences with the Western Others. Here the Arctic has a clear potential, but that can be realised only if political actors decide to act. As our study has shown, the constant invoking of NATO activity as hostile in contrast to Russia’s alledgedly reactive and defensive posture serves as the core legitimizing argument for the upgrading and modernization of the Russian military – already a practical reality. However, in facing this practical reality it will be up to NATO, not Russia, to judge the underlying intentions. Here emerges the larger picture of a downwards spiralling of mutual securitization between two actors who both claim to be seeking security only. On this background, we feel that holding back the rhetorical trench war is a necessary step toward mitigating tragedy (in the security dilemma sense**). For these representations matter beyond the nuisance of a loud and aggressive Russia–West conversation – they matter in order to avoid a military conflict that neither side wants.**

## Alt Answers

### 2AC---Perm Do Both + Alt Fails

#### Desecuritization fails to protect vulnerable groups or prevent war, so legal methods are the best alternative --- they complement desecuritization while maintaining constitutionality by checking sovereign powers --- only the perm solves

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Given the spectre of exceptionalism that comes with security, research in the tradition of the Copenhagen School has focused mostly on averting securitizations that facilitate emergency measures (see Roe, 2008; Wæver, 2000: 253–254). It has been claimed that a securitizing move that shifts an issue from normal politics into the realm of the exception needs to be countered by an explicit desecuritizing move that shifts the issue back to the normal by discursively undermining the threat construction (Hansen, 2012: 542–545; Huysmans, 1995: 65–67; 1998; Roe, 2004: 285–287).8 Such a conception of securitization and desecuritization presents several ways back to normal politics. However, it also reproduces the categorical belief that there are only two possible political forms: ‘non-security’ (associated with normal politics) and ‘security’ (associated with the logic of war) (see Figure 1). This perspective is conceptually constraining because non-security is not always an option: on one hand, desecuritizing moves may simply not be successful because desecuritizers lack discursive authority or because their discursive strategies do not resonate with the relevant audiences (see Buzan et al., 1998: 26). On the other hand, non-security may be undesirable owing to the negative side-effects that desecuritization can produce – for example, by undermining legitimate claims to protect vulnerable groups (Roe, 2004). Without an alternative to desecuritization, this would mean letting the logic of war unfold.

The alternative we propose here is based on the assumption that there is little reason to accept that speaking about security concerns necessarily leads to the use of full emergency measures. Paul Roe (2004: 292–293) has argued convincingly that securitized issues can be managed. While the language of security remains present, its effects can be mitigated (see also Tjalve, 2011). As the debate on the state of exception among legal theorists shows, there are different ways of constitutionally dealing with emergencies that foresee particularly the taming of sovereign power through constitutional containment (see Dyzenhaus, 2006; Ferejohn and Pasquino, 2004; Gross, 2003; Scheuermann, 2006). For example, what has been termed the ‘accommodation model’ of exceptionalism is based on the understanding that it would be unrealistic to think that the existing constitutional order could remain completely untouched during times of crisis. Nevertheless, the basic pillars of the constitution need to be protected and the legal order should therefore have mechanisms ready to keep an emergency within these constitutional confines (Ackermann, 2004; Gross, 2003: 1043–1044; Tushnet, 2005). Thus, from a legal theory perspective, one important alternative and complement to desecuritization is constitutional accommodation (see Figure 1). It is an alternative insofar as it mitigates the effects of securitizations that cannot be avoided. However, it is also complementary to discursive desecuritization because it counteracts the tendencies of the emergency trap outlined earlier – in other words, it removes or mitigates a precondition for further securitizations (see also White, 2013: 14–15 for the inverse approach).

Such confines can be both ex ante and ex post constitutional checks on discretionary powers. Ex ante, both the initiation and the scope of emergency measures can be constrained. Regarding the initiation of emergency rule, Schmittian decisionism – according to which the sovereign themself determines the exception – can be countered by functionally separating the decision on the presence or absence of an emergency and the decision on the means to overcome it. This is seen as a fundamental precondition for keeping emergency rule ‘constitutional’ (Rossiter, 1948: 299–300). At the IO level, this could mean that a member-state body or other subcommittee is entitled to formally invoke the state of exception and that only then can an IO organ decide on emergency measures. The range of available emergency measures can be circumscribed so that the sovereign’s discretion does not trespass on elementary rules and rights even in the state of emergency.

In addition, IO emergency powers can be contained ex post with the help of accountability mechanisms. As scholars in the literature on emerging global administrative law argue, basic principles of domestic administrative law – and thereby mechanisms of political and judicial review – can and should be instituted within the international legal system to increase IO accountability (see Kingsbury et al., 2005).9 Accountability can take the form of political review, whereby an interstate assembly or executive board watches over IO emergency powers. Legal review, in turn, can be achieved by either a legal counsel or an internal review panel to assess the lawfulness of the actions of IOs. In addition, inter-institutional processes of steering and control can contribute to the review of an IO’s deployment of emergency competencies (Kingsbury and Casini, 2009: 337). An important side-effect of accountability mechanisms is that they enhance the transparency and public scrutiny of IO activities. This may also prove to be positive feedback for desecuritization efforts by opening the possibility of discursively contesting the securitizing moves of IOs.

### 2AC---Cosmopolitanism Perm

#### Perm Do Both – Policy can utilize technology towards security concerns while maintaining cosmopolitan ethics

Schmidt 2022 (Nikola Schmidt, factuly at the institute of political science in Charles University, “Space Community as an Enabler of Cosmopolitan Ideas Through Large Technical Systems” <https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Nikola-Schmidt-3/publication/359408196_Space_Community_as_an_Enabler_of_Cosmopolitan_Ideas_Through_Large_Technical_Systems/links/623da8802d8ea42c14a42b48/Space-Community-as-an-Enabler-of-Cosmopolitan-Ideas-Through-Large-Technical-Systems.pdf>) //sethlee

The traditional approach to socio-technical interactions is anchored in post-WW2 technological determinism. While positive technological determinism entails a conviction that technology can solve many social problems and bring good to society, negative technological determinism understands the role of technology in a society in the exactly opposite way [77]. However, the argument that technology impacts the way we live is undisputable, as current studies within the sociology of technology focus mainly on perspectives on how to study that relation in terms of evolution or dissolution of LTS and how they influence sociotechnical change [78]. We argued previously “that large technical systems have constitutive power to shape global governance system, because of their mere existence. This can be turned to humanity’s advantage if we develop a normative framework for them, before they influence our lives in an undesirable way” [74]. Each technology not only has potential to influence the way we live, but is designed to do so. A well-considered normative framework is the way to ensure that such positive potential is realized in society. The normative framework should be read as a desirable direction, desirable design of intended technological use, or desirable state of the future in general. This dynamic is even more interesting in an age in which states are continuously unable to govern technological inventions [79]. Nation states were crucial in shaping undertakings such as the Manhattan Project, CERN, and ISS. All these ideas would have never materialized without a direct political interest and direct investment by the government that had some larger picture of the future behind its rationalization; however, today’s technological inventions, and even the development of LTS, influencing the way we live are in the hands of private persons (Facebook). What the nation states could do is to encourage scientists and engineers towards certain unanswered questions, which is actually done through financial instruments of research projects, or draw more specific contours of long-term projects and include cosmopolitan ethics, as the political explanation of why it is worth pursuing. Cosmopolitan ethics should play a role in shaping policy intentions before creating LTS, which could influence how engineers and scientists approach their task to build LTS and how politicians understand their role in keeping the project in line with possible national security concerns. In other terms, the design of the project should have practical objective-solving problems (debris, asteroids, propulsion) but also a normative objective to enable responsible cosmopolitan politics. In our understanding of pragmatism as (re)introduced by Jonna Nyman reflecting both is the pragmatic approach to practical politics. One single example of such a policy approach is CERN. Scientists wanted a particle accelerator that did not exist at that time, while politicians wanted a united Europe around civilian nuclear physics research [80]. CERN was unique due to the historical circumstances. ITER is unique due to very specific research that is not affordable by a single global actor, and as a research project it will last almost or even more than a hundred years from the first ideas to the development of tokamak that would test all the technologies. The result will be a developed high-end international science in fusion physics with practical impact on humanity in general – electricity from a fusion reactor. Fusion reactors can be key to climate change, they will enable completely new possibilities in space, and the whole scientific megaproject already united countries around a critical scientific task. Striving for such global cooperation should be a central interest of any responsible cosmopolitan state – it is practical, nurtures international security, unites humanity, and yields breakthrough scientific discoveries solving key problems on the planet.

### 2AC---AT: Cosmopolitanism Alt

#### The Cosmopolitanism alt is vague and full of contradictions, providing no basis to actualize a cosmopolitan utopia

Chen 2019 (Xunwu Chen, PhD in philosophy at University of Texas at San Antonio, “Beyond Kant’s Political Cosmopolitanism in advance: Thinking a World Constitution without a World State”, <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/335138243_Beyond_Kant%27s_Political_Cosmopolitanism_in_advance_Thinking_a_World_Constitution_without_a_World_State?enrichId=rgreq-f10fdca2801a6263c75766cd9a67f471-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzMzNTEzODI0MztBUzo4MjQ0NzYwOTA1MTEzNjFAMTU3MzU4MTgyNjEyMg%3D%3D&el=1_x_3&_esc=publicationCoverPdf>)

Now, Kant has bequeathed an enduring, daunting question to the present discourse of cosmopolitanism: how is a global order under the rule of cosmopolitan law without a global state possible? Kant wanted a constitutionalized global order, but not a world state. As he claimed, “the proposal for a universal cosmopolitan nation, to whose power all individual nations should voluntarily submit, and whose laws they should obey, may sound ever so nice in the theory of the Abbe St. Pierre or of a Rousseau, yet it is of no practical use” (Kant 1972: 89). Also, “the idea of international right presupposes the existence of many separate, independent, adjoining nations” (Kant 1972: 124). As Kant saw it, the concept of international right contradicts the idea of a world state. “If there were such a global political body, there would strictly speaking be only one state, and then international right would not be applicable” (Kant 1972: 60). How can a global order under the rule of law without a world state be possible? The key challenge here is to locate a legitimate public authority as the necessary enactor of cosmopolitan sovereignty. Kant did find one but his choice leaves much to be desired. He proposed the mechanism of a world congress or federation as the candidate: “This would be a federation of nations, but it must not be a nation consisting of nations” (Kant 1972: 115). In spite of his confidence, Kant’s world federation may not be competent to be the enactor of cosmopolitan sovereignty. Some problems with it are inherent and irradicable. This can be seen as follows: (1) The proposed cosmopolitan order is one under the rule of law; (2) the rule of law calls for a sovereign power that defines and enforces laws and that is the necessary enacting agent and condition for the rule of law; that is to say, the rule of law calls for a government of sovereignty as the necessary enacting agent and condition; (3) in our time, a sovereign government is associated with the sovereignty of a state; (4) therefore, how can we talk about the sovereignty of cosmopolitan laws as civil laws without a world state? In his misgiving about global justice, Thomas Nagel raises a similar question. As he indicates, global justice calls for the rule of law; the rule of law calls for government as the necessary enacting conditions for justice; no wonder, “the nation-state is the primary locus of political legitimacy and the pursuit of justice”; “justice as a property of the relations among human beings (and also injustice, for the most part) requires government as an enacting condition” (Nagel 2005: 114). Thus, Kant has bequeathed a defining, enduring question to the present discourse of cosmopolitanism: how can we have sovereign global laws without a global state-power?

### 2AC---Realism

#### Realism isn’t unethical or a promotion of war

Kevin Blachford 22, Kevin is a lEcturer of IR at the Baltic Defence College, “Realism After the War in Ukraine,” The National Interest, 06/24/2022, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/realism-after-war-ukraine-203150> [\\pairie](file:///\\pairie)

The war in Ukraine has opened up a renewed debate on the merits of realist foreign policies and the realist paradigm. The invasion has challenged assumptions of the post-Cold War era and both critics and proponents of realism seek to prescribe a response to the crisis. Much of the debate has centered on John Mearsheimer’s provocative 2014 Foreign Affairs article “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault.” While supporters may celebrate Mearsheimer’s prescience, for critics, the invasion of Ukraine merely shows realists’ callous disregard for morality and a lack of concern for the values of the liberal international order. One recent critic complained that realists “have very little to say about” the “evil” of Putin’s actions and that the offensive realism promoted by Mearsheimer is not just “morally slimy” but “plain offensive.” To question NATO expansion, as Mearsheimer did, is to be on the “wrong side of history” and realism has therefore become a “bogeyman” for polite society. But Mearsheimer’s realism is not a thin theoretical veneer for a morally bankrupt policy of power politics. During his long career, he has repeatedly warned against hubris, unnecessary wars, and the dangers of escalation. Indeed, Mearsheimer’s realism follows a long American tradition of republican realism.

There can be no doubt that the invasion of Ukraine is unjustifiable. The conflict in Ukraine has resulted in shocking images of innocent people under attack in their cities and homes. This has understandably created a moralistic urge to “do something” and an emotional appeal to make “Putin pay”. Yet, this does not necessarily mean that realism as a theoretical perspective can be disregarded for being ambiguous about moral issues. The celebrated economist Adam Tooze launched one of the most thoughtful recent critiques of realism in the British political magazine New Statesman by arguing that realism is based on the “naturalization of war.” One of his most challenging critiques of realism is aimed directly at what he sees as realism’s support for military force and aggression. As Tooze argued:

Other than wars of national liberation, one is hard pressed to name a single war of aggression since 1914 that has yielded clearly positive results for the first mover. A realism that fails to recognise that fact and the consequences that have been drawn from it by most policymakers does not deserve the name.

For Tooze, realism is a continuation of pseudo-fascist ideas, and his critique is based on the premise that realism has “dark roots in the imperialist era.” Building on the work of the intellectual historian Matthew G. Specter, this position sees realism as having “dark origins” in controversial thinkers such as Karl Haushofer and Carl Schmitt. The imperial era Germanic influence over realism should come as no surprise to international relations scholars, given that the German emigres who fled to America played a founding role in the discipline, most notably John Herz, Hans Morgenthau, and Henry Kissinger, among others. But modern realism is also influenced by a uniquely American tradition of thought traced back to the founding of the United States and the Federalist Papers.

Realism is a diverse approach that is too often turned into a caricature as a war-like and power-hungry paradigm. It has therefore become a cliche to see realism as an approach synonymous with power politics and little else, but there has also been a consistent strand of realist thought which has cautioned against the temptations of power and viewed war and militarism as destructive of liberal-republican values. The realist canon provides a basis for a conservatism that demonstrates a commitment to attacking moralistic foreign policy crusades while urging restraint against universalism and pursuing limited policy goals. The realist critique of imperial adventures corrupting democratic institutions at home can be seen primarily with the resistance to the wars in Vietnam and Iraq. Leading realist thinkers such as Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Arthur Schlesinger Jr. all criticized the Vietnam War. In the post-Cold War era, realists responded to the neoconservative aggression of the Bush Doctrine by forming The Coalition For a Realistic Foreign Policy to counter the arguments of those in favor of American primacy. Crucially, these realist warnings against wars of primacy have been coupled with concerns about the corrosive effect such conflicts can have on democratic institutions. American power in the post-Cold War has often been compared to the imperial republics of Athens and Rome. In making these analogies, realists have warned of the hubris of American military power and the previous fates of republics that suffered from military overstretch. The extent of American power and its relationship to conflicts has therefore always inspired debates within realism that represent a classical republican concern, namely, can a republican polis be commensurate with empire?

Contrary to the caricature of realism as supporting a Machiavellian Prince-like figure, Mearsheimer has warned of the “damage” a militaristic and bloated security state can cause to the “fabric of American society.” In this sense, Mearsheimer follows the realism of Hans Morgenthau whose later career increasingly turned to discussions about the “national purpose” of the United States and the importance of American morals and values. As a political commentator, Morgenthau consistently warned against an overreliance on military power and the challenge of a bureaucratic military-industrial complex limiting democratic debate. In examining the corruption of democracy and threats to American liberty arising from the Vietnam War, Morgenthau framed his analysis using the example of Rome’s transformation from a republic into an empire. He observed how the concentration of power within Rome in “the hands of one man” resulted in the appearance of a republic, but without the “substance.” Morgenthau was aware of the Federalist authors’ fear of a Caesar-like figure, and he used this concern to critique the centralization of power and lack of presidential accountability during the Vietnam War. Niebuhr and Schlesinger made a similar critique by warning about the growth of an “imperial presidency.” Crucially, wars were seen by these thinkers as having an inherent tendency to be a source of instability and a threat to a free society that rests on a stable and balanced order.

The realist critique against wars of primacy and the threats such wars pose to domestic democratic institutions remains valid today. Liberals have broadly interpreted the invasion of Ukraine as an assault on global democracy and the liberal values of the West. Their prescription is to double down on the expansion of the European Union and NATO and to create a stronger liberal world order, with direct intervention if necessary. Mearsheimer’s provocative claim that the Ukraine crisis may have been caused by Western overreach has led to howls of rage from liberal voices, but this merely reflects the liberal frustration over the West’s limited options to respond to a nuclear-armed Russia. Advocates for no-fly zones, humanitarian corridors, escalation, and direct intervention may attack Mearsheimer for blaming the West, but they also have little response to the realist cautions against the unpredictable and corrupting nature of war. Far from being a theory that supports war, American realists have long seen war as having a degenerative effect on America’s institutions.

Attacks against Mearsheimer are a reflection of the Western experience of the post-Cold War unipolar era that has left it blind to its own hubris. Over two decades of wars of choice against rogue states and pariah regimes have led the West to believe that military force can be used to install a peaceful liberal order and that reactions against constant Western expansion are indicative of irrationality. The West has lived under conditions of American primacy for so long that it lacks a vocabulary to understand the current moment or formulate a realistic response. The sidelining of realist voices is therefore a detriment to meaningful debate which risks downplaying the dangers of the escalatory and unpredictable nature of war.

#### Realism is true and not immoral or unethical

Sumantra Maitra 6/18, Sumantra is a national-security fellow at the Center for the National Interest and an elected associate fellow at the Royal Historical Society, “Hatred for Realism Is an Elite Afflicition,” The National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/hatred-realism-elite-affliction-203056> [\\pairie](file:///\\pairie)

Why do people hate realism so much? It’s a thoughtful question asked by Stephen Walt in Foreign Policy. Walt is a card-carrying foreign policy realist, his work on alliances and his theory of balance of threat influenced the theoretical framework of much such research with major explanatory power. Walt argues that at the time of realism’s triumph, as the theory predicted a conflict in Ukraine, we’re observing a withering attack on the worldview. “Much of this ire has been directed at my colleague and occasional co-author John J. Mearsheimer, based in part on the bizarre claim that his views on the West’s role in helping to cause the Russia-Ukraine crisis somehow make him ‘pro-Putin’ and in part on some serious misreadings of his theory of offensive realism,” Walt writes, adding that “another obvious target is former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, whose recent comments urging peace talks with Moscow, a territorial compromise in Ukraine, and the need to avoid a permanent rupture with Russia were seen as a revealing demonstration of realism’s moral bankruptcy.”

Walt concludes that there are several reasons people dislike realism. Primary among them is the idea that realism is pessimistic. “It’s not hard to understand why many people are reluctant to embrace such a pessimistic view of the human condition, especially when it appears to offer no clear escape from it.” Second, realism is “indifferent or hostile” to ethical considerations, being an amoral framework where power is the chief determinant. “There is a grain of truth in this charge, insofar as realism’s theoretical framework does not incorporate values or ideals in any explicit way,” Walt writes, “for realists, noble aims and good intentions are not enough if the resulting choices lead to greater insecurity or human suffering.” Realists do not consider any country exceptional, as their worldview argues that every country, every power will usually act in a certain way, facing a certain set of variables. That also rubs most people the wrong way, as most people tend to think in group dynamic, and any criticism of their own country’s behavior or dissent and nonconformity to the “current thing” or conventional wisdom, are considered unpatriotic.

Finally, Walt writes that realism got major questions right, and naturally got major ideological opponents on the way. Walt writes, “realism tends to be unpopular because its proponents have an annoying tendency to be right … realists were right about NATO enlargement, dual containment in the Persian Gulf, the war in Iraq, Ukraine’s ill-fated decision to give up its nuclear arsenal, the implications of China’s rise, and the folly of nation-building in Afghanistan, to note just a few examples.”

There is a lot of sense in these arguments. Realism, a framework which privileges (to borrow a word used often by the academic Left) power and national interest, is by definition a “reactionary” theory, more at home within political conservatism and hierarchy. It is fundamentally opposed to mass democracy and subsequent volatility of public passions. And while it is sternly in favor of national interest, it also favors compromises and a balance of power based on relative gains. Furthermore, being a reactionary theory, it believes in a cyclical view of history, instead of a steady arc of progress. Therefore, realism falls squarely opposed to any worldview that affirms egalitarianism or progress, whether liberalism, socialism, feminism, or Marxism, all of which are theories stemming from the enlightenment, with an egalitarianism embedded. In turn, all progressive theories, from liberalism to Marxism, are normatively opposed to any political reaction. The opposition to realism (and realists) within the academy is therefore qualitatively similar to all the progressive fanaticism about statue toppling, hierarchy, and canceling classics, a deep aversion to anything vaguely reactionary from patrimony, to authority, to national borders, an opposition which isn’t just academic or theoretical, but ideological. To borrow Peter Hitchens’ famous words, a rage by “tiny figures scuttling through cavernous halls built for much greater men.”

Realism is, of course, amoral, but not cruel or unethical. In fact, the instinct for compromise and balance of power comes from a higher ethical consideration. As Hans Morgenthau wrote,

Realism maintains that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation, but that they must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place. The individual may say for himself: “Fiat justitia, pereat mundus (Let justice be done, even if the world perish),” but the state has no right to say so in the name of those who are in its care. Both individual and state must judge political action by universal moral principles, such as that of liberty. Yet while the individual has a moral right to sacrifice himself in defense of such a moral principle, the state has no right to let its moral disapprobation of the infringement of liberty get in the way of successful political action, itself inspired by the moral principle of national survival. There can be no political morality without prudence; that is, without consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral action.

While realism isn’t blameless, the record of realism isn’t comparable to the democracy crusades of the last thirty years.

But to return to the original question, one must add that the framing of the question itself is flawed. The people don’t hate realism. In fact, public opinion is usually fundamentally reactionary, if channeled rightly. The majority favors national borders and opposes foreign misadventures. What could be more reactionary than that in our time? Public opinion can be volatile and appeals to emotion succeed in the short term. But overall, the public understands their interests if clearly communicated with. Consider the recent drop in support for a No-Fly Zone (NFZ) over Ukraine, the moment it was explained what an NFZ would actually entail. The hatred for realism (and any political reaction) is an elite progressive affliction, aided by an ideological academy. What realists sometimes refuse to accept is that they are at a structural disadvantage. This isn’t the time of Metternich, nor is it the time of Yalta, or even Kissinger’s secret China visit. Realism isn’t a worldview that can succeed automatically in the age of social media, NGOs, hyper-democracy, and an activist academy and internationalist news media. To succeed in that scenario, realism and realists will need to use the inherent reactionary public instinct to their advantage, and communicate in ways that might at times go against electoral propriety, and sound like an uncouth New York tycoon. Whether it is a compromise academic realists are willing to entertain, to regain a hand in policy setting, is a key question.

#### Realism is the only theory that correctly structures the world.

Marcelo de Araujo 14, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, 2014, “Moral Enhancement and Political Realism.” Journal of Ethics and Emerging Technologies. Vol 24. No. 2 [ML]

It might be objected now that if this account of political realism is correct, then we would have to admit that structural realists, too, have to take for granted a specific conception of human nature, namely that human beings naturally strive for security and survival. Waltz himself admits that there is a basic “wish for survival” common to all states (Waltz 2001, 203). Yet, if there is a conception of human nature at issue here, it is a very modest one. This is, actually, the assumption that makes intelligible a wide range of human activities. We strive to make safer cars, better medicines, and earthquake-resistant buildings on the assumption that people will generally prefer security and survival rather than danger and death. Human institutions, just like cars, medicines and buildings, can also be designed to promote the basic goals of security and survival. Both positive law, in the context of domestic politics, and the system of states as a whole, are institutions that clearly reflect the human quest for security and survival. Positive laws can certainly make our lives more secure in the context of states, where a powerful institution is in a position to enforce them. But in the context of interaction among states, the absence of such an institution means that states will have to rely upon themselves in order to promote the basic goals of security and survival.

Once we have understood how the structure of international relations often constrains actors operating within the structure to prefer war over peace, as well as conflict over cooperation and mistrust over trust, in situations in which everyone would be better-off by acting otherwise, we can ask more pertinent questions. In particular, we can ask ourselves whether, given the goals of security and survival in a world in which weapons of mass destructions are becoming so readily available, we would not have reasons to radically change this structure or even get rid of it. My intention here is not to propose a blueprint for the implementation of radical change in world politics. I simply intend to explain why this option is not incompatible with the realist approach, nor with the project of the moral enhancement of human beings. Quite the opposite: the idea of a “world state,” devoid of state borders and ruled by “supra-national institutions,” was perfectly in line with the original project of some human nature realists, although it eventually disappeared in the works of the so-called “neo-realists,” such as Waltz and Mearsheimer.

**VI.**

The suggestion that the system of states could one day be abolished might perhaps be dismissed as a far-fetched idea and, indeed, as wholly incompatible with political realism itself. For political realism presupposes the very existence of the system of states. Should the system of states ever disappear, political realism would fail to make any sense. It is not entirely clear, however, whether political realism must be understood as both a *descriptive* and a *prescriptive* theory. If political realism is both descriptive and prescriptive as a theory of the structure of the international relations, then the objection is justified. For one could not endorse political realism and, at the same time, prescribe the dissolution of the system of states as part of a solution to a range of problems to which some moral enhancements theorists rightly draw attention. But although some realists do advocate political realism on both descriptive and prescriptive grounds, it seems to me that we can coherently retain only the descriptive aspect of the theory. Consider, for instance, the following passage from Mearsheimer’s book *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*:

It should be apparent from this discussion that offensive realism is mainly a descriptive theory. It explains how great powers have behaved in the past and how they are likely to behave in the future. But it is also a prescriptive theory. States should behave according to the dictates of offensive realism, because it outlines the best way to survive in a dangerous world. (Mearsheimer 2001, 11)

Political realism, in my view, correctly describes the structure of the international relations in a world devoid of central government. The absence of an institution with the real power to enforce laws for mutual benefit on a global scale means that the states can only count on self-help in their attempts to guarantee their own security and survival. But if the survival of humankind in the future becomes threatened for some of the reasons to which moral enhancement theorists plausibly call attention, then abolishing the system of states, rather than following the “dictates of offensive realism,” may very well be the best prescription to follow.

#### Realism evolves to accommodate the international order and explains the factors of war.

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An unintended and unfortunate consequence of the debate about neorealism is that neorealism and a large part of its critique (with the notable exception of the English School) has been expressed in abstract scientific and philosophical terms. This has made the theory of international politics almost inaccessible to a layperson and has divided the discipline of international relations into incompatible parts. Whereas classical realism was a theory aimed at supporting diplomatic practice and providing a guide to be followed by those seeking to understand and deal with potential threats, today’s theories, concerned with various grand pictures and projects, are ill-suited to perform this task. This is perhaps the main reason why there has been a renewed interest in classical realism, and particularly in the ideas of Morgenthau. Rather than being seen as an obsolete form of pre-scientific realist thought, superseded by neorealist theory, his thinking is now considered to be more complex and of greater contemporary relevance than was earlier recognized (Williams 2007, 1–9). It fits uneasily in the orthodox picture of realism he is usually associated with.

In recent years, scholars have questioned prevailing narratives about clear theoretical traditions in the discipline of international relations. Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and other thinkers have become subject to re-examination as a means of challenging prevailing uses of their legacies in the discipline and exploring other lineages and orientations. Morgenthau has undergone a similar process of reinterpretation. A number of scholars (Hartmut Behr, Muriel Cozette, Amelia Heath, Sean Molloy) have endorsed the importance of his thought as a source of change for the standard interpretation of realism. Murielle Cozette stresses Morgenthau’s critical dimension of realism expressed in his commitment to “speak truth to power” and to “unmask power’s claims to truth and morality,” and in his tendency to assert different claims at different times (Cozette 10–12). She writes: “The protection of human life and freedom are given central importance by Morgenthau, and constitute a ‘transcendent standard of ethics’ which should always animate scientific enquiries” (19). This shows the flexibility of his classical realism and reveals his normative assumptions based on the promotion of universal moral values. While Morgenthau assumes that states are power-oriented actors, he at the same time acknowledges that international politics would be more pernicious than it actually is were it not for moral restraints and the work of international law(Behr and Heath 333).

Another avenue for the development of a realist theory of international relations is offered by Robert Gilpin’s seminal work *War and Change in World Politics*. If this work were to gain greater prominence in IR scholarship, instead of engaging in fruitless theoretical debates, we would be better prepared today “for rapid power shifts and geopolitical change ”(Wohlforth, 2011 505). We would be able to explain the causes of great wars and long periods of peace, and the creation and waning of international orders. Still another avenue is provided by the application of the new scientific discoveries to social sciences. The evidence for this is, for example, the recent work of Alexander Wendt, Quantum Mind and Social Science. A new realist approach to international politics could be based on the organic and holistic world view emerging from quantum theory, the idea of human evolution, and the growing awareness of the role of human beings in the evolutionary process (Korab-Karpowicz 2017).

Realism is thus more than a static, amoral theory, and cannot be accommodated solely within a positivist interpretation of international relations. It is a practical and evolving theory that depends on the actual historical and political conditions, and is ultimately judged by its ethical standards and by its relevance in making prudent political decisions (Morgenthau 1962). Realism also performs a useful cautionary role. It warns us against progressivism, moralism, legalism, and other orientations that lose touch with the reality of self-interest and power. Considered from this perspective, the neorealist revival of the 1970s can also be interpreted as a necessary corrective to an overoptimistic liberal belief in international cooperation and change resulting from interdependence.

#### Realism is a logically sound theory that explains and analyzes past behavior.

John J. Mearsheimer 06 an American political scientist and international relations scholar, who belongs to the realist school of thought. He is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago. He has been described as the most influential realist of his generation, 2006, “China’s Unpeaceful Rise,” Current History 105, no. 690 (April 2006): 160–2. [ML]

Can China rise peacefully? My answer is no. If China continues its impressive economic growth over the next few decades, the United States and China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war. Most of China’s neighbors—including India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Russia, and Vietnam—will join with the United States to contain China’s power.

To predict the future in Asia, one needs a theory of international politics that explains how rising great powers are likely to act and how other states in the system will react to them. That theory must be logically sound and it must account for the past behavior of rising great powers.

My theory of international politics says that the mightiest states attempt to establish hegemony in their region of the world while making sure that no rival great power dominates another region. This theory, which helps explain US foreign policy since the country’s founding, also has implications for future relations between China and the United States.

The contest for power

According to my understanding of international politics, survival is a state’s most important goal, because a state cannot pursue any other goals if it does not survive. The basic structure of the international system forces states concerned about their security to compete with each other for power. The ultimate goal of every great power is to maximize its share of world power and eventually dominate the system.

The international system has three defining characteristics. First, the main actors are states that operate in anarchy, which simply means that there is no higher authority above them. Second, all great powers have some offensive military capability, which means that they have the wherewithal to hurt each other. Third, no state can know the intentions of other states with certainty, especially their future intentions. It is simply impossible, for example, to know what Germany or Japan’s intentions will be toward their neighbors in 2025.

In a world where other states might have malign intentions as well as significant offensive capabilities, states tend to fear each other. That fear is compounded by the fact that in an anarchic system there is no night watchman for states to call if trouble comes knocking at their door. Therefore, states recognize that the best way to survive in such a system is to be as powerful as possible relative to potential rivals. The mightier a state is, the less likely it is that another state will attack it. No Americans, for example, worry that Canada or Mexico will attack the United States, because neither of those countries is powerful enough to contemplate a fight with Washington. But great powers do not merely strive to be the strongest great power, although that is a welcome outcome. Their ultimate aim is to be the hegemon—that is, the only great power in the system

## Framework

### 2AC---Not Monolithic

#### Securitization shouldn’t be a yes/no ethical question---you should evaluate our unique instance of action instead of blanket opposition against our AFF

Eric Van Rythoven 20, Eric is a professor of Political Science @ Carleton University, “The Securitization Dilemma,” Journal of Global Security Studies, 5(3), July 2020 <https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogz028> [\\pairie](file:///\\pairie)

A Tragic Vision of Securitization

Tragedy is largely absent from the existing normative debate on securitization. Instead, the debate has become organized around whether securitization is a “negative” or “positive” concept. In the classic formulation, the Copenhagen School points to how “[n]ational security should not be idealized. It works to silence opposition and has given power-holders many opportunities to exploit ‘threats’ for domestic purposes” (Buzan et al. 1998, 29; Williams 2003). Securitization has negative effects when it functions as “a political technology that consistently favors the interests of the powerful and enables violence and exclusion” (McDonald 2015, 154). Correspondingly, Wæver admits a “‘bias’ for desecuritization” or de-escalation, although he quickly notes that this is “not always better than securitization” (Wæver 2011, 469). At the same time, a number of approaches point to cases where securitization is ethically desirable. In her compelling consequentialist argument, for example, Floyd asks “whether the consequences of, and the gains from, the securitization are preferable relative to the consequences and gains from a politicization” (2007, 338). Relatedly, Roe contends that “the extent to which securitization necessitates a lack of openness and deliberation has been overexaggerated” and suggests it may even elicit unappreciated forms of cooperation (2012, 250).

The problem with the negative/positive debate is that it appears to impose moral certitude where there often is none. Registering securitizing moves as clearly positive or negative can be difficult because their effects can be mixed and temporally distant. The difficulty in making this determination may also be an indicator of the uncertainty surrounding securitizing moves. In the end, because the outcomes of security claims are uncertain, we cannot know in advance whether they will lead to positive or negative consequences. Instead, we should entertain a distinctly tragic vision of securitization that councils an ethic of self-limitation. The core of this tragic vision is a recognition that the powerful allure of using security talk to “gain control” over a situation will always be present (Wæver 1995, 54). However, we should also recognize that this control is always illusory because it presumes all of its effects can be predetermined. The tragedy of securitization is that the failure to recognize how contingency imposes limits on action lures political actors into a false sense of certainty and the conviction that they can determine the future. This leads to a hubristic adoption of “misplaced certainty,” such as when Vice President Dick Cheney declared in August of 2002 that “there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction” (quoted in Mitzen and Schweller 2011, 3). A similar situation emerged when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld subsequently claimed in November that the Iraq conflict could be “[f]ive days or five weeks or five months, but it certainly isn’t going to last any longer than that” (Esterbrook 2002). A similarly misplaced certainty is evident in US General Stanley McChrystal’s assurances to the Obama administration in 2009 that a surge in troops and resources were critical to stave off American defeat in Afghanistan (Woodward 2009). More recently, it is visible in President Donald Trump’s 2018 assertion that he was “100 percent right” on the weaknesses of the Iran nuclear deal (CNN 2018).

Yet, tragedy cuts both ways. Blanket opposition to securitizing moves can also have unanticipated effects. Ironically, the desecuritization of an issue may not just result in its repoliticization, but in its disappearance from public view (Floyd 2010, 57–58). Viewing security discourse as negative also underplays how the management of threats can serve as a focal point for democratic cooperation among different political actors (Roe 2012, 250, 257–58). The point is not that every security discourse and the practices it justifies has catastrophically perverse consequences. Instead, the goal is to highlight a sensible restraint over the limits of seeing into the future, how this shapes choice, and the dangers of hubris that follow. When properly adapted to this constructivist context, the tragic vision of securitization can be an important tool in cultivating prudence and restraint (cf. Lebow 2003, 364).

### 2AC – AT: Discourse

#### Discourse cannot explain sensory experience.

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At one level, Edwards et al. are right. Realists cannot prove there is a world beyond discourse if by prove we mean ‘demonstrate with absolute certainty’ as analytical philosophers have traditionally demanded. No one can absolutely prove, for example, that the world is not a figment of the imagination of some disembodied consciousness (that would have to be my consciousness of course, not yours, since I know that I can imagine the world!) But there would be something rather ironic about a group of self-proclaimed relativists who disown notions of absolute truth demanding that other people’s claims can only be justified by that standard. Nor does the argument work as an immanent critique of critical realists, as it might if we were ourselves committed to such a standard, because critical realists insist on the fallibility of all knowledge claims: the possibility that they might be wrong (e.g. Bhaskar 1986: 15). What we claim is that it is so overwhelmingly likely that the world ‘out there’ exists that we can take this as a firm working assumption. As Bruno Latour, a very different kind of realist, has said: “why burden this solitary mind with the impossible task of finding absolute certainty instead of plugging it into the connections that would provide it with all the relative certainties it needed to know and to act?” (1999: 12). To come to this conclusion, however, we must question the assertion that our only access to reality is through discourse. Banging on a table, for example, may well be an act that is given discursive employment, but it is not only a discursive act. The person striking the table feels its resistance, its solidity, and those present hear the thump. Although our ability to label or interpret that solidity or that noise as such depends on the possession of language and a personal history of discursive interaction, there is nevertheless a sensory experience that also occurs. If the realist were to try to bang on an illusion of a table, no such solidity would be experienced, and no such noise would occur to demonstrate the point.5 It is only because humans have some access to a sensory experience of reality that we can make the realists’ point by banging on a table, although making that point also requires a shared linguistic and discursive environment. And of course, we can move one step further away from the discursive case, as Harry Collins does, for example, when he discusses the case of stumbling accidentally against a rock. When such events occur, the experience of the rock’s solidity is not a discursive act at all, yet it is a sensory experience that gives us good evidence for the belief that there is a real material world in which we move. Edwards, Ashmore, and Potter reject such claims on the grounds that in making the claim we switch between the stumbling event to a discursive account (1995: 30). But this response is viable only if we accept the constructionist argument that language cannot refer beyond itself. This argument was criticised in Chapters 5 and 7, and also by John O’Neill in his reply to these authors: “That the argument is in language doesn’t entail that it is ‘trapped’ in language” (1995: 101). Furthermore (and this is a point to which I shall return in discussing neo-Kantianism), our conversations, our speech acts, our rhetoric themselves depend on such sensory experience. Speaking is transmitted as sound waves through the air; journal articles like ‘Death and Furniture’ only succeed in communicating to us if we can sense them as patterns on pieces of paper or computer screens (whether as patterns of black and white, or as raised marks). While it is not true that we can experience the material world only through discourse, it is the case that we can experience discourse only through the material world!

### 2AC---Security Discourse Good

#### If our impacts are true, Securitization is justified

Floyd 2019 (Rita Floyd, Security Studies at the University of Birmingham, “The Morality of Security” <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108667814.010>) //sethlee

In the process I have set forth eight principles determining just securitization. These principles are supposed to hold regardless of the origin of the threat, the nature of the referent object (i.e. the entity threatened and to be made safe by securitization) and the provider of security. In more detail I have argued that securitization is morally permissible only in the presence of a just cause which in turn is made up of an objective existential threat to a just referent object of security. Referent objects are just provided they satisfy basic human needs, specifically autonomy and physical health. I further insisted on a sincerity of intention condition, whereby the right intention for securitization is the just cause. Just initiation of securitization was complemented by a criterion specifying macroproportionality, which held that the expected good gained from securitization must be judged greater than expected harm from securitization. I further specified that just securitization needs to take account of the probable consequences of treating an issue in security mode. Specifically, securitization has to have a reasonable (i.e. greater than that of nonsecuritization alternatives) chance of succeeding in achieving the just cause. The second of the two research questions was discussed as part of the development of the principles designating just conduct during securitization. I argued that the security measures used must be appropriate for dealing with the threat in question, and not serve some ulterior motive. A second criterion was concerned with reducing harm as much as possible; I argued that while the nature of the security measures differs according to the source of the threat, as well as the nature of the referent object, securitizing actors must consider the harm caused by the measures, and aim to choose the least overall harmful option available. In addition, I argued that securitization is unjust if the measures used are more harmful to the referent object than the threat they seek to solve. A third and final criterion specified just conduct of executors of securitization, including security professionals. I argued that although securitization necessarily involves the infringement of some human rights, executors of securitization should when they – as part of securitization – harm people be appropriately constraint those people’s rights to life, freedom from torture and arbitrary detention. Like recent versions of the just war theory, JST goes beyond theorizing simply the moral permissibility of securitization. Instead, it also considers the issue of just termination of securitization. In JST, desecuritization is conceptualized as a process (not an outcome) that occurs (in time) after securitization. This has meant that unlike securitization, which in JST remains a political choice decided by securitizing actors, not scholars, desecuritization is obligatory for actors who are remedially responsible for unmaking the preceding securitization, either on the basis of outcome responsibility or by connection. Although securitization and desecuritization are then interrelated processes, in JST the justice of one is judged independently of the justice of the other. In other words, an unjust desecuritization does not render a just securitization unjust and vice versa. JST specifies three principles of just desecuritization, concerning 1) the timing when desecuritization must ensue (notably, I have argued that a securitization can remain just only for as long as there is a just cause); 2) the dismantling of the security measures taken, as well as the reversal of security language; and 3) a series of restorative measures aimed at reducing the possibility of renewed and/or reactionary securitization. In addition to providing criteria determining the justice of securitization and desecuritization, the wider research argument also revealed a number of difficult issues such as that of the moral culpability of executors of securitization who have followed the rules of just securitization, but who have acted in securitizations that were unjustly initiated (Chapter 6, section 6.6). Or the question of whether just desecuritizing actors who played no part in securitization have fewer restorative responsibilities than desecuritizing actors culpable of unjust preceding securitization (Chapter 7, section 7.9), or the issue of whether securitization and a relevant counter-securitization can be just at the same time (Chapter 6, section 6.7). I have in this book advanced answers to these and other difficult questions, but I recognize that more can and needs to be said on all of them, as well as on all of the substantive principles advanced. Beyond contributing to security studies, this book also contributes to the just war tradition. This is especially the case because some just war theorists are increasingly interested in wars that do not involve kinetic force, and as such, phenomena that may be called securitization. By thinking about what the just war tradition’s criteria mean for securitization, JST speaks to just war theorists interested in these softer versions of war. I have mentioned on more than one occasion on the preceding pages that the argument is conceived as very much a first word on just securitization. I hope that other scholars will devise theories of just securitization of their own volition. This is important because I believe that research on the principles of just securitization has more than just the potential to impact positively on the scholarly study of security and/or on the decisions and actions of practitioners. Beyond that it could – provided the idea of just securitization becomes widely known, which, in turn, is likely to happen only if just securitization becomes a research area in its own right – equip the public with tools to question the ethics of the decision to securitize including the security measures used and thus hold security practitioners accountable. In other words, the long-desired (in some parts of critical security studies) goal of emancipation can quite conceivably be achieved through just securitization. The room for competing theories of just securitization is vast. One reason for this is that my interpretation of securitization is only one among many possible interpretations of the concept. For example, a theory of just securitization that theorizes securitization as an intersubjective process and focuses on audience acceptance of the speech act as pivotal would look quite different to the principles proposed as part of JST. Among other things, such a theory of just securitization would have to focus on ethical language, that is, on what kind of things securitizing actors are allowed to utter when it comes to securitizing speech acts, while they would also have to focus on what kind of audiences make ideal ethical adjudicators of the speech act and other new issues besides. Another reason for the open-endedness of just securitization research is that JST focuses only on the circumstances when securitization is morally permissible, when it is equally valid and important to ask: when, if ever, is securitization morally required? A theory of just securitization that prioritizes the obligation to securitize is bound to be quite different from JST. Unlike JST, its objective would not be to reduce the number of securitizations in the world, but to use the mobilization power inherent to securitization to achieve security as a state of being. With this in mind, potential advocates of such a theory might utilize a scalar as opposed to a categorical approach to principles of just securitization (e.g. one where not all principles advanced as part of such a theory have to be met all of the time), largely to facilitate the ease with which securitization can take place. Theories of just securitization that focus on moral obligation could differ widely from one another depending on whether their proponents broadly concurred with cosmopolitan/global or communitarian/statist ethics. Moreover, theories of just securitization could also derive their inspiration from virtue ethics, and, for example, devise principles that determine what makes for a virtuous securitizing actor. Theories of just securitization could supposedly also take a permissive view of the justice of securitization and seek to develop principles that specify the circumstances when securitization is forbidden. In future, just securitization research also needs to engage with the issue of what can reasonably be expected of security practitioners when it comes to the issue of ethics and security.1 These concluding remarks show that there is huge potential for research in the area of just securitization. In fact the diversity and thus potential for just securitization research is such that it could become a meta-theoretical framework organizing thinking on ethics and security in general, in the same way as thinking about the morality of war is systematized by the just war tradition. Whatever happens in terms of just securitization research from here on in, this book has shown not only that questions concerning the morality of security ought to be taken seriously by anyone interested in the study and/or practice of security but also that clear and systematic answers are possible.

#### Security Discourse within the debate space does shape reality, but also shapes specific policy solutions which are critical to decision making.

Kronfeld 2018 (Melissa Jane Kronfeld, PhD Candidate at Rutgers University in Global Affairs, “The Construction and Prioritization of Threats in the Post-Cold War Era and the Evolution of American National Security Policy”, [https://rucore.libraries.rutgers.edu/rutgers-lib/57350/PDF/1/play/) /](https://rucore.libraries.rutgers.edu/rutgers-lib/57350/PDF/1/play/)%20/)/sethlee

A crisis is defined as an unstable or crucial time period, or state of affairs, in which a decisive change is impending, or a time when a difficult or important decision must be made. Discourse is defined, in its most basic form, as a written or spoken form of communication. In the context of culture, discourse is defined as a mode of organizing knowledge, ideas, or experience that is rooted in language and its concrete contexts. Balzacq notes that using discourse, or discursive action is, “compelling power to cause a receiver or the audience to perform a deed.” He adds, “through mutual knowledge, discourse shapes social relations and builds their form and content… [and] on the causative sides, as vehicle of ideas, discourse targets and creates the instantiation of a particular communicative action. For the purposes of this research, crisis discourse is defined by the rhetorical practices employed in order to construct threats as clear and present, and requiring immediate action or resolution. In the tradition of frame analysis, advanced by David Snow and Robert Benford, or in the tradition of William Sewell’s “schemas” and Swidler’s “tool kit”, crisis discourse provides the behavioral rules and linguistic structure, as well as the repertoire of social and political practices that enables an agent or actor to act upon structures to manifest transformation. Borrowing from Snow et al. and Goffman, I define a frame as a, “‘schemata of interpretation’ that enable individuals to ‘locate, perceive, identify, and label’ occurrences within their life space and the world at large. By rending events or occurrences meaningful, frames function to organize experience and guide action.” Robert Entman adds that framing denotes the selection or emphasis on, “some facets of events or issues and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation and/or solution.” It is therefore necessary for prioritization. I define crisis discourse as characterized by 1) the identification of a threat as a hazard to the current state of affairs, or existence of a group of individuals (i.e. community, state, or way of life); 2) constructing a threat as the cause, or existing as a critical part, of a given situation in which change is impending and will significantly impact the future course of events; and 3) the framing of a solution(s) in response to the threat, as a byproduct of the identification and construction of the threat. This is particularly important when threats are clear or present because, Daniel Kahneman and Jonathan Renshon note, hawkish biases are more persuasive where conflict is, or perceived as being, more likely. Crisis discourse is critical because political culture, and its effects on institutional decision making, are best exemplified by the discourse used to frame a threat. As Deva Woodly notes, “communication matters, because changing public discourse, changes power relations, and altered power relations change politics – the principles and policy that are at stake in the struggle over who shall govern and how.” She add the “critical battleground” for change is political discourse, where “political issues take on popular meaning and affect the common-sense understanding.” Discourse can, “advance particular interests [and] to actually change politics itself, rewriting the common understandings present in the discursive field upon which political possibilities are considered and wherein binding decision are made.” As Holland notes, “9/11 generated a discursive void as the events could not be subsumed into existing foreign policy discourse. However, 9/11, in and of itself, was not a crisis. Initially unregulated but discourse, the ‘events’ did not mean anything for certain. Instead 9/11 became a crisis through a process of discursive construction, which reinstated ‘politics’ over ‘the political.’ Crises… are constructed.”

### 2AC---Security Discourse Good (Biological Weapons)

#### Securitization of biological weapons as an ex-risk is good and necessary – modern securitization theory agrees

Patrick Saunders-Huntings 14, epidemiologist risk scientist working with Accenture, January 8th, 2014, <https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/45317>\\iris

2. Securitization Theory and Biological Weapons

Securitization theory is a constructivist approach informing how certain issues become framed through a security lens6 . It offers a useful analytical framework for understanding how, why, and what issues come to be viewed as security threats. Securitization is an active process wherein a securitizing actor, in this case the American government, presents and addresses an issue as an existential threat to a particular group, or referent object7 . In these situations, emergency response measures and extensive resource commitments are considered justified7 . Securitization theory generally promotes desecuritization as preferable because it avoids the negative consequences of securitization, including a heavy-handed state response, reduced democratic accountability, and the narrowing of public choice8 . However, it also recognizes that securitization is sometimes appropriate. Recent considerations of securitization theory identify three criteria that, if fulfilled, justify securitization: an objective, existential threat, a referent object whose protection promotes human well-being, and a response appropriately measured to the particular threat6 .

In the case of bioweapons securitization, the second criterion is less controversial, given that the referent object is human population; thus, any harm to the referent object would directly reduce a human well-being. However, the question of whether securitization of biological weapons meets the other two criteria is more contentious. Skeptics may point to Colin Powell’s 2003 address to the United Nations as a case where the biological weapons security threat may have been exaggerated and securitization was promoted for political ends, thereby calling into question the legitimacy of the securitizing actor, the U.S. government. In his speech, Powell made the case for an invasion of Iraq by claiming Iraq had capabilities to produce biological weapons of mass destruction, including mobile bioweapons labs, a claim that later turned out to be false9.

Critics also target the policies resulting from securitization, arguing that the capacity of aggressors to carry out large scale attacks causing mortality has been overestimated, calling into question whether an existential threat truly exists and whether the response has been appropriately measured10. Government funding may be seen as unjustifiably skewed in favour of biodefense, defined as the capacity to respond to a biological weapons attack, to the neglect of other key areas, such as endemic and pandemic diseases. For instance, Klotz calculated what is referred as the “likelihood-adjusted mortality” for biological weapons, pandemic diseases, and endemic diseases by multiplying the probability of occurrence by an estimate of mortality were an event to occur11. By comparing these values with government funding allocated to each category, he demonstrated that biodefense receives more funding than its likelihood-adjusted mortality estimate would suggest is warranted11 .

However, objections have been raised to this argument. Supporters of biodefense prioritization point to the fact that focusing solely on potential fatalities ignores other issues, such as the negative social and economic fallout from an attack12. Additionally, they point to the possibility that it is more expensive to combat intentional threats, where there will be an explicit effort to circumvent current practices by exploiting weaknesses12. It should also be considered that the probability of one attack is not independent from another, and that an increasing probability of success may elicit more attempts12. To follow will be an examination of whether government spending and policies constitute a justified response to the threat of biological weapons. Securitization is relevant in that it was a way for decision-makers to implement the policies they want and is justifiable to the extent that the programs themselves are necessary and appropriate. Despite other consequences of securitization, such as public fear, political manipulation, and a heavyhanded response, which may give the impression of an overreaction, the reality is that securitization was a means of enabling the implementation of certain policies and programs necessary to respond to the threat of biological weapons.

3. Consequences of an Attack

A government’s decision to securitize an issue is a strategy to make extreme responses seem justified, and it centers on the perceived existential risk a threat poses to the population7 . Beginning with a brief history of biological weapons use, this section will aim to defend the framing of biological weapons use as an existential threat by examining their E-International Relations ISSN 2053-8626 Page 2/10 Securitization Theory and Biological Weapons Written by Patrick Saunders-Hastings ability to cause mortality or to generate negative social and economic fallout. A brief discussion of the potential catastrophic consequences of a smallpox attack will illustrate the argument.

The use of biological weapons dates back centuries. Examples include the Tatars catapulting plague-infected corpses over city walls at the siege of Kaffa in the 14th century, the deliberate triggering of a smallpox epidemic among Native Americans via contaminated blankets in the 18th century during the French and Indian War, and the contamination of salad bars with salmonella at a restaurant in Oregon in the 20th century2 . However, with the development of the germ theory during the 19th and into the 20th century, there was an increase in scientific knowledge about biological weapons10. States became increasingly interested in such weapons, with Japan establishing a bioweapons program between 1932-1945, the United States in 1942, and the Soviet Union in 197313 . In 1972, in response to increasing concern about the threat of biological weapons, the United Nations proposed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction , more commonly known as the Biological Weapons Convention (or BWC)14 . The treaty came into effect in 1975, and banned the development, acquisition, and stockpiling of biological weapons1 . However, it failed to halt the research and development of biological weapons, which have continued into the 21st century.

Those who argue that government response to the biological weapons threat has been overstated point to very low mortality in previous attacks11. The anthrax attacks of 2001 in the United States, for example, resulted in only 5 deaths15. This argument could be used to urge governments to instead invest resources in areas that consistently cause higher mortality, such as infectious diseases like AIDS or even the seasonal flu. However, in carrying out a threat assessment, it is also important to look at the potential for mortality. Here it has been suggested future attacks may not be on the same relatively small scale as those in the past15. It is difficult to produce reliable estimates of fatalities that might result from an attack; there is huge variation in estimates and, often, little statistical evidence to support the predictions11. That said, it is agreed that, in theory, even small amounts of a dangerous biological agent could cause significant mortality if prepared and disseminated effectively16. For instance, the WHO estimates that 50kg of B. anthracis distributed upwind of a population of 500 000 would leave 95 000 people dead and 125 000 more incapacitated17. Other sources suggest that 100kg of B. anthracis, disseminated via a crop-sprayer, could kill as many as three million people, and comparable values have been projected for other agents2,18. Another concern is that a contagious biological agent will result in person-to-person transmission, creating a self-sustaining effect not present in any other weapons class10 .

While mass casualties are possible, it is also important to note that, even in situations with few casualties, biological weapons attacks may have profound social and economic ramifications3 . Such attacks could lead to widespread social panic and disorder, resulting in self-destructive behaviour and creating what is called a “societal autoimmune effect” involving increases in crime and looting19. While there is little evidence to predict this would occur based on previous disaster situations (such as the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in 1993 and 2001, where the public reaction is described as effective and adaptive, rather than panicked and disruptive), it must remain a consideration20. The effects of a largescale attack involving biological weapons are unknown, and epidemics of highly fatal diseases may cause serious social disruption20 .

The economic consequences of biological weapons attacks are severe and suggest that investing in defense makes good economic sense. While there were only five deaths in the 2001 anthrax attacks, those attacks resulted in tens of billions of dollars in government spending21. Also, the financial sector may be negatively impacted if investor confidence plummets3 . Similarly, an attack on the agricultural sector, which accounts for 15% of the United States GDP, could have severe economic ramifications3 . If the biological agent being used is contagious, there could also be implications for trade and travel restrictions3 . The SARS epidemic of 2003 showed the economic consequences of a highly infectious disease, essentially ~~“crippling~~”[killing] some of the most dynamic cities in the world4 . The Center for Biosecurity has estimated the economic cost of a biological weapons attack in the U.S. could exceed one trillion USD15. In short, there are social and economic consequences that, considered in conjunction with the potential for catastrophically high mortality, justify the framing of biological weapons as a significant existential threat to the United States. This is illustrated by considering the specific case of smallpox.

The Variola virus, which causes smallpox, is an example of an agent that, if weaponized and used in an attack, would pose a serious existential threat to the United States22. It is highly contagious; in a 1972 outbreak in Yugoslavia, even with routine vaccinations, which are no longer carried out, the disease spread rapidly, with each affected individual infecting 11 to 13 others23. It is also lethal, with a 30% fatality rate1 . Human populations are highly susceptible because, since eradication, vaccinations have not been given for 20 years24. Other features make smallpox an appealing option for bioterrorism: it has no treatment once symptoms occur; it would not be detected for 7-17 days; it is physically disfiguring; and the virus is stable in aerosol form1,24. Perhaps the most problematic aspect of smallpox is that those infected are contagious before symptoms appear. Simulations have been carried out, including a 1999 exercise by the Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies at Johns Hopkins University, where a terrorist release of Variola virus grew into a global outbreak, which the health and emergency response system was unable to control22 . Here it could be suggested that prevention efforts promoted by securitization are the only option, given the apparent inability to contain a global outbreak after an attack has occurred. While the dangers posed by the Variola virus are not contested, skeptics argue that it is too difficult to acquire to be a real danger10. However, there is significant concern over unaccounted Soviet Union smallpox samples, and a 1999 U.S. report pointed to evidence that secret stockpiles of the virus are held by North Korea, Russia, and Iraq1,25. It has also been suggested that the terrorist organization Aum Shinrikyo holds quantities of the Variola virus22 .

Threat and risk assessments should not rely solely on the worst-case scenarios of biological weapons attacks, especially since practical challenges still limit terrorists’ ability to conduct attacks that will have the greatest possible effect. However, it is equally crucial to be aware of the wide range of consequences of such an attack. This section has argued that there could be serious ramifications on several dimensions, ramifications which justify the framing of biological weapons as an existential threat to the United States and warrant investment in an appropriate response capacity. Securitization, therefore, played an important role encouraging policy responses that were justified and appropriate.

### 2AC – AT: Securitizing structural violence bad

#### Securitization is morally permissible if the threat is objectively existential --- proven by justified responses to white supremacy’s existential risk

Jessica Wolfendale 22, professor of Philosophy at Marquette University, 03/08/2022, “White Supremacy as an Existential Threat: A Response to Rita Floyd’s The Morality of Security: A Theory of Just Securitization”, European Journal of International Security /lg

Rita Floyd’s The Morality of Security: A Theory of Just Securitization is an important and insightful book that delineates a theory of just securitisation (modified from the jus ad bellum and jus in bello criteria in just war theory) involving three sets of principles governing the just initiation of securitisation, just conduct of securitisation, and just desecuritisation. This book is a much needed addition to the security studies and just war scholarship.

Here, I explore the potential of Floyd’s just securitisation theory (JST) to provide insights into the moral justifiability of non-state groups that are not political entities engaging in resistance against forms of structural violence that pose an existential threat to those groups. Using the case study of the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement and the threat of white supremacy to African Americans as an illustrative example, I argue that structural forms of violence can meet Floyd’s definition of an objective existential threat, justifying the resort to securitisation by groups such as BLM. As Floyd writes in chapter 5:

non-state actors are permitted to [securitize issues normally under the state’s jurisdiction], and thus effectively defy the state, when states fail to do their duty to protect against an objective existential threat … this allows non-state actors to securitize against those unjust regimes that pose objective existential threats to non-state groups within states.38

In section 1, I argue that Floyd’s analysis of non-state groups leaves open the possibility that loosely organised protest groups such as BLM may constitute a non-state group for the purposes of applying Floyd’s just securitisation framework. In section 2, I argue that white supremacy poses an objective existential threat to African Americans, meeting the criterion of just cause in Floyd’s JST. The multilayered ways in which white supremacy creates an objective existential threat to African Americans illustrates the potential of Floyd’s conception of an objective existential threat to offer insights into the impact of other forms of structural violence, such as entrenched sexism. In section 3, I show that, despite the gains of the civil rights movement, the threat of white supremacy has not been curtailed through legal reform or by democratic means. Thus, groups like BLM may be justified in resorting to extraordinary measures to combat the ongoing threat of white supremacy, including ‘whatever most reasonable persons would agree constitutes exceptional means and actions … non-state securitization can take the form of secession, civil disobedience, acts of sabotage and resistance.’ 39 Applying Floyd’s JST to the threat of white supremacy thereby demonstrates the value of her approach for thinking about securitisation outside the traditional foci of security studies but, as I discuss in section 3, also reveals some limitations in her theory, particularly in relation to the criterion of reasonable chance of success when applied to non-state groups resisting an unjust state.

1. Does Black Lives Matter constitute a non-state group?

Floyd does not explicitly define the kinds of non-state groups that could, in principle, engage in securitisation. On p. 61 she writes that, according to Copenhagen School, ‘sufficiently organized societal groupings united by a strong enough “‘we’ identity” … can revert to a course of conduct that can only be described as securitization’. The Copenhagen School included ‘nations, religion and racial groups’ 40 in ‘societal groupings’. However, in a footnote, Floyd notes that many security scholars now hold that ‘other − smaller − non-state securitizing actors than those who can cement a large enough we-feeling are now a possibility’, 41 suggesting that a shared identity is not required in order for a non-state actor to engage in securitisation. But it appears that Floyd agrees with the Copenhagen School that non-state groups need to be ‘sufficiently organized’ to engage in securitisation, although she does not define this term.

In her book, Floyd discusses organised and relatively small groups such as the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society and Arizona Border Recon,42 but does not discuss broad protest movements such as BLM. That said, there are two reasons to think that BLM can fit her conception of a nonstate group. Firstly, while some might object that the Black Lives Matter movement does not have legitimate or representative authority to engage in securitisation on behalf of African Americans, Floyd explicitly rejects the criterion of representative authority in her theory of just securitisation,43 and so BLM does not need to claim to represent (or be viewed as representing) the interests of all African Americans in order for it to constitute a non-state group for the purposes of applying her framework.44 Secondly, while BLM is diverse in its strategies and has a loose organisational structure, it supports and facilitates organised action across the United States and elsewhere to protect the interests of African Americans. As the BLM website states: ‘Black Lives Matter Global Network Foundation, Inc. is a global organization in the US, UK, and Canada, whose mission is to eradicate white supremacy and build local power to intervene in violence inflicted on Black communities by the state and vigilantes.’ 45 These factors are sufficient, I argue, for BLM to constitute a non-state group for the purposes of evaluating the possibility of just securitisation.

2. Is white supremacy an existential threat to African Americans?

In Floyd’s theory, just initiation of securitisation by a non-state group requires a just cause: ‘an objective existential threat to a referent object, that is to say a danger that – with a sufficiently high probability – threatens the survival or the essential character/properties of either a political or social order, an ecosystem, a non-human species, or individual.’ 46 Existential threats include ‘all those things that threaten basic human needs, which when met, enable humans to live minimally decent lives’. 47 Does white supremacy pose an existential threat to African Americans?

The term ‘white supremacy’ does not simply refer to individuals’ racist beliefs. Rather, as Charles Mills explains, white supremacy ‘is a political system, a particular power structure of formal or informal rule, socioeconomic privilege, and norms for the differential distribution of material wealth and opportunities, benefits and burdens, rights and duties’. 48 In a system of white supremacy, whiteness confers social, material, and political advantages on white-identified people at the expense of the welfare and interests of non-white persons: ‘From slavery, federal land grants … through differential access to education, job opportunities, white markets, union membership, and equal wages and promotion chances to ghettoization, restrictive covenants, redlining, white flights, and differential allocation of resources to schools and neighborhoods, whites have historically been materially advantaged over nonwhites, particularly blacks.’ 49

The concept of white supremacy thus captures the ways in which interconnected set of practices, norms, and institutions (social, legal, political) privilege white identity and negatively structure the lives of African Americans (and other people of colour) regardless of the specific intentions of the individuals involved. So defined, white supremacy is embedded within multiple formal and informal institutional and social structures that affect all aspects of life for African Americans, including (but not limited to) the education system, the criminal justice system, and the healthcare system.50

But it is one thing to say that white supremacy systematically disadvantages African Americans; it is quite another to claim that it poses an existential threat to African Americans. Below, by applying Floyd’s threat categories to the examples of the criminal justice system and the healthcare system I show that white supremacy creates agent-intended threats (‘where an aggressor is at the source of the threat intent on harming’),51 agent-caused threats (where ‘an actor’s behaviour leads to a threat to someone else … without the actor intending to do harm’),52 and exacerbates the harm of agent-lacking threats (‘threats that occur irrespective of human agency’).53 The combined impact of these threats on the ability of African Americans to live minimally decent lives is, I argue, sufficient to meet the definition of an existential threat.